Judgment This criminal revision, by a private party (P.W.2) is directed against acquittal of respondents 1 to 10, by the Judicial First Class Magistrate. Devakottai. in C.C. 39 of 1977, of offences under Ss.120-B, 419, 420, 468 and 471, I.P.C., and S.82(c) and (d) of the Indian Registration Act, on the ground that since some of the offences come within the purview of S.195(1)(b)(ii), Crl.P.C, the trial Court ought not to have taken cognizance of the same, without a Complaint from the concerned court, as required under the above section. 2. Facts briefly are - The petitioner, by name Rakkammal, on 13.8.1944 under the original of Ex.P2, othied certain items of property in favour of the first respondent. On 8.6.1945 under the original of Ex.P1, she othied certain other items of property in favour of one Ariya Muthu, who is father of respondents 2 and 3 herein. The lands continued to be in the possession of the respective mortgagees. In May, 1974, the petitioner approached respondents 1 to 3 (Ariya Muthu having died and respondents 2 and 3 having succeeded him) for redeeming the mortgages. Respondents 1 to 3 however demanded that the petitioner should execute sale deeds in their favour and that they were agreeable for purchasing the property. The petitioner was not willing to sell the properties. She therefore, on 8.8.1974 filed O.S. No.333 of 1974 in the court of District Munsif at Paramakudi against respondents 2 and 3 for redemption of the mortgage. On 9.8.1974, she filed O.S. No.330 of 1974, against the first respondent therein, for redemption of the mortgage in his favour. Meantime she came to know that the respondents 1 to 10 have conspired together and on 24.7.1974 and 25.7.1974 respondents 1 to 10 with the 6th respondent impersonating the petitioner had brought into existence, two registered sale deeds, the originals of Ex.P3 and P4 purporting to be executed by her in favour of respondents 1 and 2 respectively. She therefore, on 12.8.1974, made a Complaint about the above facts before the District Registrar. Sivaganga, who in turn, forwarded the same to the Registrar of Kalaiyarkoil, who prepared a Complaint Ex.P20, and sent it to the Sub-Inspector of Police, Kalaiyarkoil. Ex.P20 was registered as Crime No.193 of 1974 of Kalaiyarkoil Police Station, for offences under Ss.419, 420 and 467, I.P.C. 3. The fifth respondent is the son of the first respondent. Sivaganga, who in turn, forwarded the same to the Registrar of Kalaiyarkoil, who prepared a Complaint Ex.P20, and sent it to the Sub-Inspector of Police, Kalaiyarkoil. Ex.P20 was registered as Crime No.193 of 1974 of Kalaiyarkoil Police Station, for offences under Ss.419, 420 and 467, I.P.C. 3. The fifth respondent is the son of the first respondent. 6th respondent is the wife of the first respondent. Respondents 2 and 3 who are brothers, are the sons of Ariya Muthu. Respondents 7 and 8 had attested the sale deed. Ex.P3 Respts. 7 and 9 had attested Ex.P4 sale deed 10th respondent is the scribe of the original of Exs.P3 and P4. The fourth respondent is the village Karnam, who is a friend of respondents 1 to 3, and who on 28.7.1974 on the basis of Exs.P3 and P4 recommended change of the Patta in the name of respondents 1 and 2. During the investigation, the police took thumb impressions from the petitioner and from the 6th respondent and also took the thumb impression found in the thumb impression book maintained in the office of the Sub-Registrar of Kalaiyarkoil of the executant of original of Exs.Pl and P2 and also the executant of the originals of Exs.P3 and P4. The questioned prints, as well as the specimen prints, were sent to the Finger Print Expert, P.W.6 who on Comparison, gave his opinion that the finger prints found in the finger print book relating to the originals of Exs.P1 and P2 tallied with the finger print of the petitioner, that the finger prints of the executant of the original of Ex.P3 and P4 as-found in the Finger Print Book relating to Ex.P3 and P4 did not tally with the finger prints of the petitioner, but tallied with the finger prints of the 6th respondent herein thereby revealing that the two sale deed original of Ex.P3 and P4 had not been executed by the petitioner herein who was the executant of the originals of Ex.P1 and P2, but had really been executed by the 6th respondent herein. Charge-sheet was filed against respondents 1 to 10 for offences under Ss,120B, 419, 420, 467, 468 and 471.I.P.C., and S.82(c) and (d) of the Indian Registration Act. The trial court took the case on file, for the above offences and proceeded with the trial. 4. Charge-sheet was filed against respondents 1 to 10 for offences under Ss,120B, 419, 420, 467, 468 and 471.I.P.C., and S.82(c) and (d) of the Indian Registration Act. The trial court took the case on file, for the above offences and proceeded with the trial. 4. Meantime, respondents 1 to 3 in the respective suits filed written statements contending that Rakkammal who was the executant of the mortgages under the original of Ex.Pl and P2 was not really the petitioner herein, but some other Rakkammal and that from that other Rakkammal, they obtained the sale deeds under the original of Ex.P3 and P4 and that therefore the petitioner was not entitled to redeem the mortgages. The originals of Ex.P3 and P4 were produced by respondents 1 to 3 in court. The District Munsif before whom the above suits were pending, through his staff (examined as P.W.8 in the criminal trial) took specimen finger prints of the petitioner, which on his requisition to the State Finger Print Bureau was Compared, by two experts (examined in the criminal trial as P.Ws.9 and 11 with the finger prints of the executant found in the original of Ex.P3 and P4. The Assistant Public Prosecutor filed a memo in the criminal court that additional evidence should be received and on the memo being ordered PWs.8, 9 and 11, were examined as additional witnesses, to corroborate P.W.6. 5. In the trial Court, on behalf of the prosecution, P.Ws.1 to 17 were examined, and Ex.P1 to P40 were marked. M.Os.1 to 20 were produced. 6. When questioned under S.313, Crl.P.C, respondents 1 to 10 in general terms denied the offence. They had no oral evidence to offer. Ex.D1 was marked on their side. 7. The trial Court without going into the evidence recorded and the truth or falsity of the allegations, acquitted the accused on the ground that the original of Ex.P3 and P4 had been produced before the District Munsif, Parmakudi in O.S.Nos 330 and 333 of 1974 and that therefore the offences, if any, committed with reference to Ex.P3 and P4 came within the purview of S.195(i)(b)(ii) and (iii), Crl.P.C, and that the criminal court ought not to have taken cognizance of the case, in the absence of a Complaint by the civil court, as required under S.195, Crl.P.C. Reliance was placed upon a decision of this Court reported in Narasimhamoorthy, In re, A.I.R 1955 Mad. 237: (1954) 1 M.L.J. 650 : 1954 M.W.N.231: 1954 M.W.N. (Crl) 55; for holding that the cognizance initially taken by him was illegal. Challenging the legality of the acquittal P.W.2 has preferred the present revision. The State has not chosen to file any appeal. 8. Thiru R.N. Kothandaraman, the learned counsel for the petitioner, contended that the trial Court was in error in holding that the offences came within the purview of Ss.195(1)(b)(ii) and (iii) in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Patel Lal-jibhai v. State of Gujarat, 1974 L.W.(Crl.) 114:A.I.R 1971 S.C.1935, which had been reaffirmed in the later decisions of the Supreme Court in Raughunath and others v. State of U.P. and others, A.I.R.1973 S.C.1100: (1973) 1 S.C.C.864: (1973) S.C.C.(Crl.) 448 and State of Karnataka v. Hemareddi, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1417, holding that where the offences had already been committed by the accused, before they became parties to the proceedings, the same would not be covered by S.195 (1) (b) and that though these decisions had been rendered prior to the amendment of the Criminal Procedure Code in 1974, the amendment as such, did not unsettle this position of law and that therefore the trial Court, ought to have followed the above decisions to hold that S.195(1)(b)(ii) and (iii) would not apply to the facts of the case. 9. Per contra, Thiru R. Gandhi, learned counsel for respondents 1 to 10 contended that the above decisions of the Supreme Court, having been rendered prior to the amendment of the Criminal Procedure Code in 1974, would not apply subsequent to the amendment. The learned counsel contended that in view of the fact, that the documents had been produced in the Civil Court and a finding on its genuineness was bound to be rendered by the Civil Court, the criminal Court could not take cognisance of the offence, without a Complaint by the Civil Court which could be given after the conclusion of the civil suits. 10. The question that arises for consideration is whether the amendment introduced to S.195, Crl.P.C, would unsettle the law laid down in Patel Laljibhai v. State of Gujarat, 1974 L.W (Crl.) 114: A.I.R. 1971 S.C.1935, and re-affirmed in Raghunath and others v. State of UP and others, A.I.R1973 S.C.1100, and State of Karnataka v. Hemareddi, A.I.R. 1981 S.C.1417. 11. 10. The question that arises for consideration is whether the amendment introduced to S.195, Crl.P.C, would unsettle the law laid down in Patel Laljibhai v. State of Gujarat, 1974 L.W (Crl.) 114: A.I.R. 1971 S.C.1935, and re-affirmed in Raghunath and others v. State of UP and others, A.I.R1973 S.C.1100, and State of Karnataka v. Hemareddi, A.I.R. 1981 S.C.1417. 11. An extract of the relevant provisions of the Code, as they stood prior to the amendment in 1974 and as they now stand, would be conductive to a better appreciation of the legal position involved,S.195(1) (of the old Code): - "No Court shall take cognisance ... (a) and (b)... (c) of any offence described in S.463 or punishable under Ss.471, 475 or S.476 of the same Code, when such offence is alleged to have been committed by a party to any proceedings in any court in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in such proceedings, except on the Complaint in writing of such court, or of some other court, to which such court is subordinate." -(the emphasis supplied by this Court.) 195 (1) (of the new Code) (a) No Court shall take cognisance – (a) and (b) (i) ...... (ii) of an offence described in S.463, or punishable under Ss.470. 475 or S.476 of the said Code, when such offence is alleged to have been committed in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in proceedings in any court." It is significant that the only change that has bee brought about by the amendment, is the omission of the words ‘by a party to any proceeding in any court’. It has therefore to he seen as to whether, by deleting the above words, the Legislature intended to bring about a change in the law, as settled by the Supreme Court prior to the amendment. 12. The procedure that is laid down when a court acts under S.195, Crl. P.C., as found in S.340, Crl. P.C. is also relevant to the issue. S.340, Crl. P.C, is as follows: "340. 12. The procedure that is laid down when a court acts under S.195, Crl. P.C., as found in S.340, Crl. P.C. is also relevant to the issue. S.340, Crl. P.C, is as follows: "340. Procedure in cases mentioned in S.195 -When upon an application made to it in this behalf or otherwise, any Court is of opinion that it is expedient" in the interests of justice that any inquiry should be made into any offence referred to in Cl.(b) as sub-S.(1) of S.195 which appears to have been committed in or in relation to a proceeding in that court or, as the case may be, in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in that court, such court may, after such preliminary inquiry, if any, as it thinks necessary-(a) record a finding to that effect; (b) make a Complaint thereof in writing; (c) sent it to a Magistrate of the first class having jurisdiction; (d) take sufficient security for the appearance of the accused before such Magistrate, or if the alleged offence is non-bailable and court thinks it necessary so to do, send the accused in custody to such Magistrate; and (e) bind over any person to appear and give evidence before such Magistrate. (2) The power conferred on a court by sub-S.(1) in respect of an offence may in any case where that court has neither made a Complaint under sub-S.(1) in respect of that offence nor rejected an application for the making of such Complaint, be exercised by the court to which such former court is subordinate within the meaning of sub-S.(4) of S.195. (3) A Complaint made under this section shall be signed. (a) Where the court making the Complaint is a High Court, by such officer of the Court as the Court may appoint. (b) in any other case, by the presiding officer of the court; (4) In this section/Court’ has the same meaning as in S.195." The question as to whether the omission of the words ‘by a party to any proceeding in court’ in S.195(1)(b)(ii) is intended to change the position of law, will have to be decided on a combined reading of Ss 195 and 340, Crl.P.C. as also the rationale behind the decision of the Supreme Court in Patel Laljibhai v. State of Gujarat, 1974 L.W.(Crl.) 114:A.I.R 1971 S.C.1935. 13. 13. In Patel Laljibhai v. State of Gujarat, 1974 L.W. (Crl.) 114: A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1935. a suit for the return of certain sums of money, due on cheques and certain coupons produced in court, was dismissed, accepting the plea of the defendants that the above cheque and coupons had been forged. After the dismissal of the suit, the defendants filed a private Complaint against the plaintiff, for offences under Ss.467 and 471, I.P.C, before the Court of the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Dholka. The question in this case, which finally went to the Supreme Court, was whether S.195(1)(c) of the old Code brought within its ambit, documents forged by the accused, even prior to his becoming a party to the proceeding, or whether it would include only offences alleged to have been committed by the party to the proceeding, in his character as such party. The Supreme Court went in detail into the relevant provisions of law, as also several other judgments of various High Courts, and finally held that the narrow view, that the bar under S.195(1)(c) would be attracted only if the offence is alleged to have been commuted in respect of documents, which are already produced or given in evidence and not to offences committed earlier in proceedings in court, should be followed. The Supreme Court therefore held that the offence under S.471, I.P.C. was committed by the accused, after he became a party to the civil proceeding and the offence therefor could come under S.195(1)(c) thereby requiring a Complaint by the civil court. However, with reference to the offence under S.467, I.P.C, the same was not necessary unless it was shown that the cheques and coupon had been forged by the plaintiff, in his character as plaintiff, after the suit had been filed. 14. This narrow view was re-affirmed by the Supreme Court in Raghunath and others v. State of U.P. and other, A.I.R. 1973 S.C.1100. In that case, a sale deed was forged through impersonation and was presented for mutation of names, which was resisted successfully by the real owner on the ground that, the sale deed was a forged one. Thereafter, the real owner filed a criminal Complaint for offences under Ss.419, 414 and 471, I.P.C, and the sessions court framed charges under Ss.465, 466, 471, I.P.C, and S.82 (d) of the Indian Registration Act. Thereafter, the real owner filed a criminal Complaint for offences under Ss.419, 414 and 471, I.P.C, and the sessions court framed charges under Ss.465, 466, 471, I.P.C, and S.82 (d) of the Indian Registration Act. The Supreme Court following its earlier decisions referred to in the preceding Paragraph held that the offences relating to forgery of the sale deed through impersonation had been committed by the accused, not in his character as such party in the mutation proceedings and that, therefore, the bar under S.195(1)(c) would not apply. Similarly in State of Karnataka v. Hemareddi, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1417, the defendant resisted redemption of a mortgage on the basis of a sale deed, found to have been forged through impersonation. The alleged vendor and had really died in 1953, while the. sale deed purporting to have been executed by her, was registered on 10th November, 1970. The sale deed, however, was never produced in the suit. On a Complaint to police, charge sheet was laid for offences under Ss.l20B, 193, 465, 467, and 420 read Ss.114, I.P.C. The Supreme Court held that since the offences were committed, prior to the accused having become a party in the civil proceedings and the offences had been Completed prior to the institution of civil proceedings, the bar under S.195(1)(c) would not apply to the offences. Regarding the offence under S.193.I.P.C, the Supreme Court held, that the above section was not attracted, since the sale deed itself had not been put in evidence in redemption suit. 15. From the foregoing decisions, it is clear that the Supreme Court, had consistently adopted the narrower view, restricting the scope of S.195(1)(b)(ii) and (iii) only to offences committed, after the proceedings had started before the concerned court-Whatever the offences had been committed prior to the commencement of the civil proceedings and were Complete by themselves, the bar under S.195(1)(b)(ii) would not apply and it would be open to the private individual to set the law in motion. 16. The 41st Law Commission while proposing the amendment omitting the words ‘by a party to any proceedings in any court’ gave its reasons as follows: "any important point that has to be considered here is whether the restriction of the application of the section to a party to the proceeding should be retained. 16. The 41st Law Commission while proposing the amendment omitting the words ‘by a party to any proceedings in any court’ gave its reasons as follows: "any important point that has to be considered here is whether the restriction of the application of the section to a party to the proceeding should be retained. The purpose of the section is to bar private prosecutions, where the course of justice is sought to be perverted, leaving it to the court itself to uphold its dignity and prestige. On principle, there is no reason why the safeguard in Cl.(c) should not apply to offences committed by witnesses also. Witnesses need as much protection against vexatious prosecutions as parties, and the court should have as much control over the acts of witnesses that enter as a Component of a judicial proceeding as over the acts of parties. If therefore, the provision of cl.(c) or extended to witnesses, the extension would be in conformity with the broad principle which forms the basis of S.195" It is therefore clear that the only object behind the amendment was to extend the protection under S.195, Crl.P.C, then given to parties to proceedings, also to witnesses, scribes, attestors etc, and thereby enlarge the protection envisaged by the section. They too, had to be safeguarded against frivolous and vexatious proceedings. The omission of the words ‘by a party to any proceeding in any court’ therefore, has no bearing on the law laid down by the Supreme Court indicated above. The pre-amendment decisions would apply with equal force, to S.195(1) (b)(ii) as it stands, after the amendment. 17. It would also be useful at this stage to consider the main grounds, that weighed with the Supreme Court in adopting the restricted and narrow view in preference to the wider view. Enlarging the ambit of S.195 would cause practical difficulties to the courts; since the inquiry that is contemplated under S.340, Crl.P.C, by the court, could not be thorough and as effective, as an investigation that would be done by specialized investigating agencies, and a Complaint laid sown by the Court under S.340 for such offences, without the necessary investigation, is bound to be ineffective. It was in this context that the Supreme Court in Patel Laljibhai v. State of Gujarat, 1974 L.W. (Crl.) 114: A.I.R.1971 S.C.1935. It was in this context that the Supreme Court in Patel Laljibhai v. State of Gujarat, 1974 L.W. (Crl.) 114: A.I.R.1971 S.C.1935. "The offences about which the court alone, to the exclusion of the aggrieved, private parties, is clothed with the right to Complaint may therefore be appropriately considered to be only those offences committed by a party to a proceeding in that court, the commission of which has a reasonable close nexus with the proceedings in that court, so that it can, without embarking upon a Completely independent and fresh enquiry, satisfactorily consider, by reference principally to its records, the expediency of prosecuting the delinquent party." 18. Apart from this, unlike a civil wrong, arising out of a tortious liability or the infringement of a right of particular individuals who have to seek their remedies on their own, a crime is primarily considered as an offence against society, thereby making the State machinery the investigating and prosecuting agency. Therefore, it is, that the language of S.190, Crl.P.C., is very wide, so as to enable a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence, whether on a Complaint or on a police report or on information received from any person or upon his own knowledge, that the office has been committed. Anyone could set the criminal law in motion. The concept of locus standi in criminal proceedings, subject to certain statutory exceptions, is alien to criminal law. However, certain types of offences which are mentioned in Ss.195. 198,° 198A and 199, Crl.P.C, are considered as offences primarily directed against certain authorities or certain individuals, thereby requiring a Complaint to be instituted by that person aggrieved. . Similarly the offences mentioned in Ss.196 and 197, Crl.P.C, require sanction from certain authorities before the Criminal Court can take cognisance of them. These sections therefore, being exceptions to the general S.190, Crl.P.C.,have to be interpreted strictly. The general right to set the law in motion, available under S.190, Crl.P.C., could not be lightly taken away, by too liberal an interpretation of the section dealing with exceptions to that general rule. Adopting the narrow view therefor, would also be, in consonance with the general principle of criminal jurisprudence. 19. The general right to set the law in motion, available under S.190, Crl.P.C., could not be lightly taken away, by too liberal an interpretation of the section dealing with exceptions to that general rule. Adopting the narrow view therefor, would also be, in consonance with the general principle of criminal jurisprudence. 19. In fact, the single Judge of the Kerala High Court in Philip v. Raphael, 1985 Crl.L.J. 126 after discussing several decisions of the Supreme Court and the other High Courts, has found that the law laid down in Patel Laljibai v. State of Gujarat 1974 L.W. (Crl.) 114: A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1935., and re-affirmed in the later decisions referred to above, would stand, even after the amendment to S.195(1)(b)(ii) and the restricted view has to be taken . Similarly, a Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Harbans Singh v. State of Punjab, 1986 Crl.L.J. 1834, in a well considered judgment has laid down certain legal propositions, a few of which I extract below: "(i) The provisions of S.195(1)(b) (ii) of the new Code are by way an exception the general right of a citizen, to approach ordinary criminal courts as contained in S.190 of the Code, and hence should be strictly construed. (iii) Ss.195 and 340 of the new Code form part of statutory scheme dealing with the subject of prosecution for offences against the administration of justice and thus have to be read together to ascertain the intention of the legislature. (iv) The offences about which the court alone, to the exclusion of the aggrieved party has jurisdiction to file Complaint in respect of an offence, should have a reasonably close nexus with proceedings in court, so that it can satisfactorily consider by reference, principally to its records, the expediency of prosecuting the delinquent person. (v) The court while embarking upon an enquiry under S.340 of the Code should not act as an investigating agency as it would he impracticable for the Court decide about the. expediency of launching of prosecution in respect of forgeries committed earlier to the proceedings initiated in that court." I am in entire agreement with the propositions of law laid down above. It follows therefore that offences committed by accused before they become parties to the proceedings and which are Complete by themselves, would not come under the purview of S.195, Crl.P.C. 20. It follows therefore that offences committed by accused before they become parties to the proceedings and which are Complete by themselves, would not come under the purview of S.195, Crl.P.C. 20. Applying the above principle to the facts of the case, we find that the offences of conpiracy, forgery, impersonation have been committed prior to and on 24th July, 1974 and 25th July, 1974. The offence under S.471 has been committed on 28th July, 1974 when the fourth respondent facilitated patta transfer, on the basis of the forged sale deeds. It is only on 8th August, 1974 and 9th August, 1974, that the civil suits have been instituted by the petitioner and it is much later that the forged sale deeds themselves have been produced before the civil court by respondents 1 to 3. The offences for which respondents 1 to 10 were tried, having been committed long prior to the commencement of the civil proceedings and prior to the documents having been produced in the civil proceedings, would not come within the purview of S.195(1)(b)(ii), Crl.P.C. The fact that a fresh offence under S.471, I.F.C., by the above document being used in the Civil Court where they are produced as an answer to the prayer for redemption, would be a fresh offence regarding which the civil Court if satisfied about the expediency of the prosecution, could act under section 340, Criminal Procedure Code. That would not in any way alter the fact that the offences had already been committed, long before civil proceedings were even contemplated. The mere fact that some evidence collected by the Civil Court had been let in as additional evidence in the criminal Court, would not change the legal position. Section 195(1)(b)(ii), Criminal Procedure. Code would not apply to the facts of the case and a Complaint by the District Munsif is not necessary to enable the Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence. Acquittal of respondents 1 to 10 merely on that ground cannot be sustained. 21. However, in view of the fact that this is a revision by a private party, the only course upon to this Court on the basis of the above findings, is, to order a re-trial. It is unfortunate that the State has not chosen to prefer an appeal, at least to set right the legal issues involved. 22. 21. However, in view of the fact that this is a revision by a private party, the only course upon to this Court on the basis of the above findings, is, to order a re-trial. It is unfortunate that the State has not chosen to prefer an appeal, at least to set right the legal issues involved. 22. Judgment of the Judicial First Class Magistrate of Devakottai in C.C. No.39 of 1977 acquitting respondents 1 to 10 is therefore set aside. The revision is allowed. The case will go back to the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, Devakottai for retrial and disposal according to law.