ORDER R.P. Singh, J. - This petition is directed against an order passed by the Additional District Judge, Varanasi, dated 24-8-85 allowing the appeal in proceedings arising out of S. 21 of U.P. Act X III o f 1972, hereinafter referred to as the Act. 2. Heard Sri Saran Behari Lal, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri R.N. Singh, learned counsel for respondent 3. 3. The facts of the case briefly are that the petitioner moved an application under section 21(1)(a) of the Act for the release of the shop situate in Sakshi Vinayak (Vishwanath Gali), Varanasi which is in the tenancy of respondent 3, Loknath Bubans. It was alleged that the shop in dispute is required for setting up the petitioner's youngest son Balbir Singh who is unemployed, for starting his business therein which need is bona fide and genuine and that the respondent 3 is carrying on his business of selling saries in various shops in Kunj Gali which is famous Sari Centre of Varanasi and since there is no other shop in which the petitioner can set up his unemployed son in business while the respondent 3 is running various shops in Kunj Gali in the city of Varanasi, greater hardship would be caused if the shop in dispute is not released in favour of the petitioner. This application was contested by respondent 3 on the ground that the disputed shop was let out by the petitioner's husband Narendra Bahadur Singh, who used to realise the rent though after some time Narendra Bahadur Singh told the respondent 3 that the rent receipt will now be issued under the signature of Smt. Laxmi Devi, the petitioner in the case and the Corporation number of the said accommodation would be D-10/17A. The respondent 2 alleged that the need of the petitioner for the shop in dispute is not bona fide and genuine and that the petitioner has other alternative accommodation in his possession. The Prescribed Authority, on going through the evidence on record, held that the need of petitioner for setting up his unemployed son in business was bona fide and genuine and allowed the application of the petitioner vide his order dated 9th Dec. 1983. The Prescribed Authority, on going through the evidence on record, held that the need of petitioner for setting up his unemployed son in business was bona fide and genuine and allowed the application of the petitioner vide his order dated 9th Dec. 1983. Feeling aggrieved the respondent 3 went up in appeal before the II Additional District Judge, Varanasi, respondent No. 1 who however, without going into the merits of the case about the bona fide need of the petitioner for the accommodation in dispute, allowed the appeal holding that the application for release was not maintainable because the evidence goes to show that both Narendra Bahadur Singh and Laxmi Devi are co- landlords of the shop and that the release application was not signed by Narendra Bahadur Singh who was also a necessary party to be impleaded in the application and hence the release application was not maintainable. Feeling aggrieved the petitioner has challenged this order passed by the II Additional District Judge, dated 24th Aug. 1985. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the respondent 3 never challenged the maintainability of the application moved by the petitioner under S. 21(1) (a) of the Act before the Prescribed Authority and it was during the course of the argument in appeal before the Additional District Judge that the respondent 3 moved an application on 7-8-85 for amendment alleging that the application moved by the petitioner was not maintainable as the accommodation was let out by the petitioner's husband Narendra Bahadur Singh and he having not signed the application, the same was not maintainable. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that there is ample evidence on the record of the case to show that the petitioner is the landlady and owner of the premises in dispute, Narendra Bahadur Singh being the husband of the petitioner, was realising the rent on her behalf as an 'attorney' or 'agent' and that it is the petitioner who is the landlord and owner of the accommodation in dispute and further that the respondent 3 himself has been treating the petitioner as the landlady and owner of the premises in dispute and hence the application for release filed by the petitioner was fully competent which could not be dismissed as not maintainable. 5. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner has in support of his submission, drawn my attention to the money order coupons sent by respondent 3 remitting rent for the accommodation in dispute in the name of the petitioner, copies of which have been annexed as Annexure-2-A of the supplementary affidavit which shows that respondent 3 sent the rent of the accommodation in dispute by money order in which the petitioner was addressed as 'makanmalkin' landlady Laxmi Devi wife of Narendra Bahadur Singh. The amount was Rs. 980/- being the rent for the months of Oct. 1981 to April 1982. Another receipt to which my attention has been drawn is the photostat copy of the M.O. coupon sent by respondent 3 in which he has again addressed the petitioner as 'Makanmalkin' Laxmi Devi wife of Narendra Bahadur Singh. The amount sent is Rs. 560/- being rent for the months of May 1982 to Aug. 1982. The 'learned counsel for the petitioner contended that this aspect of respondent 3 in sending the rent to the petitioner addressing her as 'Makanmalkin' clearly shows that the respondent 3 treated the petitioner as the landlady and owner of the house in dispute. Another paper to which my attention was drawn is the photostat copy of the receipt dated 23rd June, 1982 issued by the Tax Superintendent, Nagar Mahapalika, Varanasi showing that the name of the petitioner Laxmi Devi was mutated in the Assessment Register maintained by the Nagar Mahapalika, Varanasi against the premises in dispute. This' document also shows that the name of the petitioner is mutated as the owner of the premises in dispute in the records maintained by the Nagar Mahapalika, Varanasi. In paragraph 14 of the written statement filed by respondent 3, a copy of which has been annexed as Annexure-5 to the writ petition, it has been categorically stated by respondent 3 that Narendra Bahadur Singh used to realise rent but after some time Narendra Bahadur Singh had told the respondent 3 that rent receipts will now be issued under the signature of Smt. Laxmi Devi who is his wife. This conduct of respondent 3 in tendering rent of the accommodation in dispute to the petitioner addressing her as 'Makanmalkin' shows that respondent 3 had been treating the petitioner as the landlady of the premises in question. 6. This conduct of respondent 3 in tendering rent of the accommodation in dispute to the petitioner addressing her as 'Makanmalkin' shows that respondent 3 had been treating the petitioner as the landlady of the premises in question. 6. A perusal of the order passed by the respondent 1 shows that he has held that Laxmi Devi is the owner of premises No. D 10/17A and Narendra Bahadur Singh is the owner of the premises No. D-10/17. The rent receipts have been issued by both, some time by Laxmi Devi and some time by her husband Narendra Bahadur Singh. So this evidence goes to show that both Narendra Bahadur Singh and Laxmi Devi are co-landlords of the disputed shop. After recording this finding the respondent 1 has held that Narendra Bahadur Singh, another co-landlord is the necessary party to be impleaded in the release application and he having not signed the release application as provided under R. 15. the release application moved by Laxmi Devi is not legally maintainable. In my opinion, the respondent No. 1 has gravely erred in allowing the appeal merely on the ground that the application moved by the petitioner was not maintainable at the instance of Laxmi Devi the petitioner alone. In Yogesh Saran v. Jyoti Prasad, 1978 All Rent Cas 408 a similar question arose where it was observed that : "To me it appears that the omission to sign the application by all the landlords* is of a formal character and an application made by the landlord cannot be rejected on that bass. It is so because for getting a premises released under S. 21 it is not necessary that the landlord must set up the needs of all the landlords and allege that the premises is needed by all of them. It can be for the need of only one landlord." 7. In Girraj Singh v. IIIrd Addl. District Judge, Bareilly, 1979 All Rent Cas 422 : 1979 All LJ 862 also the application under S. 21 was dismissed by the learned District Judge on the ground that it was not signed by all the co-landlords. It was held that the rule expressly ,permits the signing of the application under S. 21 of the Act by one or more of the co. 'landlords and the other co-landlords may be arrayed as pro forma opposite parties. It was held that the rule expressly ,permits the signing of the application under S. 21 of the Act by one or more of the co. 'landlords and the other co-landlords may be arrayed as pro forma opposite parties. It was also observed that it would be sufficient compliance with the Rules if the non- petitioning landlords are only arrayed as pro forma respondents. 8. Ina Full Bench case of Gopal Dass v. Ist Addl. District Judge, Varanasi, reported in (1987) 1 All Rent Cas 281 : 1987 All LJ 494 it was held : "In view of these decisions, there can, therefore, be little doubt as to the maintainability of the action for eviction brought by one co-owner without impleading the other co-owners". It was also observed that - "However, we may point out that the requirement of R. 15(2) that an application for release of premises owned by co-owners should be signed by all co-owners would be invalid. One co-owner is competent to maintain an action for eviction of the tenant of the entire premises, since he can be considered as a landlord within the meaning of S. 3(j) of the Act. One co-owner alone would be competent to sign such an application." 9. In Sri Ram Pasricha v. Jagannath, reported in AIR 1976 SC 2335 it was observed at p. 2339 as follows : "Jurisprudentially it is not correct to say that a co-owner of a property is not its owner, he owns every part of the composite property along with others and it cannot be said that he is only a part-owner or a fractional owner of the property. The position will change only when partition takes place. It is, therefore, not possible to accept the submission that the plaintiff who is admittedly the landlord and co-owner of that premises is not the owner of the premises within the meaning of S. 13(1) (f) as long as he is a co-owner of the property being at the same time the acknowledged landlord of the defendants." In Rang Nath v. State of U.P., reported in 1984 All LJ 455, it was held that a suit for eviction filed under S. 21 of the Act by one of the co-owner-landlords alone is maintainable. The same view has also been taken in t)i case of Smt. Vatsala Nayar v. Smt. Vandana Tandon, reported in (1988) 1 All Rent Cas 57 : 1988 All LJ 209. Thus in view of the discussion above, it is amply clear that the application filed by the petitioner Smt. Laxmi Devi for the release of the accommodation under S. 21(1) (a) is clearly maintainable. 10. The learned counsel for the petitioner then contended that necessary material being already on the record, the circumstances of the case are such that the case could be decided by this court itself instead of prolonging the litigation by remanding the case to the Additional District Judge for decision afresh on merits. The learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, contended that since the case has not been decided on merits by the learned Additional District Judge in appeal, in any case if it is held that the application filed by the petitioner under S. 21(1) (a) was maintainable, the case has to be remanded back to the learned Additional District Judge to decide the case afresh on merits. I find force in the submission made by the learned counsel for the respondent that the appeal having not been decided on merits by the learned Additional District Judge, it has to be remanded back to the learned Additional District Judge to decide the appeal on merits. 11. In the result, the petition is allowed, the order passed by the learned IInd Additional District Judge, dated 24th Aug. 1985 is quashed and the case is remanded to respondent 1 with a direction to readmit the appeal to its original number and decide the same on merits and in accordance with law, since the case is an old one, the respondent No. I is further directed to decide the appeal on merits expeditiously within a period of three months from the date of presentation of the certified copy of this judgment before him. Parties are directed to bear their own costs.