JUDGMENT S. B. Sinha, J. - This application is directed against the order dated 19.5.1980, passed by the Additional Collector, Samastipur as contained in Annexure 2' as also against the order dated 14.1.1981, passed by the Additional Member, Board of Revenue, Bihar, Patna as contained in Annexure 3' to this writ application, whereby and where under the application for pre-emption filed by the respondent no. -3 was allowed. 2. The facts of the case lie in a very narrow compass and are not much in dispute. Admittedly one Abdul Hafiz was owner of Old Survey Plot no. 333 corresponding to new Survey Plot no. 904, 905 and 906 measuring 12 kathas situated in village Suraul, P. S. Warisnagar in the district of Samastipur. The said Abdul Hafiz admittedly died leaving behind three sons and two duaghters namely; Md. Wahid (2) Md. Sahid (3) Md. Zahirul Hassan (4) Koraisa Khatoon and (5) Wahidan Khatoon by and between the heirs of the aforesaid Abdul Hafiz and the eastern portion measuring thee kathas of land was allotted to Koraisa Khatoon and Wahidan Khatoon, the daughters of the aforesaid Abdul Hafiz. The western block of land, adjacent to the aforementioned land, was allotted to respondent no. 4 and the land lying on the further west was allotted to Md. Wahid, whereas the western portion of the land was allotted to Zahirul Hassan. As mentioned hereinbefore all the aforementioned four blocks were consisted of three kathas each the plot being rectangular in shape. The respondent no. 3 had purchased the aforementioned eastern block of three kathas of land from Wahidan Khatoon in the year 1969. Thereafter, by reason of a registered sa1e deed dated 10.2.78, the petitioner purcI1ased two kathas 10 dhurs of land from respondent no. 4 together with three kathas of land from Md. Wahid jointly. The land, under the aforementioned sale deed, was the subject matter of an application for pre-emption filed by respondent no.3, in terms of the provision of Section 16 (3) of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Lands) Act, 1961. Admittedly the said application was dismissed by an order dated 20th of March, 1979, passed by the D. C. L. R., Samastipur as contained in Annexure – ‘1’ to the said application. The respondent no. Admittedly the said application was dismissed by an order dated 20th of March, 1979, passed by the D. C. L. R., Samastipur as contained in Annexure – ‘1’ to the said application. The respondent no. 3 preferred an appeal against the aforementioned order dated 20th of March, 1979 to the Additional Collector, Samustipur being Ceiling Appeal no. 19 of 1979-80, who by an order dated 19.5.80 as contained in Annexure -2' to the writ application, allowed the said appeal. The petitioner, thereafter preferred a revision before the Member Board of Revenue, Bihar, Patna in terms of Section 32 of the aforementioned Act, which was dismissed by the Additional Member Board of Revenue, Bihar, Patna by an order dated 14.1.1981 as contained in Annexure 3' to the writ application. 3. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners has raised a novel point. He submitted that in view of the fact that the lands in question, meaning thereby five kathas ten dhurs, being in two separate blocks and having been owned by two different owners namely respondent no. 4 and Md. Wahid respectively, the question of allowing the application of pre-emption filed by respondent no. 3, did not and could not arise. According to the learned counsel, by reason of the aforementioned sale deed, the petitioners became the owner of both the blocks, which are adjacent to each other and thus they also became the owner of the adjacent land and as such no order for preemption in terms of Section 16 (3) of the Act could be passed against them. The learned counsel, in this connection has relied on a recent division bench decision of this Court in Ramrup Yadav vs. The State of Bihar (1987 P. L. J. R. 455). In the aforementioned decision the pre-emption purchased two blocks of lands which were adjacent to each other on the same day and in that situation it was held that the owner of the land had a better title over the pre-emptor as by purchasing two plots on the same date, he himself became the holder of an adjoining plot and, therefore, he could defeat the application for pre-emption filed by the 3rd party. The aforementioned decision, in my opinion, is completely distinguishable and must be held to have rendered in a different situation and in peculiar facts of that case. 4. The aforementioned decision, in my opinion, is completely distinguishable and must be held to have rendered in a different situation and in peculiar facts of that case. 4. In the aforementioned decision, the petitioner thereof purchased two different blocks of land by two different deeds, the title in respect of one would be held to have passed earlier than the other and as such in such a situation it was possible for the petitioners of that writ application to become the owner of adjacent land which he himself purchased on the same date. In that decision only one block of land was subject matter of one sale deed and another block of land was covered by another sale deed, the later being the subject matter of the application under Section 16 (3) of the Act. 5. In the instant case, however. the entire five khaths 10 dhurs of land although owned by different persons is the subject matter of the same sale deed and as such the petitioner would be deemed to have derived title in respect of the entire land of five kathas 10 dhurs of land at the same time. In such a situation, it can not be said that any occasion arose for the petitioner to become adjacent owner of any land whatsoever. Further in this case the entire five kathas 10 dburs of land is subject matter of preemption. 6. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the aforementioned Division Bench decision has no application in the facts and circumstances of the case. It is also well known that a decision is an authority for what it actually decides and not what can logically be deduced from it. A reference in this connection may be made to the decision in Quinn vs. Leatham reported in 1900-3 All England Law Reporter Page 1 at page 6. In view of my findings aforementioned the facts of this case is distinguishable from the facts involved in Ramroop Yadav's case and as such the petitioner cannot derive any support from the said decision. No other point has been raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 8. In this view I do not find any merit and it is accordingly dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs.