MURLIDHER RAO, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioners who are in possession of premises bearing Door Nos. 208 to 211 and 217 to 222, Raja Market, Avenue Road, Bangalore-2, have filed these two Writ Petitions, challenging the order passed by the Special Deputy Commissioner. Bangalore, in H. R. C. (City) A. No. 117/84-85 and 118/84-85. ( 2 ) THE premises belonged to late Raja Venkatachalapathy and R. V. Govindarajulu. They were leased to Nirmal Kala's Kisenchand Chellaram, under a registered lease deed dated 20-12-1964, by Raja Venkatarama Setty. The said lease was for 10 years. Thereafter, the third respondent - nagarathnamma wife of Raja Venkatarama Setty and her two sons entered into a fresh lease on 3-1-1976, in favour of the aforesaid lessee for a period of 20 years with option to the lessee to renew the same. Petitioners case is that they have purchased the textile business run by Nirmal kala's Kisenchand Chellaram, under sale deed dated 13-10-1983, and they have been in occupation of the premises. ( 3 ) THE revenue inspector submitted a report on 27-4-1984, to the effect the shops are vacant and therefore action is called for under Part II of the Rent Control Act. On the basis of the said report, the Rent Controller notified the vacancy on 6-7-1984. He issued notice to the land lady on 21-7-1984. The petitioners who were in actual occupation of the premises were not notified. Of their own accord, they filed their objections on 30-7-1987, contending that there was no vacancy and therefore no action is called for under Part II of the Rent Control Act. In their objections, they contended that these shops have been newly constructed and they have not completed five years and as such they were exempted from the purview of Part II of the said Act. ( 4 ) THE Rent and Accommodation Controller by his order dated 17-8-1984, came to the conclusion that the premises in question were made out of one single hall by a sanctioned plan dated 13-12-1983, which was valid upto 12-12-1985. He therefore came to the conclusion that the premises in question was exempted from the provisions of the Rent Control Act for a period of five years and hence by order dated 17-8-1984, dropped the proceedings. ( 5 ) AS against this order, respondent-4 in each of these petitions, filed appeals before the Special deputy Commissioner. He therefore came to the conclusion that the premises in question was exempted from the provisions of the Rent Control Act for a period of five years and hence by order dated 17-8-1984, dropped the proceedings. ( 5 ) AS against this order, respondent-4 in each of these petitions, filed appeals before the Special deputy Commissioner. Both the appeals were clubbed and by a common order dated 21-2-1985, it was held that the building constructed was old one and it was let out unauthorisedly and therefore the order of the Rent Controller dropping the proceedings, on the ground that the building was outside the purview of Part II of the Rent Control Act, was erroneous. The Deputy commissioner allowed the appeals and directed the Rent Controller to proceed further under the provisions of the Rent Control Act. These orders are challenged in these Writ Petitions. ( 6 ) ONE of the grounds raised in the Writ Petitions and which was strenuously urged by the learned Counsel for the petitioners was that the appellants before the Special Deputy commissioner were applicants for allotment and therefore they had no competence to file appeal under Section 12 of the Rent Control Act; in other words, the contention was that they are not "aggrieved persons", the expression employed in that section. ( 7 ) MR. Munivenkatappa, Counsel for the petitioners submitted that the appeal filed by respondent-4 in each of these cases was not maintainable. According to the learned Counsel, these respondents being applicants for allotment, they are chance-takers. There is no vested or legal right in them. Their position is no better than intending bidders in the auction sale, who cannot question the settlement of dispute between decree-holder and Judgment-debtor, before the sale. Taking a second analogy he said a candidate for selection for appointment has a chance to be considered for selection, but he has no right if the authority decides not to make appointments. He submitted that if under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act the government, before taking possession, decides to drop the acquisition, the land owner whose land was sought to be acquired cannot compel the Government to acquire. He submitted that if under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act the government, before taking possession, decides to drop the acquisition, the land owner whose land was sought to be acquired cannot compel the Government to acquire. In all such cases the citizen has a right of being considered if and only if, the authorities decide to conduct the auction (in the first case) make recruitment (in the second case) and continue acquisition (in the third case ). To substantiate his submission he relied on the following observations of Division Bench in S. L. V. RAJAN AND ANR. v. Y. S. SURENDER, ILR Karnataka, 1979, 1049. At para 20-A, their Lordships have observed thus: ". . . . . . Hence it cannot be said that if a vacancy is notified, the Writ Petitioner gets a legal right vested in him to get the building allotted in his favour. He has a mere chance of getting the house allotted. That does not amount to a legal right vested. There is no duty on the part of the controller to allot the building only in favour of the person who obtained the consent of the owner. He will be No. 10 in the order of preference. If any other persons within the order of priority in Rule 4 (A) (1) to (9) come forward, the building has to be allotted to them. Therefore, the writ petitioner does not have any legal right vested in him. His assertion is only in the field of speculation and that is not sufficient to afford a locus standi for him to challenge the order of the special Deputy Commissioner. His status is no better than that of a "stranger". Further, in para 21, it is observed thus: "even taking a liberal approach, it cannot be said that a mere chance of getting a house allotted would constitute any legal right vested in a person. . . . " ( 8 ) IN ADI PHEROZSHAH v. H. M. SEERVAI, AIR1971 SC 385 , (1970 )2 SCC484 , [1971 ]1 SCR863 Chief Justice Mr. Hidayatullah. . . . " ( 8 ) IN ADI PHEROZSHAH v. H. M. SEERVAI, AIR1971 SC 385 , (1970 )2 SCC484 , [1971 ]1 SCR863 Chief Justice Mr. Hidayatullah. as he then was, after quoting several decisions, has summarised thus: 1) Any person who feels disappointed with the result of the case is not a "person aggrieved"; 2) He must be disappointed of a benefit which he would have received, if the order had the other way; 3) The order must cause him a legal grievance by wrongfully depriving him of something; 4) It is no doubt a legal grievance and not a grievance about material matters, but his legal grievance must be a tendency to injure him; 5) That the order is wrong or it acquits some one who he thinks ought to be convicted does not by itself give rise to a legal grievance. ( 9 ) IN Bar Council of MAHARASHTRA v. DABHOLKAR, AIR1975 sc 2092 , (1975 )2 SCC702 , [1976 ]1 SCR306 it was observed thus: ". . . . . The meaning of the words "a person aggrieved" may vary according to the context of the statute. One of the meanings is that a person will be held to be aggrieved by a decision if that decision is materially adverse to him. Normally, one is required to establish that one has been denied or deprived of something to which one is legally entitled in order to make one "a person aggrieved". Again a person is aggrieved if a legal burden is imposed on him. . . . " ( 10 ) IN FERNANDIS v. HOUSE RENT CONTROLLER Mr. Hakeem, J. , ILR1986 KAR 3249 after quoting the above two decisions of the Supreme Court and the division Bench decision in S. L. V. Rajan v. Surender, ILR Karnataka, 1979, 1049 held that a landlord cannot be considered as an aggrieved person in a proceeding to evict a tenant under section 10-A of the Act. ( 11 ) THE above decisions manifest a legal position that the respondents, who have only a chance of being considered for allotment cannot be aggrieved persons, against an order of Rent and accommodation Controller holding that Part II of the Act is not applicable and the proceedings are dropped. They may be annoyed by the order, but that by itself does not make them aggrieved persons. They may be annoyed by the order, but that by itself does not make them aggrieved persons. ( 12 ) IT is argued that a 'person interested' has a right of appeal. The words employed in Section 12 do not admit of such a construction. The right of appeal, is neither a guaranteed nor a constitutional right. It is axiomatic that such a right is not a fundamental right. It is a creature of the Statute. A person may be interested in the subject matter, that by itself, does not inhere in him the right of appeal. The legislature in its wisaom has conferred the right on the aggrieved person; it may be, it is intended to avoid frivolous litigation by busy bodies. Vacancy' is a jurisdtctional issue to be determined by the Rent and Accommodation Controller. An intending allotee gets a chance to apply only if it is so determined and not otherwise. At that stage, he has not been given any right to participate in the proceedings. If a landlord to whom a notice is sent disputes the occurring of vacancy, an intending allottee is not given a right to file objections. No such objections are ever invited. Indeed, in the premises, he gets a right only if it is allotted; his interest is confined to his case being considered for allotment, as per the Rules. It cannot be gainsaid that right of appeal can be availed of by persons whose rights are prejudicially affected and who is aggrieved by the order. In the case of an applicant for allotment, there is no right at all, vested or legal, it follows he cannot be an aggrieved person. Mr. Yoganarasimha submitted that if the Rent Controller determines the question arbitrarily, capriciously or on collateral consideration or acts mala fide, can it be said that it cannot be questioned; the answer may be 'no' but not by way of appeal under Section 12, but may be by invoking Article 14 of the Constitution of India by filing a Writ Petition. ( 13 ) FOR the foregoing reasons it has to be held that the appeals before the Special Deputy commissioner, were incompetent; therefore those orders are liable to be quashed; they cannot be sustained. ( 14 ) WITH the quashing of the appellate order, the Rent and Accommodation Controller's order gets restored. Mr. ( 13 ) FOR the foregoing reasons it has to be held that the appeals before the Special Deputy commissioner, were incompetent; therefore those orders are liable to be quashed; they cannot be sustained. ( 14 ) WITH the quashing of the appellate order, the Rent and Accommodation Controller's order gets restored. Mr. Munivenkatappa submitted that even if the petitioners are treated as sub-tenants, so long as sub-tenants are in possession, though contrary to Section 23, there can be no vacancy under Section 4 of the Act; he relied on the Bench decision in M. SAMARENDRA naidu v. HOUSE RENT AND ACCOMMODATION CONTROLLER, 1967 (2) KLJ 190 wherein it is held thus: ". . . . It is thus clear that the assumption made by the Controller that there was a vacancy in consequence of the subletting to the petitioner was quite groundless and receives no support from Section 4. The Controller overlooked the contrariety between the provisions of Section 4 and Section 23 and that in a case to which Section 23 applies, there is no vacancy within the meaning of Section 4. " This may strengthen petitioners contention if it had been held that Part II is applicable. It is unnecessary to pursue this argument. ( 15 ) FOR the aforesaid reasons, I make the following order:rule is made absolute; Writ Petitions are allowed; the order of Special Deputy Commissioner, dated 21-2-1985, in HRC (City) Appeal Nos. 117 and 118/84-85, is quashed. The order of Rent and Accommodation Controller, City area, Bangalore, dated 17-8-1984, is restored. No costs.