Judgment :- 1. All these writ petitions are filed by the same landlord and the orders that are challenged in these writ petitions are the same. The landlord filed a rent control petition R.C.P. No.12 of 1982 for eviction of the tenant for bona fide need of his own occupation of the building in question. This is a valid ground under S.11 (3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. The landlord also filed another petition R.C. P. No. 13 of 1982 in respect of an adjacent room to the building referred in R.C.P. No. 12 of 1982 for the same purpose. O.P.No. 892 of 1987 and O.P. No. 4436 of 1988 are from R.C.P. No. 12 of 1982 and O.P. No. 1018 of 1987 is from R. C. P. No. 13 of 1982. In R.C.P. No. 12 of 1982 as well as R.C.P.No.13 of 1982, the Rent Controller after evaluating the evidence found that the landlord has established his case under S.11(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. Though the bona fide need was found, the Rent Controller dismissed the application on the ground that the building sought to be evicted was for doing business by the grandson of the landlord and the Rent Controller held that the grandson is not a person dependant on the landlord. The landlord filed an appeal before the Appellate Authority as R.C.A.No.101 of 1983 and the tenant filed an appeal as R.C.A. No.4 of 1984. In regard to R.C.P.No.13 of 1982 also the Rent Control Court found that the landlord has established his bona fide need for own occupation and dismissed the petition on the ground that the grandson is not a dependant on the landlord. There also, the landlord filed an appeal R.C.A.No.102 of 1983 and the tenant filed an appeal R.C.A.2 of 1984. The tenant's appeal related to the finding of the Rent Control Court with regard to the bona fide need claimed by the landlord and the subject matter of the appeal by the landlord was that the finding of the Rent Control Court that the grandson is not a dependant on the landlord is incorrect. The Appellate Court allowed the appeals of the landlord and dismissed the appeals filed by the tenants. The tenant in R.C.P.No.12 of 1982 filed two revision petitions R.C.R.P.No.48 of 1985 and R.C.R.P.No.49 of 1985. The Appellate Court allowed the appeals of the landlord and dismissed the appeals filed by the tenants. The tenant in R.C.P.No.12 of 1982 filed two revision petitions R.C.R.P.No.48 of 1985 and R.C.R.P.No.49 of 1985. He filed two revision petitions, since his appeal was dismissed and the appeal of the landlord was allowed. The tenant in R.C.P.No.13 of 1982 filed a revision before the District Court as R.C.R.P.No.50 of 1985. The tenant in R.C.P.No.13 of 1982 filed only one revision. The Revisional Court disposed of all the revision petitions by a common order. True copy of the common order is marked as Ext.P1 in all these original petitions. 2. The Revisional Court though dismissed all the writ petitions filed by the tenants held that the order of eviction can be executed only if the landlord produces a licence for dealing in rubber before the Execution Court. This condition according to the landlord is a condition which is practically impossible to be performed. He submits that it is not possible to obtain licence without satisfying the authorities issuing the licence that the applicant has got a building for doing the business in his exclusive possession So long as, the building continues with the tenants, it is not at all possible for the landlord to obtain the licence and if he is not getting the licence he will not get possession of the building. This is simply creating a vicious circle and the landlord is prevented from executing the order. In short, what has really happened is that even though the landlord has satisfied the court that he needs the building bona fide for own occupation and that he has established the ease under S.11 (3) of the Act, no relief is granted to the landlord. This is the main ground of attack made in these original petitions against the common order passed by the Revisional Authority. Before considering this question, I may now advert to certain proceedings that took place before the filing of these original petitions. 3. The landlord has filed three civil revision petitions C.R.P.Nos.1311 and 1312 of 1986 and C.R.P.No.1313 of 1986. C.R.P.No.1311 of 1986 was from R.C.R.P.No.48 of 1985 and C.R.P.No.1312 of 1986 from R.C.R.P.No.49 of 1985 and C.R.P.No.1313 of 1986 was from R.C.R.P.No.50 of 1985. 4. C.R.P.No.1312 of 1986 challenging the common order was allowed on 29-8-1986 by this court. 3. The landlord has filed three civil revision petitions C.R.P.Nos.1311 and 1312 of 1986 and C.R.P.No.1313 of 1986. C.R.P.No.1311 of 1986 was from R.C.R.P.No.48 of 1985 and C.R.P.No.1312 of 1986 from R.C.R.P.No.49 of 1985 and C.R.P.No.1313 of 1986 was from R.C.R.P.No.50 of 1985. 4. C.R.P.No.1312 of 1986 challenging the common order was allowed on 29-8-1986 by this court. True copy of the order is marked as Ext.P2. I am told that the tenant filed a review petition before this court. It was dismissed. The tenant took up the matter before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court set aside Ext.P2 order and held that no revision under S.115 C.P.C. is entertainable against the revisional order passed by the Revisional Authority under S.20 of the Act. Allowing the appeal, the Supreme Court observed thus: "In view of the judgment of this Court in Aundal Ammal v. Sadasivan Pillai (1987 (1) S.C.C. 183), the order and judgment of the High Court of Kerala, dated the 29th August, 1986 are set aside. This, however, will not prevent the rights, if any, of the parties to move the High Court under Art.227 of the Constitution of India." C.R.P.No.1311 of 1986 was dismissed by this Court. While dismissing the C.R.P., this court observed that the dismissal will not prevent the landlord from filing a petition under Art.227. 5. C.R.P.No.1313 of 1986 was dismissed by a Single Bench of this Court observing that "at this length of time I am not inclined either to grant permission to convert the revision petition into an original petition or to grant liberty to approach this Court under Art.226 and 227 of the Constitution." Counsel for the petitioner submitted before me that in fact the civil revision petition was filed only in 1986 and this court dismissed the civil revision petition 4th February, 1987. 6. The net result of these proceedings is that in two of the civil revision petitions filed against the common order, the petitioner obtained specific permission to file an original petition under Art.227. This permission was obtained in one case by the Supreme Court and the other case by this court. But in the third revision petition this court specifically denied the petitioner the right to file an original petition under Art.227 of the Constitution. The position created by the observations of this court and the Supreme Court really creates difficulty for the petitioner. But in the third revision petition this court specifically denied the petitioner the right to file an original petition under Art.227 of the Constitution. The position created by the observations of this court and the Supreme Court really creates difficulty for the petitioner. Obviously, the observations are inconsistent. But one fact assumes great importance and that is the Supreme Court thought while disposing of an appeal filed by the tenant to observe that the landlord-petitioner can seek appropriate remedies under Art.226 and 227 if so advised. Counsel for the petitioner submitted that since the Supreme Court allowed the landlord to file a petition under Art.227 of the Constitution, it has to be treated as a binding decision ratio of which is applicable to all three original petitions now considered by this court. The counsel also submitted that a Single Bench of this Court has given the petitioner the liberty to file an original petition against the common order in one of the civil revision petitions filed by the petitioner. Taking these circumstances, the petitioner submits that the observation of this court in C. R. P. No. 1313 of 1986, should not stand in the way of maintaining the original petition. 7. Counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the observation in the order in C. R. P. No. 1313 of 1986 is totally without jurisdiction. No permission is required for the petitioner to file an original petition before this court challenging the common order. The law on this matter has to be understood clearly and plainly. The question whether a writ petition is maintainable or not is for the court which deals with the original petition. It is difficult to foreclose a suitor from filing a writ petition making certain observations in an earlier proceedings under S.115 C. P. C. between the parties. If the court which deals with an original petition feels that the earlier judgment in the civil revision petition is a bar to entertain this original petition, of course, that court can dismiss the original petition on that ground. If the court which deals with an original petition feels that the earlier judgment in the civil revision petition is a bar to entertain this original petition, of course, that court can dismiss the original petition on that ground. Counsel submits that when the civil revision petition is disposed of observing that this court has no jurisdiction to entertain the petitioner under S.115 C. P. C., there is no jurisdiction for this court to preclude the petitioner-landlord from approaching this court under Art.227 of the Constitution, no effective order binding the parties can be passed in a petition not entertainable by the Court. 8. Counsel referred me to several decisions stating that the principle of res judicata is applicable only if the decision is rendered with jurisdiction and tells me that when the court refuses to entertain a civil revision petition on the ground that it has no jurisdiction, any observation in that judgment will not operate as res judicata. Counsel referred me to the decisions reported in Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal and Others v. Dossibai (AIR 1971 SC 2355), John and Oths. v. Mathew and Others (1975 K.L.T. 68), Palaniappa Chettiar v. Parvathi Bai (AIR 1972 Mad. 52) and Abdul Hamid v. Additional District and Sessions Judge (1977 (1) SCC 5). In the last mentioned decision, the Supreme Court has observed thus: "The point for consideration is whether a petitioner after withdrawing a writ petition filed by him in the High Court under Art.226 of the Constitution of India without the permission to institute a fresh petition can file a fresh writ petition in the High Court under that Article. On this point the decision in Darayo case is of no assistance. But we are of the view that the principle underlying R.1 of Order XX1II of the Code should be extended in the interests of administration of justice to cases of withdrawal of writ petition also, not on the ground of res judicata but on the ground of public policy as explained above. It would also discourage the litigant from indulging in bench - hunting tactics. In any event there is no justifiable reason in such a case to permit a petitioner to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Art.226 of the Constitution once again. It would also discourage the litigant from indulging in bench - hunting tactics. In any event there is no justifiable reason in such a case to permit a petitioner to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Art.226 of the Constitution once again. While the withdrawal of a writ petition filed in a High Court without permission to file a fresh writ petition may not bar other remedies like a suit or a petition under Art.32 of the Constitution of India since such withdrawal does not amount to res judicata, the remedy under Art.226 of the Constitution of India should be deemed to have been abandoned by the petitioner in respect 9f the cause of action relied on in the writ petition when he withdraws it without such permission." The observation above quoted may not be of much help to resolve the question. It gives the right approach that has to be made in these matters. 9. It is better now to recapitulate the essence of what has really happened in these cases. The landlord-petitioner in these original petitions was aggrieved by the observation in the common order that he must produce the Rubber Board licence before execution of the order filed three civil revision petitions. All these civil revision petitions were initially entertained by this court. Since at the time of filing these revision petitions, the petitioner had the legal right to approach this court under S.115 C. P. C. since the weighty pronouncement by a Full Bench of this court, has held that an aggrieved party can file a revision petition under S.115 C. P. C. against the order of the revisional authority under S.20 of the Rent Control Act. It has to be noted that one of the civil revision petitions was allowed by this court. The appeal filed against the order of this court allowing the civil revision petition, the Supreme Court has said that the landlord-petitioner can approach this court under Art.227 of the Constitution. I am of the view that there is much force in the argument that the observation made by this court that the landlord is precluded from filing an original petition under Art.226 and 227 is ineffective and without jurisdiction. Further, in these cases, I have to find a just solution to meet the ends of justice. I am of the view that there is much force in the argument that the observation made by this court that the landlord is precluded from filing an original petition under Art.226 and 227 is ineffective and without jurisdiction. Further, in these cases, I have to find a just solution to meet the ends of justice. A just solution for the particular case is the crucial fact in the decision process. I always try to remember that equitable rule of decision that consideration of justice is directly relevant to a justification of a decision. I hold that the submission made by the counsel for the respondents-tenants that these original petitions are not maintainable is unsustainable. I hold that all the three civil revision petitions are maintainable and those petitions have to be decided on merits. 10. Now, I turn to the merits. Of course, I am exercising my power under Art.227 and the power is a limited one and I can exercise that power only to keep the statutory authorities within their bounds of jurisdiction. The question is whether the revisional court has exceeded its jurisdiction. The Appellate Authority found clearly and plainly that the landlord-petitioner is entitled to an order for eviction because he has established his case under S.11 (3) of the Act. The revisional authority has also very clearly held that the finding of the Appellate Authority in regard to S.11(3) is absolutely correct. The revisional court observed that "P.W.1 and P.W.3 have sworn to the bona fide requirement of the landlord that his grandson who has completed his education and who is dependant on him needs the petition schedule building for conducting a business in rubber and that the landlord has no other building in his possession for providing accommodation to his grandson. So, both the courts below have rightly come to the conclusion that the bona fide need alleged by the landlord is true and valid". When once the bona fide need is found in favour of the landlord S.11 (3) is attracted and the statutory authorities are bound to give an order in favour of the landlord. The section itself takes care of a situation where a landlord after obtaining an order for eviction on the ground of bona fide need has not used the building for the need for which he has obtained an order for eviction. The section itself takes care of a situation where a landlord after obtaining an order for eviction on the ground of bona fide need has not used the building for the need for which he has obtained an order for eviction. S.11 (12) of the Act provides that: "Where a landlord who has obtained possession of a building in pursuance of an order under sub-s. (3). does not occupy it without reasonable cause within one month of the date of obtaining possession, or having so occupied it. vacates it without reasonable cause within six months of such date, the tenant,who has been evicted may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing that he shall be restored to possession of the building, and the Court shall make an order accordingly notwithstanding anything contained in S.4". 11. In the light of this provision, I have to examine whether the condition added by the Revisional Court that the order of eviction can be executed only if the landlord produced a licence for dealing in rubber is with jurisdiction or not. The landlord-petitioner before me has produced Exts.P3 and P4 in O. P. No. 892 of 1987. For receiving Exts. P3 and P4 he has filed a C.M.P. No. 17018 of 1988 which I have allowed today. Ext. P3 is instruction from the Government of India, Ministry of Commerce, in regard to grant of licence to deal with rubber. This gives instructions to be complied with by persons who want to obtain a license to deal in rubber. In Para.2 of Ext. P3 it is stated that "the premises should have separate enclosures and separate entry. It should be in the exclusive possession of the applicant and it should have separate access from the public road". In view of this instruction, counsel for the petitioner submits that it is not possible for the petitioner to obtain a licence before actual eviction is effected. By the order of the revisional authority Ext. P1, the licence has to be produced for obtaining exclusive possession of the building in question. Counsel submits that this is impossible. 12. I feel that the submission made by the counsel is absolutely correct. By the order of the revisional authority Ext. P1, the licence has to be produced for obtaining exclusive possession of the building in question. Counsel submits that this is impossible. 12. I feel that the submission made by the counsel is absolutely correct. The question is whether the revisional authority has got jurisdiction to clamp such an impossible condition with the order thereby, making the order futile and really though allowing the application in effect it becomes a dismissal of the application. 13. First of all I have to consider whether any such condition can be imposed by the Revisional Court. It may not be very correct to say that the revisional authority has absolutely no jurisdiction to impose certain conditions when allowing an application under S.11 (3). Of course, reasonable conditions can be attached to the order allowing eviction; eg. granting a little time to the tenant to surrender the building or like conditions. But the question is even though the Revisional Court has got the power to add certain conditions, can the Revisional Authority impose a condition which is practically impossible for performance, and if such a condition is imposed whether it will be beyond the jurisdiction of the revisional court. I am sure that if it is beyond the jurisdiction this court can correct it by exercising its power of superintendence under Art.227. I have no hesitation to hold the power of the revisional authority do not extend to add such impossible conditions. 14. In allowing C.R.P. No. 1312 of 1986 His Lordship Justice Pareed Pillay observed that "the condition imposed by the learned District Judge that eviction can be granted only on production of the licence issued by the Rubber Board is hereby deleted". His Lordship thought that the condition is impossible of performance and so allowed the civil revision petition. 15. I think the condition imposed in the order Ext. P1 that the landlord should produce the licence for the purpose of execution for obtaining actual possession of the building is a condition which the revisional court has no jurisdiction to impose on the petitioner. Hence, I have to allow the original petition. I make it clear that the condition that the petitioner in these original petitions should produce the licence is deleted from Ext. P1 order. The landlord can execute the order without producing the licence. Original Petitions are allowed. 16. Hence, I have to allow the original petition. I make it clear that the condition that the petitioner in these original petitions should produce the licence is deleted from Ext. P1 order. The landlord can execute the order without producing the licence. Original Petitions are allowed. 16. Counsel for the respondents-tenants submitted before me that it is very difficult for the respondents to find an alternate accommodation and this court should grant a little time to surrender the buildings in question. The request for time was seriously opposed by the counsel for the petitioner. Considering the difficulty to get an alternate accommodation, I feel that the tenants should be given a little time to surrender the building on condition that the tenants should file an undertaking before the Rent Control Court that they will surrender the building unconditionally within four months from today. The undertaking has to be filed in the form of an affidavit within six weeks from today. If the undertaking is not filed within the time stipulated above, the landlord can execute the orders as such. Issue photo copy on usual terms.