JUDGMENT : D.P. Mohapatra, J. - One of the member of the second party in the proceeding u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure (for short "Code of Criminal Procedure") has filed this application u/s 482. Code of Criminal Procedure to set aside the order passed by the City Magistrate, Cuttack in Criminal Misc. Case. No. 724 of 1983 confirmed by the Addl. Sessions Judge, Cuttack in Criminal Revision No. 40 of 1986 declaring the first party to be in possession of the disputed properties on the date of the preliminary order. 2. The proceeding was initiated at the instance of opposite party No. 1 (hereafter referred to as the "first party") on 9-11-1983. It was alleged by the first party inter alia, that he had purchased the disputed land and was possession the same. A Title suit bearing No. 15 of 1975 had been filed by him against the Petitioner Hari Singh (hereinafter referred to as "second party") wherein right title, interest and possession of the first party was declared. The appeal. Title Appeal No. 53 of 1976 filed by the second party was dismissed. Thereafter the first party filed Execution Case No. 13 of 1976 in which the said second party was evicted and delivery of possession was given to the first party sometime in 1976 through Court. Since then the first party has been in possession of the suit land and is occupying two thatched rooms standing thereon. Thereafter on several occasions the second party threatened to dispossess the first party. As stated by the first party there was likelihood of breach of the peace and he sought for immediate action by the learned Magistrate by initiating proceeding u/s 145 Code of Criminal Procedure The learned Magistrate on being satisfied about the existence of likelihood of breach of the peace concerning the disputed land passed the preliminary order on 9-1-1983. 3. The gist of the case of the second party was that he is in possession of the disputed land despite the decree of the civil court passed against him. Indeed it was his case that he was never dispossessed by the first party in the Execution Case in which, only symbolical delivery of possession had been effected. Further, the settlement authorities recorded that he was in forcible possession of the disputed land which is evident from the record of rights. 4. Indeed it was his case that he was never dispossessed by the first party in the Execution Case in which, only symbolical delivery of possession had been effected. Further, the settlement authorities recorded that he was in forcible possession of the disputed land which is evident from the record of rights. 4. Both the parties led evidence in support of their respective claims. During pendency of the proceeding, a petition was filed before the learned Magistrate on 8-2-1985 by the first party that on 5-2-19-85 at 9.30 p.m. the second party wrongfully and forcibly occupied the disputed land. On consideration of the materials on record the learned Magistrate came to hold that the first party was in actual possession of the disputed land till 4-2-1985 and as such he was in possession of the said property on the date of the preliminary order. He did not accept the case of the second party that no actual delivery of possession was effected in favour of the first party in the Execution Case and the second party continued to be in possession of the property even thereafter. 5. The second party challenged the order of the learned Magistrate in revision which was disposed of by the Additional Sessions Judge, Cuttack on 20th August, 1987. On perusal of the order of the learned Addl. Sessions Judge it appears that on a fresh assessment of the materials on record the revisional court concurred with the findings of the trial court accepting the case of the first party and rejecting that of the second party. The learned Magistrate as well as the learned Addl Sessions Judge considered the evidence led by the second party, particularly the entry in the settlement record of rights showing forcible possession of the disputed land by the second party and did not accept the said entry since it was not supported by any acceptable evidence and indeed it was against the materials available on record. The revisional court in paragraph 5 of the order further observed that the sale deed in favour of Sara Bewa on the basis of which the aforementioned entry in the remarks column of the record of rights was made was held to be an invalid document creating no right, title and interest in favour of Sara Bewa in respect at the disputed property in Title Suit No. 15 of 1975. Regarding the complaint of the first party that he was forcibly dispossessed from the disputed property on 5-2-1985, the learned Addl. Sessions Judge referring to the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2 observed that after taking forcible possession of the disputed land for about twenty-five days, the members of the second party vacated the said property after a report to the police was made by the first party. 6. The main thrust of the submissions made by Shri R.N. Nayak appearing for the Petitioner was that since the admitted position in the case is that there was a previous civil suit in which fight, title, interest and possession of the first party was declared and as alleged by the first party possession of the property was delivered to him in the Execution Case arising out of the said suit, the learned magistrate had no jurisdiction to initiate the proceeding u/s 145. Code of Criminal Procedure and instead ought to have taken recourse to Section 107, Code of Criminal Procedure. The learned Counsel has placed reliance on the decision of this Court in the case of Banamali Mohapatra Vs. Bajra Nahak and Others, . 7. I have carefully perused the aforementioned decision. In my view it does not lay down a general proposition as urged by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner and it is also distinguishable on facts from the present case. In the decided case, the successful party in the civil suit had moves the Addl. Sessions Judge to quash the proceeding u/s 145. Code of Criminal Procedure initiated by the learned Magistrate. The Court declined to quash the proceeding holding that as more than one year had elapsed from the date of the judgment of the High Court in Second Appeal and the date on which the Petitioner himself sought the protection of the Magistrate, the opposite party might have obtained forcible possession of the land notwithstanding the order of injunction passed against them. It also observed that all the members of the opposite party were not parties in the previous litigation and that consequently the judgment of the High Court may not bind these persons who were not parties. It also observed that all the members of the opposite party were not parties in the previous litigation and that consequently the judgment of the High Court may not bind these persons who were not parties. Considering the facts of the case this Court held that all parties in the proceeding u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure were also parties in the previous civil litigation and therefore they were obviously bound by the decision in the said litigation. While granting the prayer of the Petitioner to quash the proceeding u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure this Court observed that the decree of the Civil Court ought to be respected by criminal courts if the opposite party had come forward with the case that after the successful termination of the second appeal in the High Court in favour of the Petitioner the latter again resettled the lands with the members of the opposite party there may be some justification for drawing up a proceeding u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure but as the opposite party did not put forward any such plea in the proceeding u/s 145 Code of Criminal Procedure and they completely suppressed the fact that there was a previous titillation and tried that they were in possession all along, such a plea cannot possibly be accepted in view of the decision in the civil litigation. The Court further observed that even if they attempt forcibly to take possession that would be disobedience of the order of injunction of the Civil Court which ought to be punished according to law. In a case of this kind the successful party in the civil litigation must be maintained in possession and any attempt to interfere with his possession should be prevented only by taking recourse to proceedings u/s 107 or Section 144, Code of Criminal Procedure if it becomes necessary. In the present case, it appears from the records that no attempt was made either before the learned Magistrate or even before the learned Addl. Sessions Judge for quashing the proceeding u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure in view of the previous civil litigation between the parties. For the first time this contention is being raised before this Court. In the present case, it appears from the records that no attempt was made either before the learned Magistrate or even before the learned Addl. Sessions Judge for quashing the proceeding u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure in view of the previous civil litigation between the parties. For the first time this contention is being raised before this Court. Further there is nothing on record to show that there was any decree in the civil suit permanently injuncting the members of second party to come upon the land which they can be said to have violated. In the present case there was a gap of more than seven years between the delivery of possession in the Execution. Case and the preliminary order passed by the, learned Magistrate and the successful party in the civil litigation applied to the learned Magistrate for initiating the proceeding u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure. In the said proceeding, as it is revealed from the orders of the learned Magistrate and the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, due respect has been shown to the decree of the Civil Court and possession of the successful party (first party) has been upheld in this case. In these circumstances in my view no parallel can be drawn between the decision of this Court in the case of Banamali Mohapatra (supra) and the present case. 8. Section 145, Code of Criminal Procedure confers power on executive Magistrate to intervene and pass a temporary order in a dispute between parties regarding possession of land which threatens to develop into use of force causing a breach of the peace. To prevent such danger the speedy remedy provided is the drawing up of a proceeding by passing a preliminary order under Sub-section (1) against all the parties concerned in the dispute, calling upon them to appear on a specified date and time and put in written statement in support of their claims to actual possession and to decide the question of actual possession and maintaining the possession of that party who in the decision of the Magistrate was in actual physical possession or who was dispossessed from such possession within two months next before the date of the part of the police officer or other information about the dispute leading to the institution of the proceeding and forbidding all exerbances until evicted in due course of law. The decrees in the civil court or orders relating to possession are not infrequency relied upon by one party or others in support of the possession in proceeding u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure. They have this uses but up to a certain point as the magistrate is concerned only with present actual possession and not who has or bad the title or right to possession by virtue of the decree or order. There has been a mass of decisions on this subject question and they are not all agreed. The position that emerges on analysis of the views taken in the decisions is that decrees or orders of civil courts relating to possession ought ordinarily to be respected and giver effect to by the Magistrate unless and until there is something shown which might induce him to hold that subsequent to the delivery of possession something has happened which had the effect of dispossessing the party to whom possession was delivered but that does not mean that wherever there was previous civil litigation between the parties recourse can never be had to Section 145. Code of Criminal Procedure even if the Magistrate is satisfied that there exists likelihood of breach of the peace relating to possession of the disputed land. Whether initiation of the proceeding u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure will be appropriately or not depends on the facts and circumstances of the case. It delivery of possession under the decree of the civil court has been recent or within a time not remote, then it is the duty of the Magistrate to maintain the right of the party declared by the Civil Court and the successful party therein should be given all protection to render all the litigations by proceedings u/s 107, Code of Criminal Procedure against the unsuccessful party. While recent decree or delivery of possession may raise a presumption which is rebuttable it is not in any way conclusive and cannot be taken as depriving the Magistrate of his jurisdiction to initiate a proceeding u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure. 9. Though the learned Counsel for the Petitioner made a feable attempt to assail the order of the learned Addl. Sessions Judge on the ground of erroneous appreciation of the materials on record. I find no substance whatsoever in the said contention. 9. Though the learned Counsel for the Petitioner made a feable attempt to assail the order of the learned Addl. Sessions Judge on the ground of erroneous appreciation of the materials on record. I find no substance whatsoever in the said contention. Further keeping in view the limited scope of this proceeding u/s 482, Code of Criminal Procedure as enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of Madhu Limaye Vs. The State of Maharashtra. I find little scope to interfere with the impugned orders on this score. 10. In the result, the petition is devoid of merit and it is accordingly dismissed. Revision dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed