Judgment :- PADMINI JESUDURAI J. The petitioner, who is the first accused in C.C. No. 174 of 1985 on the file of the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate (E. O. I.), Egmore, Madras, facing trial for offences under sections 120B, 420, 467, 471 and 379, I. P. C., and other offences under the Indian Penal Code and section 277 of the Income-tax Act, invokes the inherent powers of this court under section 482, Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, to quash the trial Facts briefly are : The respondent had filed a complaint against the petitioner and 19 others for the above offence relating to forging tax deduction certificates issued by the Madras Race Club at Madras an Uthagamandalam, forging and submitting false income returns and obtaining refund orders of income-tax deducted from the prize-winners, encashing the same and appropriating them to themselves. The petitioner is an income-tax practitioner, while the co-accused are his father, his brothers, his mother, his wife, all of the undivided family and the typist and others employed under him in his office as also certain employees in the race club. All the accused had conspired together to obtain such refund orders and, in pursuance of the conspiracy, had committed the various offences. Initially, after the case was filed, the petitioner along with certain co-accused filed Crl. M. P. No. 3711 of 1985 in this court on May 13, 1985, under section 488, Cr. P. C., for quashing the complaint on the basis of certain alleged illegalities. The co-accused also filed different petitions. This court heard all the petitions together and passed a common order on January 28, 1987, dismissing the above petitions, except with reference to certain offences, It is stated that the special leave petition filed by the petitioners before the Supreme Court was also dismissed at the admission stage. Thereafter, the prosecution had examined 60 witnesses and had marked 250 exhibits. Neither the petitioner nor the co-accused had cross-examined any of the witnesses. The trial court posted the case to August 1, 1988 for questioning the petitioner and the co-accused under section 313, Cr. Thereafter, the prosecution had examined 60 witnesses and had marked 250 exhibits. Neither the petitioner nor the co-accused had cross-examined any of the witnesses. The trial court posted the case to August 1, 1988 for questioning the petitioner and the co-accused under section 313, Cr. P. C. At that stage, the petitioner has commenced his second round of quash petitionsThe fact that an earlier quash petition was filed and was dismissed and that the special leave petition was also dismissed are not mentioned in this quash petition but has been brought to our knowledge only by learned counsel for the respondent to whom notice was ordered by this court even at the admission stage Thiru A. Natarajan, learned counsel for the petitioner, urged the following contentions in support of his prayer (1) The petitioner is an income-tax practitioner and section 277 of the Income-tax Act will not apply to him since the same would apply only to an assessee (2) Sanction for prosecution for offences under the Indian Penal Code has not been given but has been accorded only for prosecution under section 277 of the Income-tax Act (3) The respondent is not competent to file a complaint, since he is the Chief Commissioner (Administration), who, in 1985, was not competent to file a complaint (4) Notice under section 276 CC of the Income-tax Act has not been given and hence prosecution is premature (5) The assessees had not been residing within the jurisdiction of the Chief Commissioner who has, therefore, no territorial jurisdiction to file a complaint (6) The complaint does not show tinder what provision of law it has been filed Learned standing counsel countered all the above contentions. Reliance had been placed upon certain decisions by learned counsel for the respondent and learned counsel for the petitioner, to which I shall refer in the course of the discussion. Contention No. 1 According to learned counsel for the petitioner, only an assessee can be brought within the scope of section 277 of the Act and the petitioner who is an income-tax practitioner cannot be made liable since he is only acting in his professional capacity as an income-tax practitioner and cannot be held liable for any false verification or any false statement in the accounts made by the assessee. Reliance was placed upon a decision rendered by me in NavaratHna, Navarathna and Co. Reliance was placed upon a decision rendered by me in NavaratHna, Navarathna and Co. v. State (By Income-tax officer) [1987]LW(Crl.)326.The above contention of learned counsel cannot be accepted. Section 277 makes it clear that any person who makes a false statement in any verification under the Act or delivers an account or statement which is false and which he either knows or believes to be false shall be punished. This court in M. R. Pratap v. V. M. Muthukrishnan, ITO 1977 (47) CC 815 , 1977 (110) ITR 655 , has held that the expression "person" occurring in section 277 must be given its ordinary dictionary meaning which would include any individual who fails to carry out the duty imposed on him by the specific provisions of the Act and is not used in reference only to an assessee as defined in the Act. The complaint clearly shows that the petitioner is not tried for anything done by him in his capacity as an income-tax practitioner. On the other hand, the allegation is that the petitioner, in conspiracy with the other accused and certain employees of the race club, applied for duplicate tax deduction certificates in the names of winners, forged the signatures of the original winners, made false documents and filed the returns containing false declarations and forged signatures and, on the basis of all these, obtained tax refund certificates, which were encashed by them. The assessees had not come into the picture at all. Their names had been used by the petitioner and the co-accused, since they were the winners. The assessees were unaware of what had been done in their names. Under these circumstances, my decision referred to by learned counsel for the petitioner can have no application since, in that case, an auditor who had merely prepared the returns of the assessee on the basis of the materials placed before him, which later on were found to be false was held to be not liable. In the instant case, however, the petitioner was not acting as an income-tax practitioner for anyone. The above contention is rejectedContention No. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner would say that the Commissioner has sanctioned prosecution only for an offence under section 277 of the Act and that prosecution for the offence under the Indian Penal Code have not been sanctioned and that, therefore, the proceedings have to be quashed. The above contention is rejectedContention No. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner would say that the Commissioner has sanctioned prosecution only for an offence under section 277 of the Act and that prosecution for the offence under the Indian Penal Code have not been sanctioned and that, therefore, the proceedings have to be quashed. I am not able to accept the above contention. Prosecution under this Act has to be at the instance of the Commissioner as seen from section 279 of the Act. Offences under the Indian Penal Code are not included in the above section. Only certain offences under the Act are mentioned in the above section. Contention No. 3 It is contended that the respondent, since he is the Chief Commissioner (Administration) is not competent to file a complaint since, in 1985, the Chief Commissioner could not file a complaint. The above contention is untenable. In view of the specific averment made in paragraph 2.3 in the complaint, it is stated thus. ."The respondent is also the Commissioner of Income-tax, Tamil Nadu No. 1, Madras and the complaint was being filed at the instance of the Commissioner of Income-tax, Tamil Nadu, Commissioner of Income-tax, Tamil Nadu IV, Commissioner of Income-tax, Tamil Nadu V, Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay City X, and Commissioner of Income-tax, Trivandrum, in whose jurisdiction the offence under the Income-tax Act had been committed." * The Supreme Court in T. S. Baliah v. T. S. Rangachari, ITO , has held that the expression "person" occurring in section 277 must be given its ordinary dictionary meaning which would include any individual who fails to carry out the duty imposed on him by the specific provisions of the Act and is not used in reference only to an assessee as defined in the Act. The complaint clearly shows that the petitioner is not tried for anything done by him in his capacity as an income-tax practitioner. On the other hand, the allegation is that the petitioner, in conspiracy with the other accused and certain employees of the race club, applied for duplicate tax deduction certificates in the names of winners, forged the signatures of the original winners, made false documents and filed the returns containing false declarations and forged signatures and, on the basis of all these, obtained tax refund certificates, which were encashed by them. The assessees had not come into the picture at all. The assessees had not come into the picture at all. Their names had been used by the petitioner and the co-accused, since they were the winners. The assessees were unaware of what had been done in their names. Under these circumstances, my decision referred to by learned counsel for the petitioner can have no application since, in that case, an auditor who had merely prepared the returns of the assessee on the basis of the materials placed before him, which later on were found to be false was held to be not liable. In the instant case, however, the petitioner was not acting as an income-tax practitioner for anyone. The above contention is rejectedContention No. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner would say that the Commissioner has sanctioned prosecution only for an offence under section 277 of the Act and that prosecution for the offence under the Indian Penal Code have not been sanctioned and that, therefore, the proceedings have to be quashed. I am not able to accept the above contention. Prosecution under this Act has to be at the instance of the Commissioner as seen from section 279 of the Act. Offences under the Indian Penal Code are not included in the above section. Only certain offences under the Act are mentioned in the above section. Contention No. 3. It is contended that the respondent, since he is the Chief Commissioner (Administration) is not competent to file a complaint since, in 1985, the Chief Commissioner could not file a complaint. The above contention is untenable. In view of the specific averment made in paragraph 2.3 in the complaint, it is stated thus. Contention No. 3. It is contended that the respondent, since he is the Chief Commissioner (Administration) is not competent to file a complaint since, in 1985, the Chief Commissioner could not file a complaint. The above contention is untenable. In view of the specific averment made in paragraph 2.3 in the complaint, it is stated thus. ."The respondent is also the Commissioner of Income-tax, Tamil Nadu No. 1, Madras and the complaint was being filed at the instance of the Commissioner of Income-tax, Tamil Nadu, Commissioner of Income-tax, Tamil Nadu IV, Commissioner of Income-tax, Tamil Nadu V, Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay City X, and Commissioner of Income-tax, Trivandrum, in whose jurisdiction the offence under the Income-tax Act had been committed." * The Supreme Court in T. S. Baliah v. T. S. Rangachari, ITO , has held that the expression "person" occurring in section 277 must be given its ordinary dictionary meaning which would include any individual who fails to carry out the duty imposed on him by the specific provisions of the Act and is not used in reference only to an assessee as defined in the Act. The complaint clearly shows that the petitioner is not tried for anything done by him in his capacity as an income-tax practitioner. On the other hand, the allegation is that the petitioner, in conspiracy with the other accused and certain employees of the race club, applied for duplicate tax deduction certificates in the names of winners, forged the signatures of the original winners, made false documents and filed the returns containing false declarations and forged signatures and, on the basis of all these, obtained tax refund certificates, which were encashed by them. The assessees had not come into the picture at all. Their names had been used by the petitioner and the co-accused, since they were the winners. The assessees were unaware of what had been done in their names. Under these circumstances, my decision referred to by learned counsel for the petitioner can have no application since, in that case, an auditor who had merely prepared the returns of the assessee on the basis of the materials placed before him, which later on were found to be false was held to be not liable. In the instant case, however, the petitioner was not acting as an income-tax practitioner for anyone. The above contention is rejectedContention No. 2. In the instant case, however, the petitioner was not acting as an income-tax practitioner for anyone. The above contention is rejectedContention No. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner would say that the Commissioner has sanctioned prosecution only for an offence under section 277 of the Act and that prosecution for the offence under the Indian Penal Code have not been sanctioned and that, therefore, the proceedings have to be quashed. I am not able to accept the above contention. Prosecution under this Act has to be at the instance of the Commissioner as seen from section 279 of the Act. Offences under the Indian Penal Code are not included in the above section. Only certain offences under the Act are mentioned in the above section. Contention No. 3. It is contended that the respondent, since he is the Chief Commissioner (Administration) is not competent to file a complaint since, in 1985, the Chief Commissioner could not file a complaint. The above contention is untenable. In view of the specific averment made in paragraph 2.3 in the complaint, it is stated thus. "The respondent is also the Commissioner of Income-tax, Tamil Nadu No. 1, Madras and the complaint was being filed at the instance of the Commissioner of Income-tax, Tamil Nadu, Commissioner of Income-tax, Tamil Nadu IV, Commissioner of Income-tax, Tamil Nadu V, Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay City X, and Commissioner of Income-tax, Trivandrum, in whose jurisdiction the offence under the Income-tax Act had been committed." * The Supreme Court in T. S. Baliah v. T. S. Rangachari, ITO 1969 AIR(SC) 701, 1969 CAR 32, 1969 (72) ITR 787, 1969 (3) SCR 65 , 1969 (2) MLJ 9, 1969 (2) MLJ(SC) 9, 1969 (1) SCJ 890, 1969 (2) MLJ 9, while explaining the words "at the instance of" occurring in section 52 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (its parallel provision in the present Act being 279), observed as follows (at page 795). "There is no statutory requirement that the complaint petition itself must be filed by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner. "There is no statutory requirement that the complaint petition itself must be filed by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner. The clause 'at his instance' in section 53 of the 1922 Act only means 'on his authority' and it is, therefore, sufficient compliance with the statutory requirement if the complaint petition is filed by the respondent on being authorised by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner." * The third contention of learned counsel, therefore, has to be rejected Contention No. 4 Learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that a notice under section 276 CC of the Act is contemplated and that, therefore, there cannot be a prosecution for an offence under section 277 without a notice. I am unable to appreciate the above legal contention. Section 276 CC of the Act punishes one who wilfully fails to furnish in due time the return of income which he is required to furnish under section 139(1) or by notice given under section 139(2) or section 148. The present prosecution against the petitioner is not for failure to furnish any return of income. On the contrary, the prosecution is for having forged returns, made false statements in verifications and the statements of account, for having forged the above statements in the names of persons, who were real winners in the race and, on the basis of those forged documents, for having obtained refund of income-tax. No notice is contemplated for an offence under section 277 of the Act. The contention is rejected. Contention No. 5. It is next contended that the assessees had not been residing within the jurisdiction of the respondent, and that, therefore, he has no competence to file a complaint. As already stated earlier, in paragraph 3 of the complaint, it is clearly mentioned that a complaint is being filed at the instance of the different Commissioners of Income-tax of different circles in whose jurisdiction the offence under the Income-tax Act had been committed. It is also stated that the respondent, besides being the Commissioner of Income-tax, Tamil Nadu Circle I, is also the administrative head of the Income-tax Department in Tamil Nadu and the Income-tax Officers and other income-tax authorities are administratively subordinate to him. The Act does not require anything more. This contention is also rejectedContention No. 6. It is also stated that the respondent, besides being the Commissioner of Income-tax, Tamil Nadu Circle I, is also the administrative head of the Income-tax Department in Tamil Nadu and the Income-tax Officers and other income-tax authorities are administratively subordinate to him. The Act does not require anything more. This contention is also rejectedContention No. 6. It is stated that the complaint does not show under what provision of law it has been filed, and that, therefore, the entire proceedings are illegal. This point has already been taken in the earlier quash petition though in a slightly different form. This court has held that the complaint is one under section 200, Cr. P. C., and, it being a complaint given by a public servant, does not call for examination of the complainant and the witnesses, when the complaint clearly shows that it has been given by the public servant acting in the discharge of his official duties. This contention also is without merit. In the result, the petition is dismissed.