Judgment Khastgir, J. In this application under Article 227 of the Constitution and under section 115 CPC the question which calls for determination is with regard to the jurisdiction of the learned Referee under the West Bengal Shops and Establishments Act. Being aggrieved by an order passed by the learned Chief Judge, Small Causes Court dated 2nd February, 1988 affirming the order passed by the learned Referee, the petitioners moved this application. The following facts are relevant for the purpose of determination of the point raised in this petition. 2. The petitioner is a partnership firm having its registered office at 29, Ganesh Chandra Avenue, who engaged respondent No. 1 as the salesman and custodian of the stores belonging to the petitioner's business. On 27th January, 1984 at about 1 P.M. it was the case of the petitioners that the respondent No. 3 removed 14 nos. electrical contractors of an estimated value of Rs.20,209.60 from the stores belonging to the petitioner company which was under the custody of the respondent No.4, R.B Raval. These contractors were purchased by the petitioner from M/s. Siemen's India Limited under invoice No. 2071/0037 dated 20.10.93 and invoice No. 2071/1801 dated 26.9.83. The petitioners were further aggrieved inasmuch as on an earlier occasion in the month of July 1981, there was a similar allegation of theft against respondent and his increment was stopped for one year for committing such offence. It was the petitioners' case that on 2nd February, 1984 the respondent No. 4 was charge sheeted for the aforesaid misconduct of removing the company's materials valued at Rs.20,209,60. By letter dated 2.2.84 respondent No. 4 was directed not to leave the station but to be present daily at the office during office hours so that the petitioners could complete the disciplinary proceeding against respondent No. 4 as expeditiously as possible. But instead of such direction, respondent No. 4 not only refused to accept the charge-sheet but also defied such direction of not leaving the station and did not join the place of work. But instead of such direction, respondent No. 4 not only refused to accept the charge-sheet but also defied such direction of not leaving the station and did not join the place of work. Instead of complying with the directions given by the petitioners and also instead of joining the place of business, it was the case of the petitioners, that respondent No. 4 filed an application before the learned Authority under the West Bengal Shops and Establishments Act on 21.4.84 for recovery of wages from December, 1983 to March 1984 for a total sum of Rs.2,800/-. Earlier thereto by letter daten 15.3.84 respondent No. 4 addressed a latter to the petitioner company stating that although he was attending to his duties with effect from 10.2.84 he was not being allowed to sign the attendance register and that his wages from December, 1983 upto February 1984 have not been paid by the petitioner company. The respondent No. 4 simultaneously pursuing his application filed before the Authority concerned under the West Bengal Shop and Establishments Act also wrote a letter to the Labour Commissioner raising an industrial dispute. Thereafter on 11.9.84 respondent No. 4 filed another application before the learned Authority under the West Bengal Shops and Establishments Act for recovery of his wages from April to August, 1984 for a sum of Rs.3,500/-. On 29.5.85, the learned Referee under the said Act directed the petitioner to pay the respondent a sum of Rs.6,300/- towards his pay for nine months from December, 1883 to August, 1984 at the rate of Rs.700/- per month. Even after having obtained the said order for payment of the arrears of salaries, the respondent No. 4 pursued the industrial dispute with the Assistant Labour Commissioner, West Bengal who commenced a conciliation proceeding with effect from 1.7.85 on the alleged grounds of refusal of service of the respondent No. 4. To that effect respondent No. 4 wrote a letter to the company. The petitioner by letter dated 21.1.85 asked the respondent No. 4 to join his duties immediately and to show cause to the charge sheet dated 2.2.84. 3. Being aggrieved by the order passed by the learned Referee the petitioner company preferred an appeal under section 14 of the West Bengal Shops and Establishments Act before the learned Chief judge Small Causes Court, Calcutta. 3. Being aggrieved by the order passed by the learned Referee the petitioner company preferred an appeal under section 14 of the West Bengal Shops and Establishments Act before the learned Chief judge Small Causes Court, Calcutta. Before such appeal was filed an application was taken out under section 5 for condonation of delay in filing such appeal. However, this application for condonation of delay was dismissed by order dated 17.1.86. Being aggrieved there the petitioners moved an application under Article 227 of the Constitution before this court. The said revisional application was disposed of by an order passed by Hon'ble Mr. justice Chittatosh Mookherjee (as His Lordship then was). Thereafter the delay was condoned and the appeal was heard and the impugned order passed on 2nd February 1988. The petitioner challenged the said order of the appellate court below on the ground that the court below had no jurisdiction under section 14(6) of the West Bengal Shops and Establishments Act. The learned Referee had no jurisdiction to enter into any disputed question of fact and law. Moreover, the respondent No. 1 has proceeded on the footing as if he was dealing with the matter under the Industrial Disputes Act whether his claim under the Act for alleged non-payment of wages and thereby the respondent has exceeded its jurisdiction by entertaining such claim in respect of which the applicant already has raised an industrial dispute before the proper forum. It was the case of the petitioner before us that the respondent No.2, the learned Referee, under the Act is not bestowed with the power of the civil court or of Industrial Tribunal. Under the circumstances, he has no jurisdiction to enter into the disputed question of law and/or fact. Admittedly, on and from 3rd February, 1984 the applicant did not work for the petitioner. Hence it was the contention of the petitioner that the principle of no work and no pay was applicable in respect of that period undisputedly during which the applicant, before the learned Referee, did not work. Admittedly, on and from 3rd February, 1984 the applicant did not work for the petitioner. Hence it was the contention of the petitioner that the principle of no work and no pay was applicable in respect of that period undisputedly during which the applicant, before the learned Referee, did not work. Although it was contended on behalf of the respondents that this court has no jurisdiction to entertain this application in as much as when there was a concurrent finding of fact, under the circumstances, invoking the jurisdiction under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure did not arise nor the petitioner could invoke the jurisdiction under Article 127 of the Constitution. In that respect a reference was made to the case of Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. vs. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha and others reported in 1980 Lab. I.C. 1004 where in paragraph 72 the learned judges were of the view, that every wrong order cannot be righted merely because it is wrong. It can be quashed only if it is vitiated by the fundamental flaws of gross miscarriage of justice, absence of legal evidence, perverse misreading of facts, serious errors of law on the face of the order, jurisdictional failure and the like, which will allow to assume jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. 4. The question involved before this court is for determination as to the question of jurisdiction and/or exceeding such jurisdiction by the court below. If it is a question of jurisdiction or the excess of jurisdiction exercised by the court below it becomes a question of law which could be properly dealt with by this court in the present application. If under the Shops and Establishments Act, the learned Referee has no jurisdiction to enter into the disputed question of fact and/or question of law and there is exercise of such jurisdiction in respect of disputed question of fact and/or question of law involving its jurisdiction then it would amount to erroneous exercise of jurisdiction which can be corrected by this court in the present application. In the case of Mcleod and Co. In the case of Mcleod and Co. vs. Sixth Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal and others, reported in AIR 1956 Cal 273 , P.B. Mukharji, J. as His Lordship then was, in paragraph 13 of the said judgment observed in the manner following: "It is necessary to emphasise here that the proper legal effect of a proved fact is essentially a question of law. Whenever an inference is drawn from certain conclusion on fact that inference is a question of law in its essential nature." Similarly in the case of Viswanath Tukaram vs. General Manager, Central Railway and others, reported in AIR 1958 Bom 111 , the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court presided over by Chagla, C.L. as His Lordship then was, while considering the jurisdiction of the authority acting under the Payment of Wages Act were of the view that the authority concerned had no jurisdiction to decide whether the services of an employee have been rightly or wrongly terminated or whether the dismissal is lawful or unlawful. In as much as under the Payment of wages Act, primary function of the authority is to determine what was the wages of the employee and whether there had been a delay in payment of those wages or a deduction from those wages. In order to determine the wages it may be necessary to determine what the terms of the contract were under which the employee was employed and under which he was claiming his wages. In order to determine what the contract was and what the terms of the contract were, what were the wages due under the contract, it might become necessary for the authority to determine whether in the first place there was an employment or not. But when there is a dispute as to which is the contract that governs the relationship of the parties and if two rival contracts are in the field, then the authority under the Payment of Wages Act has no jurisdiction to decide which of the contracts should regulate the rights of the parties. In the case of Sushil Kumar Das & ors. In the case of Sushil Kumar Das & ors. vs. Reserve Bank of India and ors, reported in 1984(1) CHN 31 Amitabha Dutta, J. as His Lordship then was, relying upon the principle of 'No work no pay' had to consider whether the bank was justified in not paying on pro rata basis for not doing increased quota of work done, held in a petition where Class III employees of the Reserve Bank of India had challenged the orders relating to the deduction of their salaries and for an order upon the Bank to pay the salaries which had been deducted inasmuch as the bank made some pro rata deduction from the salaries of the petitioners on account of their unauthorised absence from duty and/or non compliance of the prescribed quota of work allotted to them. The learned judge was of the view that the non-payment of remuneration which was not earned by actual work does not tantamount to punishment as such rules of natural justice were not attracted. Following the decision of Sabyasachi Mukherji, J. in the case of Algemene Bank vs. Central Government Labour Court, reported in 1978 (II) LLJ 117 the learned judge held that the wages were the payment for services rendered and work was not done for a period or it fell short the amount fixed or the quota without any reasonable excuse, the question was not whether the contract was divisible into hourly work or indivisible but was one of failure on the part of the employee to fulfill the reciprocal promise to perform the work in accordance with the terms of the employment as consideration for the employer's providing employment and paying remuneration. So if the employee does not do the work for the specified period or of the specified amount he has no right to get the remuneration pro rata at least where the remuneration is payable monthly. Relying upon the said decision it was urged on behalf of the petitioner that admittedly when the petitioner (?) has not rendered any service, the question of payment of wages for that period does not arise under the Shops and Establishments Act. Relying upon the said decision it was urged on behalf of the petitioner that admittedly when the petitioner (?) has not rendered any service, the question of payment of wages for that period does not arise under the Shops and Establishments Act. As observed earlier, the learned Referee cannot enter into the disputed question of fact as to whether there has been a wrongful determination and as to whether the claimant has been wrongfully debarred from attending to his work which is outside the domain and/or jurisdiction of the learned Referee inasmuch as serious disputes have been raised with regard thereto. In the case of The Managing Director, Jalpaiguri Electric Supply Co. Ltd. vs. The Authority under Payment of Wages Act and others, reported in Volume 49 of the Indian Factories & Labour Reports at page 49 G.N. Ray, J was of the view that there may not be inherent lack of jurisdiction of the Authority under section 15(1) of the Payment of Wages Act to entertain claims of workmen relating to the question of 'wages' and deduction of such wages, but in the facts of a case it may be necessary to go into intricate question of law and fact relating to such claim of wages. In such circumstances on the ground of expediency the Authority under the Act should not entertain complicated questions of facts and law relating to claim of wages and such claim should be left to be decided by the authority under the Industrial Disputes Act which is a special Act for dealing with all questions between the workmen and the employer. In that case also it was necessary to determine as to whether or not retrenchment in fact and law had taken place. It was essentially necessary to probe a little deeper into the rival contentions made by the parties and, in the exercise of the limited jurisdiction of the authority concerned the learned Judge was of the view that it was not desirable or expedient that the said. Authority should entertain such question. It is true that the said case was decided under the Payment of Wages Act. In instant case the claim has been made under the Shops and Establishments Act. From the relevant provisions of the Act it indicates that the Authority concerned has no jurisdiction to enter into the question of fact and law. Authority should entertain such question. It is true that the said case was decided under the Payment of Wages Act. In instant case the claim has been made under the Shops and Establishments Act. From the relevant provisions of the Act it indicates that the Authority concerned has no jurisdiction to enter into the question of fact and law. Under the circumstances, this court is of view that the petitioner is entitled to an order as prayed for. 5. As a result, the application under Article 227 of the Constitution is allowed and the order dated 29th May, 1988 passed by the learned Referee under the West Bengal Shops and . Establishments Act which had been affirmed by the order dated 2nd February, 1988 passed by the learned Chief Judge, Small Causes Court, Calcutta is set aside. 6. This order will not prevent the claimant to agitate before the proper forum with regard to non-payment of wages and as to whether the service was determined or not. There will be no order as to costs. Application allowed; order impugned set aside.