SHIVASHANKAR BHAT, J. ( 1 ) PETITIONER in W. P. No. 4474/1978 is the appellant in W. A. No. 2707/1985 - (he is referred as the petitioner hereinafter ). Petitioner unsuccessfully challenged the order of the Land Tribunal conferring occupancy rights in favour of respondents 3 to 5 under the provisions of the karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 (the Act' for short) and hence this appeal. ( 2 ) RESPONDENT-5 was held to be the tenant of Sy. No. 16 (1 acre 9 guntas) and respondents 3 and 4 were held to be tenants of Sy. No. 48 (5 acres 10 guntas) of Khasbhag village, Belgaum Taluk by the Land Tribunal and consequently, they were ordered to be registered as occupants under section 48-A of the Act. The order was challenged mainly on the ground that the area comprising the lands in question came within the purview of the Urban Land (Ceiling and regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the 'ceiling Act', for short); therefore, the Act ceased to be applicable. ( 3 ) THE Land Tribunal and the learned Single Judge, proceeded on the assumption that the lands in question are within the Belgaum Urban Agglomeration, as defined in the Ceiling Act and that, the lands are comprised in the area, reserved for non-agricultural purposes in the Master Plan duly approved under the provisions of the Karnataka Town and Country Planning Act. But, the contention of the petitioner that, on coming into force of the Ceiling Act, the provisions of the act ceased to apply, was not accepted by the Land Tribunal and the learned single Judge. ILR1985 KAR 3898 , 1985 (2 )Karlj569 ( 4 ) BEFORE the learned single Judge, it was also argued that the State Legislature passed a resolution (referred hereinafter as 'the Resolution') in December, 1972, under Article 252 of the constitution, resolving that "the imposition of ceiling on urban immoveable property and acquisition of such property in excess of the ceiling limit with a view to utilising such excess for public purposes and all other matters connected therein or incidental thereto shall be regulated in this State by Parliament by law", and that, after this Resolution, State Legislature ceased to have any legislative competence to enact a law in respect of the subject matter covered by the said resolution. The subject of the Act in an urban area, is identical or incidental to the subject of imposition of ceiling on urban immoveable property and hence stood transferred to Parliament for an appropriate legislation. In view of this transfer and consequential cessation of legislative competence in the State Legislature, the Act cannot be enforced, as it ceased to govern the lands, which are urban immovable properties. ( 5 ) THE learned single Judge held that it was unnecessary to consider the enforceability of Chapter iv of the Act, which impose ceiling on agricultural holdings in the State and proceeded to consider the effect of the Resolution on Chapter-Ill of the Act only, which provides for vesting of tenanted lands in the State and conferment of occupancy rights on the tenants, as on 1-3-1974. It was held that the topic of the Resolution did not cover this subject matter covered Chapter III of the Act. ( 6 ) PETITIONER had raised another contention that he was a soldier and therefore entitled to certain benefits under the Act. This was rejected since absolutely no material was placed before the land Tribunal or before the learned single Judge to establish the said fact. Hence the plea was rejected. For the same reason, the said plea formally referred in the arguments of the petitioner's learned Counsel before us, also is liable to be rejected. ( 7 ) W. A. NO. 2361/1985 is by the petitioners in W. P. No. 5787/85, who challenged the order of the Land Tribunal conferring occupancy rights under the Act on the 1st respondent. The land in question is in Bengeri village, Hubli Taluk and is alleged to be within the Hubli-Dharwar Urban agglomeration. The only question argued was the enforceability of the Act, after the passing of the Resolution, referred already above. Following the earlier decision, the learned single Judge rejected the contention of the petitioner herein also. ( 8 ) W. P. NO. 9173/1986 is by the owner of the land situated in the village of Amminabhavi in dharwad Taluk. The Land Tribunal ordered registration of the 3rd respondent as an occupant of this land under the provisions of the Act. The ground of attack, in this petition was confined to the applicability of the Act to the land in question, after the passing of the Resolution. The Land Tribunal ordered registration of the 3rd respondent as an occupant of this land under the provisions of the Act. The ground of attack, in this petition was confined to the applicability of the Act to the land in question, after the passing of the Resolution. However, we find, as held by the Land Tribunal, there is no factual basis for this contention, since the petitioner has not adduced acceptable evidence to establish that the land in question was reserved for non-agricultural purpose in the relevant 'master Plan'. ( 9 ) THE only point that was urged before us in these cases, is - whether the provisions of the Act ceased to be operative in respect of an agricultural land reserved for non-agricultural purposes in the Master Plan, in an Urban Agglomeration, after the passing of the Resolution, or atleast, after the coming into force of the Ceiling Act. ( 10 ) IT was urged that the Resolution of the State Legislature passed under Article 252 of the constitution, shifted the topic covered by the Resolution, from List II of Schedule VII to the constitution and vested the competence to make the law in respect of the said topic, in the parliament. Thereafter, the existing law enacted by the State Legislature ceases to have efficacy in respect of the said topic. Alternatively, it was urged that, when in pursuance of the Resolution, the Parliament legislates in respect of the topic covered by the Resolution, the Parliamentary law, repeals or supercedes any existing State Legislation on the topic and therefore, such a State law cannot be enforced thereafter. ( 11 ) IN two decisions, the Supreme Court had occasion to consider some aspects of the questions raised before us. The first one is UNION OF INDIA etc. v. VALLURI BASAVAIAH chouwdhary and ORS. , AIR1979 SC 1415 , (1979 )3 SCC324 , [1979 ]3 SCR802. Therein the Supreme Court inter alia, held that, (i) on passing of a Resolution under Article 252 of the Constitution, Parliament becomes entitled to legislate relating to the subject matter covered by the Resolution ; (ii) The State Legislature ceases to have a power to make a law relating to that matter ; (iii) the Resolution, was in respect of a subject called "ceiling on Urban immovable property". By virtue of this, it is open to the Parliament to legislate relating to a part only of the said subject, without covering the entire field of the transferred subject, at a particular time ; (iv) Ceiling Act related to the subject of 'urban land' only, and the said subject is a specie of the wider subject of "ceiling on urban immovable property" and therefore, the Ceiling Act came within the purview of Parliament's competence, consequent on the passing of the Resolution by the State Legislatures ; (v) The State Legislatures had before them the Model Bill prepared by the Working Group (constituted by the Government of India for this purpose) and the report of the Working Group and the provisions of the Model bill enunciated the relevant concepts to be incorporated in the Ceiling Act. Therefore, the State legislatures were fully aware of the contents of the subject matter, resolved by them, to be transferred to the Parliament under Article 252 of the Constitution ; (vi) The Resolutions passed by the State Legislatures do not restrict the power of the Parliament to legislate relating to the relevant subject matter, by any condition. ( 12 ) THE relevant observations, to the above conclusions of the Supreme Court were as follows :at para-13,-" the effect of the passing of a resolution under Clause (1) of Article 252 is that Parliament, which has no power to legislate with respect to the matter which is the subject of the resolution, becomes entitled to legislate with respect to it. On the other hand, the State Legislature ceases to have a power to make a law relating to that matter. " at para-28, - ". . . It is not disputed that the subject matter of Entry 18, List II of the Seventh Schedule. e. , 'land' covers 'land and buildings' and would, therefore, necessarily include 'vacant land'. The expression 'urban immoveable property' may mean 'land and buildings', or 'buildings' or 'land'. It would take in lands of every description,. e. , agricultural land, urban land or any other kind and it necessarily includes vacant land. " at para-29 : ". . . . . A working Group was constituted under the Chairmanship of the Secretary, Ministry of works, Housing and Urban Development. The report of the Working Group shows that the proposal was to impose a ceiling on urban immoveable property. " at para-29 : ". . . . . A working Group was constituted under the Chairmanship of the Secretary, Ministry of works, Housing and Urban Development. The report of the Working Group shows that the proposal was to impose a ceiling on urban immoveable property. In its report the said Working group defined 'urban area' to include the area within the territorial limits of municipalities or other local bodies and also the peripheral area outside the said limits. Such inclusion of the peripheral limits in an urban area was accepted by the Government and a Model Bill prepared in pursuance thereof also contained such a definition. A copy of each of the report of the Working group and the Model Bill referred to was placed on the table of the Parliament on December 15, 1970 and March 22, 1972 respectively. The said documents were forwarded to the State government of Andhra Pradesh, besides other State Governments, for consideration by the State legislatures before they passed a resolution under Article 252 (1), The State Legislatures were, therefore, aware of the position when they passed a resolution authorising the Parliament to make a law in respect of urban immoveable property. Their intention was to include the lands within the territorial area of a municipality or other local body of an urban area and also its peripheral area. The concept of ceiling on urban immoveable property and the nature and content of urban agglomeration ultimately defined by Section 2 (n) of the impugned Act was, therefore, fully understood by the State Governments. " At para-31 : "it is but axiomatic that once the legislatures of two or more States, by a resolution in terms of article 252 (1), abdicate or surrender the area,. e. , their power of legislation on a State subject, the Parliament is competent to make a law relating to the subject. It would indeed be contrary to the terms of Article 252 (1) to read the resolution passed by the State Legislature subject to any restriction. The resolution, contemplated under Article 252 (1) is not hedged in with conditions. In making such a law, the Parliament was not bound to exhaust the whole field of legislation. It would indeed be contrary to the terms of Article 252 (1) to read the resolution passed by the State Legislature subject to any restriction. The resolution, contemplated under Article 252 (1) is not hedged in with conditions. In making such a law, the Parliament was not bound to exhaust the whole field of legislation. It could make a law, like the present Act, with respect to ceiling on vacant land in an urban agglomeration, as a first step towards the eventual imposition of ceiling on immoveable property of every other description. " ( 13 ) THE second decision in THUMATI VENKAIAH etc. etc. v. STATE OF ANDHRA pradesh and ORS. , AIR1980 SC 1568 , (1980 )4 SCC295 , [1980 ]3 scr1143 also arose from the State of Andhra Pradesh. Therein, Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 was challenged, on the ground that, the subject matter of the said law was covered by the topic of legislation transferred to Parliament by the resolution and that actually, the Ceiling Act covered the subject. Therefore, it was argued that, the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms Act was unenforceable. It was reiterated in the said decision at page 1570: "the effect of passing of resolutions by the Houses of Legislature of two or more States under this constitutional provision is that Parliament which has otherwise no power to legislate with respect to a matter, except as provided in Article 249 and 250, becomes entitled to legislate with respect to such matter and the State Legislatures passing the resolutions cease to have power to make law relating to that matter. The resolutions operate as abdication or surrender of the powers of the State Legislatures with respect to the matter which is the subject of the resolutions and such matter is placed entirely in the hands of Parliament and Parliament alone can then legislate with respect to it. It is as if such matter is lifted out of List II and placed in List I of the Seventh schedule to the Constitution. " Again, after a few sentences, Supreme Court proceeded to say, - ". . . . It is as if such matter is lifted out of List II and placed in List I of the Seventh schedule to the Constitution. " Again, after a few sentences, Supreme Court proceeded to say, - ". . . . The result was that at the date when the Andhra Pradesh Act was enacted, Parliament alone was competent to legislate with respect to ceiling on urban immoveable property and acquisition of such property in excess of the ceiling and all connected, ancilliary or incidental matters, and the Andhra Pradesh Legislature stood denuded of its power to legislate on that subject. " at page 1573, the effect of the Ceiling Act is stated, as, - ". . . . . It will thus be seen that the Central Act imposes a ceiling on holding of land in urban agglomeration other than land which is mainly used for the purpose of agriculture and agriculture in this connection includes horticulture, but does not include raising of grass, dairy farming, poultry farming, breeding of live-stock and such cultivation or the growing of such plants as may be prescribed by the Rules, and, moreover, in order to fall within the exclusion, the land must be entered in the revenue or land record before the appointed day as for the purpose of agriculture and must also not have been specified in the master plan for a purpose other than agriculture. " the contention urged there and the answer thereto wen stated at para-6, thus: "the argument of the landholders was that the Andhra Pradesh Act sought to impose ceiling on land in the whole of Andhra Pradesh including land situate in urban agglomerations and since the concept of urban agglomeration defined in Section 2 (n) of the Central Act was an expansive concept and any area with an existing or future population of more than one lakh could be notified to be an urban agglomeration, the whole of the Andhra Pradesh Act was ultra vires and void as being outside the legislative competence of the Andhra Pradesh Legislature. This argument, plausible though it may seem, is in our opinion, unsustainable. It is no doubt true that if the Andhra Pradesh Act seeks to impose ceiling on land falling within an urban agglomeration, it would be outside the area of its legislative competence, since it cannot provide for imposition of ceiling on urban immoveable property. This argument, plausible though it may seem, is in our opinion, unsustainable. It is no doubt true that if the Andhra Pradesh Act seeks to impose ceiling on land falling within an urban agglomeration, it would be outside the area of its legislative competence, since it cannot provide for imposition of ceiling on urban immoveable property. But the only urban agglomerations in the State of andhra Pradesh recognised in the Central Act were those referred to in Section 2 (n) (A) (i) and there can be no doubt that, so far as these urban aggiome rations are concerned, it was not within the legislative competence of the Andhra Pradesh Legislature to provide for imposition of ceiling on land situate within these urban agglomerations. It is, however, difficult to see how the Andhra pradesh Act could be said to be outside the legislative competence of the Andhra Pradesh legislature in so far as land situate in the other areas of the State of Andhra Pradesh is concerned. We agree that any other area in the State of Andhra Pradesh with a population of more than one lakh could be notified as an urban agglomeration under Section 2 (n) (A) (ii) of the central Act, but until it is so notified it would not be an urban agglomeration and the Andhra pradesh Legislature would have legislative competence to provide for imposition of ceiling on land situate within such area. No sooner such area is notified to be an urban agglomeration, the central Act would apply in relation to land situate within such area, but until that happens the andhra Pradesh Act would continue to be applicable to determine the ceiling on holding of land in such area. It may be noted that the Andhra Pradesh Act came into force on 1st January 1975 and it was with reference to this date that the surplus holding of land in excess of the ceiling area was required to be determined and if there was any surplus, it was to be surrendered to the State government. It may be noted that the Andhra Pradesh Act came into force on 1st January 1975 and it was with reference to this date that the surplus holding of land in excess of the ceiling area was required to be determined and if there was any surplus, it was to be surrendered to the State government. It is therefore clear that in an area other than that comprised in the urban agglomerations referred to in Section 2 (n) (A) (i), land held by a person in excess of the ceiling are a would be liable to be determined as on 1st January 1975 under the Andhra Pradesh Act and only land within the ceiling area would be allowed to remain with him. It is only in respect of land remaining with a person, whether an individual or a family unit, after the operation of the andhra Pradesh Act, that the Central Act would apply, if and when the area in question is notified to be an urban agglomeration under Section 2 (n) (A) (ii) of the Central Act. We fail to see how it can at all be contended that merely because an area may possibly in the future be notified as an urban agglomeration under Section 2 (n) (A) (ii) of the Central Act the Andhra Pradesh legislature would cease to have competence to legislate with respect to ceiling on land situate in such area, even though it was not an urban agglomeration at the date of enactment of the Andhra pradesh Act. Undoubtedly, when an area is notified as an urban agglomeration under Section 2 (n) (A) (ii), the Central Act would apply to land situate in such area and the Andhra Pradesh Act would cease to have application, but by that time the Andhra Pradesh Act would have already operated to determine the ceiling on holding of land falling within the definition in Section 3 (j) and situate within such area. It is therefore not possible to uphold the contention of the land holders that the Andhra Pradesh Act is ultra vires and void as being outside the legislative competence of the Andhra Pradesh Legislature. It is therefore not possible to uphold the contention of the land holders that the Andhra Pradesh Act is ultra vires and void as being outside the legislative competence of the Andhra Pradesh Legislature. " ( 14 ) SRI R. N. Narasimhamurthy, the learned Counsel argued that, from a combined reading of the two decisions, the only inference to be drawn, is that, the State Legislature was aware of the concepts includible in the law pertaining to "imposition of ceiling on Urban immoveable property", when the State Legislatures passed the Resolutions under Article 252 of the constitution and this included the areas to be comprised in urban agglomerations as subsequently enacted in the Ceiling Act, as well as all incidental, ancillary and essential matters required to be legislated to make a law "imposing ceiling on urban immoveable properties", an effective and comprehensive law on the said topic and all those incidental, ancillary and essential matters having stood transferred to Parliament, the Act (. e. . the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961), lost all its force in an urban agglomeration. One question that arises from the contentions of the learned Counsel is: If the State Legislation (here, the Land Reforms Act, 1961) was already in existence, having been legislated when the state Legislature had admittedly, competence to legislate, whether it will cease to operate immediately on passing of a Resolution under Article 252 of the Constitution, whereby the State legislature resolves to transfer the competence in respect of the same subject matter, to the parliament? or, whether, the cessation of the State Law will be only from the date when parliament's law on the subject starts operating? ( 15 ) IT is not necessary to go into this question in this case, in view of our decision on the content of the subject matter that stood transferred to the Parliament by virtue of the Resolution. Hence, we do not propose to answer the above question. 16. The basic question that arises here is - what is the actual content of the subject matter that was resolved to be entrusted to the Parliament, by the State Legislatures under Article 252 of the constitution. The Resolution names the said subject matter as the one "imposing of a ceiling on urban immoveable property and acquisition of such property in excess of the ceiling and all matters connected therewith or ancillary and incidental thereto". The Resolution names the said subject matter as the one "imposing of a ceiling on urban immoveable property and acquisition of such property in excess of the ceiling and all matters connected therewith or ancillary and incidental thereto". There is no doubt that this is a topic, that falls within Entry 18 of List II of schedule VII to the Constitution (for short referred as 'entry 18', hereinafter) and as the Constitution stood, the entire subject matter of the said entry 18 has been originally kept apart for the State Legislature to make law. Parliament had no competence at all in respect of the several matters falling under the wide scope of said Entry 18. A part of the area falling under Entry 18 is carved out now and the said carved out portion is shifted, or transferred to the domain of Parliament to make law relating to the matters falling within the carved out portion. The remaining area in Entry 18 of List II is still within the State domain. One of the principles governing the interpretation of an Entry, is to give widest scope for legislation under particular entry. Here, widest scope for legislation has to be given, both to the, subject resolved to be transferred to the Parliament and the subjects remaining with the State legislatures under Entry 18 of List. Land may be agricultural or non-agricultural. It may be rural or urban. Land is no doubt an immoveable property. But the concept of 'immoveable property' is wider than a property which is only a land. The subject matter carved out of Entry 18, under the Resolutions of State legislatures, is "urban immovable property. " Urban land certainly would fall within this concept of urban immovable property. But the law that may be enacted by the Parliament by virtue of the resolution is, a law "imposing ceiling" on this urban immovable property. As the Supreme Court held already. Parliament may choose an item like vacant land or vacant land and buildings in an urban area for enacting the law imposing ceiling leaving other matters falling within the concept of 'urban immoveable property' for future legislation by it. As the Supreme Court held already. Parliament may choose an item like vacant land or vacant land and buildings in an urban area for enacting the law imposing ceiling leaving other matters falling within the concept of 'urban immoveable property' for future legislation by it. ( 16 ) THE argument of Sri Narasimhamurthy, was, that, vesting of a tenanted land in the State (as provided by Section 44 of the Act) and conferment of occupancy rights on the tenants (under section 45 read with Section 48-A of the Act), are matters directly falling under the subject of imposing ceiling on land holding. At any rate, those matters are incidental and ancillary to the main topic of imposing ceiling. The learned Counsel pointed out that when parcels of lands belonging to a big holder of land, are granted to tenants, under the Act, the large holding gets reduced to such an extent that it will be impracticable and impossible for the Parliament to impose a ceiling on such a holding; hence, the power to legislate that remained under Entry 18 should not be read to include a power that will affect the Parliament's power to effectively legislate imposing a ceiling on urban holding. ( 17 ) IT is not possible to accept this line of reasoning. Varieties of topics can be subject matters of regulatory legislations, governing the lands or other immovable properties. In the sphere of ownership, it covers a law imposing ceiling on owning the property. In the sphere of lease of a property, the law may regulate the relationship of lessor and lessee, payment of rent, manner of granting the lease, conferment of ownership on the lessee, eviction of the lessee etc. In this reformative age, where, law has stepped in to implement agrarian reforms or to regulate relationships arising out of transactions governing lands or buildings whether rural or urban, certain concepts have particular roles to play. Conferment of ownership on the tenants is one such distinct concept. Imposing of ceiling on owning or to hold agricultural land or any other kind of property is another independent subject. History of such legislations indicate that, initially, fixation and payment of rent was taken up for legislation. Next came protective legislations, conferring immunity on tenants against evictions. The third stage was the conferment of ownership over the leasehold, on the tenants. History of such legislations indicate that, initially, fixation and payment of rent was taken up for legislation. Next came protective legislations, conferring immunity on tenants against evictions. The third stage was the conferment of ownership over the leasehold, on the tenants. Imposition of ceiling has been considered as an altogether independent subject. It is possible, as Sri Narasimhamurthy suggested, that in this process of conferring ownership on the tenants, the effectiveness of the law imposing ceiling may be affected. But such affectation is only marginal and is neither direct nor proximate. It cannot be said that the pith and substance of the law governing the conferment of land ownership on the tenant, is a law regulating imposition of ceiling on land holding. Equally, the pith and substance of the law imposing ceiling on land holding cannot cover the subject of conferring ownership of land on the tenant. ( 18 ) WHEN two distinct powers have come into existence, vesting law making competence in the two different legislative bodies, pith and substance of the laws made by each of them has to be examined, to see whether, anyone of them encroaches the field set apart as falling within the competence of the other body. In this connection the principle stated by the Privy Council, in PRAFULLA KUMAR mukherjee and ORS. v. BANK OF COMMERCE LTD. KHULNA, 1947 PC 60 has been followed in India, eversince then, as - "as Sir Maurice Gwyer C. J. said in Subramanyam Chettiar's case (1940 F. C. R. 188) : 'it must inevitably happen from time to time that legislation though purporting to deal with a subject in one list, touches also upon a subject in another list, and the different provisions of the enactment may be so closely inter-wined that blind adherence to a strictly verbal interpretation would result in a large number of statutes being declared invalid because the Legislature enacting them may appear to have legislated in a forbidden sphere. Hence the rule which has been evolved by the Judicial Committee, whereby the impugned statute is examined to ascertain its pith and substance or its true nature and character for the purpose of determining whether it is legislation with respect to matters in this list or in that. Hence the rule which has been evolved by the Judicial Committee, whereby the impugned statute is examined to ascertain its pith and substance or its true nature and character for the purpose of determining whether it is legislation with respect to matters in this list or in that. ' their Lordships agree that this passage correctly describes the grounds upon which the rule is founded, and that it applies to Indian as well as to Dominion legislation. " the proposition, placed before us, was that, the legislative head or field, referred as 'imposition of ceiling on urban immoveable property' covers the topic of legislation concerning conferment of ownership on a tenant of such a property. While considering this proposition, the rule of interpretation settled by the Supreme Court in CALCUTTA GAS COMPANY (Proprietary) ltd. v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND ORS. , AIR1962 SC 1044 , [1962 ]supp3 SCR1 also has to be borne in mind. It was held at page 1049 : ". . . . The entries in the three Lists are only legislative heads or fields of legislation; they demarcate the area over which the appropriate Legislatures can operate. It is also well settled that widest amplitude should be given to the language of the entries. But some of the entries in the different lists or in the same Lists may overlap and sometimes may also appear to be in direct conflict with each other. It is then the duty of this Court to reconcile the entries and bring about harmony between them. " The Supreme Court quoted accepting the principle stated in a passage from AIR 1939 FC 1 : ". . . . An endeavour must be made to soive it, as the Judicial Committee have said, by having recourse to the context and scheme of the Act, and a reconciliation attempted between two apparently conflicting jurisdictions by reading the two entries together and by interpreting, and, where necessary, modifying the language of the one by that of the other if indeed such a reconciliation should prove impossible, then, and only then, will be non-obstante clause operate and the federal power prevail. " Thereafter, after quoting another passage, Supreme Court proceeded to say, - "the Rule of construction adopted by that decision for the purpose of harmonizing the two apparently conflicting entries in the two Lists would equally apply to an apparent conflict between two entries in the same List. Patanjali Sastri, J. as he then was, held in State of Bombay v. Narothamdas Jethabhai, AIR1951 SC 69 , (1951 )53 BOMLR402 , [1951 ]2 SCR51 that the words 'administration of justice and 'constitution and organization of ail Courts', in item one of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935 must be understood in a restricted sense excluding from their scope 'jurisdiction and powers of courts' specifically dealt with in Item 2 of List. In the words of the learned Judge, if such a construction was not given "the wider construction of Entry 1 would deprive Entry 2 of all its content and reduce it to useless lumber. " This Rule of construction has not been dissented from in any of the subsequent decisions of this Court. It may, therefore, be taken as a well settled Rule of construction that every attempt should be made to harmonize the apparently conflicting entries not only of different Lists but also of the same List and to reject that construction which, will rob one of the entries of its entire content and make it nugatory. "In the said case, legislature of the State had the exclusive power to legislate in respect of gas industry by virtue of Entry 25 of List. Entry 24 of List II provided for "industries subject to the provisions of Entries 7 and 52 of List I". Entry 52 of List I empowered the Parliament to make law regarding "industries", the control of which is declared to be expedient. The Supreme Court held, that the subject of gas industry stood outside other entries and the Parliament was incompetent to make a law affecting the gas industry. Here the subject of "gas and gas works" was specifically carved out of general subject of industries, by the Constitution itself. ( 19 ) THE legislative power of the State has to be reconciled with that of the Parliament. In their respective exclusive fields, each is supreme. Here the subject of "gas and gas works" was specifically carved out of general subject of industries, by the Constitution itself. ( 19 ) THE legislative power of the State has to be reconciled with that of the Parliament. In their respective exclusive fields, each is supreme. A law made within the legislative competence of the State Legislature may have some effect on the subject matter falling within the Parliament's legislative competence. But that will not make the State law invalid or inoperative. The effect of a law is not the same as the subject matter of the law. This principle has been explained in THE kannan DEVAN HILLS PRODUCE COMPANY LTD. v. THE STATE OF KERALA etc. , AIR1972 SC 2301 , 1972 (0 )KLT377 (SC ), (1972 )2 SCC218 , [1973 ]1 SCR356 : "it seems to us clear that the State has legislative competence to legislate on Entry 18, List II and entry 42 List. This power cannot be denied on the ground that it has some effect on an industry controlled under Entry 52, List. Effect is not the same thing as subject-matter. If a state Act, otherwise valid, has effect on a matter in List I it does not cease to be a legislation with respect to an entry in List II or List. " when two Entries vest power to make law - one in the Parliament and another In the State legislatures, - the Entries should be read together without giving a narrow and restricted sense to either of them. Both Entries should have the widest amplitude to operate. In case of seeming conflict between the two Entries, attempt should be made to reconcile the two and to avoid a conflict of jurisdiction. Rule of interpretation cannot extent to nullify one power of legislation, in preference to another. The passage in HOECHST PHARMACEUTICALS LTD. and ANR. etc. v. STATE OF BIHAR and ors. , AIR1983 SC 1019 , [1985 ]154 ITR64 (SC ), 1983 (1 )SCALE723 , (1983 )4 SCC45 , [1983 ]3 SCR130 , [1984 ]55 STC1 (SC ) is very apposite here: ". . . . In the case of a seeming conflict between the Entries in the two lists, the Entries should be read together without giving a narrow and restricted sense to either of them. . . . In the case of a seeming conflict between the Entries in the two lists, the Entries should be read together without giving a narrow and restricted sense to either of them. Secondly, an attempt should be made to see whether the two Entries cannot be reconciled so as to avoid a conflict of jurisdiction. It should be considered whether a fair reconciliation can be achieved by giving to the language of the Union Legislative list a meaning which, if less wide than it might in another context bear, is yet one that can properly be given to it and equally giving to the language of the State Legislative List a meaning which it can properly bear. The non obstante clause in Article 246 (1) must operate only if such reconciliation should prove impossible. Thirdly, no question of conflict between the two lists will arise if the impugned legislation, by the application of the doctrine of "pith and substance" appears to fall exclusively under one list, and the encroachment upon another list is only incidental. " These principles would govern the fact-situation in these cases before us also. The contest sought to be projected by the land owners here, is a contest between the power carved out by entry 18 and vesting the same in the Parliament to legislate, as against the power to legislate remaining thereafter, with the State Legislature in respect of the subject matter under Entry 18. Applying the said principles, it has to be held that, subject 01 imposing ceiling on urban immoveable property' cannot be construed so as to nullify other subjects left in the domain of state Legislatures, under Entry 18. "imposing of ceiling" is a distinct, separate, identifiable subject. It does not cover, other measures such as the regulation of relationship of landlord and tenant or conferment of ownership of the leasehold on the tenant. The carved out subject which now falls within the Parliament's domain of law making, under Article 252 is one topic out of several subjects of reformative legislations. If so identified, the said subject does not include the subject covered by Chapter III of the Act, which is confined to the topics of conferment of occupancy rights on the tenants and in that process, vesting those tenanted lands in the State government for certain purposes. ( 20 ) THE Act came into force on 2-1-1965. If so identified, the said subject does not include the subject covered by Chapter III of the Act, which is confined to the topics of conferment of occupancy rights on the tenants and in that process, vesting those tenanted lands in the State government for certain purposes. ( 20 ) THE Act came into force on 2-1-1965. It has seen several amendments, most important being the one made in the year 1974. The objects of the Act are to make an uniform law in the State of karnataka relating to (i) agrarian relations; (ii) conferment of ownership on tenants; (iii) ceiling on land holdings etc. Chapter II of the Act contains general provisions regarding, tenancies such as deemed tenants, prohibition against future lease of agricultural lands, rent payable, the regulation of relationship of landlord and tenant, rights of tenants, dwelling houses of tenants etc. Chapter III contains Sections 44 to 62 and provide for vesting of tenanted lands in the State government with effect from 1-3-1974, conferment of occupancy right on the tenant and other incidental matters thereto. Chapter IV deals with ceiling on land holdings. Chapter V controls the eligibility to purchase or possess agricultural lands. Chapters VI to XI provide for many other matters in the sphere of agrarian reforms. Thus the Act seeks to achieve various objects, each one of which is independent of another. The ceiling provisions are relevant under Section 45 (2), to compute the area in respect of which a tenant may be granted occupancy right. But this relevancy is of a limited application and the 'ceiling area' can be understood as the one prescribed, only for the purpose of Section 45, even if Chapter IV is ignored. In other words, while conferring the occupancy right, the said provisions of the Act can also prescribe the maximum extent of the land in respect of which a tenant can be granted occupancy right. A perusal of the various provisions of the Act, clearly shows that Chapter III deals with a distinct topic of legislation which can exist independently of the provisions of Chapter IV. In all the cases before us, application of Chapter IV of the Act is not involved. All these cases involve conferment of occupancy rights on the respective tenants. A perusal of the various provisions of the Act, clearly shows that Chapter III deals with a distinct topic of legislation which can exist independently of the provisions of Chapter IV. In all the cases before us, application of Chapter IV of the Act is not involved. All these cases involve conferment of occupancy rights on the respective tenants. Therefore, it is entirely unnecessary for us to go into the enforceability of Chapter IV of the Act, in any area described as Urban agglomeration' in the Ceiling Act. The topic of Chapter III of the Act, in no way conflicts with the subject matter transferred to the Parliament by the Resolution. Consequently, the contentions of the landowners are liable to be rejected. ( 21 ) IN the result, for the reasons stated above, these appeals and the Writ Petition fail and are dismissed, without any order as to costs.