BHAGAWATI PRASAD BANERJEE, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal at the instance of the plaintiff-appellant arises out of the judgment and decree dt. 12th May, 1979 passed by the learned Subordinate Judge. 2nd Court, Hooghly, in Title Appeal No. 272 of 1978 reversing the judgment and decree dated 18th Aug, 1978 passed by the learned Munsif, 1st Court of Serampore in Title Suit No. 12 of 1976. ( 2 ) THE plaintiff-appellant filed a suit for declaration of title and for possession stating that the suit property originally belonged to the father of the plaintiff, Hiralal Samanta, since deceased, who during his lifetime executed a deed of settlement in favour of his Second wife, Nadhubala on 9th March, 1934. The plaintiff's case was that he is the only son of Hiralal Samanta begotten by the first wife of Hiralal and after the death of Hiralal in Chaitira 1343 B. S. he became the only heir of Hiralal. The defence case was that by virtue of a deed of gift Nadhubala had become absolute owner of the suit property and her title in respect of 1/5th share had been confirmed in T. G. No. 44 of 1957. The defendants also claimed that by executing the deed of gift Nadhubala gave away the suit property in their favour and they are still in possession thereof. ( 3 ) IN the suit being Title Suit No. 12 of 1976, the learned Munsif held, inter alia, that on the day of coming into force of Hindu Succession Act 1956, Nadhubala had a limited estate as the suit property was not acquired by her by inheritance from Hiralal and, as such, the said limited estate had extinguished after her death and, consequently, the deed of gift made by Nadhubala was void. Against the said decision of the learned Munsif, the defendant-respondents preferred an appeal being Title Appeal No. 272 of 1978 and the lower Appellate Court by its judgment and decree dated 12th May, 1979 allowed the appeal holding, inter alia, that the previous suit filed by Nadhubala being Title Suit No. 44 of 1959 was res judicata in the matter of getting any relief by the plaintiff and, secondly, it was held that after passing of the Hindu Succession Act, by virtue of S. 14 of the said Act, the property possesed by a female, whether acquired before or after the commencement of the said Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner. ( 4 ) THE question that calls for determination by this Court in this appeal is whether Nadhubala acquired only a limited estate within the meaning of S. 14 (2) of the Hindu Succession Act and whether the earlier suit being T. S. No. 44 of 1957 filed by Nadhubala for declaration of her title was a res judicata on this point. ( 5 ) MRS. Archana Sengupta, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the plaintiff-appellant, contended that by virtue of the deed of settlement executed by Hiralal on 9th March, 1934 must be held to have been passing a limited estate on the date of coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act and, as such, the said estate reverted back to the plaintiff-appellant in this case and the defendants-respondents have no right, title and interests in the suit property and that the defendants had not acquired any interest therein by virtue of the deed of gift made by Nadhubala. It has been further submitted that the said suit which was decreed in favour of Nadhubala did not create any res judicata as the same was an ex parte decree. ( 6 ) MR. Roychowdhury, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the defendants-respondents, contended that the earlier suit filed by Nadhubala should be held to be a res judicata even though the same was decreed ex parte. In support of his contention, he has relied on a Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Vishnu Sugar Mills Ltd. v. I. S. P. Trading Co. In support of his contention, he has relied on a Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Vishnu Sugar Mills Ltd. v. I. S. P. Trading Co. reported in AIR 1984 Cal 246 wherein it was held that it is a settled principle now that even ex parte decrees constitute res judicata. Mr. Roychowdhury further contended that from the said deed of settlement made by Hiralal it will be evident that the suit property was given to Nadhubala on account of her maintenance and referred to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Gulwant Kaur v. Mohinder Singh, AIR 1987 SC 2251 , wherein the Supreme Court at page 2252 observed as follows :-"section 14 is aimed at removing restrictions or limitations on the right of a female Hindu to enjoy, as a full owner, property possessed by her so long as her possession is traceable to a lawful origin, that is to say, if she has a vestige of a title. It makes no difference whether the property is acquired by inheritance or devise or at a partition or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance or by gift or by her own skill or exertion or by purchase or by prescription or in any other manner whatsoever. "it was also held at page 2255 as follows :-"therefore, when specific property is allotted to the widow in lieu of her claim for maintenance, allotment would be in satisfaction of her jus ad rem, namely, the right to be maintained out of the joint family property. It would not be a grant for the first time without any pre-existing right in the widow. The widow would be getting the property in virtue of her pre-existing right, the instrument giving the property being merely a document effectuating such pre-existing right and not making a grant of the property to her for the first time without any antecedent right or title. The widow would be getting the property in virtue of her pre-existing right, the instrument giving the property being merely a document effectuating such pre-existing right and not making a grant of the property to her for the first time without any antecedent right or title. There is also another consideration which is very relevant to this issue as to the nature of the interest given to the widow in the property and did not, in so many terms, prescribe that she would have a limited interest, she would have no more than a limited interest in the property under the Hindu Law as it stood priory to the enactment of the Act and hence a provision in the instrument prescribing that she would have only a limited interest in the property would be, to quote the words of this Court in Nirmal Chand's case 1969 UJ (SC) 51 (supra), "merely recording the true legal position" and that would not attract the applicability of sub-sec. (2) but would be governed by sub- sec. (1) of S. 14. The conclusion, is, therefore, inescapable that where property is allotted to a widow under an instrument, decree, order or award (which prescribes a restricted estate) for her in the property and sub-sec. (2) of S. 14 would have no application in such a case. "the Supreme Court further observed at page 2256 as follows :-"we do not understand the court a laying down that what was enlarged by sub-sec. (1) of S. 14 into a full estate was the Hindu Women's estate known to Hindu Law. When the court uses the word 'limited estated' the words are used to connote a right in the property to which the possession of the female Hindu may be legitimately traced, but which is not a full right of ownership. If a female Hindu is put in possession of property pursuant to or in recognition of a right to maintenance, it cannot be denied that she has acquired a limited right or interest in the property and once that position is accepted, it follows that right gets enlarged to full ownership under S. 14 (1) of the Act. That seems to us to follow clearly from the language of S. 14 (1) of the Act. That seems to us to follow clearly from the language of S. 14 (1) of the Act. " ( 7 ) IN my opinion, the court below did not consider the relevant portion of the said deed of settlement where from it appears that the suit property was given to Nadhubala for the purpose of her maintenance during her lifetime on the ground that she was the second wife and there was a possibility of no peaceful co-existence with the plaintiff who was the son begotten by his first wife. Though the property was given to Nadhubala for enjoyment during her lifetime, the same was given for her maintenance. In that view of the matter, in view of the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court, if the property in question was given to her for her maintenance and in recognition of her right of maintenance it cannot be said that she had acquired only a limited right or interest in the property. ( 8 ) IN that view of the matter, I am of the view that the lower appellate court was not (sic) in decreeing the suit in favour of the plaintiff. I do not find any reason to interfere with the judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate court. ( 9 ) THE appeal is, accordingly, dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.