SHIVASHANKAR BHAT, J. ( 1 ) THE broad questions that arise in these interlocutory matters are referred to the division Bench under Section 9 (vi) of the karnataka High Court Act, 1961 under the following circumstances: a Full Bench of this Court opined on 10-4-1987 in MM. Yaragatti v Savanth (ILR 1987 kar. 1286), that no Revision Petition is maintainable under Section 115 of the Code of civil Procedure against an order made by the district Court under Section 50 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, which itself is a revisional jurisdiction. Consequently, a large number of pending Civil Revision Petitions were dismissed. In most of such cases, the erstwhile revision Petitioners filed Writ Petitions challenging the respective orders of District courts. In the meanwhile, the Supreme court overruled the view of this Court, in shyamaraju Hegde v Venkatesh Bhat (ILR 1987 Kar. 3244) and held that, revisional jurisdiction of this Court under Section 115 cpc was available against an order of the district Court made in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under Section 50 of the karnataka Rent Control Act. The decision of the Supreme Court is dated 25-9-1987. Consequent on the decision of the supreme Court, several pending Writ petitions (which were filed either by the erstwhile Revision Petitioners or by fresh petitioners against the subsequent orders of district Courts) were sought to be converted as Civil Revision Petitions. In a few cases those petitioners also filed applications for the revival of the old Civil Revision Petitions, since remedy under Section 115 CPC is now available. In other cases, where, the erstwhile Revision Petitioners did not file any writ petition, there also applications were filed to revive the old Civil Revision Petitions; in some of such cases, we are told that, orders of District Courts were even executed and the applications to revive the Civil revision Petitions will lead to restitution proceedings. The situation is summarised by the learned single Judge thus:"consequent to the dismissal of a large number of Civil Revision Petitions a particular situation has arisen. The situation is summarised by the learned single Judge thus:"consequent to the dismissal of a large number of Civil Revision Petitions a particular situation has arisen. While some of the petitioners have filed writ petitions challenging the validity of the order passed under Section 50 of the Act by the first revisional court, many others, not having taken recourse to the writ jurisdiction have sought for restoration of their revision petitions in view of the said subsequent ruling of the Supreme Court upholding the maintainability of a second revision. Yet in several cases it is reported that the orders of eviction passed or confirmed by the first revisional courts are duly executed resulting in the eviction of the tenants. Even in the pending writ petitions a question has arisen as to its maintainability in view of the availability of the alternate remedy of revision under section 115 of the CPC. In the circumstances the question that has arisen for consideration is whether the orders of dismissal made in these revision petitions which have become final and binding inter parties can be validly recalled and the Civil Revision Petitions should be once again heard and disposed of on merits". ( 2 ) THE points canvassed before the learned single Judge were: (I) In the absence of any express or implied prohibition the High Court has inherent power to recall its earlier order to meet the ends of justice and to prevent abuse of the process of the court; (II) When once there is a final disposal of the matter, right or wrong, it is binding between the parties to the case. A change of law, consequent on the decision of the Supreme Court is not a ground to review a decision inter-parties, as per Explanation to Order 47 rule 1 CPC and that bar is sought to be circumvented here, by the applicants seeking the revival of the Civil revision Petitions; (III) When, in a given case, this court's jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 has been invoked and decision was rendered by this Court, question of reviving the earlier Civil Revision petition may not arise, but, in cases where writ petitions are still pending, the earlier Civil Revision Petitions have to be revived, which is the proper alternative remedy now available in those cases to challenge the orders of district Courts. ( 3 ) THESE points were again canvassed before us by M/s. H. B. Datar and K. R. D. Karanath. Mr. S. G. Bhat, learned counsel contended that, whether the parties seek the revival of the old Civil Revision Petitions or not, this Court should suo motu recall the dismissal orders to meet the ends of justice. ( 4 ) A decision, right or wrong, is a decision binding the parties to it. In D. P. Sharma v s. T. A. (I. L. R. 1987 Kar. 3255), a Division bench of this Court speaking through venkatachaliah, J. (as he then was), ob served at 3271;"it is trite proposition that even inter parties, if the law laid down in a pronouncement is later over-ruled, as distinguished from it being reversed, its binding effect interparties is not set at naught. The decision itself has to be assailed and got rid of in a manner known to or recognised by law". Therefore, if any party has accepted the dismissal order and consequently, the revisional order of the District Court attained finality, question of suo motu recalling the earlier dismissal order does not arise. The disputes involved in these cases under the Rent Control Act, are essentially private disputes between parties. Acceptance of an adverse decision by one of the parties, for whatever reason, requires a lasting rest and it is not for this court to suo motu stir up the litigation once again. The extreme proposition advanced by Sri S. G. Bhat, does not call for further discussion and has to be rejected in limine. ( 5 ) THE next question is whether, a. party who has invoked the writ jurisdiction and suffered a decision, can once again invoke the revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 cpc. The apt answer lies in the decision of the Supreme Court in Shankar Ramachandra abhyankar v Krishnaji Dattatraya Bapat ( AIR 1970 SC 1 ) where the fact situation was, no doubt, quite opposite. After the dismissal of a revision petition by the High Court, the order of the lower court was sought to be challenged, again, by invoking the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. Two alternative reasons were given by the Supreme Court for dismissing such a writ petition. The second alternative, is applicable here (without implying anything as to whether the first reason also would be attracted ). Two alternative reasons were given by the Supreme Court for dismissing such a writ petition. The second alternative, is applicable here (without implying anything as to whether the first reason also would be attracted ). At para-8 it was observed,"even on the assumption that the order of the appellate court had not merged in the order of the single Judge who had disposed of the revision petition we are of the view that a writ petition ought not to have been entertained by the high Court when the respondent had already chosen the remedy under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. If there are two modes of invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court and one of those modes has been chosen and exhausted it would not be a proper and sound exercise of discretion to grant relief in the other set of proceedings in respect of the same order of the subordinate court. The refusal to grant relief in such circumstances would be in consonance with the anxiety of the court to prevent abuse of process as also to respect and accord finality to its own decisions". It is needless to reiterate the proposition that a revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC is a discretionary jurisdiction. Exercise of the said discretionary jurisdiction, depends on circumstances, which are substantially similar to the factors governing the exercise of writ jurisdiction. Therefore, the ratio of the above decision of the Supreme court fully justifies the conclusion, that, a party, having invoked already the writ jurisdiction of this Court and received an adverse order, cannot once again, avail the revisional forum by invoking Section 115 CPC. ( 6 ) THERE is not doubt regarding the power of this Court to recall the earlier dismissal orders. If ends of justice demand the recalling of an order made under Section 115 cpc, this court, can certainly invoke the very power under Section 115 CPC. If necessary section 151 CPC would aid the said power. On the scope of this Court's power to recall an earlier order made under Section 115 CPC, it was held by Narayana Pai, J. (as he then was) in B. V. Shindagi v Saraswatibai and Others [1968 (2) Mys. If necessary section 151 CPC would aid the said power. On the scope of this Court's power to recall an earlier order made under Section 115 CPC, it was held by Narayana Pai, J. (as he then was) in B. V. Shindagi v Saraswatibai and Others [1968 (2) Mys. L. J. 200]:"apart from these technical considerations, the exercise of the power of revision under Section 115 CPC is intended to subserve principles of justice and should a court of justice, specially the High Court exercising the power under said section, feel that interests of justice do require that a matter disposed of for default should be re-heard, I do not think fetters can be placed on Court's power larger than those expressly mentioned in the section itself. " ( 7 ) THE scope of the power inherent in the court, (as declared by Section 151 CPC), has been emphasised in Manohar Lal Chopra v rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal ( AIR 1962 SC 527 ) at p. 532:"it is well settled that the provisions of the code are not exhaustive, for the simple reason that the Legislature is incapable of contemplating all the possible circumstances which may arise in future litigation and consequently for providing the procedure for them". And then at para-21:-"a similar question about the powers of the Court to issue a commission in the exercise of its powers under Section 151 of the Code in circumstances not covered by section 75 and Order XXVI arose in padam Sen v State of Uttar Pradesh, ( AIR 1961 SC 218 ) and this Court held that the Court can issue a commission in such circumstances. It observed at page 219 thus: the inherent powers of the court are in addition to the powers specifically conferred on the court by the Code. They are complementary to those powers and therefore it must be held that the Court is free to exercise them for the purposes mentioned in Section 151 of the Code when the exercise of those powers is not in any way in conflict with what has been expressly provided in the Code or against the intentions of the Legislature'. These observations clearly mean that the inherent powers are not in any way controlled by the provisions of the Code as has been specifically stated in Section 151 itself. These observations clearly mean that the inherent powers are not in any way controlled by the provisions of the Code as has been specifically stated in Section 151 itself. But those powers are not to be exercised when their exercise may be in conflict with what had been expressly provided in the Code or against the intentions of the Legislature. This restriction for practical purposes, on the exercise of those powers is not because those powers are controlled by the provisions of the Code but because if should be presumed that the procedure specifically provided by the Legislature for orders in certain circumstances is dictated by the interests of justice". Again at 533, -"these observations have no bearing on the question of the Court's exercising its inherent powers under Section 151 of the code. The section itself says that nothing in the Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the court to make orders necessary for the ends of justice. In the face of such a clear statemeat, it is not possible to hold that the provisions of the Code Control the inherent power by limiting it or otherwise affecting it. The inherent power has not been conferred upon the court, it is a power inherent in the court by virtue of its duty to do justice between the parties before it". To the same effect are the observations found in AIR 1976 SC 1152 and AIR 1977 sc 1348 cited by M/s. Datar and K. R. D. Karanth. In the absence of an express prohibition or a patent legislative intent to the contra, the amplitude of court's inherent power to do justice between parties cannot be circumscribed. No such ban, against recalling a dismissal order 6f a revision petition, is found anywhere. ( 8 ) THE question then is, as to when such a power has to be exercised. The power to recall, is a power exercisable to do justice between the parties. It is essentially an equitable and discretionary power. The guiding factors for the exercise of such a jurisdiction are well known. Conduct of the parties, the possible effect of the order on the rights of third parties, delay involved in invoking the jurisdiction, which, along with it attracts the question of laches or acquiescence by the party invoking the jurisdiction, are major factors to be considered. The guiding factors for the exercise of such a jurisdiction are well known. Conduct of the parties, the possible effect of the order on the rights of third parties, delay involved in invoking the jurisdiction, which, along with it attracts the question of laches or acquiescence by the party invoking the jurisdiction, are major factors to be considered. ( 9 ) ON the dismissal of a Revision Petition, as not maintainable, the order of the District court becomes final. If the Supreme Court, subsequently declares that revisional jurisdiction was available to the parties and the high Court wrongly rejected the revision petitions, no doubt, law gets clarified, but other dismissed Revision Petitions do not get revived. The fact situation is not like the one involved in Shenoy and Co. v Commercial Tax officer, Bangalore ( AIR 1985 SC 621 ). There the State Government filed appeal only in one case, against the striking down of an Act of the Legislature by the High Court. Supreme Court overruled the decision of the high Court. Supreme Court held that the act stood revived by the decision of the supreme Court and therefore State Government could ignore the decision of the High court wherein reliefs were given to other persons, (though State Government had not filed any appeal against those persons ). That was not a case of private dispute. Further, it was a case, where the Act in question was held to be under eclipse by virtue of the decision of the High Court. When the period of eclipse ceased, the Act operated in full brightness and therefore State could enforce it. The Supreme Court did not say that the Writ Petitions which were allowed earlier by the High Court, were to be treated as pending, nor did it say that, Writ Petitions should have been revived for a fresh decision in the light of the Supreme Court decision. ( 10 ) IN these cases, the Revision petitioners had ample remedy, even after the dismissal of their Civil Revision Petitions. All of them could have filed fresh Writ Petitions within a reasonable time, to challenge the respective orders made against them under Section 50 of the Rent Control Act. If such a challenge was not made within a reasonable time, it is reasonable to infer that, such a party acquiesced in the order. All of them could have filed fresh Writ Petitions within a reasonable time, to challenge the respective orders made against them under Section 50 of the Rent Control Act. If such a challenge was not made within a reasonable time, it is reasonable to infer that, such a party acquiesced in the order. In such a case, we find no justification to allow the application of the erstwhile Revision petitioner for the revival of his Revision Petition, solely on the ground that, the Supreme court has, subsequently held that, the revision Petition was maintainable. ( 11 ) THERE is no difficulty in cases of pending Writ Petitions. As the Supreme Court has now declared the law and this Court's revisional jurisdiction is available, those Writ petitions can be treated as Civil Revision petitions and be dealt with accordingly. ( 12 ) CONSEQUENTLY, we hold, (I) This Court has inherent power to recall the dismissal order made in a revision Petition under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, subject to the conditions stated above. (II) If any of the Revision Petitioner acquiesced in the earlier dismissal order, resulting in his acceptance of the finality of the order under Section 50 of the Rent Control Act (acceptance may be express or by necessary implication) this Court will not exercise its discretionary jurisdiction to recall the said dismissal order so as to revive the Civil Revision Petition. (III) On dismissal of the Civil Revision petition earlier, if any party had filed a writ Petition and it was disposed off, question of recalling the earlier dismissal of the Civil Revision Petition and its revival does not arise. (IV) If any Writ Petition is pending challenging an order made under section 50 of the Karnataka Rent control Act, 1961, the petitioner may be permitted to convert the same into a Civil Revision Petition under section 115 of the Code of Civil procedure. ( 13 ) THESE matters were referred to the division Bench under Section 9 (vi) of the karnataka High Court Act, 1961. From the tenor of the order of reference, it is clear that, the reference, is of the I. As only. But individual I As with reference to the actual facts involved were not argued before us by anyone of the learned counsel. Hence it is more appropriate that all these I. As should be heard on merits. From the tenor of the order of reference, it is clear that, the reference, is of the I. As only. But individual I As with reference to the actual facts involved were not argued before us by anyone of the learned counsel. Hence it is more appropriate that all these I. As should be heard on merits. Hence these I. As will be taken up for disposal separately. --- *** --- .