Judgment :- 1. A short controversy, relating to admission of students to an aided training school, remains to be resolved in this appeal. The academic year has commenced; the admissions can no longer wait; the dispute thus requires to be settled without any further delay. 2. The appellant is the Manager of an aided training school governed by the Kerala Education Act and the Rules made thereunder. The rules regulate admission and twenty per cent of the seats alone are reserved for selection by the Managers of these aided institutions while sixty per cent of the seats are filled by selection through the Public Service Commission and twenty per cent by deputation of untrained teachers in Government schools. This statutory restriction is challenged by the appellant on the ground that it offends bis fundamental right under Art.30(1) of the Constitution. He claims that he is the Manager of an educational institution established and administered by a minority community and R.6, 7 and 8 in Chapter XXV of the rules (K.E R. for short) are inapplicable to him and his training school. The Government on the other hand refute bis claim and assert that the appellant's school was never treated or declared as a minority institution by the Government or the Education Department. A learned judge of this Court held that the appellant has not proved by evidence or circumstances that his school is a minority institution and dismissed his claim. The appeal is against this decision. 3. On 28th February, 1963, the Government sanctioned a new private training school at Quilon, the I mam Hussain Memorial Basic Training School, in the name of Haji M. Abdul Majeed Sahib, President, Mila-de-Sheriff Committee, Quilon. Haji M. Abdul Majeed died in 1972. There was some dispute regarding change of management as a claim was made by the Muslim Educational Society, Quilon, stating that it bad obtained assignment of the management rights from Haji Abdul Majeed before his death, based on an unregistered deed written on stamp paper. This dispute could not be settled and there was no Manager recognised by the Department. The recognition of the school was, therefore, withdrawn by the Deputy Director on 29-5-1973; but the Government promptly stayed the order on 16-6-1973. This dispute could not be settled and there was no Manager recognised by the Department. The recognition of the school was, therefore, withdrawn by the Deputy Director on 29-5-1973; but the Government promptly stayed the order on 16-6-1973. Almost a year thereafter, the stay was vacated on 26-4-1974; but meanwhile, all the training schools in the State remained closed till 1977 and this school also did not function all these years. The school reopened in 1977, and the Government authorised the District Educational Officer to function as Manager till the management dispute was settled. The Government, eventually by order dated 26-10-1978 held "the school belongs to a corporate Educational Agency, the Mila-de-Sheriff committee. Now this Committee is represented by its President, Shri Yoonus Kunju (the appellant) and he is to be recognised as the Manager of the School" and the earlier order withdrawing the recognition was cancelled. (Ext. P30). Two Writ Petitions, O.P. No. 3818 of 1978 and O.P. No. 362 of 1979, filed by the Muslim Educational Society and its Branch Office at Quilon, were dismissed is July, 1984. When in the next academic year, 1985, admissions had to commence, the appellant informed the authorities that it was proposed to fill all the 40 seats available in the school by candidates selected by the management and requested that no candidate selected by the Government may be sent or deputed to this school. The Government, however, took the firm stand that the appellant's institution was not established for the benefit of any particular minority community and could not be treated as a minority institution'in the absence of conclusive proof thereon'. Refusal by the management to admit the Government sponsored candidates, naturally provoked the authorities to issue notice to show cause why the recognition to the appellant's school should not be withdrawn. The appellant showed cause; but swift action followed. The teacher in charge of admission was suspended in July 1986, a senior teacher was directed to be in charge of admission, and orders were issued declaring that the 32 oat of the 40 admissions made by the Manager were unauthorised and directing their names to be removed from the rolls (Ext. P24). Orders were also issued disqualifying the appellant as the Manager of the School, de-recognising the school for the year 1987-88 and for the closure of the school from 1988-89 onwards. P24). Orders were also issued disqualifying the appellant as the Manager of the School, de-recognising the school for the year 1987-88 and for the closure of the school from 1988-89 onwards. At the moment, we are not concerned with the admissions made in the previous years, but, only with the admissions for the year 1988-89 as the admissions for the earlier years are all covered by interim orders issued by this Court from time to time and the final directions issued by the learned judge while disposing of the Original Petition. Those orders have worked themselves out and also do not require to be reopened. 4. If R.6.7 and 8 of Chapter XXV of the K.E.R. apply to the appellant's institution, be can admit only 8 students to the 20 per cent quota available to the management and not to all the 40 seats available in the school. 5. Two questions, therefore, arise for determination: (1) Are R.6, 7 and 8 in Chapter XXV of the K. E. R. applicable to minority institutions and (2) if they are applicable, is the appellant's institution a minority institution entitled to the protection under Art.30 (1) of the Constitution? 6. R.6.7 and 8 in Chapter XXV of the K. E. R. are as follows: "6. Twenty per cent of the seats in aided Training Schools shall be reserved for selection by the Managers of the respective Training Schools". 7. Selection of candidates for sixty percent of the seats in Aided Training Schools and for eighty per cent of the seats in Government Training Schools shall be made by a Selection Committee consisting of a member of the Public Service Commission as Chairman and an Official nominee of the Education Department. There shall be a Selection Committee for each Revenue District. Note: Two per cent of the total seats under the open quota shall be reserved for qualified orthopaedically handicapped persons". "8. In the remaining twenty per cent of seats; the Director shall depute untrained teachers employed in Government Schools for teacher's training in Government and Aided Training Schools. Provided that the teachers recruited through the Employment Exchange in Government Schools shall not be entitled for such deputation". 7. The provisions of this Chapter relating to admission to Teacher's Training Schools were introduced only in 1961 even though the Act came into force on 1-6-1959. 8. Provided that the teachers recruited through the Employment Exchange in Government Schools shall not be entitled for such deputation". 7. The provisions of this Chapter relating to admission to Teacher's Training Schools were introduced only in 1961 even though the Act came into force on 1-6-1959. 8. There are two decisions directly in point, one, of the Supreme Court in Sidhrajbhai v. State of Gujarat (AIR 1963 SC. 540) and another, of a Division Bench of this Court in State of Kerala v. Manager, C. M. of Schools (1970 KLT.106). 9. In Sidhrajbhai v. State of Gujarat (AIR 1963 SC 540), a constitution Bench of six judges, was considering the validity of R.5(2),11 and 14 of the rules made by the Bombay Government regarding reservation of seats in Primary Training Colleges and recognition of private training institutions. Under R.5(2) of the rules for Primary Training Colleges, the Government was authorised to reserve in "non Governmental institutions" a percentage of seats "for the Board deputed teachers" and the management of the institution had the right to admit students only for unreserved seats. By R.11 of the rules for recognition of, the Private Primary Institutions the Government assumed to itself the cowers to reserve seats for "Board deputed teachers". R.14 authorised withdrawal of the recognition of any institution and withholding of the payment of grant to that institution in case the institution failed to comply with the rules. In pursuance of these rules, the educational authorities directed the Principals of Private Training Colleges not to admit private students in excess of 20 per cent of the total strength in each class and insisted that 80 per cent of the seats should be reserved by the colleges for "School Board Teachers" The management of forty two primary schools and one training college, Christian Missionaries in the State of Gujarat, refused to abide by these directions and the threat of withdrawal of recognition and refusal to pay the grant by the Government compelled them to approach the Supreme Court under Art.32 of the Constitution contending that these provisions and the directions issued violated the fundamental right guaranteed under Art.30(1) of the Constitution. It can thus be seen that the Supreme Court was considering the question as to whether reservation of seats for admission of students to a training school or college was violative of Art.30(1). It can thus be seen that the Supreme Court was considering the question as to whether reservation of seats for admission of students to a training school or college was violative of Art.30(1). After an elaborate consideration of the relevant aspects, the Supreme Court concluded as follows: "We are, therefore, of the view that the R.5(2) of the Rules for Primary Training Colleges, and R.11 and 14 for recognition of Private Training institutions, in so far as they relate to reservation of seats, therein under orders of Government, and directions given pursuant thereto regarding reservation of 80 per cent of the seats and the threat to withhold grant-in-aid and recognition of the College, infringe the fundamental freedom guaranteed to the petitioners under Art.30 (1)." The validity of Rules, 6, 7 and 8, Chapter XXV of the K. E. R. itself came up for consideration before this Court in Stale of Kerala v. Manager, C. M. of Schools (1970 KLT.106). Following the Supreme Court ruling, this Court held as follows: "When it is remembered that the object of Art.30 (1) is the conservation or advancement of the religious culture of minority communities, it is easily understandable that teachers of a particular category who will promote the purpose are required for service in their institutions, and that it is to train such teachers that these training schools are established by the community, though some other teachers who do not injure their cause will also be entertained there. To restrict the community's choice of candidates for training in their schools to 20 per cent of the school-strength would certainly prejudice that interest of the community and would therefore violate the freedom assured to them under Art.30 of the Constitution. The insistence that 80 per cent of the strength should be candidates chosen by extraneous authorities; like the Selection Committee or the Director of Public Instruction, would seriously affect the character of the institution as an institution of the minority community and would almost reduce their freedom to a "teasing illusion". A like condition, of reservation of 80 Per cent of seats for candidates chosen by the Government of Bombay, was held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Sidhrajbhai's case (AIR 1963 SC 540). We do not find any material distinction between the facts of that case and the instant one". A like condition, of reservation of 80 Per cent of seats for candidates chosen by the Government of Bombay, was held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Sidhrajbhai's case (AIR 1963 SC 540). We do not find any material distinction between the facts of that case and the instant one". "We would therefore uphold the learned judges' directions that the condition of reservation of 80 per cent of the seats in aided training schools for candidates chosen by the Selection Committee and the Director of Public Instruction should not be applied to schools run by minorities within the meaning of Art.30(1) of the Constitution." 10. With these two decisions binding on us, there is little elbow room for fresh thinking and for the Government to contend that R.6, 7 and 8 in Chapter XXV still applied to minority institutions. Even then, the Advocate General contended that the "trend" of the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court indicated that conditions could be imposed for the grant in aid by the Government, and when those conditions relate to admission of students, especially in training institutions and to achieve excellence in educational standards, they are regulatory in nature, permissible under the constitution and not violative of Art.30(1). In particular, the learned Advocate General invited our attention to certain observations in St. Xaviers College v. Gujarat (AIR. 1974 SC. 1389) and in All Bihar Christian Schools Assocn. v. State of Bihar (AIR. 1988 SC. 305). 11. Shrimathy Usha Sukumaran, learned counsel for the appellant is right in her submission that in view of the clear pronouncements of the Supreme Court, there is no scope for this Court at this stage to find distinguishing threads to embark on any fresh line of thinking. 12. We have been rightly taken through the advisory opinion of the Supreme Court in In re. Kerala Education Bill, 1957 (AIR. 1958 SC.956) and the decisions of the Supreme Court in St. Xavier's College v. Gujarat (AIR. 1975 SC 1389). State of Kerala v. Mother Provincial (AIR. 1970 SC.2079), All Saints High School v. Government of A. P. (AIR. 1980 SC. 1042) and Frank Anthony PSE. Assocn. v. Union of India (AIR. 1987 SC. 311) and Alt Bihar Christian Schools Assocn. v. State of Bihar (AIR. 1988 SC. 305). Xavier's College v. Gujarat (AIR. 1975 SC 1389). State of Kerala v. Mother Provincial (AIR. 1970 SC.2079), All Saints High School v. Government of A. P. (AIR. 1980 SC. 1042) and Frank Anthony PSE. Assocn. v. Union of India (AIR. 1987 SC. 311) and Alt Bihar Christian Schools Assocn. v. State of Bihar (AIR. 1988 SC. 305). The advisory opinion given by the Supreme Court is as much binding on a High Court as any other decision of the Supreme Court (In Re The Special Courts Bill, 1978 (AIR. 1979 SC. 478). 13. The law is settled that the right of the minorities to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice guaranteed under Art.30(1) is, not an absolute right, but is subject to reasonable regulations which subserve the purpose of recognition and affiliation and preserve "the excellence of the institution as a vehicle for general education". Regulations prescribing the curriculum of studies and syllabi for examinations, the conditions of employment of teachers and the hygiene of students, and principles and methods relating to admission of students and academic needs of the institution, are not restrictions within the "prohibited zone" of Art.30(1). Regulations, however, cannot be stipulations for the surrender of this fundamenta.1 freedom and cannot abridge or annihilate the minority right to establish and administer an educational institution of its choice. To decide whether a regulation is within the permissible limits of Art.30(1), the question to be asked is not "whether the particular regulation is calculated to advance the general public interest" but "whether it is conducive to the interests of the minority community". Regulations taking away the right of admission of students, ordinarily exercisable by the management of the minority institution and vesting it on an outside body or those fixing a small percentage of seats as the management quota are not intended in the interests of the minority community and have to be treated as destructive of the right of administration guaranteed under Art.30(1). 14. The observations of the Supreme Court in Rev. Sidhrajbhai Sabhai v. State of Bombay (1963 3 SCR 837) : (AIR 1963 SC 540) are pertinent. "The right is intended to be effective and is not to be whittled down by so-called regulative measures conceived in the interest not of the minority educational institution, but of the public or the nation as a whole. Sidhrajbhai Sabhai v. State of Bombay (1963 3 SCR 837) : (AIR 1963 SC 540) are pertinent. "The right is intended to be effective and is not to be whittled down by so-called regulative measures conceived in the interest not of the minority educational institution, but of the public or the nation as a whole. If every order which while maintaining the formal character of a minority institution destroys the power of administration is held justifiable because it is in the public or national interest, though not in its interest, as an educational institution, the right guaranteed by Art.30(1) will be but a "teasing illusion" a promise of unreality". 15. The contention of the learned Advocate General that "additional regulations" can be legitimately imposed when the educational institution seeks aid, does not advance his cause for the simple reason that those additional regulations are also subject to Art.30(1). The educational institution seeking aid from the Government does not seek to surrender its fundamental rights under Art.30 (1). Barter of fundamental rights is foreign to constitutional jurisprudence and money cannot purchase minority rights. We are, therefore, not impressed with the contention of the learned Advocate General that the impugned rules as conditions forgiving aid to the educational institutions, are applicable to minority institutions. 16. It was then contended that the appellant's predecessor applied for sanction of the school along with others when the Government, realising the educational needs of the locality invited applications for the purpose. At that stage, there was no assertion of minority rights, there was no recognition of any such right and no sanction was made on the ground that the applicant was a minority protected under Art.30 (1). The applicant agreed to abide by all the provisions of the KER. It is, therefore, contended that the appellant cannot be allowed to urge at a later stage that be will not be bound by some of the provisions of the KER. Considerable reliance was placed on a Full Bench decision of this Court in Fr. Mathew v. State of Kerala (1978 KLT 763). It was held therein thus: "That the right is not absolute and unqualified but one capable of regulation in the matter and manner of its exercise, is now beyond dispute. Considerable reliance was placed on a Full Bench decision of this Court in Fr. Mathew v. State of Kerala (1978 KLT 763). It was held therein thus: "That the right is not absolute and unqualified but one capable of regulation in the matter and manner of its exercise, is now beyond dispute. In the course of the argument, we bad asked the petitioner's counsel whether the minorities would claim a right to establish educational institutions whenever and wherever demanded. Although with hesitation, petitioner's counsel was obliged to admit that this extreme right cannot be maintained. We think too. that such an extreme position entitling the minority to ask and to be given the educational institutions, wherever it wants to establish, at any moment when the cry is raised, is not the scope and the content of Art.30 Regulation of the right in time as well as in space, must, it appears, be permissible. R.2 seems to provide for nothing more than such a regulation. It provides for the assessment of the educational needs of the locality by 8 competent authority after taking into account the relevant considerations. In weighing the educational needs of the locality, the authority, we have no doubt, is bound to consider, and will indeed consider, the requirements of the minority communities in establishing educational institutions of their choice. Before finalising the list of Schools to be opened in any locality, applications are to be invited, objections are to be received, and only after consideration of these, is the list to be finalised. The minority community therefore get abundant opportunity for urging and putting forward its needs for serving the cause of education in a locality. Quite apart from the opportunity that it gets, the authorities are themselves bound to consider on their own the educational needs of the locality from the point of view of the interests of the minority community. We cannot, therefore, in the nature of things, regard R.2 as passing beyond the pale of permissible regulations and trenching on the offending sphere of restrictions on the fundamental right. We are of the opinion, that the Rule is well within the border-land of regulation of the right sanctioned by judicial decisions". 17. We do not think that this decision can be of any help to the State in this case. We are of the opinion, that the Rule is well within the border-land of regulation of the right sanctioned by judicial decisions". 17. We do not think that this decision can be of any help to the State in this case. No records are available to show whether the appellant's institution had asserted any minority rights at the time of application. Nor is there anything to show whether the Government considered the claim of minority rights to establish an educational institution in this particular locality. We are not sure whether the principles formulated by this Court in 1978 were in fact followed in 1963 by the Government. There is no factual basis for any reliance to be made on this decision. 18. Thus we have to hold, rejecting the contention of the learned Advocate General that rules, 6, 7 and 8 of Chapter XXV of the K.E.R. do not apply to minority institutions protected under Art.30(1) of the Constitution.. The decision of this Court in State of Kerala v. Manager, C.M. of Schools (1970 KLT.106) does not require reconsideration, as has been rightly held by the learned single judge also. 19. This takes us to the second question whether the appellant's training school is a minority institution entitled to the protection under Art.30 (I). It is not disputed that the Muslims belong to the minority community in Kerala. This training school was sanctioned to the Mila-de-Sheriff Committee, Quilon. It was the President of this committee who applied for sanction and sanction was accorded in the name of the then President of the Committee, Mila-de Sheriff Committee, in 1963. The Government again declared in Ext. P 30 in 1978, that the school belongs to the Mila-de-Sheriff Committee. This committee has been recognised as the "corporate educational agency" to manage the institution under the K.E.R. Corporate Educational Agency, under the K. E. R., as distinct from an individual Educational Agency, includes "cases where the right is vested in (a) two or more persons jointly with written registered agreement, (b) a Board or Society or Association or Company or institution registered under a statute or created by a statute (c) an Institution of Trust and (d) an ecclesiastical office of any religious denomination" (Chapter III- Ruls 1). It is, therefore, clear that the Government themselves held that the school belongs to an association of persons, and not to a mere individual, and recognised the President of that corporate Educational Agency as its Manager under the K.E.R., both at the time when the school was sanctioned in 1963 and later in 1978, when the dispute was settled. 20. Regarding the activities of the Mila-de-Sheriff committee. Ext. P29. an order by the District Collector in an encroachment case is significant. There was a complaint by the Revenue authorities that this Committee had trespassed in 5.10 acres of Government land and the Tahsildar had directed eviction. The Committee filed a statutory appeal before the District Collector, Quilon. The District Collector found that the 5.10 acres a1ongwith the lands on the northern side covered an area of 11 acres and that the entire area had been used "for religious purposes undisputedly by the Muslim community of Quilon town. The northern portion was still being used for burial purposes and the southern portion for religious purposes on festive occasions. He also noticed that in the disputed area, there is a sacred tank for the Muslims, and that the tank is used by them for religious purpose during Mubaram. Bakrid etc. The Muslims had claimed exclusive right over the entire 11 odd acres, for more than hundred years and the District Collector came to the conclusion thus: "I have come to the irresistible conclusion that the Muslims of Quilon have acquired 8 right to use the entire area of about 11 acres in the Vadekkevila village and known by the name Garbala Maidan for religious purposes, by way of prescription. I do not see that Muslims are in occupation of the land in the strict sense of the term what they have is the right to use the land by prescription for religious purposes. The user of the land as a matter of right enjoyed by the Muslims is not a trespass by the Muslims and hence it cannot be called an encroachment." The appeal of the Mila-de-Sheriff Committee was thus allowed. It is this Committee, vitally involved in religious activities of the Muslim community, that owns the Training School. The bye-laws of the Committee, Ext. It is this Committee, vitally involved in religious activities of the Muslim community, that owns the Training School. The bye-laws of the Committee, Ext. P1, produced by the appellant also show that one of the objects of the Committee was: "To carry on all activities aimed at the progress of the Muslims inhabiting in Quilon, Chinnakada, Cantonment and Vadakkevila areas in their social, cultural, educational and economic fields and especially to establish Educational Institutions and to do all things necessary for their efficient functioning." We have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that on the materials on record, the Imam Hussain Memorial Basic Training School, was established by a minority community, the Muslims, for the benefit of that Community and thus the appellant's educational institution is entitled to the protection guaranteed under Art.30(1) of the Constitution. It is, therefore, difficult, with great respect, to agree with the reasoning and conclusion of the learned judge on this aspect. 21. The order of the Government dated 28-2-1963 was not produced before the learned single Judge. It is published in the Gazette and the Gazette notification was made available to us at the time of hearing. On the evidence, therefore, it cannot be said, as has been found by the learned single judge that there is no material that the school was established by a group of persons or any committee. The appellant produced Ext. P1, a photostat copy of the bye-laws of the committee and stated that the bye-laws were framed in 1962 and they were considered by the Government at the time of sanction of the school in 1963. This fact was not specifically denied in the counter affidavit of the State; and even then, the learned judge stated that as the sanction has not been produced, it is not possible to verify whether the averments made by the appellant in the writ petition are true. It has to be noted that the Government did not produce at the time of the bearing before the learned judge or before us, at the bearing of the appeal, the relevant files relating to the sanction granted to the school in 1963. In fact, it was submitted that the file is not traceable. Under the circumstances, an adverse inference can be drawn only against the Government and not against the appellant. It has, therefore, to be held that it was on consideration of Ext. In fact, it was submitted that the file is not traceable. Under the circumstances, an adverse inference can be drawn only against the Government and not against the appellant. It has, therefore, to be held that it was on consideration of Ext. P1 bye-laws that the sanction was originally granted in 1963 and the President of the Mila-de-Sheriff Committee was recognised as the Manager of the Corporate Educational Agency under the K.E.R. On these facts it is also difficult to accept the submission on behalf of the State that Ext. P1 could not have been the bye-laws of the Committee, as it is an incomplete document and that the recitals therein show that they were not placed before a general body for approval. Ext. P1, on its shown showing, is a complete document. The fact that various committees have to be constituted under the bye-laws does not mean that Ext. P1 is left unfinished. The counter affidavit of the State did not refer to Ext. P1 as incomplete and the Government cannot be beard to say that it does not contain the whole bye-laws when they themselves do not produce the copy of the bye-laws which should have been in their possession. Ext. P1 itself states the Mila-de-Sheriff Committee was constituted at a general body meeting held on 6-10-1962 and the Committee directed the framing of the bye-laws at its meeting held on 10-11-1962. The bye-laws were thereafter framed and placed before the Committee. The bye-laws provide the qualifications for membership to the Committee, the election and term of office of the office bearers of the Committee, the duties of the office bearers and responsibilities of the steering committee. The bye-laws thus take note of these salient features and it is difficult to accept the oral submission of the State, without anything more, that these are not the bye-laws of the Mila-de-Sheriff Committee. At any rate, Ext. P1 does show that this Committee was established in 1962 and its objects were religious and charitable to benefit the Muslim community. The committee in management of the Imam Hussain Memorial Basic Training School is the representative of a minority community which established the institution for the benefit of that community. 22. Minority right guaranteed under the constitution does not depend on any declaration to be given by the Government. The committee in management of the Imam Hussain Memorial Basic Training School is the representative of a minority community which established the institution for the benefit of that community. 22. Minority right guaranteed under the constitution does not depend on any declaration to be given by the Government. The fact, therefore, that the Government in this case, has not declared that the appellant's institution is not a minority institution, cannot be a good ground to reject the appellant's case. 23. It was then submitted that the appellant did not assert the claim to minority rights for several years and he cannot be allowed to raise it for the first time in 1986. There is no waiver of the fundamental right under Art.30 (1) and the right is not lost by non user. Moreover, from 1973 to 1977, the Government did not permit any training school in this State. The management dispute was settled only in 1984 when this Court dismissed the writ petitions filed by the contesting claimants. From 1988, the appellant has been asserting his right under Art.30(1). Appointments of teachers and admission of students constitute the soul of the rights guaranteed under Art.30(1) and the statutory attempt can only to be to accomplish those constitutional objects. A right available to a minority community cannot be denied on account of any indifference or inaction of any individual. In the circumstances, the appellant's constitutional right cannot be ignored in this proceeding under Art.226 of the Constitution. 24. It has been brought to our notice that there are 98 Training Schools in this State. Of these, 30 are treated as minority institutions as would be seen from a notification dated 1-1-1988 published in the Gazette dated 2nd February, 1988. It is not disputed that in all these minority institutions, admissions of students are made only by the management and not by the Government. The Government themselves have rightly applied and followed the decision of this Court in State of Kerala v. Manager, C. M. of Schools (1970 KLT.106) and R.6, 7 and 8 of Chapter XXV of the K.E.R. have not been applied to those institutions. Eighteen years, thereafter, the Government cannot be allowed to retrace the steps settled by decisions and take the stand that R.6, 7 and 8 apply to minority institutions as well. 25. Eighteen years, thereafter, the Government cannot be allowed to retrace the steps settled by decisions and take the stand that R.6, 7 and 8 apply to minority institutions as well. 25. In the result, the appeal has to be allowed and the directions (i), (ii) and (iv) issued by the learned judge are set aside and it is declared that R.6, 7 and 8 of Chapter XXV of the K.E.R. are not applicable to the appellant's Training School, the Imam Hussain Memorial Basic Training School. Directions are, therefore, issued to the respondents not to enforce the said provisions against the appellant and his Training School and the orders issued de-recognising the school and directing closure of the school, are hereby set aside and the respondents are restrained from withdrawing the recognition of the school or withholding its grant for violation of R.6, 7 and 8 of Chapter XXV of the K.E.R. The direction issued by the learned judge regarding the students admitted during the academic year 1986-87 shall stand. All students admitted during the previous years in the appellant's school shall be allowed to complete the course and sit for the examinations. Admission for the year 1988-89 will be made without reference to R.6, 7, and 8 of Chapter XXV of the Kerala Education Rules. In the interest of excellence of educational standards, we hope and trust that merit is not unduly sacrificed by the Management in making admissions. The appeal is allowed to the above extent. The parties shall bear their own costs.