Judgment J.N. Hore, J. The petitioner Debprosad Chiney @ Debiprasad Chiney is one of the partners of a partnership firm under the name and style of 'Messrs. Gayaram Chiney-Debprosad Chiney'. The said firm has seven partners. 2. Samar Kumar Basu (PW 1), Sub-Divisional Food Inspector of Hooghly Sadar, had been to the grocery of one Dulal Pal at Manasatala within Bansberia Municipality on 6.9.80 and took sample of refined rapeseed oil for the purpose of getting the same analysed by the Public Analyst. The said sample did not conform to the specification of refined rapeseed oil and as such was held to be adulterated by the Public Analyst. The District Health Officer, Hooghly then gave sanction for prosecution against the vendor Arun Kumar Pal, the seller Dulal Chandra Pal and Messrs. Gayaram Chiney-Debprosad Chiney, Warrantor. Subsequently, a petition of complaint was filed in the court of the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate at Hooghly Sadar alleging commission of offence under s. 16(1)(a)(ii) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act against the said persons. A charge under s. 16(1)(a) (i) read with s. 7 of the Prevention of the Food Adulteration Act was framed against the accused persons. 3. On completion of the trial, the learned Judicial Magistrate, Hooghly by his judgment and order dated 6.4.82 found the petitioner guilty of the charge, convicted him thereunder and sentenced him to suffer rigorous imprisonment for two years and a fine of Rs.2000/-, in default to suffer rigorous imprisonment for three months more in C.R. Case No. 912 of 1980/T.R. No. 434 of 1981. The petitioner preferred an appeal against the said order of conviction and sentence being Cr. Appeal No. 109 of 1982 which was dismissed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, 1st Court, Hooghly on 11.1.83 affirming the order of conviction and sentence passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate. Being aggrieved, the petitioner moved this court in revision and obtained the present Rule. 4. Mr. Dutt, learned Counsel for the petitioner, has urged that in the absence of any evidence and/or finding that the petitioner was in charge of and/or was responsible to the firm at the time the offence was committed in terms of s. 17 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, the conviction of the petitioner is not sustainable in law. Mrs. Ghosh, learned Advocate for the State, has not controverted the contention of Mr. Mrs. Ghosh, learned Advocate for the State, has not controverted the contention of Mr. Dutt and conceded that the conviction of the petitioner is unsupportable. 5. Relevant part of s. 17 as substituted for the old section by Act 34 of 1976 runs as follows:- "17. Offences by companies: (i) where an offence under this Act has been committed by a company – (a)(i) the person, if any, who has been nominated under sub-s. (2) to be in charge of, and responsible to, the company for the conduct of the business of the company (hereinafter in this section referred to as the person responsible), or (ii) where no person has been so nominated, every person who at the time the offence was committed was in charge of, and was responsible to, the company for the conduct of the business of the company; and (b) the company shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to he proceeded against and punished accordingly; Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any such person liable to any punishment provided in this Act if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge and that he exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence. (2) Any company may, by order in writing, authorise any of its directors or managers such manager, being employed mainly in a managerial or supervisory capacity) to exercise all such powers and take all such steps as may be necessary or expedient to prevent the commission by the company of any offence under this Act and may give notice to the Local (Health) Authority, in such form and in such manner as may be prescribed, that it has nominated such director or manager as the person responsible, along with the written consent of such director or manager for being so nominated. Explanation.............................. (3) ....................................... Explanation.............................. (3) ....................................... (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing sub-section, where an offence under this Act has been committed by a company and it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to, any neglect on the part of any director, manager, Secretary or other officer of the company not being a person nominated under sub-s. (2) such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. Explanation:-For the purpose of this section (a) "Company" means any body corporate and includes a firm or other association of individuals; (b) "director" in relation to a firm, means a partner in the firm: (c)....................................." 6. A plain reading of S. 17 would make it clear that a director of a company qua director or for that matter a partner of a firm qua partner is not liable for any offence under the Act committed by the company or the firm. The company or the firm has been made primarily liable but to make any other person vicariously liable it has to be shown that his case comes within the purview of either sub-clause (i) or sub-clause (ii) of Clause (a) of sub-so (1) or sub-section (4). In other words, it must be either shown that such person has been nominated under sub-s. (2) to be in charge of, and responsible to the company or the firm for the conduct of the business of the company or the firm or in the absence of such nomination such person was in charge of and responsible to, the company or the firm at the time the offence was committed or that the offence has been committed with the consent and connivance of, or is attributable to any neglect the part of such person. In this connection, we may refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ram Kishan Rohatgi and others ( AIR 1983 SC 67 ). In that case there were clear allegations that the sample taken by the Inspector from a shop which was sent to the Public Analyst, was manufactured by the Company in question and that the Public Analyst found the sample to be adulterated. The complaint was filed against the company, its Directors and the Manager. In that case there were clear allegations that the sample taken by the Inspector from a shop which was sent to the Public Analyst, was manufactured by the Company in question and that the Public Analyst found the sample to be adulterated. The complaint was filed against the company, its Directors and the Manager. So far as the Directors were concerned, there was not even a whisper nor a shred of evidence nor anything to show, apart from the presumption drawn by the complainant, that there was any act committed by the Directors from which a reasonable inference could be drawn that they could also be vicariously liable. In these circumstances, the Supreme Court held that no case against the Directors had been made out ex facie on the allegations made in the complaint and the proceedings against them were rightly quashed by the High Cont. 7. In the instant case, there is no allegation whatsoever against the petitioner in the petition or complaint, nor there is any finding by the Courts below that the petitioner was in charge of, and responsible to, the firm 'Messrs. Gayaram Chiney-Debprosad Chiney' for the conduct of the business of the firm or that the offence was committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to any neglect on the part of the petitioner or that the petitioner committed any act from which it can be inferred that he could also be vicariously liable. It has been held by the courts below that Arun Paul and Dulal Paul, the two other accused persons, purchased rapeseed oil from Messrs. Gayaram Chiney-Debprosad Chiney', under a valid warranty (vide Ext. A/1) Accused Arun Paul and Dulal Paul were, therefore, acquitted by the learned Magistrate. Ext. A/1 was granted by the firm and there is no evidence or finding that it was granted by the petitioner on behalf of the firm. The mere fact that the firm Messrs. Gayaram Chiney-Debprosad Chiney sold adul1erated rapeseed oil does not ipso facto make the petitioner, a partner of the said firm, liable for the offence punishable under s. 16(1)(a)(i) read with s.7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. The complaint was filed against Arun Kumar Paul, Dulal Chandra Paul and the firm Messrs. Gayaram Chiney-Debprosad Chiney, warrantor. The petitioner did not figure as an accused at all. The complaint was filed against Arun Kumar Paul, Dulal Chandra Paul and the firm Messrs. Gayaram Chiney-Debprosad Chiney, warrantor. The petitioner did not figure as an accused at all. Strangely enough, the charge under s. 16(1)(a)(i) read with s. 7 of the Prevention of the Food Adulteration Act was framed against the petitioner in his individual capacity and not against the firm against which the complaint was filed. The petitioner appeared on behalf of the firm and it seems that thereafter the proceeding continued against the petitioner and not against the firm. It appears that both the courts below regarded the firm and the petitioner as synonymous and instead of the firm, the petitioner was prosecuted and convicted without any finding that the petitioner was in charge of, and was responsible to, the firm for the conduct of the business of the firm at the time the offence was committed or that he played any role in the matter of the sale of the rapeseed oil and issue of the warranty. The order of conviction of the petitioner is, therefore, wholly unsustainable in law. 8. For the foregoing reasons we allow the revision and make the Rule absolute. The order of conviction and sentence as passed by the Courts below is hereby set aside. The petitioner who is on bail is discharged from his bail bonds. A.C. Sengupta, J.: I agree. Rule made absolute; conviction and sentence set aside.