JUDGMENT S.D.Agarwala 1. This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India arising out of proceedings under section 21 of U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 2. The petitioner is the landlord of the house in dispute. Mahgoo Ram, respondent no. 3, was the original tenant. He has now died and, in his place, his heirs have been substituted. The property in dispute is house No. B-1/101 and open space of land No. B-1/107, situate in Mohalla Assi, in the city of Varanasi. The petitioner landlord is staying in a portion of the building, which is occupied by the respondent no. 3. An application for release under section 21 (1) (a) and (b) of the Act was filed by the petitioner on 28th October, 1974, for release of the tenanted portion on the ground that his family consists of four sons, three of whom were married and have children. He had four daughters; two of whom are unmarried and, as such, he required the accommodation for his residential purposes. He also set up the need for augmenting his income for carrying on other businesses, as the theka of cycle stand, which was with him, in the State Bank of India, has now ceased and, consequently, wanted to start his own business. He further stated that he wanted to start his business for the sons who had not been employed. It was further stated by him that the tenant had constructed a house along with shops very near the accommodation in dispute and thus, consequently, no hardship will be caused to the tenant in case his release application is allowed. 3. The tenant hotly contested the release application and specifically averred that the landlord had got ample accommodation with him. He had got released certain accommodation during the pendency of the release application. He has also let out the same and that he has ample accommodation for carrying on his business and, consequently, his need for residence as well as business was satisfied and the application, consequently, was liable to be rejected. 4. The Prescribed Authority by its order dated 29th September, 1980, rejected the release application. Aggrieved, the landlord filed an appeal under section 22 of the Act. THE 2nd Additional District and Sessions Judge, Varanasi, by judgment dated 28th August, 1981, dismissed the appeal. 4. The Prescribed Authority by its order dated 29th September, 1980, rejected the release application. Aggrieved, the landlord filed an appeal under section 22 of the Act. THE 2nd Additional District and Sessions Judge, Varanasi, by judgment dated 28th August, 1981, dismissed the appeal. Both the judgments of the Prescribed Authority as well as the Appellate Authority have been challenged by means of the present petition. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the judgments of the Prescribed Authority as well as of the Appellate Authority are cryptic. The judgments do not consider the evidence filed in the case nor reasons have been given, but only on the basis of certain facts, which were presumed by the Courts, the judgments have been delivered against the petitioner. His case, consequently, is that the courts below have acted illegally and with material irregularity in exercise of their jurisdiction in not giving proper findings after considering the evidence on the record and, as such, the case of the petitioner having not been considered at all, he has been seriously prejudiced by the non-consideration of his case. 6. Learned counsel for the respondents has, however, controverted the arguments by placing before me the various affidavits on the record and has also urged that evidence was available on the record and the observations made in the judgment, though the affidavits have not been referred, but ultimately, the findings are correct findings and need not be interfered with by this Hon'ble Court After examining the contentions of the learned counsel for the parties and going through the judgments, I find that the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner are well founded. Neither the Prescribed Authority nor the appellate authority has at all considered the evidence led by the parties and both the judgments are just based on presumptions and on the basis of the facts which the authorities themselves have found out from certain records. 7. In particular, in order to test this position, it is necessary to mention that the appellate authority has rejected the need of the petitioner on one of the grounds, namely, that all the sons of the petitioner are posted at a very high place and, consequently, they are not at all in need of financial earning or to augment their income. The only evidence which has come in the case is that two of the sons of the petitioner are in service and the other two sons are not in service at all. This presumption is patently erroneous. The need of the petitioner has further been denied on the ground that four big halls have been released in their favour through Court. The petitioner has stated in his petition that four rooms which have been vacated were of sizes 8' x 10', 10' x 12', 8' x 12' and 10' x 12' and that they were part of the residential accommodation and are being used for residential purposes. The actual size of the rooms has not been controverted in the counter affidavit on the ground that the tenant has no knowledge of the size. This fact needed ascertainment. The size, mentioned above cannot possibly, be called as big halls. They are, of course, rooms of normal size and it was incumbent on the appellate authority to consider whether these rooms, which have been released in favour of the landlord would suffice the need for residence as well as business. These are the factors which have to be considered by the authorities after going through the evidence on the record and not merely by reading the evidence on the record. 8. In Damyanti Devi v. Brindaban, 1979 ARC 392, I had an occasion to consider as to the duty which has been cast upon an appellate authority while deciding an appeal. I had clearly held that where the judgment of the appellate authority is of affirmance, it is not necessary that every piece of evidence be considered once again, but there must be sufficient discussion to show that the Court had applied its mind to the facts and circumstances of the case. The appellate authority should further state the reasons why it found in agreement with the Prescribed Authority. In the instant case, the Prescribed Authority had not considered the evidence at all. The judgment of the Prescribed Authority neither gives any reasons nor proper findings in regard to the bonafide need. In view of the special facts and circumstances of this case, the appellate authority was bound to consider the evidence and thereafter decide the appeal under section 22 of the Act with greater detail after considering the relevant affidavits which had been filed on the record. In view of the special facts and circumstances of this case, the appellate authority was bound to consider the evidence and thereafter decide the appeal under section 22 of the Act with greater detail after considering the relevant affidavits which had been filed on the record. In my opinion, the judgment of the appellate authority is not sustainable in law. It is necessary that the case may be considered on merits afresh after considering all the relevant evidence on the record. 9. In the result, the petition is allowed. The order dated 28th August, 1981, passed by the appellate authority is quashed and the case is remanded to the appellate authority for decision in accordance with law. In the circumstances of the case, the parties are directed to bear their own costs. Petition allowed.