Order The assessee has filed an application for review/modification of our judgment in Tax cases nos. 5 of 1977, 33, 34 and 35 of 1980, which had been disposed of by common judgment dated 21st April, 1988, by us. Since M/s Eclat Construction (P) Ltd. Patna was the assessee and since income from hiring of bulldozer was common to all of them, they were heard together. The question referred for our opinion in Tax cases Nos. 33, 34 and 35 of 1980 was as follows :- "Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the income derived from hiring of Bulldozer and Hemlers is assessable under the head" "Business" or "other sources" ? The question referred to us in Tax case no. 5 of 1970, has been quoted in paragraph 2 of our judgment. It appears that by some slip the question referred to us for our opinion in Tax Cases nos. 33.34 and 35 of 1980 was not mentioned in the judgment. The counsel for the parties were Ad Idem that the nature of the income derived from hiring of Beavers would be same as that of Bulldozer. Probably, that is how the question referred in the later Tax case was not noted in the judgment. In our view, it was just an omission on our part which can be set right in an application for review/modification of our judgment. 2. There is no provision for review of judgment by High Court in the Income Tax Act but there are series of decisions laying down that review application would lie, the grounds, however, being different in different cases. There is no case like the question in the present case. That, however, will not make any difference. It is however well settled that by way of review a party cannot seek rehearing of the same matter. The spirit of Order 47, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure must form the guide for reviewing a judgment. 3. In Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay v. Ace Camera Equipment, Pvt. Ltd. (150 ITR. 231) a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court observed that ordinarily a review application would lie if some statutory provision having direct relevance or binding authority has not been considered by the Bench. 3. In Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay v. Ace Camera Equipment, Pvt. Ltd. (150 ITR. 231) a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court observed that ordinarily a review application would lie if some statutory provision having direct relevance or binding authority has not been considered by the Bench. A Division Bench of Calcutta High Court in Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal v. Surajmull Choteylal (114 ITR, 130) observed that review is provided for in Order 47 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Although, their Lordships rejected the prayer for review on merit but their Lordships clearly laid down that review of judgment was permissible. That case also arose out of a reference under section 66 (1) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922. In Ahmad v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Kerala (96 ITR, 29) a Division Bench of the Kuala High Court held that where a sentence crept in due to an accidental slip or omission or carelessness, the High Court would be flee to remedy the slip, or omission. It laid down that there was no law which precluded a High Court from doing so and that if there are accidental errors or omissions, the High Court as a court of review has the jurisdiction to correct those errors and rectify those omissions. The principle is that no act of a court shall ever injure a party." The error in judgment on a reference was rectified also in case of Commissioner of Income Tax Y. Ayodhya Kumari (156 ITR, 898) by a Bench of the Rajasthan High Court. An application for review would be maintainable was laid down also in case of Commissioner of Sales Tax, Uttar Pradesh v. Ramji Prasad Agrawal (40 ITR, 85). To crown all the High Courts the Supreme Court in Jaipur Mineral Development Syndicate v. the Commissioner of Income Tax, New Delhi (106 HR, 653) laid down that the High Court has inherent power to recall its earlier order. It observed as follows :- "There is nothing in any of the provisions in the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922, which either expressly or by necessary implication stands in the way of the High Court from passing an order for disposal of the reference on merits. It observed as follows :- "There is nothing in any of the provisions in the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922, which either expressly or by necessary implication stands in the way of the High Court from passing an order for disposal of the reference on merits. The High Court should not be loath to exercise the inherent power of recalling an earlier order provided that the party concerned approaches the Court with due diligence." 4. On a review of these discussions we have not the least doubt why the accidental omissions in our judgment cannot be corrected. 5. The position in law in regard to income from bull dozer in relation to four accounting years has already been dealt with in the earlier judgment. The income from leasing of Beavers must stand on the same footing as income from bulldozer. The income from Beavers accrued only during assessment years 1971-72, 1972-73 and 1973-74. In regard to income from Beavers also the question is whether it would be income from "Business" or income from "Other Sources". The statement of cases shows that the Beavers was purchased out of loan taken by the assessee. The facts found by the Tribunal are that while the business of production 01 mosaic tiles had not commenced, the assessee indulged in hiring of Beavers. This, in our view was an adventure in the nature of trade. The decision of Gajendra Gajkad, J. in (1932) 18 T.C., 43 would apply to the income from Beavers as well. In our view, the nature of income from hiring Beavers would be the same as income from hiring of bull dozer. The Tribunal, therefore, was not correct in holding that income from Beavers in the facts and circumstances of the case would be income from "other sources". The position in regard to income from leasing Beavers would be the same as income from hiring of bulldozer. The question referred to us in relation to income from Beavers must be answered in favour of the assesee and against the revenue. The application for review /modification in allowed accordingly. 6. Let this order be communicated to Assistant Registrar, Income Tax Appellate Tribunal to be read as part of the earlier judgment in the cases mentioned above in terms of section 256 (2) of the Income Tax Act. Review petition allowed.