Tata Engineering And Locomotive Company Limited And Another v. Union Of India
1988-09-27
BISHESHWAR PRASAD SINGH, SATYESHWAR ROY
body1988
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment 1. In this writ petition, the petitioner-Company (the Company for short) has prayed for issuing appropriate writ directing the respondents to approve the price lists already filed, annexure 2 to the writ petition and such further price lists as may hereafter be filed by the Company without taking recourse to Rule 9B of the Rules framed under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 (the Act for short) and without in any manner taking into consideration the prices of the motor vehicles sold by the Company from its Regional Sales Offices (R.S.O. for short) and to forbear from provisionally approving/ assessing the price lists that may be filed hereafter by the Company. 2. The Company is engaged in manufacturing motor vehicles at its factory at Jamshedpur and is liable to pay excise duty under the Act. The motor vehicles are removed at the place of manufacture. Those are sold and delivered by the Company to buyers at the factory gate at Jamshedpur. It also sells its vehicles from various R.S.Os. spread over the country. The prices at which the vehicles are sold at R.S.Os. are higher than the prices at the factory gate at Jamshedpur. 2.1. The Company submitted price lists to respondent No. 2 for approval. Since the normal prices at which the motor vehicles are sold at the place of removal, i.e. factory gate at Jamshedpur are available, the declared prices in the price lists were the prices at which motor vehicles are sold at the factory gate. However, from March 1983 and onwards none of the price lists submitted by the Company was finally approved by respondent No. 2; instead most of the price lists were approved provisionally under rule 9B of the Rules on the alleged ground that evidence regarding the price of motor vehicles sold through R.S.Os. were required to be furnished. Some of the price lists were not approved at all and are still pending. One price list dated 1.2.1986 was approved with the rider that approval would not apply to the sales made through the R.S.Os. 3. Respondent No. 2 called for information regarding sale and price structure of the vehicles sold through the R.S.Os. with regard to the price lists approved provisionally and also the price lists for which no order had been passed as yet.
3. Respondent No. 2 called for information regarding sale and price structure of the vehicles sold through the R.S.Os. with regard to the price lists approved provisionally and also the price lists for which no order had been passed as yet. The Company replied that the informations called for were unnecessary and irrelevant for passing final order on the price lists submitted by it. Respondent No. 2 insisted that the Company must furnish the price lists at which the motor vehicles are sold through R.S.Os. The Company refused to give information on the ground that since the normal price of motor vehicles ordinarily sold by the Company to a buyer in course of wholesale trade at the place of removal, i.e. at the factory gate at Jamshedpur, was and is known, that must be treated as the valuation of the vehicles for the purpose of charging duty of excise. Respondent No. 2 refused to accept this and demanded the prices at which the motor vehicles are sold through R.S.Os. 4. The question that requires to be considered is whether: in alleged exercise of the power under rule 173C of the Rules, respondent No. 2 can demand from the Company the price lists of the R.S.Os., when the normal price of the motor vehicles ordinarily sold by the Company to the buyers at the place of removal, i.e. the factory gate at Jamshedpur was and is known. 4A. For the purpose of charging duty of excise, excisable goods are to be valued. Sec. 4 of the Act lays down the method of valuation. Admittedly, duty of excise is chargeable on the motor vehicle with reference to its value. The dispute between the parties is whether in the circumstances of this case, Sec. 4(1) (a) shall apply or the proviso to it will apply. 5. Before proceeding further, I will dispose of the preliminary objection raised by Mr. Debi Prasad, learned Counsel for the respondents. He submitted that respondent No. 2 has not rejected the price lists submitted by the Company and no final order has been passed. All that respondent No. 2 wanted before passing final order was the price lists at which the vehicles are sold through R.S.Os.
Debi Prasad, learned Counsel for the respondents. He submitted that respondent No. 2 has not rejected the price lists submitted by the Company and no final order has been passed. All that respondent No. 2 wanted before passing final order was the price lists at which the vehicles are sold through R.S.Os. Respondent No. 2 is competent during the course of enquiry for the purpose of passing final order on the price lists requiring the Company to produce or deliver any document or thing relevant to the enquiry, the Company cannot refuse to produce the documents, it has been asked to produce, and at this state the Court ought not to interfere with the enquiry. According to Mr. Prasad, if the final order passed by respondent No. 2 goes against the Company, remedy has been provided under the Act. He urged that the writ petition was premature. 6. Mr. Taleyarkhan, learned Counsel for the petitioner, submitted that from 1983 respondent No. 2 has kept the matter pending and for some years he has approved the price lists provisionally and for some he has approved the price lists with rider that the same would not apply to the sale which takes place through the R.S.Os. He urged that the Company has taken a definite stand before respondent No. 2 that the price lists at which vehicles are sold through the R.S.Os. were irrelevant. According to him since respondent No. 2 has kept the matter pending on one pretext or the other from 1983 resulting in provisional assessment, the Company do not know what would be its liability if the price lists submitted by it which must cover all sales are not approved. The Company cannot be kept under suspense for indefinite period. He submitted that no doubt respondent No. 2 can ask the Company to produce documents for the purpose of enquiry in terms of rule 173C(9), but the documents called for must be relevant to the enquiry. 7. This writ petition was filed on 2.5.1988. On 6.5.1988 it was listed for admission and it was adjourned on the prayer made on behalf of the respondents. On 11.7.1988 this writ petition was listed for admission and it was again adjourned to 5th August, 1988. On 19.7.1988 the respondents filed their counter affidavits. On 5.8.1988 the writ petition was admitted for hearing.
On 6.5.1988 it was listed for admission and it was adjourned on the prayer made on behalf of the respondents. On 11.7.1988 this writ petition was listed for admission and it was again adjourned to 5th August, 1988. On 19.7.1988 the respondents filed their counter affidavits. On 5.8.1988 the writ petition was admitted for hearing. It was admitted after perusing the writ petition, counter affidavit and hearing the learned Counsel for the parties. In spite of the fact that no final order had been passed by respondent No. 2 on the price lists filed by the Company, the Bench admitted this application. 8. Further, the short point involved in this writ petition in whether the documents called for, i.e. the price lists of the vehicle sold through the R.S.Os. by the Company can be said to be relevant for the purpose of enquiry under rule 173C in view of the judgment of a Bench of this Court on the same question in Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co. Ltd. V/s. S.N. Guha Thakurta reported in 1972 E.L.T. (J) 14 : 1977 Cen-Cus 47D and decisions on the same by the Supreme Court. 8.1 For the reasons aforesaid, I am of the opinion that it is not a fit case in which we should refuse to give any relief to the Company at this stage simply on the ground that no final order has been passed by respondent No. 2 on the price lists submitted by the Company. Preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondents is overruled. 9. Admittedly, two wholesale prices of the motor vehicles manufactured by the Company are available, one at the factory gate, the place of removal at Jamshedpur and the other at the different R.S.Os. It is also admitted that the price of the motor vehicles at R.S.Os. is higher than that at factory gate at Jamshedpur. 10. For the purpose of charging duty, firstly normal price of the goods must be ascertained. How that is to be done has been provided under Sec. 4 of the Act.
It is also admitted that the price of the motor vehicles at R.S.Os. is higher than that at factory gate at Jamshedpur. 10. For the purpose of charging duty, firstly normal price of the goods must be ascertained. How that is to be done has been provided under Sec. 4 of the Act. Sec. 4(1)(a) provides that where under the Act, the duty of excise is chargeable on any excise goods with reference to value, such value shall, subject to the other provisions of this section, be deemed to be the normal price thereof; that is to say, the price at which such goods are ordinarily sold by the assessee to a buyer in the course of wholesale trade for delivery at the time and place of removal, where the buyer is not a related person and the price is the sole consideration for the sale. Mr. Khan relied on this. There are three provisos to this. Mr. Debi Prasad relied on proviso (1) which reads as follows: (i) where, in accordance with the normal practice of the wholesale trade in such goods, such goods are sold by the assessee at different prices to different classes of buyers (not being related persons), each such price shall, subject to the existence of the other circumstances specified in Clause (a), be deemed to be the normal price of such goods in relation to each such class of buyers;. Mr. Prasad submitted that 70% of the sale of the motor vehicles manufactured by the Company takes place through its R.S.Os. at a price higher than that available at the factory gate. He urged that the Company sells at different prices to different classes of buyers the vehicles manufactured by it. Each such price, therefore, shall be deemed to be the normal price in relation to each such class of buyers. 11 There is nothing on the record to show that motor vehicles are sold at Jamshedpur to a particular class of buyers. Rather, there are assertions on the part of the Company that anybody may come and purchase motor vehicle at the factory gate at Jamshedpur. There is also assertion in the writ petition that even with reference to the price for Government, Local Bodies etc., price has been approved provisionally.
Rather, there are assertions on the part of the Company that anybody may come and purchase motor vehicle at the factory gate at Jamshedpur. There is also assertion in the writ petition that even with reference to the price for Government, Local Bodies etc., price has been approved provisionally. It has also asserted that the Company has submitted price lists showing the price of the vehicle at which it is available at Jamshedpur to all buyers, Indian and Foreign, except Nepal. Respondent No. 2 has approved the same, but confined it to Jamshedpur only. In the counter affidavit, filed on behalf of the respondents, it has not been asserted that the Company sell the motor vehicles at Jamshedpur only to a particular class of buyers and to particular class of buyers vehicles are sold through particular R.S.Os. It appears that the respondent No. 2 was obsessed by the fact that large percentage of vehicles are. being sold through R.S.Os. at higher price and he is perhaps deliberating whether to fix normal price under Sec. 4 at the value at which the vehicles are being sold through R.S.Os. 12. On the facts proved, we do not find any confusion in the legal position. As noticed above, the motor vehicles are manufactured at Jamshedpur and those are removed from there. Vehicles are sold there at wholesale price and are available there to all classes of buyers. It is not the case of the respondents that at Jamshedpur buyers can be said to be related persons within the meaning of the Act. These facts must attract Sec. 4(1)(a). There is no evidence to show that the motor vehicles manufactured by the Company at Jamshedpur in the normal practice of the wholesale trade are sold by the Company at different prices to different class of buyers. First proviso to Sec. 4(1)(a) has, therefore, no application. In TELCO V/s. S.N. Guha Thakurta (supra) the demand of the department asking for price lists of R.S.Os. were quashed. But Mr. Prasad submitted that the legal position has changed and he referred to Union of India V/s. Bombay Tyre International Ltd.. He urged that respondent No. 2 was entitled to call for price lists of R.S.Os. 13.
In TELCO V/s. S.N. Guha Thakurta (supra) the demand of the department asking for price lists of R.S.Os. were quashed. But Mr. Prasad submitted that the legal position has changed and he referred to Union of India V/s. Bombay Tyre International Ltd.. He urged that respondent No. 2 was entitled to call for price lists of R.S.Os. 13. In Bombay Tyre, Supreme Court referred to Sec. 4(1)(a) and held that price at which excisable article sold by an assessee at arms length in the wholesale trade at the time and place of removal must be taken to be value for levy of excise duty. If this is not available, then recourse may be had to the provisos. This case does not support Mr. Prasad. In Indian Oxygen Ltd. V/s. Collector of Central Excise, the Supreme Court reiterated it. From the judgment it appears that Indian Oxygen manufacture excisable goods at its factory at Visakhapatnam. Those are sold from the factory at Visakhapatnam and also from the depot/service centres at Vijayawada, Rajamundry, Vadlapudi, Jeypore and Damanjodi. It also appears from the report that separate price lists were indicated for the same goods at Visakhapatnam, the place of manufacture and Vijayawada, a place of about 400 Km. away which was only a depot. Since excisable goods which are manufactured at Visakhapatnam and removed from there are ordinarily sold by the assessee to a buyer in course of wholesale trade at the place of removal, it was held that the normal value would be the value at Visakhapatnam in terms of Sec. 4(1)(a). That exactly is the position in this case. The price at which the company sell the vehicles manufactured at Jamshedpur shall be the normal price for the purpose of ascertaining the value of the excisable goods f or charging duty. 14. One must be clear about the power of respondents during the course of enquiry under rule 173C. An assessee is required to file, price list of goods assessable ad valorem. When such list is filed, under Sub-rule (9) the proper officer may, where he considers it necessary during the course of enquiry in connection with the price list so submitted, inter alia, require any person to produce or deliver any document or thing relevant to the enquiry.
An assessee is required to file, price list of goods assessable ad valorem. When such list is filed, under Sub-rule (9) the proper officer may, where he considers it necessary during the course of enquiry in connection with the price list so submitted, inter alia, require any person to produce or deliver any document or thing relevant to the enquiry. The rule lays down sufficient guideline and only document or thing relevant to the enquiry may be called for and not any and every document according to whim and fancy of the officer concerned. In view of my finding, price list of R.S.Os. cannot be said to be at all relevant for passing final orders on the price lists submitted by the Company. Mr. Prasad submitted that the Company was not going to be in any way prejudiced and there is nothing to show that respondent No. 2 will rely on those price lists. But why at all the Company should produce it? He also urged that from Telco V/s. S.N. Guha Thakurta (supra) it would appear that the Company had produced those then. That may be correct, but if documents are not relevant, respondent No. 2 cannot insist that the Company must produce it. 15. For all the reasons aforesaid, the petitioners must succeed in this application. The application is allowed. Let appropriate writ be issued commanding respondent No. 2 to pass without delay, appropriate final order on all the price lists already submitted by the Company keeping in view the legal position as stated hereinabove. Respondent No. 2 shall also follow this for passing final order on price lists that may be submitted in future by the Company for approval, if the law in this regard is not changed by any amendment by Parliament or by interpretation by the Supreme Court. There will be no order as to costs.