Order This is a petition filed under Sec.482. Cr.P.C, to quash the proceedings in M.C.No. 32 of 1984, on the file of the Revenue Divisional Officer and Sub Divisional Magistrate, Thiruthuraipoondi. 2. The Inspector of Police, Thiruthuraipoondi, laid a report before the Executive Magistrate that there is a dispute between the petitioners (A party) and the counter petitioners (B party) respecting as to who is entitled to the possession of the property in Survey No.64/5 measuring an extent of 32 cents situate in Vezhur village, Thiruthuraipoondi taluk. The Magistrate took the case on file as M.C.No. 32 of 1984 and after considering the materials available on record passed an order prohibiting both the parties from entering into the property. This order was challenged before the Sessions Court of East Thanjavur at Nagapattinam in Cr.R.C.No. 5 of 1985, which was also dismissed confirming the order of the Executive Magistrate. The present petition is filed questioning the legality of the order of the Sessions Judge confirming the orders passed by the Magistrate. 3. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners would submit that the impugned order suffers from grave illegality of not deciding the party in possession of the property. He would amplify the arguments by stating that, it is incumbent upon the Magistrate to decide the question of possession in favour of one or other of the parties in the proceedings under Sec.145. Cr.P.C, and if he is unable to decide such question, he is to act under Sec 146, Cr.P.C, attaching the subject of dispute and appointing a Receiver. He has not even done this. In such a state of affairs he would contend that the order passed by the Magistrate is totally without jurisdiction and therefore the same deserves to be quashed. 4. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents was unable to repel this arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioners, except stating that it was not possible for the Magistrate to decide the question of possession in favour of one of the parties. On a perusal of the provisions of Secs. 145 and 146, Cr.P.C, I am perfectly satisfied that the order passed by the Magistrate prohibiting both the parties from entering into the property in dispute is totally without jurisdiction calling for the setting aside of such order. 5. On a perusal of the provisions of Secs. 145 and 146, Cr.P.C, I am perfectly satisfied that the order passed by the Magistrate prohibiting both the parties from entering into the property in dispute is totally without jurisdiction calling for the setting aside of such order. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents would submit that the proceedings under Sec. 482, Cr.P.C, is not permissible when especially a specific provision has been made in the Act by way of a revision as against the order passed by the Magistrate under Sec. 145, Cr.P.C. No doubt, true, it is that the inherent power of the High Court under Sec. 482, Cr.P.C, is to be sparingly exercised to meet the ends of justice and should not be resorted to in all cases, when there is specific provision in the Act itself for dealing with such matters. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that the inherent power of the High Court under Sec. 482, Cr.P.C, is not whittled down or taken away, merely because of the existence of specific provisions in the Code covering such cases. He would submit that when there is patent illegality or total lack of jurisdiction in passing an order, the right and proper course to adopted to set at naught the illegal order so passed is to initiate proceedings under Sec. 482, Cr.P.C. for quashing the same. In support of his contention, he seeks to place reliance on the decision reported in Raj Kapoor v. State (Delhi Admn.) Raj Kapoor v. State (Delhi Admn.) A.I.R 1980 S.C. 258 wherein it is held as follows: “The inherent power of the High Court under Sec. 482, does not stand repelled when the re-visional power under Sec. 397, overlaps. Nothing in the Code not even Sec. 397 can affect the amplitude of the inherent power preserved in so many terms by the language of Sec. 482. Even so, when a specific provision is made easy resort to inherent power is not right except under Compelling circumstances. Not that there is absence of jurisdiction but that inherent power should not invade areas set apart for specific power under the same Code. There is no total ban on the exercise of inherent power where abuse of the process of the Court or other extraordinary situation excites the Court's jurisdiction. The limitation is self-restraint, nothing more. Not that there is absence of jurisdiction but that inherent power should not invade areas set apart for specific power under the same Code. There is no total ban on the exercise of inherent power where abuse of the process of the Court or other extraordinary situation excites the Court's jurisdiction. The limitation is self-restraint, nothing more. The policy of the law is clear that interlocutory orders, pure and simple, should not be taken up to the High Court and resulting in unnecessary litigation and delay. At the other extreme, final orders or clearly capable of being considered in exercise of inherent power, if glaring injustice stares the Court in the case.” The decision cited above makes it crystal clear that the inherent power of the High Court is always there to set at right, if the glaring injustice stares the Court in the face, by quashing the orders which are manifestly illegal and suffers from want of jurisdiction. Affixing my seal of approval to the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner in this regard, 1 hold that the present petition is maintainable. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioners would also snatch an argument that invoking the jurisdiction under Sec. 145, Cr.P.C., is not permissible, when the civil litigation between the parties is pending before the civil Court in respect of which proceedings are initiated under Sec. 145, Cr.P.C. No doubt true it is that in the case on hand both the parties approached the civil Court and got interim injunction in their favour prohibiting the other party from entering into the property in dispute. These civil proceedings did not get terminated at all in the sense of passing of a decree by a Competent civil Court. When the civil proceedings are pending proceedings under Sec. 145, Cr.P.C, appeared to have been instituted. Proceedings under Sec. 145, Cr.P.C, as well as the proceedings before the civil Court can go simuiltaneously and there cannot be any legal bar at all. It is of course true that once the civil Court passed a decree in respect of the subject matter, the same is binding upon the Magistrate. Proceedings under Sec. 145, Cr.P.C, as well as the proceedings before the civil Court can go simuiltaneously and there cannot be any legal bar at all. It is of course true that once the civil Court passed a decree in respect of the subject matter, the same is binding upon the Magistrate. If the civil Court had passed the decree prior to the initiation of proceedings under Sec. 145, Cr.P.C, then it may not be possible for the Magistrate to proceed under Sec. 145, Cr.P.C, and decide the question of possession when especially the civil Court has already decided such matter. The case on hand is not one where the civil Court had already adjudicated about the subject matter in dispute by passing a decree. In such a state of affairs, the learned counsel for the petitioners would concede that there is no bar for the proceedings under Sec. 145, Cr.P.C. 8. In view of what has been stated above, it goes without saying that the petition deserves to be allowed and is therefore allowed by quashing the proceedings in M.C. No. 32 of 1984 on the file of the Revenue Divisional Officer, and Sub Divisional Magistrate, Thiruthraipoondi. B.S. ----- Petition allowed.