JUDGMENT : H.L. Agrawal, C.J. - All these three revisions were listed for admission and the learned lawyers for the parties were heard. Although the revisions relate to three different cases, the point that arises in these cases being common proposes to dispose of all the three cases by this order. 2. The circumstances under which the revisions arise may be shortly stated: On 18-5-1988, K.P. Mohapatra, J, directed the office to call for the records of the following cases, disposed of by Shri K.C. Panda, then Additional Sessions Judge, Sambalpur in which he had passed judgment of acquit tat: (1) Criminal Appeal No. 13133 of 1986, disposed of on 2-1-1988. (2) Criminal Appeal No 3144 of 1986 disposed of on 8-3-1988. (3) Criminal Appeal No. 1318 of 1984-85, disposed of on 21-12-1987. 2. In pursuance of the above direction, the office of this Court called for the records of all the three cases and placed them before the learned Judge on 18-0-1988, as desired by him The three revisions have been initiated at the instance of the learned Judge. 3. In the first and third Criminal Appeals, the learned Additional Sessions Judge had set aside the orders of conviction of the Appellant-opposite parties for the offence u/s 376 of the Indian Indian Penal Code. Similarly, in the second Criminal Appeal, a judgment of acquittal of the accused u/s 307 of the Indian Indian Penal Code was passed After noticing the fact, the learned Judge on 22-6-1988 passed identical orders in all the three files reading as follows. ...It is not known whether any Government Appeal has been preferred in this case. A suo motu revision against the order of acquittal may be registered and the case may be used before an appropriate Bench for further action. (Underlining is mine) 4. In pursuance of the above note dated 22-6-1900 in all the three files, the Registrar directed the office to take action and comply with the minutes of the learned Judge, immediately The office then registered three separate Criminal Revision, extracted the minutes of the Hon'ble Judge dated 22-6-1988 in the three order-sheets, and the matters were listed for admission It further appears that before the matters were listed, the office on its own issued notices to the opposite parties fixing 25-8-1988 as the returnable date. The notices issued to the opposite parties in the cases read as follows: Notice is hereby given to you that the aforesaid Criminal Revision started in Court's own motion will be put up for hearing on 25-8-1986. You are hereby directed to show cause on the aforesaid day through your Advocate as to why the order of acquittal passed by the Addl. Sessions Judge, Sambalpur,...shall not be set aside. 5. In obedience to the notice, the opposite parties have entered appearance. When the matters were placed before me and I perused the nothings. I entertained some doubts regarding the correctness of the procedure which has been followed for initiating the suo motu proceedings. But, I must express my strong regret that the learned lawyer for neither party was of any assistance. Rather, they simply submitted that the cases; be admitted and an early date of hearing fixed. I must reward my serious concern for the casual manner in which he learned Advocate for the opposite parties who was engaged to defend them has conducted himself. 6. Be that as it may, I shall now take up the matters. The orders have been passed by the learned Judge when he was not in session of any of the cases in any manner A question arises, whether in such a situation he had any jurisdiction or authority in law to direct for starting suo moto proceedings? It would now be necessary to refer to the provisions of Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This section empowers the High Court or any Sessions Judge to call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court, and may,...direct that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended, and if the accused is in confinement, that he be released on bail or on his bond pending the examination of the record. 7. The question that now arises is whether in the aforesaid circumstances, the orders which the learned Judge passed directing for starting the suo motu revisions against the judgments of acquittal were within his jurisdiction or not. 7. The question that now arises is whether in the aforesaid circumstances, the orders which the learned Judge passed directing for starting the suo motu revisions against the judgments of acquittal were within his jurisdiction or not. In this connection Article 225 of the Constitution of India may also be referred to. Reading the provisions of the Constitution it is evident that the Chief justice alone has the authority to arrange for the sittings of the Court and the constitution of Benches. It is for the Chief justice to allot work to the Judges and the judges can only do such work as allotted to them. 8. It is evident that neither the appeals nor any matter arising out of the cases had traveled to this Court and, therefore, there was no question of any matter being placed before any Hon'ble Judge of this Court. In that view of the matter K.P. Mohapatra, J. being not in session of the cases or any matter touching them had no jurisdiction to direct for initiating the suo motu revision. I find full support for this view from a Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in State Vs. Devi Dayal, where the position was still more favorable for the Bench inasmuch as the rule of enhancement with respect to the conviction was issued on the filing of a complaint against the accused while hearing an appeal which was held to be without jurisdiction. I am tempted to quote a portion of the observation made in that judgment. I am of opinion that after the said Bench had decided the appeal and had directed the filing of the complaint against Debi Dayal it become functus officio and had no further jurisdiction left in the matter. It could have jurisdiction in the matter only if the case were listed before it under the orders of the Chief Justice or in accordance with his directions. I have not been able to find anything from the record that the matter relating to the sentence of Debi Dayal under the different sections should be listed before the said Bench or that it had been listed for necessary orders before the said Bench. I have not been able to find anything from the record that the matter relating to the sentence of Debi Dayal under the different sections should be listed before the said Bench or that it had been listed for necessary orders before the said Bench. In this view of the matter I am of opinion that the Bench consisting of James and Takru JJ., had no jurisdiction to issue notice to Debi Dayal to show cause for the enhancement of the sentences passed against him u/s 465 and 113, I.P.C. by the Judicial Magistrate. It has been repeatedly observed that the suo motu power should be exercised sparingly and only where sufficient grounds are established justifying sending for the records to avoid any miscarriage of justice, although the powers of the High Courts are very wide to take action u/s 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on any authentic information received from any source. 9. Reference may also be usefully made to two cases of the, Supreme Court, i.e., Bandhua Mukti Morcha Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, and M.C. Mehta and another Vs. Union of India and others, dealing with the epistolary jurisdiction of the High Courts and the Supreme Court. While dealing with the enforcement of the fundamental right on the basis of matters addressed to the Supreme Court pro bono public or for redressal of individual grievance it was emphasized in the earlier case that all communications and Petitioner invoking the jurisdiction of the Court must be addressed to the entire Court, that is to say, the Chief Justice and the companion Judges. In the next case, even while liberalizing the position, it was observed that a letter addressed to an individual Judge of the Court should be entertained only if it is on behalf of a person in custody or on behalf of a woman or a child or a class of deprived or disadvantaged persons. In other words, the authority of a puisne Judge to act on behalf of the Court has not been accepted. In Durga Gaddi v. State of Bihar, (1986) 4 SCC 564 some observations of the same nature were also made by the Supreme Court with respect to the exercise of suo motu power by a High Court Judge in bail matters. 10. In Durga Gaddi v. State of Bihar, (1986) 4 SCC 564 some observations of the same nature were also made by the Supreme Court with respect to the exercise of suo motu power by a High Court Judge in bail matters. 10. I therefore, have no doubt in my mind that the very initiation of the proceedings being without jurisdiction the revisions should be dismissed and the notice issued to the opposite parties discharged. I order accordingly. Final Result : Dismissed