G. M. Lodba, C. J.: - This is a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging, inter alia, the order of the Board of Revenue dated 15th February, 1988 confirming the order dated 26th November, 1986 passed by the Settlement Officer, Sonitpur and Darrang in Misc. Case No. 20/85-86. We have heard Mr. A. S. Choudhury, the learned counsel for the petitioners at length and perused the relevant record, the Regulations and the Rules referred by him. 2. The controversy is about the land at village Medhipara, Mouza Barsila, Circle Odalguri, which is admittedly a Tribal Belt. 3. The petitioners' case is that though it is a Tribal Belt the land is in their occupation since 1940, much before the constitution of the Tribal Belt and, therefore, their cases are save in the enforcement of the provisions relating to providing protection to the tribals, as contained in Chapter X of the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation, 1886. 4. Before we proceed to discuss the various contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners we may mention that Chapter X provides protection of backward classes. Section 160 in terms starts with an enabling direction to tie State Govt. irrespective of the provision of any other law to adopt certain measures as it may deem fit for the protection of those classes who on account of their primitive condition and lack of education or material advantages are incapable of looking after their welfare in so far as such welfare depends upon their having sufficient land for their maintenance. Sub-clause (2) thereof authorises the State Govt. to specify the classes of such people by notification. Section 161 then enables the Govt. to constitute compact areas in regions predominantly peopled by the classes of people notified under the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 160, into belts or blocks. 5. Section 162 (1) authorises the State Govt. that it may, by notification in the official Gazette, direct that the provisions of this chapter shall apply to the areas, or any of the areas, constituted into belts or blocks, under the provisions of Section 161. 5. Section 162 (1) authorises the State Govt. that it may, by notification in the official Gazette, direct that the provisions of this chapter shall apply to the areas, or any of the areas, constituted into belts or blocks, under the provisions of Section 161. Sub-section (2) of Section 162 is of great importance which an terms mentions that notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any law, usage, contract or agreement no person shall acquire or possess by transfer, exchange, lease, agreement or settlement any land in any area or areas constituted into belts or blocks in contravention of the provisions of Sub-section (1). Obviously the rigour of sub-section (2) is that, for the purpose of protection of such backward classes, who on account of their primitive condition and lack of education cannot look after their welfare, in so far as such welfare depends upon their having sufficient land for their maintenance in terms of Section 160, such lands would neither be alienable or transferable in any manner whatsoever. This provision expressly mentions inalienability of such land even by lease, agreement, settlement, transfer or exchange. 6. The object which is too patent is to make all transfers, exchanges, leases, agreements or settlements save as contemplated in Section 163 void ab initio and non-est in the eye of law so that no person can exploit the lack of education or the primitive condition of those backward classes by providing some attraction in getting the land transferred or by adopting any other method to deprive them of their only source of livelihood. 7. We would like to point out that Section 160 in terms mentions 'sufficient land' for their maintenance and provides protection for those classes, who are notified in sub-clause (2). Obviously the object and purpose of this law is to provide protection to the backward classes for whom the Constitution has been very jealous to carve out exceptions, in various fields, realising that those backward classes normally cannot withstand and compete with or can be matched against other people, who are more resourceful. We are, therefore, of the opinion that once it is found that the land in question is covered in a belt which has been carved out by the Govt. We are, therefore, of the opinion that once it is found that the land in question is covered in a belt which has been carved out by the Govt. under the provisions of Sections 161 and 162 of Chapter X of the Regulation then it would be the duty of all the State functionaries, Tribunals and the Courts to interpret the provisions and scrutinise the cases with the objective that as far as possible the pious sacred object of Chapter X is upheld and not negatived or made nugatory by cutting of the ice either on technicalities or on account of the other parties being more resourceful and the backward classes in comparison being handicapped. 8. We, therefore, hold that the bedrock of Chapter X is to provide protection to backward classes for ensuring sufficient land for their maintenance and then warding of all attempts by all and sundry to deprive them of it by any method whatsoever under any law. It was for this reason that in Section 160 as well as sub-section (2) of Section 162 non-obsentate clause has been provided by the legislature that protection would be provided, notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any law, usage, contract or agreement. 9. Now in the above background we find that before the Board of Revenue the points which were agitated and contained in Annexure-30 relate to the allegation that the petitioners were occupying the land since 1940, much before the Constitution of the Tribal Belt. The learned members of the Board of Revenue have rejected this contention on the ground that a copy of the sale deed of 1956 and some revenue paying receipts from 1983 to 1986 and some kacha patta of 1974 and 1977 have been filed which are too long after the coming into force of these provisions. 10. Before us the learned counsel for the petitioners repeatedly argued that the Settlement Officer did not provide any opportunity to lead evidence and he changed the dates in their absence and although he promised to have a site inspection and enquiry on the spot he never turned up. The order of the Settlement officer dated 26 11.86 at Annexure-29 recites: ".....The opposite parties were present on the different dates of the proceeding. Some of the opposite parties filed their written statements and also submitted some photostate copies of land documents. The order of the Settlement officer dated 26 11.86 at Annexure-29 recites: ".....The opposite parties were present on the different dates of the proceeding. Some of the opposite parties filed their written statements and also submitted some photostate copies of land documents. The opposite parties did not argue their case although several opportunities were given to them." Moreover we do not not find any such backdrop or foundation in the order dated 15.2.88 of the Board of Revenue. The Board of Revenue has gone into details of the documents, which were produced, and mentioned them in detail and we have got no reason to believe that if the petitioners would have pressed any such arguments the Board would have avoided it without adjudicating it. 11. Contrary to it the Board of Revenue has very expressly and categorically said: "There is no iota of proof that the petitioners were occupying land since 1940." 12. The learned counsel pointed out to us that certain documants were filed which showed possession in 1953 and onwards. Firstly, we are not convinced that they were having any relevancy, for otherwise the learned counsel would have pointed out the same to the Members of the Board of Revenue. Secondly, even if they were there, since the Tribal Belt was constituted in 1950, any documents of later date have got no relevance. 13. Before us the order of the Settlement Officer was also read and commented upon. We find from that order that the Settlement Officer has also stated that the opposite parties failed to prove that they were residents of the said village prior to the constitution of the Tribal belt. Not only that, there is a positive and affirmative finding to the contrary that all these persons came long after the creation of the Tribal belt. 14. It is well settled law that under Article 226 of the Constitution of India this Court cannot sit in appeal and all that it can examine is that whether the order is with jurisdiction or without jurisdiction. There are some other factors which can also be taken into consideration for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution, but none of them have been pointed out to us. Both the impugned orders, Annexures 29 and 30 are speaking orders and above all exhaustive on the point raised before us. There are some other factors which can also be taken into consideration for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution, but none of them have been pointed out to us. Both the impugned orders, Annexures 29 and 30 are speaking orders and above all exhaustive on the point raised before us. We are not pursuaded to believe from whatever is said now merely on affidavit, that the Settlement Officer did not allow opportunity or that he promised to come on the spot, is correct. 15. It was also argued that under the Regulations the Settlement Officer has got no jurisdiction to pass such orders as they can only be passed by the Deputy Commissioner. It was further argued that under Section 151 once a order is passed it cannot be reconsidered or reviewed. We find, as rightly pointed out by the learned Senior Govt. Advocate, that Rule 4 of the Rules under the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation, expressly provides that the Settlement Officer would exercise the powers of Deputy Commissioner under these Rules. Under Section 137 the Settlement Officer could be vested with all or any of the powers of the Deputy Commissioner under the Regulation. It was also urged that the Settlement Officer could have the powers only if settlement operation were there and not otherwise. The order of the Settlement Officer Annexure-29 at it outset states of 'the current settlement operation' and further on, of the 'mutation during the said settlement operation'. We are unable therefore to find any inherent lack of jurisdiction in the settlement officer before whom also the question was not raised as the impuged order Annexure 29 is conspicuously silent about it. We further find that no such objection was taken before the Board of Revenue as the judgment nowhere mentions that any lack of jurisdiction was pointed out or argued or pressed. 16. It is settled law that when under Article 226 of the Constitution or even in appeal, judgment of the lower court is challenged and a submission is made that some points were argued and pressed and yet the lower court ignored without adjudication then the procedure to be adopted normally is, that before that very court an application should be filed to show and point out this aspect. Secondly, in case it is not done then the Counsel should file an affidavit that such paints were argued but were not decided. The object of this principle and rule is very obvious, that a party cannot be allowed to improve his case in this manner behind the back of the officer who has decided the case, by condemning him for non-consideration and non-adjudication of those points in a light hearted and casual manner. 17. We are also of the opinion that Chapter X in its entirety is to be seen and if that is studied as a whole it leaves no room for doubt that the intention of the law maker was to provide protection to the backward classes in the matter of those areas which are declared as Tribal belts. Before us it was pointed out that even in Chapter X there are certain circumstances under which departure can be made and for that Section 163 was pointed to us. We are not in this case required to decide the ambit and scope of Section 163 inasmuch as no such question was raised before the settlement Officer and also the Board of Revenue. 18. So far as the question that cases once decided cannot be reopened, we may again point out that such a point was not argued before the learned Board of Revenue. Even otherwise we find that this Court has repeatedly held that cases where the land cannot be alienated at all stand on a different footing and the Revenue Tribunal cannot validate the sale which is void. Reference may be made to AIR 1950 Assam 40, Narayan Bedia vs. Dambamnath Borgohin and Ors. AIR 1951 Assam 45, Brojomohan Das vs. Konoj Kumari Das. Even in the absence of the above decisions we are of the opinion that when a statute expressly prohibits any sale or exchange or any sort of transfer and alienation by tribals to non-tribals in a tribal area then any transaction to the contrary is void ab-initio and neither there is any limitation nor requirement of law for getting it declared by process in any Court of law. Section 151 expressly permits and so also it authorises the revenue authentic irrespective of the question of limitation to invoke jurisdiction (AIR ; 1970 Assam 82, Abdul Gani vs. Assam Board of Revenue). 19. Section 151 expressly permits and so also it authorises the revenue authentic irrespective of the question of limitation to invoke jurisdiction (AIR ; 1970 Assam 82, Abdul Gani vs. Assam Board of Revenue). 19. The learned counsel then pointed out that in the grounds of appeal before the Board of Revenue they have taken all the objections. Be that as it may, taking the objections in the grounds of appeal or Memo of Appeal or Revision or Writ petition cannot be sufficient because it is common knowledge that several points are taken in 'appeal revision' or 'writ petition' but daring the arguments only few are pressed. It is not expected of the courts that they would, even if the Counsel fail to press, go into each and every fact and point raised in the appeal petition, revision or writ petition. That would be an unending futile exercise, which should be avoided. 20. It is assumed and presumed that all those points which are good and strong enough, according to the Counsel, are no to be left out during the argument and pressed and those which are not pressed are not tenable either on facts or in law. 21. In no Case jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can be invoked for having such a microscopic or telf-scopic approach to review the grounds of appeal again and again. Of course it is well known that Article 226 of the Constitution provides extraordinary equitable remedy and that is to be exercised with circumpection and restraint by the courts. If the argument of the learned counsel is accepted then the logical and legal consequence would be that a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution will have to be considered rather as first appeal or original case which was never intended by the Constitution makers. 22. The learned counsel invited our attention to Sub-section (3) of Section 162 to argue that the said provision introduced by amendment in 1964 would not effect the earlier instruments of transfer in favour of petitioners. The provisions of Sub-Section (2) of Section 162 with which we are really concerned do not depend on Sub-section (3) which even prohibited registration of documents in violation of Sub-section (2) said above. We therefore find no merit in this submission. 23. The provisions of Sub-Section (2) of Section 162 with which we are really concerned do not depend on Sub-section (3) which even prohibited registration of documents in violation of Sub-section (2) said above. We therefore find no merit in this submission. 23. The view of an authority which considers a matter may be right or wrong, but that is not a point on which writ application can be entertained. 24. We are, therefore, of the opinion that there is no merit in the petition and it is dismissed in limine.