ORDER M.P. Singh, J. - This is a defendants revision against the order dated 18-12-1987 passed by III Additional District Judge, Rampur decreeing the suit for ejectment and for recovery of Rs. 7200/- as damages for use and occupation. 2. The plaintiff-respondent purchased the premises in dispute on 5-8-1966 from one Nawabjada Sayeed Abid Ali Khan by means of registered sale deed. The accommodation was let by the plaintiff in the year 1968 to the defendant-applicant on a temporary basis for the marriage of his daughter. Despite request by the plaintiff, the defendant-applicant did not vacate the house and continued to reside therein. 3. On 14-12-1982 the plaintiff made an application under S. 21)1)(a) of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) against the defendant for release of the accommodation on the ground of bona fide need for her personal use. This case was registered as 'Rent Case No. 45 of 1982 (hereinafter referred to as the Rent case). The defendant-applicant filed a written statement in February, 1983 denying the need of the plaintiff-respondent as well as her title and also his status as a tenant. 4. The defendant renounced his character as a tenant of the plaintiff and also has denied the ownership of the landlady and illegally setup the ownership and the land lordship of the disputed premises in Amir Khan, father of the plaintiff. Consequently the plaintiff by means of a notice dated 2-3-1983 determined his tenancy requiring him to vacate and hand over the possession of the disputed house to her after the expiry of 30 days from the date of receipt of the notice. 5. This notice dated 2-3-1983 was served on the defendant-applicant who sent his reply dated 17-3-1983 to the plaintiff-respondent by registered post through a counsel. 6. Ultimately Suit No. 14 of 1986 under S. 20(2)(f) of the Act was filed by the plaintiff- respondent for. ejectment of the defendant- applicant on the ground that he has renounced his character as a tenant. He has denied the ownership and land lordship of the plaintiff- respondent. The plaintiff never waived the right of re-entry or condoned the conduct of the tenant. The tenancy right of the defendant- applicant having been duly forfeited and determined, the defendant-applicant was liable to be evicted from the disputed premises. 7. He has denied the ownership and land lordship of the plaintiff- respondent. The plaintiff never waived the right of re-entry or condoned the conduct of the tenant. The tenancy right of the defendant- applicant having been duly forfeited and determined, the defendant-applicant was liable to be evicted from the disputed premises. 7. It has further been alleged in the plaint that in keeping with his persistent wrongful conduct the defendant-applicant deliberately did not pay the rent to the plaintiff since 1-8-1981 till the date of the determination of the tenancy. With these allegations the plaintiff prayed for the ejectment of the defendant- applicant and for damages for use and occupation of the said premises and pendente lite and future. 8. The defendant-applicant contested the case admitting the plaintiff to be owner of the disputed house and denying the other allegations made in the plaint. It was further stated that the defendant had never renounced his character as a tenant and never denied the title of plaintiff. Amir Ahmad Khan, father of the plaintiff, is the person who let out the disputed house to the defendant and it is he who had been realising the rent and issuing receipts. The rent was paid through cheques which were issued in the name of Amir Ahmad. Up to October 1982 Amir Ahmed had accepted rent but thereafter he refused. The defendant started depositing the rent in court in Misc. Case No. 32 of 1983. 9. The learned III Additional District Judge by his order dated 18-12-1987 decreed the suit for ejectment and for recovery of Rs. 7200/- as damages for use and occupation and for recovery of damages pendente lice and future at the rate of Rs. 6.67 per day against which the present revision has been filed. 10. Heard Sri Murildhar, learned counsel for the applicant and Sri Sunil Gupta, learned ,counsel for the respondent. 11. The first point raised by the learned counsel for the applicant is that unless the tenant has unequivocally renounced his character as such or denied the title of the landlady and the latter has not waived his right of re-entry or condoned the conduct of the tenant, the suit is not properly maintainable. According to him the provisions of S. 20(2)(f) are not attracted in the present case. 12. According to him the provisions of S. 20(2)(f) are not attracted in the present case. 12. In order to examine the merit of this argument a reference may be made to the written statement of the defendant-applicant which he filed in the Rent case No. 25 of 1982. Paragraph 1 of the written statement filed by the applicant is being reproduced below : "The applicant is not the real owner of the house in question. The real owner of the house in the name of the applicant is fictitious, in order to avoid taxes (the sentence appears to be grammatically incorrect). The applicant's husband was in service in a very junior position and she had no means of her own or those of her husband to purchase house in question. There has never been any contract tenancy between the applicant and the answering opposite party and payment of rent has always been made to Sri Amir Ahmad Khan." 13. In addition to these unequivocal averment the applicant filed an affidavit also in the Rent case, paragraph I of which is being reproduced below : "That the house in dispute belongs to Sri Amir Ahmad Khan and not to Smt. Shah- Jahan Begum as alleged. The transaction of purchase of the house in the name of the applicant is obviously fictitious which has been done in order to avoid taxes. The applicant did not have any means to invest the huge amount of Rs. 30,000/- which had great value at the relevant time. The transaction is Benami. The house was not let out to the deponent by Smt Shah-jahan Begum and rent has always been paid through cheques to Sri Amir Ahmad Khan. All the cheques have been encashed in the State Bank of India account of Sri Amir Ahmad Khan." 14. A reference may also be made to paragraph 4 of the notice dated 2-3-1983 sent by the plaintiff-respondent to the defendant applicant. The said paragraph 4 of the notice dated 2-3-1983 is reproduced below : "That in the aforesaid rent case you filed your reply on 14-2-1983, in which you did not admit para No. 1 of the petition of the undersigned, you further wrongly set up the ownership and land lordship of the aforesaid house in Sri Amir Ahmad Khan, and wrongly denied ownership of the undersigned You further wrongly denied the contract of tenancy with the undersigned. Thus you have renounced your character as the tenant of the undersigned and also denied title and ownership of the undersigned over the aforesaid house." 15. Further on 17-3-1983 a reply was sent by the defendant-applicant through his counsel Sri Ram Narain Gupta, paragraph 1 of which is reproduced below : "That it is reasserted that my client Lt. Col. Zamir Ahmad did not have any contract of tenancy with you. The house in question was let out to him by your father Sri Amir Ahmad Khan and it was he who always negotiated all matters concerning the house including accepting rent and sanctioning deductions for annual repairs got done by my client. My client has not renounced his character as a tenant in the house." 15A. The crucial ingredients of S. 20(2)(f) are : (i) the tenant has renounced his character (ii) or denied the title of the landlord. (iii) and the latter has waived his right of re-entry. (iv) or condoned the conduct of the tenant. 16. A reading of the averments of the defendant-applicant in the preceding paragraphs leave no doubt to come to an irresistible conclusion that the defendant- applicant has renounced his character as a tenant unequivocally and denied the title of the landlady. There is no evidence worth on record to show that the landlady has waived the right of re-entry or condoned the conduct of the tenant. The requirements as contemplated by S. 20(2)(f) have been fulfilled. The frame of the suit cannot be said o be defective in any manner. The suit is maintainable. I reject the contention of the counsel for the applicant. 17. The second point raised by the learned counsel for the applicant is that mere filing of the written statement in proceedings under S. 21 of the Act does not amount to denial of title. According to him where the landlords title is denied, the denial should be as a whole and specific. 18. In order to meet this point if a reference is again made to the averments made by the applicant in his written statement, the affidavit filed in the Rent case and the reply to the notice under S. 106 Transfer of Property Act which have already been discussed in detail, it will clearly show that the denial was complete and specific. I fail to understand what else is required to be proved by the plaintiff. The second contention is also rejected. 19. The learned counsel for the applicant in order to show waiver has referred to paragraph 3 of his reply to the notice under section 1,06 Transfer of Property Act given by the plaintiff where he has said that he has no objection in accepting the plaintiff as owner. He also referred to a notice sent through Sri R.S. Diwakar saying that the defendant was a tenant of the plaintiff but in my opinion these casual averments will not change the renouncement of the tenancy by the defendant or the waiver. 20. It was also argued by the learned counsel for the applicant that there is implied condonation in as much as the plaintiff waited for three years after the filing of the written statement in the Rent case of 1982. If the law gives a right to a party to file a suit within a definite period he has a right to wait till last date. So this waiting for three years will not be treated as implied condonation or waiver within the meaning of S. 20(2)(f) of the Act. 21. The last instance of waiver brought to the notice of this Court was paragraph 2 of the affidavit filed by the plaintiff in the Rent case which is as follows : "That the deponent is the owner of the house No. 7/2 situated in Civil Lines, Rampur, detailed in the petition. The opposite party is her tenant therein. The house was purchased by the deponent for a consideration of Rs. 30,000/- from Nawabzada Abid Ali Knan S/o late Major General H.H. Nawab Sir Syed Raza Ali Bahadur, vide sale deed-dated 5th August, 1966. The sale deed was executed and got registered by Mr. S.S. Singhal attorney on behalf of Nawabzada Abid Ali Khan. A copy of the aforesaid sale deed has been duly filed by the deponent in the case." 22. This solitary unmindful use of the word 'tenant' in the fourth line will also not amount to waiver of the right. This contention has also no force and is rejected. 23. S.S. Singhal attorney on behalf of Nawabzada Abid Ali Khan. A copy of the aforesaid sale deed has been duly filed by the deponent in the case." 22. This solitary unmindful use of the word 'tenant' in the fourth line will also not amount to waiver of the right. This contention has also no force and is rejected. 23. The learned counsel for the applicant relied upon a decision of this Court reported in 1961 All LJ 644, Ram Das v. Lachman Janki wherein it has been held : "Firstly the denial of the landlord's title must be unequivocal and absolutely define, for the law strongly leans against forfeiture. Secondly when the landlord's title is denied in writing, the writing should be construed as whole without giving undue emphasis to one or the other part of it. Thirdly the onus of proving forfeiture of tenancy rights lies on the landlord-plaintiff. He must unambiguously prove that the lessee has directly and unequivocally repudiated his title to the demised property and has thereby lost his tenancy rights. Lastly the lessee may in good faith and for his own protection put the transferee of his lessor to strict proof of his title to the demised property before making payment to him." This case is under S. 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act. Section 20(2)(f) is based on the principle enunciated under S. 111(g)(2) of the Transfer of Property Act. For ready reference both are being referred to - Section 111 of Transfer of Property Act : Determination of lease.- A lease of immovable property, determines, (g) by forfeiture, that is to say, (1) in case the. lessee-breaks an express condition which provides that on breach thereof the lessor may re-enter; or (2) in case the lessee renounces his character as such by setting up a title in a third person or by claiming title in himself; or (3) the.lessee is adjudicated an insolvent and the lease provides that the lessor may re-enter on the happening of such event; and in any of these cases the lessor or his transferee gives notice in writing to the lessee of his intention to determine the lease. Section 20(2)(f) of U.P. Act XIII of 1972 that the tenant has renounced his character as such or denied the title of the landlord, and the latter has not waived his right of re- entry or condoned the conduct of the tenant." 24. A lessor has certain primary and auxiliary rights in the demised property. One of the primary rights is the right to evict the lessee from the property in certain circumstances, and as an auxiliary to that right there springs the right to give notice in writing to the lessee of intention to determine he lease and to ask the lessee to quit the property. 25. As found by me in the preceding paragraph the plaintiff-respondent has unequivocally proved that the defendant- applicant has renounced his character as a tenant. The plaintiff has discharged the burden of proving the renouncement of the character of the defendant-applicant who had denied the title of the plaintiff and the latter has not waived the right of re-entry or condoned the conduct of the tenant. The authority cited by the learned counsel for the applicant is absolutely of no help to him. 26. Another decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicant is reported in (1980) 6 All LR 347: (1980 All LJ NOC 72. Jog Raj v. Mohd. Yunus Khan. In that case the tenant only in one paragraph of the written statement has stated that the plaintiff had no independent source of income. He has no means to purchase the shop. The purchase was only a Benami transaction. The requirement of S. 20(2)(f) of the Act is that the tenant must have renounced his character as such or the title of the landlord and the later has not waived his right of re-entry or condoned the conduct of the tenant. The learned single Judge while deciding the scope of S. 3(1)(f) of the U.P. Temporary Control of Rent & Eviction Act, 1947 has not considered about the latter part of the said sub-section. The learned single Judge while deciding the scope of S. 3(1)(f) of the U.P. Temporary Control of Rent & Eviction Act, 1947 has not considered about the latter part of the said sub-section. While deciding this case brother Deoki Nandan has ignored the earlier judgment of Division Bench of this court reported in AIR 1958 All 847 Hashmat Husain v. Saghir Ahmad in which it has been held as under: "The expression "setting up a title in a third person" in S. 111(g)(2) does not mean setting up full title in a third person or asserting that the landlord had no title to the property at all. The definition of lease in S. 105 clearly shows that the term 'lease', 'lessor' and 'lessee' go together and in connection with a particular transaction would have reference only to the, particular property covered by the lease, the particular person who transfers the right to enjoy that property and the person who accepts the transfer from such a transferor. In view of these definitions, a lessee would be said to renounce his character as such when he denies either that he holds that property as a lessee or states that he, though a lessee of that particular property, is not a lessee from the person who let it out to him. Where therefore the lessee alleges in his written statement that the person from whom he has taken the lease holds only a partial proprietary right in the leased property and another person is also a co-sharer therein he states, in effect that the person is not his lessor and the lease in his favour is determined by forfeiture on account of his renouncing his character as lessee of that person by setting up a title in a third person. The word 'title' in S. 3(f) refers to the title of the landlord on the basis of which he can claim to eject the tenant and cannot be taken to refer only to proprietary rights in the accommodation which may be entirely immaterial so far as the right of ejectment is concerned. A person may be a landlord even if the proprietary title to the accommodation does not vest in him. A person may be a landlord even if the proprietary title to the accommodation does not vest in him. The lessees therefore deny the title of their landlord within this section when they allege that the person from whom they have taken the lease is not the sole proprietor of the accommodation they are holding but is only a co-sharer along with another person". 27. Another Division Bench in the case reported in (1982) 2 All Rent Cas 1 :(1982 All LJ 1441), Narain Das Khanna v. Jawahar Lal Bhatia while following the decision Hashmat Husain, ( AIR 1958 All 847 ) (supra) did not agree with the view taken in the case of Jog Raj v. Mohd. Yunus Khan, (1980 All LJ NOC 72) (supra). 28. In the case of Amar Nath Agrawal v. District Judge, Allahabad reported in (1983) 1 All Rent Cas 310: (1983 All LJ 580) a single Judge of this Court held that in spite of the knowledge the tenant denied the title of the landlord and pleaded his occupation as a co- parcener and co-owner and further pleaded his occupation as owner and not as a tenant. These pleas clearly fell within the purview of Cl. (f) of sub-sec. (2) of S. 20 of the Act. 29. In another case Central Bank of India. Moradabad v. III Addl. District Judge, Moradabad reported in (1985) 1 All Rent Cas 457, a single Judge of this Court has taken a view that in a suit for eviction by partners of the firm in committing default in payment of rent and denial of title of the partners and asserting the firm to be landlord amounts to sufficient denial for the purposes of S. 20(2)(f). The deposit of rent in favour of the firm under S. 30 will also be of no help and a suit for eviction was rightly decreed in that case. Practically similar is the position in the instant case. 30. In the instant case no evidence has been brought on record by the defendant that the plaintiff has condoned or forgiven he fault committed by the defendant- applicant by denying the title of the plaintiff. Unmindful use of the word 'tenant' in one of the replies to the notices will not help the defendant-applicant. 30. In the instant case no evidence has been brought on record by the defendant that the plaintiff has condoned or forgiven he fault committed by the defendant- applicant by denying the title of the plaintiff. Unmindful use of the word 'tenant' in one of the replies to the notices will not help the defendant-applicant. The learned Judge had discussed the evidence in great detail and recorded a finding of fact that the repeated conduct of the defendant in denying the title of the plaintiff amounts to renouncing his character as a tenant, I affirm this finding. 31. On behalf of the respondent certain additional documents have been filed along with the counter-affidavit to which the applicant has serious objection of being considered as they did not form part of the record before the court below. 32. Since I have already affirmed the findings recorded by the court below on the question of renouncement of the character of the defendant-applicant as a tenant, there is no necessity of referring to those additional documents. 33. The next submission made by the learned counsel for the applicant was based on the provisions. of Sections 230 and 231 of the Contract Act. It was submitted by him that in the admitted background it was clear that the house was let out to the defendant- applicant by Amir Ahmad Khan on behalf of the plaintiff-respondent. Amir Ahmad Khan was acting as an agent on behalf of- the principal. Section 230 of the Contract Act reads as follows : "230. Agent cannot personally enforce, nor he bound by, contracts on behalf of principal.- In the absence of any contract to that effect, an agent cannot personally enforce contract entered into by him on behalf of his principal, nor is he personally bound by them. Presumption of contract to contrary. - Such a contract shall be presumed to exist in the following cases - (1) Where the contract is made by an agent for the sale or purchase of goods for a merchant resident abroad; (2) Where the agent does not disclose the name of his principal; (3) Where the principal, though disclosed. cannot be sued." 34. The learned counsel for the applicant has based his argument that in this case the agent has not disclosed the name of the principal but the contract of tenancy was between the plaintiff and the defendant- applicant. cannot be sued." 34. The learned counsel for the applicant has based his argument that in this case the agent has not disclosed the name of the principal but the contract of tenancy was between the plaintiff and the defendant- applicant. In order to appreciate this question of law there must have been pleadings and evidence on record. In the absence of any factual foundation no finding can be recorded n this question. Suffice it to say that in none of the documents filed by the defendant- applicant there is any suggestion that Amir Ahmad Khan was only acting as an agent on behalf of the principal (Plaintiff). The applicant cannot be permitted to raise a new point in revision which needs investigation of fact. 35. Sri Sunil Gupta, learned counsel for the respondent contended that the finding on the question of waiver and the condonation is a pure question of fact and cannot be gone into by the revisional court. He has relied upon a decision of this Court reported in (1986) AU 214, M/s. Coiltech India Ltd. v. Suresh Chandra Oswal, wherein it has been held that the question of waiver is a question of fact and cannot be allowed to be raised in revision. While recording this reason the learned single Judge relied upon a decision reported in AIR 1971 Delhi 300, Muni Lal v. Nand LaL. 36. The law is well settled that the revisional court has no jurisdiction to enter into the question of fact and the question of waiver is a pure question of fact. 37. While considering the scope of S. 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887 a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Laxmi Kishor v. Har Prasad Shukla 1979 All CJ 473 has held that the court while exercising revisional jurisdiction under S. 25 does not possess jurisdiction to determine the issues of facts itself by entering into the evidence and assessing it. But if the.court finds that a particular finding of fact is vitiated by an error of law, it has power to pass such order as the justice of the case requires, but it has no jurisdiction to re-assess and re-appraise the evidence in order to determine the controversy. But if the.court finds that a particular finding of fact is vitiated by an error of law, it has power to pass such order as the justice of the case requires, but it has no jurisdiction to re-assess and re-appraise the evidence in order to determine the controversy. If it cannot dispose of the case adequately without a finding on a particular issue of fact it should send the case back after laying down proper guidelines. 38. In the instant case the learned Judge has considered the entire evidence and recorded a finding which needs no interference by this Court. 39. The phrase 'according to law' occurring in S. 25 aforesaid was considered by the Supreme Court in AIR 1963 SC 698 , Hari Shanker v. Rao Girdhari Lal Chaudhary in which it was held that the phrase 'according to law' refers to the decision as a whole and is not to be equated to error of law or of fact simipliciter. It refers to the overall decision, which must be according to law, i.e., there should be no miscarriage of justice due to mistake of law. The question is thus framed to confer larger powers than the power to correct error of jurisdiction to which S. 115 is limited. But it must not be overlooked that the section in spite of its apparent width of language where it confers a power on the High Court to pass such orders as the High Court might think fit is controlled by the opening words where it says that the High Court may send for the record of the case to satisfy itself that the decision is 'according to law'. 40. The Court approved the observations of Beaumount Chief Justice in Bell & Co. v. Waman Hemraj, AIR 1938 Bom 223, where learned Chief Justice had given some instances in which court could interfere under S. 25 : (i) where the court had no jurisdiction in the matter; (ii) where a party had not been given proper opportunity of being heard; (iii) that the burden of proof had been misplaced on wrong shoulders; (iv) where the court had based its decision on evidence which should not have been admitted; (v) the court can interfere where it comes to the conclusion that there has not been proper trial according to law. 41. 41. The learned counsel for the respondent has placed reliance on a decision reported in AIR 1969 SC 1344 , Malini Ayyappa Naicker v. Seth Menghraj Udhavdas Firm. While interpreting the provisions of S. 25(1) of Provincial Insolvency Act the Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the phrase 'according to law.' It was observed that while exercising that power the High Court is by and large bound by the findings of fact reached by the district court. If the Legislature intended to confer the power on it to re-examine both question of law and fact it would have conveyed its intention by appropriate words as has been done in various other statutes. Wrong decision of fact by a competent court is also a decision according to law. 42. In the case reported in 1965 All LI 989, Ram Narain v. Kanhaiya Lal Vishwakarma a Division Bench of this court held that under S. 25 the revisional court is not empowered to look into the evidence of the case and to decide whether a finding of fact arrived at by the court below is justified by the evidence on record or not. 43. Thus the finding recorded by the trial court that the tenant has renounced his character and has also denied the title of the landlord, the latter has not waived his right of re-entry or condoned the conduct of the tenant is perfectly correct and needs no interference in revisional jurisdiction. 44. The revision is dismissed with costs. Applicant has stated in Court and also filed an affidavit that he will handover the peaceful possession of the house after 6 months. Accordingly I order that the applicant will handover the peaceful possession by 7-11-1988 to the opposite party.