JUDGMENT - ASHOK AGARWAL, J.:---It is a human instinct to resist any change. The resistance is considerably strong when it comes to change of place of residence or business. This petition which is filed in a representative capacity sets up one such resistance on the part of the Iron and Steel merchants who are carrying on business in the City of Bombay. This trade is mainly located in (1) Carnac Bunder, (2) Kharwa Galli, (3) Dharukhana, (4) Kurla and Vidyavihar etc. By the impugned notification the said business of iron and steel is sought to be shifted out of Bombay and located at Kalamboli in New Bombay. By that impugned notification which is dated 22nd September, 1986 Exhibit-A to the petition, the respondent No. 2, the Bombay Metropolitan Region Development Authority made a declaration under section 3(1) of the Bombay Metropolitan Region Specified Commodities Markets (Regulation) Act, 1983 inter alia declaring the whole of Bombay Metropolitan Region as the market area and Kalamboli as the market yard. The said notification was declared to be effective from 1st January, 1987. Since there was a substantial amount of representation on the part of the traders inter alia complaining that the site at Kalamboli had not been made suitable for shifting their trade as it had not been provided with necessary facilities by a further notification dated 29th December, 1986 the existing sites of business were declared to be the sub-market yards upto 1st May, 1987. That Notification was extended from time to time upto 31st March, 1988. The petitioners made representation that the market yard at Kalamboli was still not provided with the necessary facilities to shift the Iron and Steel trade and therefore the notification declaring the existing business sites as a sub-market yards should be further extended. Since this prayer was not favourably responded to, the petitioners were constrained to file the present petition. 2. It is the grievance of the petitioners which grievance has been reiterated by Mr. Teleyarkhan the learned Counsel appearing on their behalf that the respondents have not complied with their obligations under section 6 of the Act to provide alternate trade facilities in the Kalamboli Market yards. Hence the insistence on the part of the respondents to shift the Iron and Steel Trade by bringing into force the provisions of section 7 was wholly unjustified. Hence the insistence on the part of the respondents to shift the Iron and Steel Trade by bringing into force the provisions of section 7 was wholly unjustified. The petitioners, in view of the laudable object behind the Act and the notification to deconjest the city of Bombay are willing to shift their trade to Kalamboli market yard. However the respondents not having complied with their obligations to provide with the necessary suitable alternative facilities at the Kalamboli market yard as required under section 6(1), the respondents were not justified in seeking to implement the provisions of section 7 whereunder the petitioners would be prohibited from carrying out their trade both in their present place of business as also on account of the lack of facilities at the proposed Kalamboli Market Yard. This action of the respondent is unreasonal irrationable and arbitrary and violates the fundamental rights of the petitioners guaranteed, both, under Article 19(1)(g) and 14 of the Constitution of India. 3. Before going into the merits of the matter it may be convenient to look at the salient features of the Bombay Metropolitan Region Specified Commodities Markets (Regulation of Location) Act, 1983 under which the impugned action has been sought to be taken. As indicated in the preamble, this has been passed in order to regulate location of market areas and wholesale markets in respect of specified commodities in the Bombay Metropolitan Region and to establish market Committees to manage and control different markets established indifferent market areas for different commodities. The Act provides for the establishment of a Development Authority for the purpose of planning, co-operating and supervising the proper, orderly and rapid development of the areas in the Bombay Metropolitan Region. It seeks to relieve the congestion and consequent traffic, accommodation and other problems which have arisen with the fast growth of population and commercial activities in Gr. Bombay particularly in South Bombay. It was therefore found desirable to shift wholesale markets for certain agricultural and non-agricultural products to other localities. It seeks to relieve the congestion and consequent traffic, accommodation and other problems which have arisen with the fast growth of population and commercial activities in Gr. Bombay particularly in South Bombay. It was therefore found desirable to shift wholesale markets for certain agricultural and non-agricultural products to other localities. Under section 2(18) of the Act "wholesale trade" is defined thus : "Wholesale trade" means sale or purchase of any commodity for purpose other than direct consumption or use by the purchaser and shall include holding of stocks or warehousing of the specified commodity at any place in the market area or in any market yard for such trade; and any such seller, buyer, holder of stock or warehouse-keeper shall be deemed to be a wholesale trader". Section 3 provides for declaration by the Metropolitan Authority, on the recommendation of the Metropolitan Commissioner of any area in the Metropolitan Region to be the market area in respect of any specified commodity. It provides for specifying one or more market yards and sub-market yards for the market area which may if necessary be located outside the market area. Section 4 provides that after the declaration of the market area under section 3(1) the State Government shall constitute the firs Market Committee. Section 5 provides that after the declaration of the market area for any commodity, the Chief Executive Officer shall publish a notice inviting from all persons lawfully engaged in the specified trade to register themselves with the market committee. Section 6 provides for the obligation of the market committee to provide every registered trader with suitable alternative facilities in the market yard to enable him to carry on his specified trade in the market yard. Section 7 prohibits, after the specified date, the carrying on the specified trade in any place in the market area other than the market yard. That trade cannot be carried on except under and in accordance with the conditions of a licence granted in that behalf under the Act. 4. Section 7 prohibits, after the specified date, the carrying on the specified trade in any place in the market area other than the market yard. That trade cannot be carried on except under and in accordance with the conditions of a licence granted in that behalf under the Act. 4. Chapter IV of the Act deals with the powers and duties of the Market Committee and section 32 provides that in addition to the powers conferred and duties imposed upon it by or under this Act, a committee may--- 1) construct, maintain and manage the market yard including any buildings or structures; 2) provide, maintain and manage any instruments or implements required in such yard; 3) acquire, hold and dispose of any movable or immovable property; 4) grant, renew, refuse suspend or cancel licences to carry on a specified trade in the market yard; 5) regulate the entry of persons and vehicular traffic in the market yard; 6) collect or maintain, disseminate and supply information in respect of production, sale, storage, processing, prices and movement of commodities; 7) provide for the licencees and other persons visiting the market, common services including transport, storage, grading, weighing, restaurants, petrol pumps, and temporary accommodation for persons visiting the market; 8) enforce the provisions of this Act and rules, regulations, by-laws and conditions of the licences granted under the Act; and 9) perform such other functions and duties as may, from time to time, be necessary or expedient for the purpose of maintaining or managing the market. These are some of the salient provisions of the Act that are relevant for the purpose of the disposal of this petition. 5. Mr. Taleyarkhan, the learned Counsel appearing in support of the petition submitted that under section 6 a definite obligation is cast on the Market Committee to provide "suitable alternative facilities" to enable the trader to carry on his specified trade in the market yard. The provision of suitable alternative facilities clearly contemplates a positive act of allotment of some premises or something as can be seen from the first proviso to section 6(1). According to him, it was clear that the Market Committee was bound to allot suitable alternate facilities even if it be at its own costs initially. The provision of suitable alternative facilities clearly contemplates a positive act of allotment of some premises or something as can be seen from the first proviso to section 6(1). According to him, it was clear that the Market Committee was bound to allot suitable alternate facilities even if it be at its own costs initially. "Suitable alternative facilities" means facilities of the kind, though they may not be in all respects so good, as that which the trader is currently enjoying. He relied on the decisions reported (1953)2 All England Reports, Page 877(878) . He emphasised that apart from the reasonable need of the trader the term suitable also contemplates growing needs in future of the trader who is to be provided with alternative facilities. Reliance was placed on 76 Bom.L.R. 240 (244-24 ). 6. Mr. Talyarkhan pointed out that sub-section (2) of section 6 provides for a right of appeal from order of allotment. Hence section 6(1) dealing with alternative facilities contemplates an application of mind by the Market Committee to the suitability of the alternative facilities which it is bound to provide. According to him, the term "facility" means something that is built or installed to perform some particular function. It also means something that promotes the ease of any action or course of conduct. It must imply something which is existing. According to him, section 32 provides for powers and duties of the Market Committee. Though Clause (1) of the said section used the term "may" having regard to the functions of the Market Committee the same contained a command on the Market Committee to perform the duties provided in the said section. Placing reliance on sub-section (1) of section 32 he submitted that it enjoined the duty upon the Market Committee to construct, maintain and manage the market yard including any buildings or structures. The provisions of the said section could not be only enabling or directory on account of the use of the word "may". It clearly lays down the duties. By placing reliance in the case of (Rangaswami, The Textiles Commissioner, and ors. v. The Textiles Commissioner and others)1, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. page 1516. He submitted that when there is a power coupled with duty the word "may" must be read as "shall" and has mandatory import. According to Mr. It clearly lays down the duties. By placing reliance in the case of (Rangaswami, The Textiles Commissioner, and ors. v. The Textiles Commissioner and others)1, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. page 1516. He submitted that when there is a power coupled with duty the word "may" must be read as "shall" and has mandatory import. According to Mr. Talyarkhan section 35 empowers the Market Committee to dispose of immovable property such as buildings, stalls, shops, stands, pens or things subject to such conditions, including charges of fees or rent or compensation. Further, section 36 contemplates that a licensee holding immovable property granted under section 35 may transfer such property to another specified trader. According to him all these provisions show that it is the duty and function of the Market Committee to provide such amenities as are requisite for a trader to carry on his trade at Kalamboli in nearly the same manner as he was doing in the present circumstances. According to Mr. Talyarkhan there was nothing to show that the Market Committee has applied its mind in even a single case or has done the positive act of allotment of suitable alternative facilities as contemplated under section 6. Even though the CIDCO may have provided "a reasonable medium of facilities" it is clear that such facilities are neither suitable nor alternative to enable the traders to carry on their trade in Kalamboli. 7. In regard to the provisions of section 7(i) Mr. Talyarkhan submitted that the same contemplates the notification of a separate date by the Metropolitan Commissioner on which date the specified trade must cease functioning in the market area, except in the specified market yards. The scheme of the Act, therefore, envisages that the appointed date must be notified after the suitable alternative facilities are made available to the traders who are affected. According to him, unless such construction is put on section 7(i), it will necessarily suffer from the vice of an unreasonable restriction, thereby not only violating Article 14 but also Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. 8. Mr. Talyarkhan further submitted that the Act which has sought to regulate the wholesale trade in specified commodities has by defining "wholesale trade" in section 2(18) sought to include within its sweep each and every trader and dealer in the specified commodities. 8. Mr. Talyarkhan further submitted that the Act which has sought to regulate the wholesale trade in specified commodities has by defining "wholesale trade" in section 2(18) sought to include within its sweep each and every trader and dealer in the specified commodities. The definition being too wide suffers from the vice of over inclusion without having any nexus to the object sought to be achieved by the Act. If apart from the wholesale traders, as also the Commission Agents are also included, their inclusion is unreasonable, irrational and arbitrary and violates the fundamental rights guaranteed both under Article 14 and Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. 9. Taking the last contention of Mr. Talyarkhan for consideration, it has to be noted that the Act is an environmental legislation which seeks to deconjest the crowded city of Bombay by relocating markets for some specified non-agricultural products like Textile, Iron and Steel, section 2(15) defines "sale" thus : "'sale' with its grammatical variations and cognate expressions, means a sale of any commodity by one person to another for cash or for a deferred payment or for any other valuable consideration, and includes a transfer of any commodity on the hire-purchase or other system of payment of price by instalment or a sale by an agent on behalf of another person for commission or other consideration." Section 2(17) defines "specified trade" thus : "'specified trade' means the wholesale trade in a specified commodity." Section 2(18) defines "wholesale trade" as follows : "wholesale trade means sale or purchase of any commodity for purpose other than direct consumption or use by the purchaser, and shall include holding of stocks or warehousing of the specified commodity at any place in the market area or in any market yard for such trade; and any such seller, buyer, holder of stock or warehouse-keeper shall be deemed to be "a wholesale trader". In my judgment Mr. Talyarkhan's apprehension that the aforesaid clauses have sought to include within its sweep each and every dealer in Iron and Steel is not justified. In my view, the said provisions do not include retail dealers in Iron and Steel. Hence when a dealer purchases Iron and Steel for retail sale or when a person purchases iron and steel for personal consumption such transaction are not covered within the ambit of the definition of "wholesale trade" as contemplated in section 2(18). In my view, the said provisions do not include retail dealers in Iron and Steel. Hence when a dealer purchases Iron and Steel for retail sale or when a person purchases iron and steel for personal consumption such transaction are not covered within the ambit of the definition of "wholesale trade" as contemplated in section 2(18). However, a dealer who either purchases or stocks iron and steel for the purpose of sale to retail dealers would be covered within the definition of "wholesale trade" as provided in section 2(18). To this extent Mr. Sanghavi the learned Counsel on behalf of the Respondents has fairly conceded. Mr. Talyarkhan, however, submitted that the definition of "wholesale trade" contained in section 2(18) should not and could not be construed to include within its ambit the Commission Agents who though may operate from the market area within the city of Bombay may not be bringing and taking out or transporting any stocks of iron and steel within or outside Bombay. If such traders are covered under the Act, the definition of "wholesale trade" would suffer from the vice of over inclusion without having any nexus to the object to be achieved by the classification. This would impose unreasonable restriction on the right of such traders to carry on their business and would be hit by the provisions of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. Reliance was placed on the case of (State of Maharashtra v. Mrs. Kamal Sukumar Durgule and others)2, reported in A.I.R. 1985 S.C. page 119 : 1985(1) Bom.C.R. 340 wherein the provisions of section 2(f) of the Maharashtra Vacant Lands (Prohibition of Unauthorised Occupation and Summary Eviction) Act (66 of 1975) was held to be ultra vires by inter alia observing as follows :--- "Section 2(f)(b) suffers from yet another vice in that, it treats all persons alike irrespective of how they are situated in the matter of their involvement in the construction of unauthorised structures and their interest therein. Classification requires division into classes which are marked by common characteristics. Such division has to be founded upon a rational basis and it must be directed at subserving the purposes of the statute. Classification requires division into classes which are marked by common characteristics. Such division has to be founded upon a rational basis and it must be directed at subserving the purposes of the statute. Section 2(f)(b) and the other cognate provisions of the Act make no distinction at all between owners of lands who have themselves constructed unauthorised structures and those others on whose lands unauthorised structures have been constructed by trespassers. The latter class of owners who are silent spectators to the forcible and lawless deprivation of their title to their property have been put by the Act on part with the trespassers who, taking law into their own hands, defy not merely private owners but public authorities." 10. Mr. Singhvi further submitted that all the business of commission agents was included within the definition of wholesale trade and it was rightly so included. Even though a Commission Agent may not be when importing goods within the market area of the City of Bombay, he having purchased the goods was the lawful owner. It was open to such a trader either to arrange for delivery either outsider market area or import the goods within the market area of the City of Bombay. Business of such a trader was the business of a wholesale trader. If a trader who did not import such goods within the market area of the City of Bombay were to be excluded it would be difficult on the part of the department to track and prosecute the offenders rendering the Act inoperative. 11. In my view there is no justification to include the business of such commission agents who carry on their business in the market area within the City of Bombay but do not either import or export their goods within or outside the market area within the definition of "whole-sale trade" as defined in section 2(18). If the definition were to include such traders, the definition would suffer from the vice of over inclusion without having any nexus to the object sought to be achieved by the Act. If the definition were to include such traders, the definition would suffer from the vice of over inclusion without having any nexus to the object sought to be achieved by the Act. The said provision in that case would infringe upon the fundamental rights of such dealers to carry on trade which right is guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) and the same would not be saved by the provisions of Article 19(6) as the same would not be making of any law which imposes in the interest of the general public, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right to carry on the trade or business. In these circumstances the definition of "wholesale trade" under section 2(18) will have to be read down so as to exclude from its ambit the business of commission agents who carry on their trade within the market area of the City of Bombay without in any manner importing or exporting iron and steel for the purpose of resale. It will therefore have to be held that the business of commission agents, who do not either import or export iron and steel within the market area for the purpose of resale are not covered by the provisions of the Act. 12. The next question that arises for consideration is whether the respondents have provided suitable alternative facilities within the Kalamboli Market Yard and whether they are justified in invoking the provisions of section 7 of the Act so as to debar the trade in any place in the market area other than in the market yard at Kalamboli. Mr. Talayarkhan contended that on proper construction of section 6(1), it will have to be held that it was incumbent for the respondents to provide alternative accommodation to each of the traders as nearly of the same standard and style as the one enjoyed by them, in the city of Bombay. He relied upon the definition of the term "Facility" in Black's Law Dictionary as meaning something that is built or installed to perform same particular function, but it also means something that promotes the ease of any action or course of conduct. He also relied upon the definition of "facilities" to mean that which promotes the ease of any action, operation, transaction, or course of conduct. The term normally denotes inanimate means rather human agencies.......... He also relied upon the definition of "facilities" to mean that which promotes the ease of any action, operation, transaction, or course of conduct. The term normally denotes inanimate means rather human agencies.......... The word "facilities" embraces anything which aids or makes easier the performance of the activities involved in the business of a person or corporation. He further relied from the decision in (Bernard v. Towers)3, reported 1953(2) All England Law Reports P. 877 where in dealing with the Rent Restrictions Act it was held that accommodation shall be deemed to be suitable if it was of the kind as the tenant was enjoying. Hence the alternative accommodation which the tenant was required to share was held not to be a suitable alternate accommodation. Reliance was placed in the case of (Krishnaji Dattatraya Bapat v. Dr. Shankar Ramchandra Abhyankar)4, reported in 67 Bom.L.R. page 690 a case under the Bombay Rent Act. The term "suitable residence" as contained in section 13(1)(1) of that Act was held to be one suitable for the tenant's reasonable needs and the need of his family. Further reference was made to the case of (Prabhakar Raghunath Dixit v. B.S. Kothare)5, reported in 76 Bom.L.R. page 240 wherein the term "suitable residence" under the Bombay Rent Act was held to mean suitable to the tenant and all the members of his family wherein growing needs of the family could not be ignored. 13. In my view, the aforesaid decisions dealing with the alternate suitable accommodation in rent restriction legislation cannot strictly be applied while construing the present Act which is essentially an environmental legislation. It would not be permissible to equate suitable alternative facilities to suitable alternative accommodation. On a proper perspective of the provisions of the present Act, it only means that the Respondents are enjoined with a duty to provide suitable facilities at the alternative site where the market yard is sought to be established. If the respondents ensure that the wholesale traders in Iron and Steel, whose business is sought to be shifted to the Market Yard, are provided with reasonable and adequate facilities to carry on their trade the obligation under section 6(1) can be said to have been met. It will be difficult to accede to the submission of Mr. If the respondents ensure that the wholesale traders in Iron and Steel, whose business is sought to be shifted to the Market Yard, are provided with reasonable and adequate facilities to carry on their trade the obligation under section 6(1) can be said to have been met. It will be difficult to accede to the submission of Mr. Teleyarkhan that it is the obligation of the Respondents to provide each and every trader with a proper accommodation of a type as similar as possible to the one which is enjoyed before he can be asked to shift to Kalamboli and before he can be prevented from carrying on his business at his present site within the city of Bombay. It is also not possible to accede to the contention of Mr. Teleyarkhan that the provisions of accommodation by CIDCO would not obviate the liability of the respondents from providing appropriate accommodation. In my view all that is required of section 6(1) is to ensure the availability of suitable alternate accommodation. The same may be provided either by the respondents or though their agents such as CIDCO. The same may be provided either on account of there being an independent transaction between the CIDCO and the traders or at the instance of the Respondents themselves. Once the suitable alternative facilities exist or are provided the obligation under section 6(1) will be met. 14. In regard to the contention of Mr. Taleyarkhan regarding the powers and duties of the Committee as provided under section 32, it may be pertinent to note that the said section appears in Chapter IV. The said chapter deals with the powers and duties of the Market Committee. Section 32 provides that in addition to the powers conferred and the duties imposed upon it by or under the Act the Committee may perform the various items contemplated in Clause 1 to 9 of the section. It is apparent that the functions and obligations contemplated under the said section are in addition to the functions and obligations contemplated under section 6 which section finds place in chapter 11 which deals with the declaration of the Market Area and the Market Yards. Having regard to the scheme of the Act and the object sought to be achieved it is not possible, as suggested by Mr. Having regard to the scheme of the Act and the object sought to be achieved it is not possible, as suggested by Mr. Teleyarkhan to read the term "may" to mean "shall" on the ground that the said section lays down powers coupled with duties. In my view, the term "may" will have to be given its ordinary grammatical meaning and the provisions of section 32 will have to be held as enabling provisions. Hence merely because section 34 empowers the Committee to levy fees and section 35 and 36 provide for transfer of immovable property of the Committee and section 37 provides for execution of contracts and the same would not assist the contention of Mr. Teleyarkhan that the provisions of section 32 are mandatory. Hence it could not be permissible by placing reliance on the provisions of section 32 to held that it was incumbent on the part of the respondents to provide for constructed accommodation to each and every trader before he can be asked to shift to Kalomboli market from their present premises in the City of Bombay. 15. Mr. Taleyarkhan next contended that it was not permissible for the Respondent to issue a notification under section 7 along with the Notification under section 3. According to him, the Authority who could issue the Notification under section 3 was the Metropolitan Authority who would issue the declaration on the recommendations of the Metropolitan Commissioner. It was after the notification under section 3 was issued declaring a market area and the market yard that the State Government was required by a separate notification under section 4 to constitute the first market committee. Similarly it was after the declaration of the Market Area and the Market Yards under section 3 that the Chief Executive Officer under the provisions of section 5 was required to issue Public Notice inviting all persons lawfully engaged in the specified trade to apply in writing for registering themselves with the Market Committee. It is the duty of the Chief Executive Officer under section 5(4), on being satisfied that the applicants were actively and lawfully engaged or intending to carry on the specified trade to include their names in the Register to be maintained by him and every such registered person was eligible to get a licence as provided under section 33. According to Mr. According to Mr. Teleyarkhan, it was only after following the aforesaid steps namely after notification under section 3 was issued after the first Market Committee under section 4 had been constituted, after the Chief Executive Officer had invited applications and had registered the traders and after the Market Committee had provided with suitable alternative facilities as contemplated in section 6 that a notification under section 7 prohibiting the trade in areas other than the Market at Kalamboli could be issued. In the present case the Notification dated 22nd September, 1986 issued under section 3(1) itself appointed the 1st January, 1987 as the appointed date under section 7. Such a notification could not be valid as it was only on the 23rd January, 1987 that the first committee was appointed under section 4. The public notices inviting applications for registration under section 5(1) were issued thereafter on the 7th December, 1987. 16. Mr. Singhvi, the learned Counsel, however, submitted that though the notification dated 22nd September, 1986 issued under section 3 itself provided for the appointed date to be on 1st January, 1987, the 2nd Respondent by its Notification dated 29th December, 1986 had declared more sub-yards in respect of the areas where the traders were carrying on their business. The said Notification was effective upto 1st May, 1987. By a further notification dated 27th April, 1987 duration of the earlier notification was extended up to 1st August, 1988 and by further notification dated 30th December, 1987, it was further extended upto 1st April, 1988. Thereafter, by the interim orders passed in this petition the same had been continued upto date. According to Mr. Singhvi, the appointed date provided under the Notification dated 22nd September, 1986 had virtually been extended and the subsequent notifications had permitted the continuance of the business in the present place of business declaring additional sub-yards. 17. In my judgment, though it may be true that the notifications dated 26th December, 1986, 27 April, 1987 and 30th December, 1987 had the effect of legalising the business in the present business sites and had, in effect, postponed the appointed date notified in the notification under section 3(1) dated 22nd September, 1986 the same would not render the notification valid. On the expiry of the period contemplated under the notifications dated 29th December, 1986, 24th April, 1987 and 30th December, 1987 appointed date would still continue to be the 1st of January, 1987. In my judgment, it was not permissible to the Respondents by one notification to declare the Market area and the Market Yard under section 3(1) and by the same notification declare the appointed date under section 7(1). This had been done without complying with the intervening formalities of appointing the first Committee and issuing public notice for inviting applications for registration under section 5 and making provision of alternative facilities as provided under section 6(1). Hence without disturbing the notification dated 22nd September, 1986 in so far as the same seeks to declare the market area and the market yards, I hold that the declaration of the appointed date being 1st January, 1987 under section 7(1) will have to be set aside. It will of course be open to the Respondent to re-issue a notification specifying the date for the coming into operations of the provisions of section 7(1). 18. The next and possibly the last question that requires consideration is regarding the provisions of suitable alternative facilities at the market yard at Kalamboli. In regard to the site at Kalamboli the CIDCO had invited applications for allotment of warehouse plots and has in fact allotted 1900 plots to various dealers in Iron and Steel. There have also been agreements between CIDCO and the plot-holders for the construction of the boundary walls. Though there was considerable controversy as to whose obligations it was to construct the same, it is common ground that upto date 62 K.M. out of 77 K.M. length of boundary wall has already been constructed. Once it is held that the Respondents under the provisions of section 6 are not obliged to offer accommodation but were required to provide only the facility I am satisfied that the site at Kalamboli is an adequate alternative site for shifting wholesale Iron and Steel trade. It has been brought on record that electricity has been provided and the electric power has been taken upto the mains and on applications for connection being made and requisite fees being paid the electric power will be connected to individual plots. It has been brought on record that electricity has been provided and the electric power has been taken upto the mains and on applications for connection being made and requisite fees being paid the electric power will be connected to individual plots. It has further come on record that the Respondent No. 2 has constructed a large building with ground and two floors known as Central Administrative Building. This has been constructed by the CIDCO in order to provide common services like Banks, Post and Telegraph offices, Restaurants, First Aid Unit and Market Committee office, CIDCO site office etc. It is further common ground that three major trade associations namely (1) Steel Chamber of India (2) Bombay Iron Merchant Association (3) Darukhana Iron, Steel and Scrap Merchant Association have been allotted plots and Steel Chamber of India has started construction on its plots. It is also common ground that (1) the Steel Authority of India (2) Tata Iron and Steel Company Ltd. and (3) Indian Iron and Steel Company who command over 50% of the Iron and Steel trade have shifted their business to the Kalamboli Market Yard. Apart from the provision of electricity CIDCO in collaboration with Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation (MIDC) and the Maharashtra Water Supply and Sewerage Board (MWSSB) have arrange for adequate supply of water to the Kalamboli Steel Market Yard. The MIDC and MWSSB have assured the uniform supply of water at the rate of 3 million litres per day which would cater the anticipated population of 20000 persons at its optimum level. Over and above this at the behest of CIDCO, the Mahanagar Telephone Nigam has constructed a 2000-line telephone exchange and this was commissioned on 27th March, 1987. This exchange has remained unutilised till this day. On account of the shifting of the Iron and Steel trade in Kalamboli the Mahanagar Telephone Nigam have planned an extension of its exchange by addition of 1000 lines i.e. from 2000 to 3000 lines in 1988-89. 19. A residential zone consisting of 6656 houses has been developed. The said 6656 houses which have been built up admeasure between 12 to 94 sq. metres and are ready to cater to the economically weaker sections, low income group, middle and higher income groups. 19. A residential zone consisting of 6656 houses has been developed. The said 6656 houses which have been built up admeasure between 12 to 94 sq. metres and are ready to cater to the economically weaker sections, low income group, middle and higher income groups. The Loan assistance from HUDCO with interest rates ranging from 7% to 121/2% with repayment facilities ranging from 81/2 years to 19 years has already been arranged. Moreover plots for construction of Bungalows for Iron and Steel traders have also been provided in the nearby New Panvel node situated at a distance of 3-4 kilometres from Kalamboli. Though at present there exists only one Police out post a full fledged Police Station has been sanctioned and the financial liability for the same have been approved. Kalamboli market yard has been provided with a truck terminal which caters for parking and washing facilities for over 500 trucks with the following facilities : (1) A large office building having built up area of 2,744 sq.mts. for 130 office units, 2 banks, 2 restaurants and 3 shops. (2) 167 Transit Godowns. (3) 33 Repair Workshops. (4) 14 Restaurants. (5) 4 Petrol Pumps. (6) 3 Lodging Houses. (7) 2 weigh bridges. (8) 5 spare part shops. 20. In my judgment the aforesaid facilities which are now available at Kalamboli are adequate and the obligation under section 6(1) can be said to have been met. It is true that the facilities may not be identical to the one available to the traders in this present site of business. However, if one has to live in Society one is expected to cater to the growing needs of the Society. If the Act, which is essentially an environmental legislation, seeks to deconjest the Bombay City certain hardships would be inevitable. As long as the Act does not impose any unreasonable restrictions on the right of business guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution no fault could be found with it. Therefore, it will not be permissible for the petitioners to resist any longer the shifting of their place of business to the market yard at Kalamboli. It would however be reasonable to expect that some time will be required for the petitioners to shift their place of business from their present market yards to the market yard at Kalamboli. Therefore, it will not be permissible for the petitioners to resist any longer the shifting of their place of business to the market yard at Kalamboli. It would however be reasonable to expect that some time will be required for the petitioners to shift their place of business from their present market yards to the market yard at Kalamboli. I am, therefore, inclined to grant time upto 31st August, 1989 for the said purpose. 21. In the result, the petition partially succeeds only in so far as it challenges the declaration of the appointed date issued under the notification dated 22nd September, 1986. While confirming that notification in so far as it relates to the declaration of the Market area and the Market yards under section 3(1) the declaration of the appointed date under section 7(1) is quashed. The rest of the challenge contained in the petition is negatived. The Rule is made partially absolute in the above terms. The Respondent No. 2 will be at liberty to issue the fresh notification declaring the appointed date under section 7(1). After the issuance of the said notification the provisions of section 7(1) will come into operation with effect from 1st September, 1989. The petitioners are granted time upto 31st August, 1989 for the purpose of shifting their trade to the Kalamboli Market Yard. Rule made absolute.