Ranchi University Teachers Association v. State of Bihar
1988-10-01
B.P.SINGH
body1988
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT B.P. Singh, J. In this writ application, the petitioner has challenged the constitutional validity of the Bihar State Universities Ordinance, 1987, which is a repromulgation of the earlier Ordinance. The challenge to the Ordinance is mainly on the ground that the practice of resorting to the - promulgation of successive Ordinances amounts to circumventing the provisions of Article 174 of the Constitution of India. It was submitted that the repromulgation of Ordinances in this manner amounts to committing fraud upon the Constitution. The power of executive legislation is a limited power, and authority to promulgate ordinances exists only in caes of emergency, when the State Legislature i3 not if) session. The life of such Ordinances is also limited, but the clever device of continuing the Ordinances by repromulgation of the same ordinance over and over again after the sessions of the legislature are over, amounts to circumventing the provisions of Article 174 of the Constitution. 2. In the instant case, it is stated that the Bihar Ordinance no. 35 of 1986, being Bihar State Universities (2nd Amendment) Ordinance was promulgated on 3.12.1986 amending certain provisions of the Bihar State Universities Act, 1976. Thereafter, another Ordinance was promulgated on 17.12.1986, known as Bihar State Universities (3rd Amendment) Ordinance, 1986, whereby various provisions of the Bihar Stale Universities Act, 1976 were amended. The aforesaid amendment abolished the Senate and Syndicate and vested their powers in the Vice Chancellor. Despite the fact that the March session of the Bihar Legislature was held from 9.3.1987, no law was passed by the legislature, and yet another Ordinance was promulgated on 18.4.1987. Thereafter, the Monsoon session of the Bihar Legislative Assembly was held from 26.6.1987 to 27.7.1987, in which the Ordinance dated 18.4.1987 was placed for approval. Serious objections were raised by the members of the legislature. However, after the session was over the same Ordinance was again repromul gated on 6.8.1987. 3. It is, therefore, submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the repromulgation of such Ordinances is a garb for the exercise of legislative power by the Executive. According to the petitioner, it is the duty of the legislature to legislate and that function cannot be abdicated in favor of the executive nor can executive nor can the executive usurp that power by committing fraud upon the Constitution.
According to the petitioner, it is the duty of the legislature to legislate and that function cannot be abdicated in favor of the executive nor can executive nor can the executive usurp that power by committing fraud upon the Constitution. The power of the executive to promulgate an Ordinance is exceptional in nature, and can be exercised only when the State Legislature is not in session to meet an emergency which necessitates the promulgation of an Ordinance. So far, these submissions are concerned, the position in law has now been pronounced authoritatively by the Supreme Court in the case of D.C Wadhwa and ors. v. State of Bihar and ors., AIR 1987 SC 579. 4. Learned standing Counsel, appearing on behalf of the State of Bihar, however, submitted that a composite Bill has been introduced in the Bihar Legislative Assembly in the month of July, 1987. The said Bill has been referred to the Select Committee on 29.7.1987 by the Legislature, and the Select Committee has held two meetings to discuss the provisions of the Bill. The matter is under the active consideration of the Select Committee of the Legislature and consequently the State Legislature is in seisin of the matter. The complaint of the petitioner no longer survives. The legislature which has the power to legislate is now considering the Bill introduced for the said purpose. It is, therefore, submitted that no relief can be granted to the petitioner, in view of the facts stated above. 5. The grievance of the petitioner is that the executive can not be permitted to bring about successive Ordinances with a view to avoid the legislature in matters of legislation. The grievance of the petitioner has considerable force. However, since that process has now stopped and a composite Bill is under consideration of the Legislature, no relief can be granted to the petitioner in this writ application, 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner then submitted that the State Legislature is considering the Bill since 29th July, 1987. In view of the delay, a mandamus be issued to the legislature to consider the Bill and pass an appropriate Act forthwith. I know of no law which authorises the High Court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, to enquire into the affairs of the legislature as regards the conduct and disposal of business before it.
I know of no law which authorises the High Court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, to enquire into the affairs of the legislature as regards the conduct and disposal of business before it. In this regard, the legislature is entirely independent of any judicial control or scrutiny. How the legislature will perform its functions and dispose of its business, is for, the legislature itself to consider. Rules have been framed for the purpose, and it is the Speaker of the House who has authority to decide matters relating to transaction of business by the House in accordance with parliamentary practice. Any judicial interference in such matters will completely destroy the delicate system of checks and balances based upon the principle of separation of powers, which is a basic feature of a written Constitution like ours. Moreover, in the instant writ application, no such relief has been claimed, obviously because at the time of the filling of the writ application the petitioner could not have made such a grievance. The legislature is not a party in the instant writ application and therefore, such a grievance cannot be entertained in its absence. 7. In this view of the matter, this writ application is dismissed as infructuous. There wilt be no order as to costs. Application dismissed