JUDGMENT 1. In this application the petitioners have challenged the provisions of Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance, 1944 (shortly) stated hereinafter to be the Ordinance of 1944) as ultra vires the Constitution and void being violative of Articles 14 and 19(1)(f) prior to its repeal and Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India, The petitioner also have challenged the orders dated 21st January, 1984, 18th April, 1984 and 23rd July, 1984 all passed by the District Judge, 24 Parganas at Alipore in O.S. No. 67 of 1982 on the application made by the Inspector General of Police, Cabinet (Vigilance) Department, Govt. of Bihar on behalf of the State of Bihar for attachment of Fixed Deposits of Rs. 1.11 Crores lying in different Banks in Calcutta as also for attachment of premises No.7, Queens Park, Calcutta. 2. This case has a chequered history. In order to appreciate the contentions urged, it is necessary to relate the historical events, which according to the writ petitioners have compelled them to file the present writ petition. 3. The first petitioner is a public limited company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, 1913 which prior to 1973 owned leasehold interest in coal land in Santhal Parganas, Birbhum. The management of the said collieries vested In the Central Government on and from 31st January, 1973 under the Coal Mines (Taking Over of Management) Act, 1973 and thereafter on 1st May, 1973 the said collieries vested in the Central Government under the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1973. According to the first petitioner up till now no compensation money has been received either for taking over the management or for vesting of the said collieries. The first petitioner never had any leasehold interest subject to sub-leases in any collieries in the State of Bihar and the question of receiving any compensation under the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 (shortly hereinafter to be referred to as B.L.R. Act) by the first petitioner does not arise. According to the first petitioner by a conveyance dated 23rd October, 1975 the first petitioner purchased undivided portion of premises No.7, Queens Park, Calcutta, at a price of Rs. 2,71,000/-. 4. The second petitioner is a private limited company incorporated on 19th November, 1951 under the Indian Companies Act, 1913, which owned 1,000 bighas of agricultural land in District Burdwan, West Bengal. 2,71,000/-. 4. The second petitioner is a private limited company incorporated on 19th November, 1951 under the Indian Companies Act, 1913, which owned 1,000 bighas of agricultural land in District Burdwan, West Bengal. The entire activities of the second petitioner was agricultural and the source of income of the second petitioner was also from agriculture. The second petitioner never owned any leasehold interest in collieries or other mines. By a conveyance also dated 23rd October, 1975 the second petitioner purchased undivided portion of land and building in premises No.7, Queens Park, Calcutta at a price Rs.4 lacs which was borrowed by the said petitioner and subsequently repaid in 1977. 5. By a registered Deed of Trust dated 27th November, 1952 one Sashti Kinkor Banerjee, since deceased, established a public religious and charitable Trust called Jadablal Trust Estate being the sixth petitioner in the writ application. The said Jadablal Trust Estate used to hold huge agricultural land in Birbhum, West Bengal, some of which vested in the State of West Bengal in 1973 under the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 as amended as a result whereof a sum of about Rs.5,00,000/- have become due from Government of West Bengal on account of compensation for vesting of the land. The said Jadablal Trust Estate also used to hold and still now holds huge agricultural properties wherefrom it had at all material times agricultural income amounting to about Rs. 3 lacs per year. The said settlor Sashti Kinkor Banerjee was the sole trustee of the said Jadablal Trust Estate from its inception until his death on 10th April, 1959 when two of his grand sons namely Keshab Narayan Banerjee and Kamal Narayan Banerjee became the Trustees of the said Trust. In 1960 and 1968 the fourth and fifth petitioners became the Trustees of the said Jadablal Trust Estate. In 1975 the said Kamal Narayan Banerjee relinquished the trusteeship of the said Jadablal Trust Estate. It is the case of the sixth petitioner that by a conveyance dated 23rd October, 1975 the said Jadablal Trust Estate purchased undivided portion of land and building in premises No.7, Queens Park, Calcutta for a consideration of Rs. 1,75,000/- in the benami names of two of its Trustees namely the fourth and fifth petitioners as also one Smt. Anita Banerjee being the third petitioners in the writ application. 6. 1,75,000/- in the benami names of two of its Trustees namely the fourth and fifth petitioners as also one Smt. Anita Banerjee being the third petitioners in the writ application. 6. In 1944 Dubrajpur Rice Mills Pvt. Ltd. was incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, 1913. In 1948 Central Manbhum Coal Co. Pvt. Ltd., was also incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, 1913. Both the aforesaid two companies are the seventh and eighth petitioners respectively in the writ application. 7. It is the case of the petitioners that in late nineteenth century one Jadablal Banerjee, since deceased, acquired several leasehold interest in collieries all situated in Dhanbad from the then Rajas of Jharia. The said leasehold interest varied between 600 and 999 years. One Smt. Shaktisudha Debi. since deceased, being the mother-in-law of the third petitioner and grand mother of the fourth and fifth petitioners created a public religious and charitable Trust known as Debikamal Trust Estate by a registered deed dated 17th June, 1950. In 1950 the said Sasti Kinkor Banerjee, since deceased, being the eldest son of late Jadablal Banerjee and grand-father-in-law of the third petitioner and great grand father of fourth and fifth petitioners gifted to the said Debikamal Trust Estate 12 leasehold interest in collieries subject to sub-leases out of several leasehold interest which the said Jadablal Banerjee acquired from the then Rajas of Jharia. According to the petitioners in 1954 the said Debikamal Trust Estate transferred four out of the said twelve leasehold interest in the collieries to the said Dubrajpur Rice Mills Pvt. Ltd. being the seventh petitioner in the writ petition in exchange of fully paid up shares of the said company. Subsequently the said Debikamal Trust Estate became the holder of 99% shares of the said Dubrajpur Rice Mills Pvt. Ltd., the other 1% shares of the said company being held by the Directors of the said company as qualifying shares. 8. It is also the case of the petitioners that Central Manbhum Coal Co. Pvt. Limited being the eighth petitioner in the writ petition acquired 13 leasehold interest in collieries subject to sub-leases in Dhanbad. In 1953 the said Jadablal Trust Estate purchased from the said Central Manbhum Coal Co. Pvt. Limited 12 out of 13 leasehold interest of collieries subject to sub-leases. Pvt. Limited being the eighth petitioner in the writ petition acquired 13 leasehold interest in collieries subject to sub-leases in Dhanbad. In 1953 the said Jadablal Trust Estate purchased from the said Central Manbhum Coal Co. Pvt. Limited 12 out of 13 leasehold interest of collieries subject to sub-leases. In 1958 the said Jadablal Trust Estate acquired by way of gift 99% shares of the Central Manbhum Coal Co. Pvt. Limited being the eighth petitioner in the writ petition the other 1% shares being held by the Directors of the said Company as qualifying shares. 9. In 1956 the Government of Bihar issued Notification whereby it was declared that all the mining leases subject to sub-leases vested in the Government of Bihar under B.L.R. Act and all the lessees who were actually working the mines were directed not to pay any royalty to top lessees. In 1959 in view of some decisions the position in law was clarified when it was held that none of the leasehold interest subject to sub-leases vested in the State of Bihar by virtue of the aforesaid Notification issued in 1956. It appears that in 1961 the Government of Bihar issued an Ordinance directing that the entire income of leasehold interest subject to sub-leases should be paid to the Government of Bihar and not to the top lessees. On 27th October, 1964 Ordinance No. 45 of 1964 was issued by the Government of Bihar as a result whereof all the leasehold interest subject to sub-leases vested in the Government of Bihar. The said Ordinance, however, was replaced by Bihar Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1965. 10. In 1971 the said Jadablal Trust Estate filed application claiming compensation for acquisition of the leasehold interest in the coal mines subject to sub-leases. In 1974 the said Dubrajpur Rice Mills Pvt. Limited and Central Manbhum Coal Co. Pvt. Limited also filed application claiming compensation for acquisition of the leasehold interest subject to sub-leases. The said Compensation Cases were numbered as Nos. 1/71-72, 3/74-75 and 1/74-75, respectively. Between July and September, 1974 the Government of Bihar paid to the said Dubrajpur Rice Mills Pvt. Limited and Central Manbhum Coal Co. Pvt. Ltd.. interim compensation. In 1976 the Government of Bihar paid to the said Jadablal Trust Estate interim compensation. All the said interim compensations were paid in the aforesaid Compensation Cases under the B.L.R. Act by Treasury Challans. Pvt. Ltd.. interim compensation. In 1976 the Government of Bihar paid to the said Jadablal Trust Estate interim compensation. All the said interim compensations were paid in the aforesaid Compensation Cases under the B.L.R. Act by Treasury Challans. On 5th February, 1977 final publication of the compensation assessment rolls were made under the B.L.R. As per the said final compensation rolls Dubrajpur Rice Mills Pvt. Limited became entitled to receive Rs.96,32,950/- and Central Manbhum Coal Co. Pvt. Limited became entitled to Rs. 52,28,000/- apart from interim compensation which they received earlier. No final compensation roll, however, has been published in respect of Jadablal Trust Estate or Debikamal Trust Estate. It is the case of the petitioners that in 1952 the said Keshab Narayan Banerjee became Directors in both Dubrajour Rice Mills Pvt. Limited and Central Manbhum Coal Co. Pvt. Limited. According to the petitioners the said two companies at their respective Board Meetings authorized the said Keshab Narayan Banerjee to realise the compensation money from the State of Bihar in the Compensation Case’s under the B.L.R. Act and to grant receipt for the same. 11. It is the common case of the petitioners and the respondents that on 17th August, 1977 the Government of Bihar issued 40 years 2½% Bihar Zamindary Abolition Bonds of the face value of Rs.96,32,950/- and Rs.52,28,000/- to the said Dubrajpur Rice Mills Pvt. Limited and Central Manbhum Coal Co. Pvt. Limited respectively being the amount of the final compensation under the B.L.R. Act which were collected and received by the said Keshab Narayan Banerjee for and on behalf of the said two companies. It is also the case of the petitioners that on 18th August, 1977 the said Keshab Narayan Banerjee as the Director and Constituted Attorney of the said Dubrajpur Rice Mills Pvt. Limited and Central Manbhum Coal Co. Pvt. Limited presented the said Bonds to the Treasury at Dhanbad for payment of four years instalments of interest under the said Bounds and received Treasury Challans for the sums of Rs. 18,91,064.72 and Rs. 10,26,319.07 respectively for the seventh and eighth petitioners respectively. It is also the case of the petitioners that thereafter the said Keshbab Narayan Banerjee presented the Treasury Challans to the State Bank of India, Dhanbad and received the amounts in cash which the said Dubrajpur Rice Mills Pvt. Limited advanced to Debikamal Trust Estate and Central Manbhum Coal Co. 10,26,319.07 respectively for the seventh and eighth petitioners respectively. It is also the case of the petitioners that thereafter the said Keshbab Narayan Banerjee presented the Treasury Challans to the State Bank of India, Dhanbad and received the amounts in cash which the said Dubrajpur Rice Mills Pvt. Limited advanced to Debikamal Trust Estate and Central Manbhum Coal Co. Pvt. Limited advanced the said sum to Jadablal Trust Estate. According to the petitioners on 23rd August, 1977 the said Jadablal Trust Estate advanced a sum of Rs.10 lacs to Debikamal Trust Estate. It is also the case of the petitioners that on 26th April, 1978 the said Dubrajpur Rice Mills Pvt. Limited and Central Manbhum Coal Co. Pvt. Limited sold the said Bihar Zamindary Abolition Bonds which they received from the State of Bihar by way of compensation under the B.L.R Act to Punjab & Sindh Bank Ltd. for a sum of Rs. 47,20,146/- and Rs. 25,61,720/- respectively. According to the petitioners on the same date i.e., 26th April. 1978 the said Dubrajpur Rice Mills Pvt. Limited advanced the said entire sum of Rs. 47,20,146/- to Debikamal Trust Estate and Central Manhbum Coal Co. Pvt. Limited advanced the entire sum of Rs 25,61,7201- to Jadablal Trust Estate. The said Jadablal Trust Estate again advanced a sum of Rs. 26,00,000/- to Debikamal Trust Estate. It is the case of the petitioners that the said Debikamal Trust Estate thereafter invested in Fixed Deposits the amounts which were received from Dubrajpur Rice Mills Pvt. Limited and Jadablal Trust Estate in various Banks in Calcutta. 12. On or about 6th July, 1979 a First Information Report (hereinafter to be referred to for brevity as F.I.R.) was lodged by one B.S. Banerjee. Inspector of Police, Cabinet (Vigilance) Department, State of Bihar being Patna Vigilance Police Station Case No. 45(7) 79 against six Officers of the Government of Bihar and the said Keshab Narayan Banerjee and one Purushotamdas Goswami. None of the petitioners in the writ petition. however, has been described as accused in the said F.I.R. and there is no charge against any of the writ petitioners. The basis of the said F.I.R. is the written report of B.S. Banerjee dated 6th July, 1979 which was filed in 34 typed pages. None of the petitioners in the writ petition. however, has been described as accused in the said F.I.R. and there is no charge against any of the writ petitioners. The basis of the said F.I.R. is the written report of B.S. Banerjee dated 6th July, 1979 which was filed in 34 typed pages. Shortly the case of the said B.S. Banerjee is that Keshab Narayan Banerjee had no genuine connection either with the said two companies or the Trust either at the time and during the relevant period for which the compensations were paid to him in the aforesaid three Dhanbad compensation Cases and the said compensations were claimed and paid on the basis of forged receipts in respect of returns claimed to have been filed as early as in 1956 and the said receipts produced were forged, fake and sham documents. According to the said B. S. Banerjee laws and rules were flagrantly violated inasmuch as compensations were paid without observation the statutory provisions and payments ware made without observing the legal formalities arid final compensation rolls were published in an irregular manner of speeding up the payments. According to the said B.S. Banerjee all such acts and overacts were part of a big criminal conspiracy to cause wrongful loss to Government and corresponding wrongful gains to the said Keshah Narayan Banerjee who through the said conspiracy not only received payments in the shape of Bonds but also huge amounts in cash. According to the said B.S. Banerjee Dhanbad Compensation Case No. 1/74-75 was started after about 10 years from the date of vesting of mining interest on the basis of a petition filed by Keshab Narayan Banerjee in support of which he was alleged to have submitted a plain copy of deed of release which according to the said B.S. Banerjee had been destroyed on 10th August, 1963 and also on the basis of a forged receipt to show that he had earlier filed a return in respect of intermediary interest in 1956. According to the said B.S. Banerjee the Additional Collector forwarded the petition to the District Mining Officer, Dhanbad for verification and report and the District Mining Officer made a quick verification and also a calculation chart in respect of net annual income of Central Manbhum Coal Co. According to the said B.S. Banerjee the Additional Collector forwarded the petition to the District Mining Officer, Dhanbad for verification and report and the District Mining Officer made a quick verification and also a calculation chart in respect of net annual income of Central Manbhum Coal Co. Pvt. Limited and on the basis of the said report compensation money was calculated which was also subsequently revised on the complaint of the said Keshab Narayan Banerjee and revised calculation was made and submitted by the said District Mining Officer. According to the said B.S. Banerjee the said compensation money was calculated by disregarding the provisions of B.L.R. Act and Bihar Land Reforms Rules. 13. Although we are not concerned with several orders passed by the Additional Collector, Dhanbad I may, however, mention here that by an order dated 19th/21st August, 1978 Additional Collector, Dhanbad cancelled the said Bihar Zamindary Abolition Bonds. By two other orders both dated 17th July, 1979 the said Additional Collector, Dhanbad also suspended the payment under the said Bonds. It appears that the aforesaid orders challenged in a separate writ application were quashed by the learned Single Judge. On appeal, however, the Appeal Court sustained the order passed by the learned Single Judge in so far as the order cancelling the Bonds is concerned but allowed the appeal preferred by the State of Bihar and others in so far as the orders suspending payments under the Bonds are concerned. 14. To complete the narration it should be mentioned here that on the basis of the said F.I.R. an application was made by the respondent in this application before the District Judge, 24 Parganas. It Alipore for attachment of the aforesaid Fixed Deposits amounting. In Rs. 1.11 Crores as also for attachment of premises No.7, Queens Park, Calcutta under section 3 of the Ordinance of 1944 whereupon on 22nd January, 1982 the said District Judge passed an ex parte order of attachment under section 4(1) of the said Ordinance. The said proceedings was numbered as G.S. No. 14 of 1982. Against the said order dated and January, 1982 the eighth petitioner herein along with the said Keshab Narayan Banerjee filed writ application in this Court whereupon Mr. Justice Sabyasachi Mukherjee (as His Lordship then was) was pleased to issue Rule and also the interim order staying all further proceedings. The said proceedings was numbered as G.S. No. 14 of 1982. Against the said order dated and January, 1982 the eighth petitioner herein along with the said Keshab Narayan Banerjee filed writ application in this Court whereupon Mr. Justice Sabyasachi Mukherjee (as His Lordship then was) was pleased to issue Rule and also the interim order staying all further proceedings. It also appears that Debikamal Trust Estate also moved another Writ application challenging the said order dated 22nd January, 1982 passed in O.S. No. 14 of 1982 on 5th April, 1982 in this Court whereupon Mr. Justice T.K. Basu (as His Lordship then was) was also pleased to issue' Rule. T.K. Basu, J. however, did not stay the order of attachment but made it clear that the order of attachment passed by the District Judge would not prevent payment of interest on Fixed Deposits. Against the said interim order dated 5th April, 1982 the State of Bihar and Ors. preferred an appeal which was numbered as F.M.A.T. No. 906 of 1982. Ultimately by a judgment and order dated 19th July, 1982 the Appeal Court was pleased to hold that in as much as no cognizance was taken against the alleged scheduled offence and also inasmuch as no application for extension of the ad-interim order of attachment under section 10(a) of the Ordinance of 1944 was made and no extension of the interim order of attachment was obtained, the said ad interim order of, attachment dated 22nd January, 1982 passed in O.S. No. 14 of 1982 ceased to have any effect or force on and from 22nd April, 1982. The Special Leave Petition filed by the State of Bihar & Ors. against the said judgment and order dated 19th July, 1982 was also dismissed by the Supreme Court. 15. In the meantime, on 3rd August, 1982 the third respondent filed a second application under section 3 of the Ordinance of 1944 before the District Judge, 24 Parganas at Alipore for attachment of the very same properties and on the same cause of action and grounds which were the subject-matter of the previous application being O.S. No. 14 of 1982. This second application has been numbered as O.S. No. 67 of 1982. This second application has been numbered as O.S. No. 67 of 1982. By a judgment and order dated 5th August, 1982 the District Judge at Alipore rejected the said application on the ground that no second or successive application lay under the Ordinance of 1944 on the self same facts and cause of action. Against the said judgment and order dated 5th August, 1982 the third respondent preferred an appeal in this Court which was numbered as F.M.A.T. No. 2423 of 1982. The third respondent also made an application in the said F.M.A.T. No. 2423 of 1982 for stay of operation of the order dated 5th August, 1982. The said prayer was subsequently amended and on 15th September, 1982 an interim order was passed by this Court attaching the said Fixed Deposits of Rs. 1.11 Crores till the disposal of the said appeal. It appears that thereafter some series of litigations went on each of which went up to Supreme Court. Against the said order dated 15th September, 1982 passed in F.M.A.T. No. 2423 of 1982 the writ petitioners herein filed a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court which was admitted and was numbered as Civil Appeal No. 3241 of 1982. By an order dated 13th October, 1982 the Supreme Court was pleased to dispose of the said Civil Appeal No.3241 of 1982. In as much as reliance has been placed by the writ petitioners on this order of the Supreme Court I would like to reproduce the said order which reads as follows: "We are of the view that the ad-interim order of attachment of the sum of Rs. 1.11 Crores and other properties made by the Division Bench of the High Court on 15th September, 1982 does not entitle the State Government to ask the Banks with which this amount is lying deposited not to pay the amount of interest on such amount to the appellants. We would accordingly declare that, on the basis of the ad-interim order of attachment, the State Government is not entitled to instruct the banks to withhold payment of the amount of interest on the sum of Rs.1.11 Crores. We would accordingly declare that, on the basis of the ad-interim order of attachment, the State Government is not entitled to instruct the banks to withhold payment of the amount of interest on the sum of Rs.1.11 Crores. This order shall not be construed as expressing any opinion on correctness of the order made by the High Court or on the merits of the controversy between the parties and the parties will be entitled to enforce whatever rights are available to them.” 16. It appears that the third respondent in the Writ petition thereafter made another application in the said F.M.A.T. No.2423 of 1982 before this Court for attachment of interest on the said sum of Rs.1.11 Crores as also attachment of premises No.7, Queens Park, Calcutta. By a judgment and order dated 17th February, 1983 this Court held that through inadvertence the premises No.7, Queens Park, Calcutta, was not attached earlier and as such, the said mistake was rectified. By the said judgment and order this Court held that as an Appellate Authority the powers of this Court are co-extensive with the powers of the District Judge and that is the limit attached to the powers of this Court when the appeal is disposed or by making an order either under section 4(i) and section 6(2) of the Ordinance of 1944 It has further been held that in an appeal preferred under section 11 of the Ordinance of 1944 it might be necessary for this Court to pass interim orders in order to sustain the appeal or to make it effective pending the disposal thereof such orders are not really orders made under section 4(1) or 6(2) of the Ordinance. This Court further held that section 11 (2) of the Ordinance of 1944 invests this Court with wide powers to make any order that this Court may think proper. It has also been held that independently of sec. 11(2) of the said Ordinance this Court possesses the necessary powers to make such an ad-interim orders as would be necessary to render the appeal effective and meaningful. This Court, therefore, passed a fresh order for attachment of interest of the said Fixed Deposits of Rs.1.11 Crores. 17. Against the said judgment and order dated 17th February, 1983 the Writ petitioners filed a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme, Court. This Court, therefore, passed a fresh order for attachment of interest of the said Fixed Deposits of Rs.1.11 Crores. 17. Against the said judgment and order dated 17th February, 1983 the Writ petitioners filed a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme, Court. While the said Special Leave Petition was pending before the Supreme Court this Court finally disposed of the said appeal being F.M.A.T. No. 2423 of 1982 which was subsequently numbered as F.M.A. No. 185 of 1983 by the order dated 10th August, 1983. By the said judgment and order dated 10th August, 1983 this Court held that in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case the second application lay although in the normal course no second application would lie on the self same cause of action and/or fact. This Court in allowing the said appeal remanded the application which was made by the third respondent under section 3 of the Ordinance of 1944 being O.S.No.67 of 1982 before the District Judge, 24 Parganas at Alipore directing him to decide the said application on merits. Against the said Judgment and order dated 10th August, 1983 the writ petitioners filed a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court. It is the case of the writ petitioners that as this Court remanded the main application without giving any decision on merits the Supreme Court was pleased not to interfere with the said order of remand and rejected the Special Leave Petition of the petitioners filed against the judgment and order dated 10th August, 1983. It is also the case of the petitioners that in view of the same the Supreme Court did not allow the Special Leave Petition which was directed against the ad interim order dated 17th February, 1983 in F.M.A.T. No. 2423 of 1982. This almost concludes the history and the background of the case. 18. I now narrate the fact which has led the petitioners to file the present application. This almost concludes the history and the background of the case. 18. I now narrate the fact which has led the petitioners to file the present application. It is the case of the petitioners that after the said order of remand the third respondent herein deliberately started delaying the proceedings before the District Judge, 24-Parganas at Alipore by taking adjournment after adjournments as will be evident from the fact that although the order of remand was passed on 10th August, 1983 the District Judge, 24- Parganas at Alipore did not pass the order under, section 4(1) of the 1944 Ordinance until 21st January, 1984. It appears that on 21st January, 1984 the District Judge passed an order under section 4(1) of the 1944 Ordinance attaching not only the Fixed Deposits and premises No.7. Queens Park, Calcutta but also interest on Fixed Deposits for which there was no application and no prayer. In fact the District Judge was merely hearing the application which was filed by the third respondent before him on 3rd August, 1982 which application was remanded by this Court to him by the order dated 10th August, 1993. It is the case of the petitioners that in that application filed on 3rd August, 1982 the only prayer was for attachment of Fixed Deposits of Rs.1.11 Crores lying in the various Banks in Calcutta and premises No.7, Queens Park, Calcutta and nothing else. It is also the case of the petitioners that on 15th March, 1984 and 22nd March, 1984 petitioners of objections were filed by the petitioners under section 4(3) or (4) of the 1944 Ordinance objecting to the said attachment being made under section 4(1) of the 1944 Ordinance, From the records it appears that on 7th April, 1984 the third respondent filed an application under section 10(a) of the 1944 Ordinance praying for extension of the ad interim attachment. The third respondent also fired another application praying adjournment of the said application which was adjourned by the District Judge to 5th May, 1984. From the records it appears that on 16th April, 1984 the third respondent filed another application asking the District Judge to hear the application for extension of the ad-interim attachment on 18th April, 1984. In fact the said application was heard on 18th April, 1984 by the District Judge. From the records it appears that on 16th April, 1984 the third respondent filed another application asking the District Judge to hear the application for extension of the ad-interim attachment on 18th April, 1984. In fact the said application was heard on 18th April, 1984 by the District Judge. According to the petitioners the said application was heard by the District Judge up to 3:55 p.m.. It appears that the District Judge passed the order No. 35 on the very same day namely 18th April, 1984. From the said order it appears that one of the points argued by the petitioners was that there was no application for attachment of interest and as such the District Judge should not have attached the interest on the said Fixed Deposits. The District Judge in his order has recorded "Although there was no application for attachment of the interest, the order for attachment thereof was passed by this Court on the verbal prayer of the learned Advocate for the petitioner". It is the case of the petitioners that no such verbal prayer was made by the third respondent and the learned District Judge has incorrectly recorded the same as will be corroborated from the fact that on 19th April, 1984 the third respondent himself made a supplementary application for attachment of interest From the said application it will be evident that the .third respondent himself never claimed that they made any verbal prayer for attachment of interest. It is also the case of the petitioners that as per the procedure followed in the Alipore Court no verbal prayer is entertained and even for adjournments written application's are necessary. It is also the case of the petitioners that the order sheet in O.S. No. 67 of 1982 also will be lie the allegation made by the third respondent by his application dated 19th April, 1984 that they made any previous supplementary application for attachment of interest as there is no mention about any such supplementary application in the order sheet and in fact no such supplementary application for attachment of interest was made or even any copy of the same was served upon any of the petitioners. From the order dated 18th April, 1984 it will appear that, the District Judge fixed 5th May, 1984 for hearing objections, The said objections, however, were not heard on the said date and the hearing of the petitions of objections were fixed on 14th July, 1984. It appears that on 14th July, 1984 the third respondent herein filed an application annexing a copy of the order passed by the learned Special Judge (Vigilance), Patna in Special Case No. 172 of 1983 arising out of Vigilance Police Station Case No 45(7) 79. By the said application the third respondent prayed that the order of attachment may be continued and made absolute without hearing the petitions of objection on merits and without making any investigation as required by sections 5(2) and (3) of the said Ordinance of 1944. The petitioners filed objections to the said application made on 14th July, 1984 and the said application filed by the third respondent on 14th July, 1984 was heard by the District Judge on 19th July, 1984. By order No.5 dated 23rd July, 1984 the District Judge allowed the said application filed by the third respondent on 14th July, 1984 without hearing the petitions of objections filed by the petitioners under section 4 of the Ordinance of 1944, It appears from the copy of the application filed by the third respondent before the District Judge in O.S. No. 67 of 1982 that on 12th July, 1984 the Special Judge (Vigilance), Bihar, Patna took cognizance of the alleged offence in Patna Special Case No. 172 of 1983 and therefore, according to the respondent the ad interim order of attachment of properties namely Rs.1.11 Crores with accrued and accruing interest thereon with the house property should continue in force until order are passed by the learned District Judge in accordance with the provisions of section 10(2) of the Ordinance of 1944 and the said ad interim order of attachment be made absolute till final disposal of the criminal proceedings in Special Case No. 172 of 1983. In spite of the objections the learned District Judge by his Order No.5 dated 23rd July, 1984 over-ruled the submissions made on behalf of the petitioners that section 5 of the Ordinance of 1944 prevails over section 10(b) of the said Ordinance. In spite of the objections the learned District Judge by his Order No.5 dated 23rd July, 1984 over-ruled the submissions made on behalf of the petitioners that section 5 of the Ordinance of 1944 prevails over section 10(b) of the said Ordinance. According to the learned District Judge the right of the petitioners to have their claim examined by the Court stands eclipsed for the operation of section 10(b) and it will be incongruous to hold that the result of section 5 of the Ordinance of 1944 operates even when the case comes within the fold of section 10(b) of the said Ordinance. In that view of the matter the leaned District Judge allowed the said application made by the third respondent on 14th July, 1984 and made the ad interim attachment absolute. 19. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid orders, on 8th August, 1984 the petitioners moved the present writ application In this Court upon notice to the respondents and after hearing the learned Advocate for the petitioners and Mr. Ram Chandra Prasad, learned Advocate appearing for the Stats of Bihar, an order was made directing the maintenance of status quo till the disposal of the said application and directions for filing affidavits were given. Against the said order dated 8th August, 1984 the first, second and third respondents preferred an oral appeal on 10th August, 1984 upon the undertaking to file a regular application whereupon the Appeal Court clarified that the order dated 8th August, 1984 would not be construed to mean that the proceedings pending before the learned Special Judge, Patna, would be stayed. The Appeal Court further directed that during the pendency of the said proceedings the respondents in the said appeal being the writ petitioners herein would be at liberty to deal with the property under attachment but they should do so upon notice to the State of Bihar. Thereafter the first, second and third respondents filed the formal appeal and the application which, however, were withdrawn by the said appellants in view of the fact that the application was heard by the First Court on 3rd September, 1984 on affidavits and the judgment was reserved. It appears that on 31st October, 1984 the first Court delivered a judgment whereby the learned Judge issued the Rule but refused to pass any interim order. It appears that on 31st October, 1984 the first Court delivered a judgment whereby the learned Judge issued the Rule but refused to pass any interim order. It further appears that against the said judgment and Order dated 31st October, 1984 both the petitioners as also the first, record and third respondents preferred two separate appeals on 28th November, 1984 the petitioners being aggrieved by the refusal of the Court to pass any interim order and the first, second and third respondents being aggrieved by the issuance of Rule. The appeal Court admitted the appeal by the Writ Petitioners and thereafter disposed of the said appeal and the application on 28th November, 1984. It appears that the Appeal Court made certain prima facie observations on the question of maintainability of the writ application. The appeal Court, however, made it very clear that whatever observations. Their Lordships were made prima facie and the Court hearing the writ application should decide without being influenced by the prima facie view and directed the said writ application to be heard as early as possible. It further appears that in view of the aforesaid order the first, second and third respondents did not ask for leave for preferring the appeal against the order of the first Court and accordingly the Appeal Court did not pass any order on the said application made by the first, second and third respondents. This then is the background of the present application. 20. Certain preliminary objections have been raised by Mr. Basdeo Prasad, learned Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of the first, second and third respondents. Firstly, be contended that this Court has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain this application or to decide the question of validity of the order dated 12th July, 1984 passed by the Spl. Judge, Patna. According to Mr. Prosad cognizance has been taken by Special Judge, Patna over whose order this Court has no jurisdiction. In support of the said contention he relied upon of the order of the Supreme Court dated 25th January, 1984 passed on a petition for Special Leave to Appeal No. 939 of 1984 wherein the Supreme Court held that this Court had no jurisdiction on the notification issued in Patna by the State of Bihar. In support of the said contention he relied upon of the order of the Supreme Court dated 25th January, 1984 passed on a petition for Special Leave to Appeal No. 939 of 1984 wherein the Supreme Court held that this Court had no jurisdiction on the notification issued in Patna by the State of Bihar. He also relied upon the said judgment dated 28th November, 1984 (wrongly stated by him as 20th November, 1984) passed in Matter No. 897 of 1984 by the Appeal Court wherein according to Mr. Prosad the Appeal Court held that the order dated 12th July, 1984 could not be challenged in a writ application in this Court. According to Mr. Prosad it is wrong to suggest that by the impugned orders of attachment the District Judge is enforcing the order of cognizance. According to him taking of cognizance is merely the cause jurisdictional fact on which the order confirming the ad interim order has been passed. 21. The second preliminary point raised by Mr. Basdeo Prosad is that the impugned orders could not be challenged by a writ application because appeal lies against them under section 11 of the Ordinance of 1944. According to Mr. Prosad the Division Bench of this Court in its above mentioned order passed in Matter No. 897 of 1984 also held that the District Judge had jurisdiction to pass the order and therefore, they could not be challenged in a writ application as appeal had not been preferred against them. Mr. Prosad, however, admits that those observations made by the Division Bench of this Court are mere prima facie ones but he contents that those observations have persuasive value. 22. In my opinion there is no substance in any of the aforesaid two contentions. In the writ petition the petitioners have challenged the constitutional validity of the Ordinance of 1944. The petitioners also have challenged the various orders passed by the learned District Judge at Alipore in O.S. No. 67 of 1982 on various grounds one of which is that the Ordinance of 1944 being ultra vires the said orders passed by the learned District Judge are also illegal and without any jurisdiction. The petitioners also have challenged the various orders passed by the learned District Judge at Alipore in O.S. No. 67 of 1982 on various grounds one of which is that the Ordinance of 1944 being ultra vires the said orders passed by the learned District Judge are also illegal and without any jurisdiction. The petitioners also have challenged the said orders of the learned District Judge at Alipore on the ground that the order dated 12th July, 1984 passed by the learned Special Judge (Vigilance), Patna in Special Case No. 172 of 1983 is a nullity and the same cannot be enforced by the third respondent herein Calcutta as has sought to have been done by the third respondent by his application dated 14th July, 1984 filed before the learned District Judge at Alipore in Calcutta in O.S. No. 67 of 1982. In my opinion the contention of the respondents that the District Judge at Alipore was not enforcing the order of cognizance is erroneous. It is the case of the petitioners that the first, second and third respondents are trying to enforce the order dated 12th July, 1984 passed by the Special Judge, Patna in Calcutta by making the application dated 14th July, 1984 and the District Judge has followed the said application. I, therefore, have no hesitation in rejecting the contention of Mr. Prosad that there is no question of any enforcement of the order taking cognizance by the first, second and third respondents and by the learned District Judge. I must make it clear that the petitioners have never contended that this Court should quash the order dated 12th July, 1984 passed by the learned Special Judge (Vigilance), Patna. The only contention of the petitioners is that the order dated 12th July, 1984 is a nullity and therefore, the same cannot be enforced in Calcutta and the learned District Judge fell in error in making the act interim order of attachment of the properties in Calcutta absolute by relying upon the said order dated 12th July, 1984. It is also the case of the petitioners that the first, second and third respondents have submitted to the jurisdiction of this Court by making the application dated 14th July, 1984 before the learned District Judge at Alipore in O.S. No. 67 of 1982 by trying to enforce the order dated 12th July, 1984 here in Calcutta. It is also the case of the petitioners that the first, second and third respondents have submitted to the jurisdiction of this Court by making the application dated 14th July, 1984 before the learned District Judge at Alipore in O.S. No. 67 of 1982 by trying to enforce the order dated 12th July, 1984 here in Calcutta. Further it is the case of the petitioners that all the properties which have been attached are located in Calcutta and both the ad interim order of attachment and the order which has made the said ad interim order of attachment absolute have also been passed by the learned District Judge at Calcutta and, therefore, not only the subject matter of the writ application, but the entire cause of action also have arisen within the jurisdiction of this Court and as such under Art. 226(2) of the Constitution of India this Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain and try this application. The petitioners also have relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in (1) Kiron Singh & Ors. v. Chaman Paswan & Ors. reported in AIR 1954 SC 340 in support of the proposition that this Court has jurisdiction to decide whether the order dated 12th July, 1984 passed by the Special Judge (Vigilance), Patna can be enforced here or not the same being a nullity. In the aforesaid decision the Supreme Court in no uncertain terms laid down the law and held that a defect of jurisdiction, whether it is pecuniary or territorial or whether it is in respect of the subject-matter of action, strikes at the very authority of the Court to pass any decree, and such a defect cannot be cured even by the consent of the parties. In that very case the Supreme Court held that an order passed by a Court without jurisdiction is a nullity and its invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon even at the stage of execution and even in colateral proceedings. In that very case the Supreme Court held that an order passed by a Court without jurisdiction is a nullity and its invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon even at the stage of execution and even in colateral proceedings. Relying upon the said decision of the Supreme Court the petitioners contend that the order of the learned Special Judge dated 12th July, 1984 in Special Case No. 172 of 1983 is a nullity inasmuch as the said Special Case has not been filed at the instance of the Court before whom the offences were committed and, therefore, the said proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction being in violation of the provisions contained in section 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter to be referred to as the new Cr. P.C.). It is also the case of the petitioners, that the said learned Special Judge has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the said case, and therefore, the said order dated 12th July, 1984 is void and a nullity which goes to the root and for this proposition the petitioners also relied upon various provisions of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act of 1952) and a decision of the Supreme Court in (2) Smt. Raj Kumari Vijh v. Dev Raj Vijh reported in AIR 1977 SC 1101 . Referring to the decision of the Supreme Court in S.L.P. No. 959 of 1984 (wrongly stated by Mr. Prosad as 939 of 1984) the petitioners' submitted that the subject matter of the writ application from which the said Spl. Leave petition was moved before the Supreme Court has nothing to do with the present application. The said writ application was filed by Mr. Keshab Narayan Baneijee challenging the notification issued by the State of Bihar by which the State of Bihar constituted Vigilance Police Station at Patna. It is in that context the Supreme Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition holding that the Calcutta High Court had no jurisdiction on the notification issued at Patna by the State of Bihar. It appears that the facts of the said case are entirely different from the present one. It is in that context the Supreme Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition holding that the Calcutta High Court had no jurisdiction on the notification issued at Patna by the State of Bihar. It appears that the facts of the said case are entirely different from the present one. As has been stated hereinbefore, the third respondent has made the application in Calcutta to have the attachment order of the Calcutta property made absolute on the basis of the order of cognizance. Admittedly the cause of action has arisen herein Calcutta. The Division Bench Judgment also, on which Mr. Prosad relied, does not help Mr. Prasad as the Division Bench made it clear that this Court should decide the case without being influenced by any prima facie observations made by Their Lordships of the Court of Appeal. In my opinion the submissions made on behalf of the petitioners are sound and should be accepted. The first preliminary objection raised by Mr. Prosad is, therefore, overruled. 23. As regards the question of alternative remedy by way of appeal under section 11 of the Ordinance of 1944 it is the case of the petitioners that they have challenged the constitutional validity of the Ordinance of 1944 which could not be challenged in the regular appeal. It has further been submitted by the petitioners that against the Rule Issued by this Court dated 31st October, 1984 the first, second and third respondents preferred an appeal challenging the said Rule on the ground that the petitioners had alternative remedy but they withdrew the said appeal without any reservation and, therefore, they are estopped from raising the said contention over again. The petitioners have further alleged that alternative remedy is not an absolute bar and even in appropriate case where both the alternative remedy as well as the remedy by way of writ application were pursued the Supreme Court held that writ application was maintainable and for this proposition the petitioners have relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in (3) Sales Tax Officer, Navgaon & Anr. v. Timber & Fuel Corporation reported in 31 SIC 585. v. Timber & Fuel Corporation reported in 31 SIC 585. As regards the judgment of the Decision Bench of this Court dated 28th November, 1984 (wrongly stated by the first, second and third respondents to be dated 21st November, 1984) the petitioners have submitted that the Court left all the points open and directed the Writ Court to consider all the points without taking into account any observations made by Their Lordships of the Appeal Court. In my opinion the contentions of the petitioners must be accepted. In that view of the matter, I am unable to sustain the second preliminary objection raised on behalf of the first, second and third respondents. 24. Before I deal with the merits of the case. I may also consider some of the other points raised by Mr. Prosad which are also preliminary in nature. Mr. Prosad submits that the orders passed by the learned District Judge have acquired finality having been upheld by the Supreme Court by order dated 13th August 1984 dismissing S.L.P.(Civil) No. 6619/84 filed against the impugned order dated 18th April, 1984 and S.L.P. (Civil) No. 8381/84 filed against the impugned order dated 23rd July, 1984. Mr. Prosad also submits that the aforesaid two orders of the District Judge have been upheld by the Division Bench of this Court passed in Matter No. 897 of 1984 mentioned above. In view of the above Mr. Prosad submits that the present writ application is barred by res judicata and/or principles analogous thereto. Dealing with the said contentions Mr. Pal appearing on behalf of the petitioners submitted that none of the present writ petitioners filed the said Special Leave petitioners and, therefore, the orders of the Supreme Court cannot bind the petitioners. In the alternative Mr. Pal submits that it is too late now in the day to argue that the orders passed by the learned District Judge have becomes final in view of the dismissal of the Special Leave Petitions by the Supreme Court. It is the submission of Mr. Pal that in a number of decisions the Supreme Court negatived the contention as raised here by Mr. Prosad and directed the Court to consider the writ applications on merits without taking into consideration the non-speaking order dismissing the Special Leave Petition. Mr. Pal has cited the Judgment of the Supreme Court in (4) Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. Vs. Pal that in a number of decisions the Supreme Court negatived the contention as raised here by Mr. Prosad and directed the Court to consider the writ applications on merits without taking into consideration the non-speaking order dismissing the Special Leave Petition. Mr. Pal has cited the Judgment of the Supreme Court in (4) Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. Vs. State of Bihar & Ors. reported in AIR 1986SC 1780. Mr. Pal also submits that from the copies of the orders of the Supreme Court it will appear that the said Special Leave Petitions were in fact withdrawn by the petitioners therein namely Debikamal Trust Estate under the circumstances explained in paragraph 7(d) of the Affidavit-in-Reply affirmed on 29th April, 1985. From the said Affidavit-in-Reply it appears that the said Debikamal Trust Estate sought to challenge the two orders passed by the District Judge at Alipore directly before the Supreme Court without coming before this Court. From the correspondence annexed to the said Affidavit-in-Reply it appears that the Supreme Court was of the view that this Court should have been moved against the two orders of the learned District Judge instead of the Supreme Court and it is for that reason the said Debikamal Trust Estate withdrew the said Special Leave Petitions. It will, therefore, be apparent that the Supreme Court never had any occasion to consider the two orders dated 18th April, 1984 and 23rd July, 1984 on merits. Mr. Prosad also had at one stage tried to submit that two Division Benches of the Patna High Court upheld the orders passed by the District Judge at Alipore. He however, did not supply any copy of any such alleged orders alleged to have been passed by the two Division Benches of the Patna High Court. I entirely agree with Mr. Pal that it is absurd even to suggest that the Patna High Court could hear any matter revision or appeal passed by the District Judge at Alipore and in fact there is no such order passed by the Patna High Court. As regards the Division Bench Judgment of this Court I have already pointed out that the Division Bench formed prima facie opinion leaving the matter to be decided by the First Court on merits. I, therefore, reject the contentions of Mr. Prosad on this point and accept the submissions made on behalf of the petitioners. As regards the Division Bench Judgment of this Court I have already pointed out that the Division Bench formed prima facie opinion leaving the matter to be decided by the First Court on merits. I, therefore, reject the contentions of Mr. Prosad on this point and accept the submissions made on behalf of the petitioners. In view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Indian Oil Corporation (Supra), there cannot be any question of res judicata because of the dismissal of Special Leave Petitions by non-speaking order of the Supreme Court in applications made by some other parties. 25. Mr. Prosad has also raised another point in the nature of preliminary objection namely that charges have already been framed by the Special Judge, Patna, on 27th February, 1986 and the question of validity of the said order is sub-judice before the Patna High Court and in that background the present writ application in so far as the petitioners challenged the order of cognizance is not maintainable having become infructious. Dealing with the aforesaid contentions it is submitted on behalf of the petitioners that I should not take any note of the submissions made on behalf of the respondents for the following reasons :- (a) The learned District Judge has passed the order on 23rd July, 1984 by relying upon the order passed by the Special Judge, Patna dated 12th July, 1984 and the learned District Judge had no occasion to consider the order dated 27th February, 1986 which was then not in existence. (b) If the order of the learned Special Judge dated 12th July, 1934 whereby he has taken cognizance is void then all the subsequent proceedings also will be void including the order dated 27th February, 1986. (c) It is not correct that by the order dated 27th February, 1986 the learned Special Judge. Patna, framed the charge. By the said order the learned Special Judge has directed changes to be framed in future. According to the petitioners such order is not warranted by Chapter XIX of new Cr. P. C. It is the case of the petitioners that by the said order the learned Special Judge, Patna, discharged some of the accused under section 239 of the new Cr. P.C. but he failed to frame charge against other accused under section 240 of the new Cr. P. C. It is the case of the petitioners that by the said order the learned Special Judge, Patna, discharged some of the accused under section 239 of the new Cr. P.C. but he failed to frame charge against other accused under section 240 of the new Cr. P. C. (d) The petitioners further submit that some of the accused have challenged both the orders dated 12th July, 1984 and 27th February, 1986 passed by the learned Special Judge, Patna before the Patna High Court and the said application is still pending. (e) The petitioners could not challenge the said order dated 27th February, 1986 in the present writ application inasmuch as the writ application was moved on 8th August, 1984 more than one and half years before the said order was passed by the learned Special Judge, Patna. Further the petitioners could not challenge the said order dated 27th February, 1986 before the Patna High Court inasmuch as no charge has been framed against any of the petitioners. (f) In any event since no charge sheet has been framed under section 240 of the new Cr. P.C. the said order dated 27th February, 1986 could not affect the petitioners or the present writ application. (g) Further both under section 3 and section 10 of the 1944 Ordinance the Court is not concerned whether any charge sheet has been framed but whether cognizance of the offence has been taken or not. Both sections 3 and 10 of the said Ordinance speak of cognizance of the alleged scheduled offence and it is for the said reason on the basis of the order dated 12th July, 1984 the learned District Judge made the ad interim order of attachment absolute. It is, therefore, submitted that if the order dated 12th July, 1984 is void the order dated 23rd July, 1984 passed by the learned District Judge at Alipore must be quashed. 26. In my opinion there is no substance in the contention raised by Mr. Prosad. One of the subject-matters of challenge in the writ application is whether the order dated 23rd July, 1984 passed by the learned District Judge at Alipore can be sustained or not. 26. In my opinion there is no substance in the contention raised by Mr. Prosad. One of the subject-matters of challenge in the writ application is whether the order dated 23rd July, 1984 passed by the learned District Judge at Alipore can be sustained or not. The learned District Judge in passing the said order dated 23rd July, 1984 relied upon the order of cognizance dated 12th July, 1984 which was the only order which he could take into consideration under sections 3 and 10 of the Ordinance of 1944 and no other order. The learned District Judge never had any occasion to consider the order dated 27th February 1986 firstly because the said order was not in existence at the said time and secondly the statute did not permit him to consider the said order. In that view of the matter I do not express any opinion on the question of validity or otherwise of the order dated 27th February, 1986 passed by the learned Special Judge, Patna which is pending before the Patna High Court. That, however does not prevent me from considering whether the order dated 12th July. 1984 is enforceable order which in fact has been given effect to by the learned District Judge at Alipore in Calcutta by his order dated 23rd July, 1984. I do not find any merits in the submissions made by Mr. Prosad which must be rejected. 27. Mr. Prosad has further submitted that the petitioners who were not even accused have filed the present writ petition for impermissible purpose for the benefit of the accused persons. He further submitted that two sets of orders of two different Courts cannot be challenged by one writ petition as in the present case. In my opinion there is no substance in any of the aforesaid two contentions. The case of the petitioners is that their properties are being attached and the said attachment has been made absolute even without hearing their objections by the learned District Judge, 24 Parganas by solely relying upon the order dated 12th July, 1984 passed by the learned Special Judge, Patna. The petitioners also have challenged the constitutional validity of the Ordinance of 1944 under which provision the said attachments have been made. The petitioners also have challenged the constitutional validity of the Ordinance of 1944 under which provision the said attachments have been made. In that view of the matter I think the petitioners are very much aggrieved by the impugned orders and I fail to appreciate how the writ application can be said to have been filed by them for impermissible purpose when admittedly they are not the accused and when their properties are being attached under the Ordinance of 1944 even without any investigation and on the allegation of the third respondent. As regards the contention of Mr. Prosad that two sets of orders of two different Courts cannot be challenged by one writ petition I may point out that the petitioners have not asked for quashing of the order dated 12th July, 1984 passed by the learned Special Judge, Patna. The petitioners have challenged mainly the constitutional validity of the Ordinance of 1944 and the orders passed by the learned District Judge 24 Parganas. It is the case of the petitioners that the learned District Judge should not have made the ad interim order of attachment absolute by relying upon the order dated 12th July, 1984 passed by the learned Special Judge. Patna, in as much as the said order is a nullity and as such it cannot be enforced. The petitioners never submitted before me that the order of the learned Special Judge, Patna, should be quashed in this proceeding. I, therefore, do not find any substance in any of the aforesaid two contentions of Mr. Prasad and I reject the same. 28. I now deal with the merits of the application. The first point raised by Mr. Pal on behalf of the petitioners is that the 1944 Ordinance is ultra vires the Constitution of India and the same is void. According to Mr. Pal the new Cr. P.C. is a complete Code. Under section 451 of new Cr. P.C. when any property is produced before any Criminal Court during any enquiry or trial the Court may make such order as it think fit for proper custody of such property pending the conclusion of the enquiry or trial. According to Mr. Pal the new Cr. P.C. is a complete Code. Under section 451 of new Cr. P.C. when any property is produced before any Criminal Court during any enquiry or trial the Court may make such order as it think fit for proper custody of such property pending the conclusion of the enquiry or trial. Explanation (b) of the section is important which provides that for the purposes of the said section property includes any property regarding which an offence appears to have been committed or which appears to have been used for the commission of any offence Section 452 of new Cr. P. C. makes provision for disposal of property at conclusion of trial. According to Mr. Pal under section 451 of the new Cr. P.C. the Court could pass an order only after hearing all the parties who are going to be affected by such order. Whereas under sections 3 and 4 of the 1944 Ordinance a property can be attached where the relevant State Government has reason to believe that any person has committed any scheduled offence and the State Government believes that the money or the property has been procured by the said person by scheduled offence or other property of the accused. The said attachment can be made even before any enquiry is made or any cognizance is taken by the appropriate Criminal Court under section 3 of the 1944 Ordinance and the only thing which the learned District Judge is to consider under section 4 of the said Ordinance is to see whether there exists any prima facie grounds for the belief of the State Government. According to Mr. Pal the valuable property and/or right of a citizen can be attached only on the belief of the State Government and even before any enquiry has started or any cognizance has been taken of any alleged scheduled offence whereas under section 451 of the new Cr. P.C. the Criminal Court has to consider in course of enquiry or trial as to the custody of the property which is produced before the Criminal Court. In considering a case under section 451 of new Cr. P.C. power of the Criminal Court is not fettered with any belief of the State Government. P.C. the Criminal Court has to consider in course of enquiry or trial as to the custody of the property which is produced before the Criminal Court. In considering a case under section 451 of new Cr. P.C. power of the Criminal Court is not fettered with any belief of the State Government. The Criminal Court has no power to attach the property and thereby deprive the valuable right of any citizen pending enquiry or trial on the mere belief of the State Government. At the stage when the Criminal Court passes all order under section 451 of new Cr.P.C. the person who is going to be deprived of the property has also the opportunity of being heard because the Criminal Court passes the order after hearing the parties and after taking into consideration all relevant facts and not on the mere belief of the appropriate State Government alone and ex parte. According to Mr. Pal an attachment is made under section 4(1) of the 1944 Ordinance ex parte and without giving any opportunity of being heard to the person who is going to he deprived of his property by attachment. It is the submission of Mr. Pal that no norms or principles have been laid down as to when the money or property of any person can be attached by following the provisions of the said Ordinance of 1944 and when they can be proceeded against under sections 451 and 452 of the new Cr. P. C. Mr. Pal, therefore, submits that a comparison of the two provisions of the new Cr. P. C. and 1944 Ordinance will make it clear that the provisions contained in the Ordinance are much more onerous than those contained in sections 451 and 452 of the new Cr. P.C. In view of the aforesaid Mr. Pal submits that the provisions contained in the 1944 Ordinance are ultra vires the same being highly discriminatory and violates the rights guaranteed to the petitioners under Articles 14 and 19(1)(f) prior to its repeal and Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India and the same should be struck down. Mr. Pal submits that the aforesaid propositions of law are so well-settled that citation is not necessary. He, however, refers to two very well known decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of (5) Surajmall Mohta & Co. v. A.V. Vissanatha Sastri & Anr. Mr. Pal submits that the aforesaid propositions of law are so well-settled that citation is not necessary. He, however, refers to two very well known decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of (5) Surajmall Mohta & Co. v. A.V. Vissanatha Sastri & Anr. reported in 26 ITR 1 and (6) Shree Meenakshi Mills Ltd. Madurai & Ors, v. Sri A.V. Vissanatha Sastri also reported in 26 ITR 713. In view of the aforesaid decisions, it is submitted by Mr. Pal that entire proceedings being O.S. No. 67 of 1982 and all the orders passed thereunder by the learned District Judge, 24-pgs. including the orders dated 21st January 1984, 18th April, 1984 and 23rd July, 1984 are wholly illegal, invalid and without any/or in excess of jurisdiction and/or without any authority of law and the same are void and should be quashed. 29. Mr. Prasad merely relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Punjab High Court in (7) G.L. Salwan v. Union of India and Anr reported in AIR 1960 Punjab 351 and submitted that the 1944 Ordinance is not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India as has been held by the Punjab High Court in the said decision. Mr. Prosad also relied upon two decisions of the Supreme Court one in the case of (8) Moganlal Chhaganlal Pvt. Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay & Ors. reported in AIR 1974 SC 2009 prs 15 and 33 thereof and in (9) Shri Mannalal & Anr. v. Collector, Jhalwar & Ors. reported in (1961) 2 SCR 962 . 30. Mr. Pal in reply submitted that the Punjab High Court proceeded on the assumption that there is a reasonable classification inasmuch as the Ordinance of 1944 purports to protect Government property. Mr. Pal submits that from the schedule to the 1944 Ordinance it will be apparent that the said 1944 Ordinance does not relate to and/or protects only the governmental properties but also non governmental properties. Mr. Pal points out that the learned Judges of the Punjab High Court also noticed the same as will appear from para 11 of Their Lordships' Judgment. Mr. Pal, therefore, submits that there cannot be any question of any reasonable classification as has been incorrectly held by the Punjab High Court and the said decision, therefore, is not correct. Mr. Mr. Pal points out that the learned Judges of the Punjab High Court also noticed the same as will appear from para 11 of Their Lordships' Judgment. Mr. Pal, therefore, submits that there cannot be any question of any reasonable classification as has been incorrectly held by the Punjab High Court and the said decision, therefore, is not correct. Mr. Pal, further submits that from the said decision of the Punjab High Court it will also be apparent that there is no guidelines as to when power under the said Ordinance of 1944 can be invoked as the learned Judges of the Punjab High Court themselves admitted that Their Lordships did not recall any case in the last twelve years or so while Their Lordships were delivering judgment in 1960. Mr. Pal further submits that from 1960 another 27 years have passed and even up till now excepting the present case it does not appear that the provisions of 1944 Ordinance have been invoked in any other case. In this connection I may point out that the 1944 Ordinance is commonly known as the S.K. Ghosh Ordinance inasmuch as the same was promulgated for a very limited purpose to attach the properties illegally procured by Mr. S. K. Ghosh who was I.C.S. Officer in those day. In my limited experience I also have not come across any other case excepting the case of Mr. S.K. Ghosh, G.L. Salwan's case and the present one in which the said Ordinance of 1944 has been invoked. It appears to me that even without invoking the said 1944 Ordinance in other cases the government properties are not found in jeopardy and they were and are still being amply protected under the old Cr. P. C. All criminal offences are being dealt with by the State and whenever any property has been procured by means of any offence is traceable the Police takes custody of the said property and under sections 451 and 452 of the new Cr. P.C. the said properties are being dealt with by the Criminal Court itself who is hearing the trial. There is, therefore, no justification for making any classification on the basis of governmental properties and non governmental properties as has been done by the Punjab High Court. 31. Mr. P.C. the said properties are being dealt with by the Criminal Court itself who is hearing the trial. There is, therefore, no justification for making any classification on the basis of governmental properties and non governmental properties as has been done by the Punjab High Court. 31. Mr. Pal, submits that the 1944 Ordinance covers the same field which is covered by sections 451 and 452 of the new Cr. P. C. and the provisions of the 1944 Ordinance are much more onerous than those contained in sections 451 and 452 of the new Cr. P.C. and there is no reasonable classification for making the said two provisions. In view of the matter Mr. Pal submits that the 1944 Ordinance was promulgated for a limited purpose which has spent its force and it is no longer necessary to protect the governmental properties which are being amply protected by the provisions contained in sections 451 and 452 of the new Cr. P. C. and as such the 1944 Ordinance should be struck down as ultra vires being violative of Articles 14, 19(1) (f) prior to its repeal and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. 32. In my opinion there is a great deal of substance in the submissions made on behalf of the petitioners. Admittedly the provisions contained in sections 451 and 452 of new Cr. P. C. covers the same filed as those contained in the 1944 Ordinance. There cannot be any doubt that the procedure laid down in the 1944 Ordinance is much more onerous than those contained in sections 451 and 452 of the new Cr. P. C. In my opinion no guidelines have been laid down as to when the more drastic procedure of the 1944 Ordinance should be resorted to in preference to the procedure laid down in sections 451 and 452 of the new Cr. P.C. With very great respect to the learned Judges of the Punjab High Court I do not find any justification for making the classification as has sought to have been done by Their Lordships of the Punjab High Court in the case reported in G.L. Salwan (Supra). The decision of the Supreme Court in Maganlal Chhaganlal Pvt. Ltd. (Supra). cited by Mr. Prosad on behalf of the respondents does not support the contention of the respondents. On the contrary the said decision of the Supreme Court supports the submission made by Mr. The decision of the Supreme Court in Maganlal Chhaganlal Pvt. Ltd. (Supra). cited by Mr. Prosad on behalf of the respondents does not support the contention of the respondents. On the contrary the said decision of the Supreme Court supports the submission made by Mr. Pal. Even paragraph 33 of the said judgment on which Mr. Prosad placed reliance supports the contention of Mr. Pal where the Supreme Court laid down as follows :- "Principle as well as procedure, clearly appreciated, would remove the mist of misunderstanding surrounding this fact of constitutional equality. The principle which emerges from the decisions of this Court-and we have already discussed some of the important decisions; is that where persons similarly circumstances are exposed to two procedures for determination of liability, one being more drastic and prejudicial than the other and no guidelines are provided by the legislature as to when one procedure shell be followed or the other, so that one person may be subjected to more drastic and prejudicial procedure while the other may be subjected to the more favourable one without there being any valid justification for distinguishing between the two, the law providing for the more drastic and prejudicial procedure is liable to be struck down as discriminatory..................". As regards the decision of the Supreme Court in Shri Manna Lal & Anr. (Supra), in my opinion the said decision does not lay down any new principle which can go against the petitioners' contention. In my opinion the provisions contained in the 1944 Ordinance being more onerous than those contained in sections 451 and 452 of the new Cr.P.C. the same are ultra vires the Constitution of India being violative of equal protection guaranteed by Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In that view of the matter all the orders passed by the learned District Judge at Alipore in O.S. No. 67 of 1982 are wholly illegal and the same are liable to be quashed and set aside. 33. In view of my aforesaid decision it is not necessary for me to decide the other submissions made by the respective parties. However, from the history of the ease stated hereinbefore it appears that the matter may not rest here and in that view of the matter and to avoid any delay I propose to decide the other submissions made by the respective parties. 34. It was next submitted by Mr. However, from the history of the ease stated hereinbefore it appears that the matter may not rest here and in that view of the matter and to avoid any delay I propose to decide the other submissions made by the respective parties. 34. It was next submitted by Mr. Pal that the order dated 12th July, 1984 passed by the learned Special Judge, Patna, in Special Case No. 172 of 1983 arising out of Vigilance Police Station Case No.45(7) 79 which has sought to be enforced by the first, second and third respondents in Calcutta in O.S. No. 67 of 1982 before the learned District Judge, 24 Parganas at Alipore, is void and a nullity and therefore, the said order cannot be enforced here in Calcutta and the learned District Judge, 24 Parganas at Alipore acted without and/or in excess of jurisdiction and/or without any authority of law in making the ad-interim order of attachment absolute by relying upon the said order dated 12th July, 1984. It has been submitted that both from the Charge Sheet as also from the order dated 12th July, 1984 by which cognizance has been taken by the learned Special Judge, Patna, it will be apparent that charges have been made against the accused persons of forgery and tampering with official documents in course of proceedings before the Compensation Officer under the B.L.R. Act, According to Mr. Pal the proceedings before the Compensation Officer under the B.L.R. Act is a proceedings in Court and in view of the same under section 195(1) (b)(ii) of new Cr.P.C. the said complaint should have been lodged by the Court of the said Compensation Officer. Inasmuch as no such complaint has been lodged by the said Court the proceedings before the learned Special Judge is without jurisdiction and consequently the order dated 12th July, 1984 passed by the learned Special Judge, Patna in Special Case No. 172 of 1983 is void bring without jurisdiction and the same is a nullity. For this proposition Mr. Pal has relied upon a Bench decision of the Patna High Court in the case of (10) Chandrakishore Jha Vs. The State of Bihar reported in 1975 Criminal Law Journal, 1939. In that case the question as to whether the Compensation Officer under the B.L.R. Act is Court or not within the meaning of section 195(1)(b) of the old Cr. Pal has relied upon a Bench decision of the Patna High Court in the case of (10) Chandrakishore Jha Vs. The State of Bihar reported in 1975 Criminal Law Journal, 1939. In that case the question as to whether the Compensation Officer under the B.L.R. Act is Court or not within the meaning of section 195(1)(b) of the old Cr. P.C. came up for consideration before the Patna High Court. The learned Judges of the Patna High Court after considering the various provisions of the B.L.R. Act and by relying upon the principle enunciated by the Supreme Court in several decisions namely (11) Brajnandan Sinha Vs. Jyoti Narain reported in AIR 1956 SC 66 , (12) Virindra Kumar Satyawadi Vs. The State of Punjab also reported in AIR 1956 SC 153 and (13) Lalji Haridas Vs. State of Maharashtra reported in AIR 1964 SC 1154 Held that the Compensation Officer while exercising his power under the B.L.R. Act is exercising judicial power deciding a civil dispute and passing an order which is final in nature and as such it has to be held that the Compensation Officer is a “Court” within the meaning of section 195(1)(b) of the old Cr.P.C. 35. According to Mr. Prosad the decision reported in 1975 Criminal Law Journal, 1939 of the Patna High Court and all similar decisions laying down the preposition of law have by necessary implication been statutorily superseded by the amendment of section 195(3) of new Cr.P.C. In support of the said contention Mr. Prosad relied upon certain passages from a book of Mr. Durgadas Basu on Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 at page 515. According to the learned author the deficiency under the old Cr.P.C. has been removed as recommended by Law Commission by adding at the end of sub section (3) of section 195 of new Cr.P.C by amending the words “but does not include Registrar...”. According to the said learned author under the new Section the word “Court” would include any statutory Tribunal if it is declared by the relevant statute for the purposes of the new Code and the said change in the new Code supersedes the decision in Lalji Haridas (Supra). According to Mr. According to the said learned author under the new Section the word “Court” would include any statutory Tribunal if it is declared by the relevant statute for the purposes of the new Code and the said change in the new Code supersedes the decision in Lalji Haridas (Supra). According to Mr. Prosad section 38 of the B.L.R. Act does not declare the Compensation Officer as Court and as in the present case the F.I.R. was lodged and cognizance was taken after the new Cr.P.C. came into force there is no substance in the submission made on behalf of the petitioners in this respect. 36. Mr. Pal in reply has submitted that sec 195(2) of the old Cr. P. C., inter alia, provided that the term "Court” includes a Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court but does not include a Registrar or Sub-Registrar under the Indian Registration Act, 1877. Construing the said provisions 0f the old Cr. P.C. the Supreme Court as early as in 1956 held that when question arises as to whether the authority created by the Act is a Court as distinguished from quasi judicial Tribunal what has to be decided is whether having regard to the provisions of the Act it possesses all the attributes of a Court. According to Mr. Pal in that very decision Virindra Kumar Satyawadi (Supra), the Supreme Court succinctly laid down the principle which distinguishes a Court from a quasi judicial and held that it would be a Court when it is charged with a duty to decide disputes in a judicial manner and declares the rights of the parties by definitive judgment. Mr. Pal further submitted that in considering the question under the Contempt of Courts Act the Supreme Court again held in Brajnandan Sinha (Supra), that the word 'Court' was not defined in the Contempt of Courts Act and laid down certain tests which should be applied for determining what is a "Court Strictly so called" within the connotation of the term as used in Contempt of Courts Act. Mr. Pal has further submitted that the new Cr. P.C. came into force after the word "Court" has already acquired to definite meaning by judicial pro pronouncements of not only of High Courts but of the highest Court of the land namely the Supreme Court. Mr. Pal has further submitted that the new Cr. P.C. came into force after the word "Court" has already acquired to definite meaning by judicial pro pronouncements of not only of High Courts but of the highest Court of the land namely the Supreme Court. It is in that context the Parliament must be presumed to have used the expression "Court" in section 195(3) of the new Cr. P.C. Mr. Pal submits that it is now well settled law that when a particular provision of a statute used a word interpreted by Courts it would be reasonable to assume that the expression was used designedly in the same sense. For this well known proposition Mr. Pal relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in (14) Banarsi Bebi & Anr. Vs. Income Tax Officer, Dist. IV Calcutta & Ors. reported in 53 ITR 100 where at page 106 the Supreme Court has laid down that when section of a statute used a word interpreted by Courts it would be reasonable to assume that the expression was designedly used in the same sense. According to Mr. Pal section 195(3) of the new Cr.P.C. is in two parts the first part provides that the term Court means Civil, Revenue or Criminal and the second part provides that the term Court includes a Tribunal if declared by the Act to be a Court for the purposes of the said section. Mr. Pal submits that the Compensation Officer under the B.L.R. Act is a Court within the first limb of section 195(3) of the new Cr.P.C. inasmuch as the Compensation Officer satisfies the conditions for being a Court as laid down by the decisions of the Supreme Court referred to hereinbefore. In support of the said proposition Mr. Mr. Pal submits that the Compensation Officer under the B.L.R. Act is a Court within the first limb of section 195(3) of the new Cr.P.C. inasmuch as the Compensation Officer satisfies the conditions for being a Court as laid down by the decisions of the Supreme Court referred to hereinbefore. In support of the said proposition Mr. Pal also relied upon the various provisions of the B.L.R. Act namely section 2(9) thereof which defines Compensation Officer, section 21, 23, 24, 24A and 25A of the B.L.R. Act which make provision for functions of a Compensation Officer, section 26 of the B.L.R. Act under which the Compensation Officer is to first publish a draft compensation roll and under sub-section (2) of the said section is to consider objections, section 38(1) of the B.L.R. Act which gives the Compensation Officer all the powers of a Civil Court, section 38(2) of the B.L.R. Act under which the proceedings before the Compensation Officer is a judicial proceedings, section 27 of the B.L.R. Act under which an appeal shall lie against the order of a Compensation Officer passed under section 26 of the said Act before a Judge of a High Court, on section 28 of the B.L.R. Act under which the Compensation Officer is to make a final publication of the compensation assessment roll, on section 30 of the B.L.R. Act which given power to rectify mistakes, on section 30A of the B.L.R. Act which gives only under a very limited circumstances to make a fresh compensation assessment roll where a new interest is found and on section 35 of the B.L.R. Act which provides that compensation assessment roll cannot be challenged by way of a suit in any Civil Court. According to Mr. Pal a perusal of the various provisions of the B.L.R. Act will make it clear that the Compensation Officer will have all the powers of a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure and the proceeding him shall be deemed to be judicial proceeding within the meaning of sections 193, 196 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter to be referred to as I.P.C.). Mr. Mr. Pal submits that construing the aforesaid provisions the Division Bench of the Patna High Court held the Compensation Officer under the B.L.R. Act to be a “Court” and not a “judicial Tribunal” and the said decision of the Patna High Court must be held to be a good law even under the new Cr.P.C. as there no substantial change has been made by the new Cr. P.C. so far as the first limb of section 195(3) of new Cr.P.C. is concerned 37. In my opinion there is a great deal of substance in the submissions made by Mr. Pal. Construing section 195 of the old Cr. P.C. the Patna High Court after taking into consideration various provisions of the B.L.R. Act and the principles laid down by the Supreme Court for determining as to whether a particular body is a Court as distinguished from Tribunal held that the Compensation Officer under the B.L.R. Act as a Court and not as a Tribunal. I entirely agree with Mr. Pal that the Parliament while enacting the new Cr.P.C. will be deemed to be conversant with the aforesaid decisions and the distinction made by the Supreme Court between a “Court” and a “Tribunal”. The entire intention of the Parliament appears to me to be that in interpreting any particular provision where the Court has held a particular body to be a Tribunal the intention of the legislature is to negate the said decisions excepting in those cases where that particular statute has declared the said Tribunal to be a Court and not to disturb the decision of the various High Courts and the Supreme Court where the Court has held that a particular body to be a “Court” which will come under the first limb of section 195(3) of the new Cr. P.C. In that view of the matter with very great respect to the learned author Shri Durgadas Basu I beg to differ from the view expressed by the said learned author cited by M. Prosad. I, therefore, reject the submissions made by Mr. Prosad. I hold that the decision of the Patna High Court reported in Chandra Kishore Jha (Supra), still holds the field and the Compensation Officer while acting under the B.L.R. Act is a Court within the meaning of the said expression occurring in section 195(1)(b) read with section 195(3) of the new Cr. P.C. 38. Mr. Prosad. I hold that the decision of the Patna High Court reported in Chandra Kishore Jha (Supra), still holds the field and the Compensation Officer while acting under the B.L.R. Act is a Court within the meaning of the said expression occurring in section 195(1)(b) read with section 195(3) of the new Cr. P.C. 38. Mr. Pal has also submitted that the order dated 12th July, 1984 passed by the Special Judge, Patna, in Special Case No.72 of 1983 is void and a nullity inasmuch as the learned Special Judge, Patna, has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter. According to Mr. Pal under section 6 of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act of 1952) read with section 7 of the Act of 1952 the Special Judges appointed thereunder will have jurisdiction to try the cases which comes under section 6 of the Act of 1952 notwithstanding anything contained in the Cr.P.C. The offences specified in section 6 of the 1952 Act are those punishable under sections 161, 162, 163, 164, 165 and 165A of the I.P.C. or section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. According to Mr. Pal all the aforesaid provisions of I.P.C. and section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Art deal with the offences which are being committed by public servants and not by private individuals. It is the case of the petitioners that from the Charge Sheet as also from the order taking cognizance it will be apparent that offences which are alleged to have been committed are those which come under sections 120B/467/468/420/471/477A of I.P.C. and section 5(2) read with section 5(1)(c) and (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. It is also the case of the petitioners that from the Charge Sheet it will be apparent that the charges which have been made against private parties namely Shri Keshab Narayan Banerjee and Shri Purushottamdas Goswami do not come under any of the offences mentioned in section 6 of the 1952 Act. According to the petitioners from the said Charge Sheet it will also be apparent that there is no charge of any conspiracy by the said private parties with the Government Officers and there is also no charge against any of the petitioners. In fact names of none of the petitioners will appear from F.I.R. In that view of the matter Mr. In fact names of none of the petitioners will appear from F.I.R. In that view of the matter Mr. Pal submits that the learned Special Judge, Patna, has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter and as such the order dated 12th July, 1984 is void and cannot be enforced here. 39. According to Mr. Prosad the petitioners have made a false statement in their written submissions that no charge of conspiracy between the private parties and the Government Officers has been made in the Charge Sheet. According to him the F.I.R., the Charge Sheet and the order framing charges make out specific case of conspiracy under Section 120B of I.P.C. against all the accused persons and accordingly the same authorised trial of persons who are not public servants also. Mr. Prasad has submitted that the Court of Special Judge is competent in the present case to try the private accused along with the accused public servants and for this proposition be relied on the decisions in (15) The State of Andhra Pradesh v. Kandimalla Subbaiah & Another reported in AIR 1961 SC 1241 and (16) Union of India v. I.C. Lala reported in 1973 Cr. LJ 1190. 40. Mr. Pal in reply has submitted that no charge has yet been framed as has wrongfully been alleged in the written submission made on behalf of the respondents. According to Mr. Pal in both the aforesaid decisions there was specific charge of conspiracy between the public servant and the private accused and they were also charged in connection with the said offence with other offences. It is in that context the Supreme Court held that the Special Judge has jurisdiction under section 7(3) of the Act of 1952 to try the other charges not specified in section 6 of the 1952 Act. Mr. Pal further points out that in the Affidavit-in-Opposition filed on behalf of the respondents there is no mention about any charges being framed against accused persons. He has also invited my attention to the Charge Sheet and submitted that charge of conspiracy has been made between Government Officers and not between Government Officer and private accused. According to Mr. Pal charge of conspiracy was made between two private accused Mr. He has also invited my attention to the Charge Sheet and submitted that charge of conspiracy has been made between Government Officers and not between Government Officer and private accused. According to Mr. Pal charge of conspiracy was made between two private accused Mr. Pal therefore, submits that the Court should hold that the learned Special Judge, Patna had no jurisdiction over the subject-matter and, therefore, the order dated 12th July, 1984 is a nullity. 41. In my opinion it will be neither fair nor proper for me to go into the question and to decide as to whether the learned Special Judge, Patna, had any jurisdiction over the subject-matter under the Act of 1952. The proper forum to agitate the said point would be the Patra High Court and in fact I am told by Mr. Prosad that the accused persons have already moved the Patna High Court. In that view of the matter I refrain from expressing any opinion as to whether the learned Special Judge has jurisdiction over the subject-matter of dispute under the Art of 1952. 42. This, however, does not debar me from considering the question as to whether the order passed by the learned Special Judge, Patna, dated 12th July, 1984 is a nullity or not in the absence of any complaint lodged by the Court of Compensation Officer in view of section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the new Cr. P.C. On this aspect there is no dispute as to fact and only question is mere interpretation of the provisions contained in section 195(1)(b)(ii) read with section 195(3) of the new Cr. P. C. and the same is a pure question of law. 43. Mr. Prosad, however, submits that a Division Bench of this Court while dealing with the B.L.R. Act held that B.L.R. Act or Bihar Land Reforms Rules do not contain any provision treating the authority thereunder as a Civil Court for all intents and purposes entitling the said authorities to invoke section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the only powers of a Civil Court that have been given to the authorities were under section 38 of the B.L.R. Act and nothing else. Mr. Prosad in this connection relied upon the decision in (17) Central Manbhum Coal Co. (P) Ltd. v. Additional Collector, Dhanbad reported in AIR 1983 Calcutta 95. Mr. Prosad in this connection relied upon the decision in (17) Central Manbhum Coal Co. (P) Ltd. v. Additional Collector, Dhanbad reported in AIR 1983 Calcutta 95. In my opinion the said decision has no application in the facts of the present case and the same is clearly distinguishable. In the case before the Division Bench of this Court the question was whether the Additional Collector can invoke his power under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure and cancel and/or suspend the Bonds issued by him earlier. In the said case it was never argued by the State of Bihar that the Additional Collector while cancelling and/or suspending Bonds was acting as a Compensation Officer and as such a Court. In the said decision the only section on which the State of Bihar relied upon was section 38 of the B.L.R. Act to show that the Additional Collector is a Court and can invoke the inherent power under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The attention or the Division Bench was not drawn to other relevant sections and several earlier decisions of the Supreme Court as also the decision of the Patna High Court in Chandra Kishore Jha (Supra). where the question was directly in issue. From the reported decision of this Court it will be apparent that this Court really was neither called upon to decide nor did it decide whether the Compensation Officer is a Court. It was also not necessary for this Court to come to any such conclusion inasmuch as the only question for consideration was whether the Additional Collector has inherent power or not apart from section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure and this Court accordingly held that it has. In my opinion the Division Bench Judgment of the Patna High Court in Chandra Kishore Jha (Supra), is a direct authority where the very question which is now before me was under consideration namely whether the Compensation Officer acting under B.L.R. Act is a Court or not to attract the provision of section 195 of the old Cr. P.C. As has been stated hereinbefore the Patna High Court came to the said conclusion by relying upon the test laid down by the Supreme Court in three decisions none of which was either cited before the Division Bench of this Court nor appears to have been considered by Their Lordships. P.C. As has been stated hereinbefore the Patna High Court came to the said conclusion by relying upon the test laid down by the Supreme Court in three decisions none of which was either cited before the Division Bench of this Court nor appears to have been considered by Their Lordships. In view of the matter in my opinion the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court relied upon by Mr. Prosad does not assist him. 44. Mr. Prosad, however, submits that cognizance at any rate under the provisions of I.P.C. other than section 471 of I.P.C. and the Prevention of Corruption Act cannot be said to be bad. Mr. Pal in reply submitted that there is no substance in this contention made on behalf of the respondents. Mr. Pal drew my attention to the decision of the Allahabad High Court in (18) Vindhya Basini Prasad and Others v. State of U.P. and Anr. reported in 1982 Cr. LJ 2177 where a similar contention was raised before the Allahabad High Court and the learned Judge of the Allahabad High Court had no hesitation in repelling the said contention and held that the main offence was in respect of forgery and other offences are in connection with and/or in respect of forgery and, therefore, section 195 of old Cr. P.C. will be a bar even in such a case. Incidentally I may mention here that even before the Patna High Court in Chandra Kishore Jha (Supra), similar argument was made as urged by Mr. Prosad and the Patna High Court also negatived the said contention. Following the aforesaid two decisions I hold that the main charge against the accused is in respect of forgery and other offences are In connection with and/or in respect of forgery and, therefore, section 195 of the new Cr. P. C. will be a bar. Prosad and the Patna High Court also negatived the said contention. Following the aforesaid two decisions I hold that the main charge against the accused is in respect of forgery and other offences are In connection with and/or in respect of forgery and, therefore, section 195 of the new Cr. P. C. will be a bar. In view of the aforesaid I hold that the order dated 12th July, 1984 is without jurisdiction and the same is a nullity and void ab initio and the same cannot be enforced and/or relied upon here in Calcutta by the respondents and the learned District Judge, 24 Parganas at Alipore erred in making the ad interim order of attachment absolute on the basis of the said invalid order and consequently the order No.5 dated 23rd July, 1984 passed by the learned District Judge, 24 Parganas at Alipore in O.S. No. 67 of 1982 is illegal awl without and/or in excess of jurisdiction and the same is liable to be quashed on this ground also apart from the fact that the entitle proceedings being O.S. No. 67 of 1982 and all orders passed thereunder are wholly without jurisdiction in view of my decision earlier given. I, however, make it very clear that only for the aforesaid limited purpose and in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Kiron Singh & Ors. (Supra), where the Supreme Court held that if an order is a nullity and without jurisdiction "its invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon even at the stage of execution and even in colaterial proceedings" I hold that the order dated 12th July, 1984 passed by the learned Special Judge, Patna is a nullity and the same could not be enforced or relied upon here in Calcutta by the learned District Judge, 24 Parganas at Alipore. This however, shall not be construed or holding that the Court has any jurisdiction to quash the said order dated 12th July, 1984 and it will be for the accused persons to move the proper forum to challenge its legality and validity and for quashing of that order before the Patna High Court. 45. Mr. This however, shall not be construed or holding that the Court has any jurisdiction to quash the said order dated 12th July, 1984 and it will be for the accused persons to move the proper forum to challenge its legality and validity and for quashing of that order before the Patna High Court. 45. Mr. Pal further submits that the Order No. 5 dated 23rd July, 1984 passed by the learned District Judge at Alipore is also illegal, without and/or in excess of jurisdiction and/or without any authority of law and void also on the ground that the learned District Judge passed the said order without following the procedure laid down in the 1944 Ordinance. According to Mr. Pal an order under section 4(1) of the 1944 Ordinance is a mere ad interim order which can be made absolute only under the circumstances mentioned in section 51(1) and section 5(3) of the said Ordinance and under no other circumstances. According to Mr. Pal after the petitioners filed their petitions of objections after the ad interim order of attachment was passed by the learned District Judge on 21st January, 1984 the learned District Judge had no competence, jurisdiction and/or authority to make the ad interim order of attachment absolute without hearing the said petitions of objections and without complying with the provisions contained in section 5(3) of the 1944 Ordinance and the learned District Judge has gone entirely wrong by making the ad interim order of attachment absolutely by relying upon the order dated 12th July, 1984 and the provisions of section 10 of the said Ordinance. Mr. Pal further submits that section 10 of 1944 Ordinance prescribes the duration of both ad interim order of attachment and the order of attachment which has been made absolute and under the said provisions no ad interim order of attachment can be made absolute. Mr. Pal drew my attention to the opening words of section 10 of the 1944 Ordinance and particularly the words "......unless it is withdrawn earlier in accordance with the provisions of this Ordinance......" and submitted that an ad interim order of attachment can be varied and/or withdrawn only under section 5(3) of the 1944 Ordinance. He, therefore, submits that section 10 should be read subject to the provisions contained in section 5 of the 1944 Ordinance. According to Mr. He, therefore, submits that section 10 should be read subject to the provisions contained in section 5 of the 1944 Ordinance. According to Mr. Pal under the scheme of the 1944 Ordinance the learned District Judge is to pass an ex partes ad interim order under section 4 of the said Ordinance and if no objection is filed then under section 5(1) of the said Ordinance the ad interim order of attachment can be made absolute. Where as in the present case petitions of objections have been filed it is incumbent upon the learned District Judge to make an investigation under section 5(2) of the said Ordinance and thereafter to pass an order under section 5(3) of the said Ordinance either to make the said ad interim order of attachment absolute or varying the said order or withdrawing the said order. Mr. Pal has submitted that the learned District Judge has failed to appreciate the mandate of the legislature and thereby has failed to exercise the jurisdiction conferred upon him by section 5 of said Ordinance and as such the Order No.5 of the learned District Judge dated 23rd July, 1984 is on the face of it erroneous, illegal and without and/or in excess of jurisdiction and/or without any authority of law and the same is a nullity. Mr. Pal draw my attention to a very recent judgment of the Supreme Court in (19) Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors. reported in AIR 1986 SC 872 whereat page 117 Their Lordships of the Supreme Court after quoting certain passages from H.W.R. Wade’s Administrative Law with approval held that lack of jurisdiction may arise in many ways. One of the cases. Their Lordships referred is where the authority concerned asks to itself wrong questions or takes into account matters which it was not directed to take into account or it would turn its enquiry into something not directed by Parliament and failed to make the enquiry which the Parliament did direct and in any of these cases the decision would be without jurisdiction and a nullity. Excepting certain preliminary objections which I have already dealt with hereinbefore and excepting merely stating that the order dated 23rd July, 1984 passed by the learned District Judge is in accordance with law, Mr. Prasad does not appear to have advanced any other submissions on this point. 46. Excepting certain preliminary objections which I have already dealt with hereinbefore and excepting merely stating that the order dated 23rd July, 1984 passed by the learned District Judge is in accordance with law, Mr. Prasad does not appear to have advanced any other submissions on this point. 46. From the impugned order passed by the learned District Judge, 24 Parganas at Alipore it will clearly appear that the petitions of objections have been filed by the present petitioners and the learned District Judge has also recorded that the parties turned on sections 2, 5 and 10 of the Ordinance of the of 1944. Referring to the words occuring in section 10 on which Mr. Pal also placed reliance before him namely ........ unless it is withdrawn earlier in accordance with the provisions of this Ordinance" the learned District Judge held that the word "earlier" seems to him as rebundant in the context of section 10(b) of the 1944 Ordinance. According to the learned District Judge the said expression is antecedent to cognizance but does not mean a time which is posterior to cognizance and the said expression covers all the cases for adjudication of dispute relating to claim but does not contemplate any case for investigation of claim when cognizance is taken. According to the learned District Judge the claim could be revived after termination of the Criminal proceedings. According to him if harmonious construction is to be put on both the sections 5 and 10 there is no repugnancy but the right of the petitioners to have their claim examined by the Court stands eclipsed for the operation of section 10(b). 47. In my opinion the reasoning of the learned District Judge is not correct on a plain reading of the various provisions contained in the 1944 Ordinance. Under the scheme of the 1944 Ordinance it appears that power has been given to the State Government under section 3 of the 1944 Ordinance to make an application for attachment only on mere belief of the State Government and before any cognizance is taken and the District Judge has been empowered to pass by section 4 of the said Ordinance an ex parte order of attachment if he so satisfied. The statute has also imposed a duty upon the District Judge to issue notice upon all persons aggrieved by such ex parte order calling upon them to show cause on date to be specified in the notice why the order of attachment should not be made absolute. Under section 5(1) of the 1944 Ordinance if no cause is shown and no objections are made under section 4 on or before the specified date the District Judge shall forthwith pass an order making the ad interim order of attachment absolute. Under section 5(2) of the said Ordinance if cause is shown or any objections are made as aforesaid the District Judge shall proceed to investigate the same. Under section 5(3) of the said Ordinance after investigations are made under sub-section (2) of section 5 of the said Ordinance the District Judge shall pass an order either making the ad interim order of attachment absolute or varying it by releasing a portion of the property from attachment or withdrawing the order. Section 10 of the said Ordinance on which reliance has been placed both by the respondents before the learned District Judge as also by the learned District Judge is set out hereinbelow :- 10. Duration of attachment:- An order of attachment of property under this Ordinance shall, unless it is withdrawn earlier in accordance with the provisions of this ordinance. continue in force :- (a) Where no Court has taken cognizance of the alleged scheduled offence at the time when the order is applied for, for three months from the date of the order under sub-section (1) of section 4 or sub-section (2) of section 6 as the case may be, unless cognizance of such offence is in the meantime so taken or unless the District Judge on application by the agent of the State Government thinks it proper and just that the period should be extended and pass an order accordingly; or (b) where a Court has taken cognizance of the alleged scheduled offence whether, before or after the time when the order was applied for until orders are passed by the District Judge in accordance with the provisions of this Ordinance after the termination of the criminal proceedings. In my opinion on a harmonious construction of the provisions of sections 3, 4, 5 and 10 of the said Ordinance it will be very clear that intention of the legislature is that there should he an ex parte attachment under the circumstances mentioned in sections 3 and 4 of the said Ordinance and a duty has also been imposed upon the District Judge to inform the persons aggrieved to show cause within the time to be specified by the District Judge to show cause why the said order of attachment should not be made absolute and if no cause is shown or if no objection is filed then to make the said ad interim order of attachment absolute. If, however, where cause has been shown or objections have been filed the statute has cast a duty upon the District Judge to investigate upon the said cause and pass an order either making the ad interim order of attachment absolute or varying it by releasing a portion of the property from attachment or withdrawing the order. Since the order of attachment was ex parte and it could have been made even before any cognizance was taken the intention of the legislature as depicted in section 10(a) of the said Ordinance is to make a time limit for such an order. Where cognizance has been taken the intention of the legislature also appears to fix the time limit for such order of attachment under section 10(b) of the said Ordinance. Both the provisions of section 10(a) and section 10(b) of the said Ordinance has to be read subject to the opening words of section 10 of the said Ordinance namely "unless it is withdrawn earlier in accordance with the provisions of this Ordinance". The only provision under which the order of attachment can be withdrawn which is relevant so far as the present case is concerned is contained in section 5(3) of the 1944 Ordinance which directs the learned District Judge to pass an order after investigation under section 5(2) of the said Ordinance either to make the ad interim order of attachment absolute or varying it by releasing a portion of the property from attachment or withdrawing the order of attachment. In my opinion there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that section 10 of the said Ordinance should be read subject to the provisions contained in section 5 of the 1944 Ordinance. In my judgment the learned District Judge has gone entirely wrong and he has failed to carry out the mandate of and the procedure laid down by the legislature contained in section 5 of the 1944 Ordinance. I, therefore, hold that the order passed by the learned District Judge whereby he made the ad interim order of attachment absolute without making any investigation under section 5(2) of the said Ordinance and without passing any order under section 5(3) of the said Ordinance by making the ad interim order of attachment absolute on the basis of the order of cognizance dated 12th July, 1984 passed by the learned Special Judge, Patna, is wrong and the same is without and/or in excess of jurisdiction and/or without any authority of law. I entirely agree that the learned District Judge has completely failed to exercise the jurisdiction conferred by the said Ordinance upon him and turned the enquiry by entertaining the application made by the respondent No.3 on 14th July, 1984 which was not directed by the said Ordinance and as such, the order dated 23rd July, 1984 is outside the jurisdiction the learned District Judge and the same is liable to be quashed and/or set aside. 48. This brings me to the last contention urged by Mr. Pal. According to Mr. Pal the learned District Judge erred in holding that the question as to whether interest on Fixed Deposits can be attached or not is not covered by the judgment in F.M.A.T. No. 2423 of 1982 and the learned District Judge failed to appreciate that inspite of the said judgment by the order dated 3rd May, 1984, Mr. Justice P.C. Barooah directed the learned Dist. Judge to consider the question as to whether interest on Fixed Deposits can be attached or not in view of the order passed by the Supreme Court on 13th October, 1982 which decision is binding not only upon the learned District Judge but also upon all the respondents. Mr. Justice P.C. Barooah directed the learned Dist. Judge to consider the question as to whether interest on Fixed Deposits can be attached or not in view of the order passed by the Supreme Court on 13th October, 1982 which decision is binding not only upon the learned District Judge but also upon all the respondents. Mr. Pal further submits that the learned District Judge failed to appreciate that no interest on Find Deposits can be attached particularly in view of the fact that no application for attachment of interest was ever made before the learned District Judge by any of the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 and the learned District Judge also failed to appreciate that by the judgment and order of remand dated 10th August, 1983 passed in F.M.A.T. No. 2423 of 1982 subsequently numbered as F.M.A. No. 185 of 1983, the Appeal Court remanded the application made by the third respondent under section 3 of the 1944 Ordinance wherein there was no prayer for attachment of interest. 49. Mr. Prosad on the other hand submitted that the judgment and order of the learned District Judge have acquired finality having been upheld as correct by the Supreme Court by order dated 13th August, 1984 dismissing the S.L.P. (Civil) No. 6619/84 filed against the impugned order dated 18th April, 1984 and S.L.P. (Civil) No. 8381/84 filed against the impugned order dated 23rd July, 1984 besides the same having been held as prima facie correct in the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court passed in Matter No. 897 of 1984. According to Mr. Prosad the petitioners have suppressed the most important order of the Supreme Court passed on 25th January, 1983 in C.M.P. No. 1028 of 1983 arising in S.L.P. (Civil) No. 9205 of 1982. Mr. Prosad also submitted, that the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court dated 10th August, 1983 passed in F.M.A.T. No. 2423 of 1982 was also binding on the District Judge, 24 Parganas at Alipore and the learned District Judge has rightly held so. It is the submission of Mr. Prosad that an application for attachment of interest and principal was made before the learned District Judge, Alipore on which an interim order dated 21st January, 1984 was passed in O.S. No. 67 of 1982 attaching both the principal and the interest. It is the submission of Mr. Prosad that an application for attachment of interest and principal was made before the learned District Judge, Alipore on which an interim order dated 21st January, 1984 was passed in O.S. No. 67 of 1982 attaching both the principal and the interest. The interest which has been attached being usufract of the principal amount. Mr. Prosad further submits that the said order of attachment has been made on the footing that the properties in question were obtained by the accused persons and not as properties belonging to the non-accused petitioners and it could not be argued that for the purposes of trial and of the 1944 Ordinance the properties in question have been attached the properties of the non-accused petitioners. 50. In reply it has been submitted on behalf of the petitioners that none of the Division Bench decisions held that the District Judge was competent to attach interest and to make ad interim order of attachment absolute only on the basis of the Ordinance without following the provisions contained in section 5 of the 1944 Ordinance. As regard the submission as to finality of the orders of the District Judge it has been submitted that none of the petitioners filed the Special Leave Petition and therefore, the order of the Supreme Court could not bind the petitioners. In any event it is too late now in the day to argue that the orders passed by the learned District Judge have become final in view of the dismissal of the Special Leave Petitions made by the Supreme Court in the applications made by some other parties inasmuch as in a number of decisions the Supreme Court held just the reverse and directed the High Court to consider the application on merits without taking into consideration of non-speaking order dismissing Special Leave Petition for which reliance was placed in AIR 1986 SC 1780 prs, 6, 8 and 12. It has further been submitted on behalf of the petitioners that from the orders of the Special Leave Petitions it will be apparent that none of the Special Leave Petitions were actually dismissed but they were withdrawn by the petitioners therein under the circumstances mentioned in the correspondence which have been annexed to the Affidavit-in-Reply as stated hereinbefore. It has further been submitted on behalf of the petitioners that from the orders of the Special Leave Petitions it will be apparent that none of the Special Leave Petitions were actually dismissed but they were withdrawn by the petitioners therein under the circumstances mentioned in the correspondence which have been annexed to the Affidavit-in-Reply as stated hereinbefore. As regards the allegation that the petitioners have suppressed the most important order of the Supreme Court dated 25th January, 1983 in C.M.P. No. 1028 of 1983 it has been submitted on behalf of the petitioners that the same is not correct inasmuch as even after the said order dated 25th January, 1983 this Court by the' order dated 3rd May, 1984 directed the learned District Judge to consider the observation made by the Supreme Court on 13th October, 1982 and the said order dated 3rd May, 1984 was passed in the presence of the respondents. In any event it has been submitted that from the order dated 25th January, 1983 it will appear that the Supreme Court merely recorded the contention of the learned Counsel that the question on attachment of interest on principal amount will be for the High Court to decide and by the order dated 3rd May, 1984 this Court directed the learned District Judge to consider the question of attachment of interest without deciding the said question itself. The petitioners further submitted that in their written submission the respondents are alleging new fact which could not be found in any of their affidavits namely that an application for attachment of interest and principal was also made before the District Judge at Alipore on which an interim order was passed on 21st January, 1984 in O.S. No. 67 of 1982. it has further been submitted on behalf of the petitioners that they have annexed certified copy of the order sheet of the learned District Judge at Alipore in O.S No. 67 of 1982 starting from 7th September, 1983 upto 18th April, 1984 and no where from the said order sheet it will appear that any such application for attachment of interest was filed before the learned District Judge at Alipore. In the original application for attachment which was filed by the third respondent before the learned District Judge under section 3 of the 1944 Ordinance there was no allegation and no prayer for attachment of interest on Fixed Deposits. By the order of remand the learned District Judge has been directed to deal with the said original application on merits and therefore, there was no scope for going into the question of attachment of interest on Fixed Deposits. It is further submitted on behalf of the petitioners that apart from the same it may also be pertinent to mention here that after the remand of the application the learned District Judge passed the ad interim order of attachment under section 4 of the 1944 Ordinance on 21st January. 1984 and no where from the said order any reference to any application being made for attachment of interest, can be found. It has further been a submitted by the petitioners that from the certified copy of the order sheet of O.S. No. 67 of 1982 it will appear that various types of applications were filed before the learned District Judge but no such application for attachment of interest will appear to have been filed. On 7th April, 1984 the respondents filed the petition for extension of the period of ad interim attachment and on 16th April, 1984 the respondents herein filed another application for extension of the period of ad interim order of attachment. On 18th April, 1984 the learned District Judge heard the said applications and passed the order of attachment for a further period of three months. From the said order it will appear that the learned District Judge recorded." Although there was no application for attachment of the interest the order for attachment thereof was passed by this court on the verbal prayer of the learned Advocate for the petitioner". According to the petitioners the learned District Judge made the said observations because the petitioners took the point before him that he had no jurisdiction to attach the interest when their was no application for such attachment of interest and to cover up the said point the learned District Judge admitted that there was no application but incorrectly staled that there was a verbal prayer for attachment of interest. The petitioners have further submitted that no such verbal prayer was made and the slime could not have been made inasmuch as per the procedure before the District Court at Alipore no verbal prayer is maintainable and even for adjournments written submissions are necessary. Even in their written submissions the respondents do not claim to have made any such verbal prayer for attachment of interest. In the written submissions they have categorically stated that they made the application for attachment of interest. Neither the order of the learned District Judge nor the record in O.S. No. 67 of 1982 however, support the said case made out by the respondents in their written submissions. The case which the learned District Judge has made out is also not being supported by the respondents themselves nor by the procedure of the Court. In view of the aforesaid it has been submitted by the petitioners that this Court should be pleased to hold that no "such application was made for attachment of interest before the learned District Judge and no verbal prayer can also be maintainable, and therefore, the learned District Judge had no jurisdiction to attach Interest on Fixed Deposits and whatever may be the result on other points I should direct he release of interest forthwith. It has further been submitted that attachments are being under the 1944 Ordinance and not under the Code of Civil Procedure and, therefore, the provisions of the 1944 Ordinance should he construed strictly inasmuch as it relates to criminal proceedings and it also gives a drastic power to the State to make an application for attachment on the mere' satisfaction of the State Government and even at a stage when no formal cognizance of any offence has been taken and such a power has not been given to any suitor under the Code of Civil Procedure. It has further been submitted that in the absence of any such express provision in the 1944 Ordinance neither the usufruct of a property nor the interest of Fixed Deposits can be attached. Referring to the Division Bench Judgment of this Court in (20) Inspector General of Police v. Central Manbhum Coal Co. (p) Ltd. & Ors. It has further been submitted that in the absence of any such express provision in the 1944 Ordinance neither the usufruct of a property nor the interest of Fixed Deposits can be attached. Referring to the Division Bench Judgment of this Court in (20) Inspector General of Police v. Central Manbhum Coal Co. (p) Ltd. & Ors. reported in 87 CWN 432 on which reliance has been placed on behalf of the respondents, it has been submitted by the petitioners that in that very judgment Their Lordships made it clear that Their Lordships were exercising inherent power as a Court of Appeal and not the power under 1944 Ordinance. 51. In my opinion it is not necessary for me to go into all the controversies raised by the parties on the point of attachment of interest. One thing is however, clear to me that no application for attachment of interest was made by the respondents State of Bihar & Ors. In the original petition for attachment which was made under section 3 of the 1944 Ordinance and which has been remanded by this Court to be heard on merits there was also no prayer for attachment of interest. It appears to me that in that context when on the basis of the order of attachment dated 15th September, 1982 the State of Bihar wanted the Banks not to pay the interest on the Fixed Deposits the Supreme Court by its order dated 13th October, 1982 in Civil Appeal No. 3241 of 1982 made the observation which P.C. Barooah, J. directed the learned District Judge to consider. The observation of the Supreme Court on which the petitioners relied upon are as follows: "We are of the view that the ad interim order of attachment of the sum of Rs. 1.11 Crores and other properties made by the Division Bench of the High Court on 15th September, 1982 does not entitle the State Government to ask the Banks with which this amount is lying deposited not to pay the amount of interest on such amount to the appellants. We would accordingly declare that, on the basis of the ad interim order of attachment, the State Government is not entitled to instruct the Banks to withhold payment of the amount of interest on the sum of Rs. We would accordingly declare that, on the basis of the ad interim order of attachment, the State Government is not entitled to instruct the Banks to withhold payment of the amount of interest on the sum of Rs. 1.11 Crores............" It is true that the Supreme Court subsequently recorded the contention of the Counsel made on behalf of some of the petitioners on which reliance was placed by Mr. Prosad which is see out as follows: "The learned Counsel for the appellant says that it is not his contention that the order made by us has in any way dealt with the matter of attachment of interest on the principal amount which will be for the High Court to decide." In this background an application was made before the Division Bench of this Court in F.M.A.T. No. 2423 of 1982 praying for attachment of interest after the Division Bench already passed the order dated 15th September, 1982 attaching the fixed Deposit of Rs.1.11 Crores which order was construed by the Supreme Court by Their Lordships' order dated 13th October, 1982 and the Division Bench of this Court by its order dated 17th February, 1983 passed a fresh order for attachment of interest on the said Fixed Deposit of Rs. 1.11 crores. From a reading of the entire judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Central Manbhum Coal Co. (P) Ltd. (Supra, 87 CWN 432), it will be amply clear that the Division Bench passed the earlier order as also the said order as a Court of Appeal and not under the Ordinance of 1944. In fact Mr. Prosad who also appeared for the appellant in the said appeal contended before the Division Bench that section 10 contemplates a statutory limit only for an Older made under section 4 or 6 of the Ordinance and not to any other order and the ad interim order which this Court passed in appeal could not be said to be such an order and the order which was passed by Their Lordships as an appellate authority in exercise of ancillary and implied powers in support of the appeal to render it effective as otherwise the appeal itself would be frustrated. It appears that the Division Bench accepted the said contention of Mr. Prosad and held that. It appears that the Division Bench accepted the said contention of Mr. Prosad and held that. "On a careful consideration of the provisions of sections 4, 6, 10 and 11, we are of the view that all and every order that we passed as an appellate authority is not an order made under sec. 4(1) or section 6(2) of the Ordinance.........But in an appeal preferred under section 11. it may be necessary for us to pass Interim order in order to sustain the appeal or make it effective pending the disposal thereof. Such orders are not really orders made under section 4(1) or 6(2) of the Ordinance.........But, even independent thereof, we possess necessary powers to make such an ad interim order as would be necessary to render the appeal effective and meaningful......... That was an order made as a step in and of the appeal because if such an attachment was not made the right of appeal would be frustrated.....• It will, therefore, be amply clear that the Division Bench of this Court on which reliance was placed by Mr. Prosad considered the question of attachment of interest In an application which was specifically made for an attachment of interest on the said Fixed Deposits as a Court of Appeal pending the disposal of the appeal. The observation of the Supreme Court on which Mr. Prosad relied upon also should be read in that context and in fact the Division Bench in that very order dated 17th February, 1983 relied upon the said observation. Unfortunately for the respondents. however, there was no application for attachment of interest before the learned District Judge and there was also no prayer for attachment of interest in the original petition which has been remanded by this Court to the learned District Judge to consider on merits. The claim of the respondants as appears from their written submissions that they made the application for attachment of interest is not supported by the documentary evidence and the same also has not been accepted by the learned District Judge himself. As regards the observation of the learned District Judge that attachment of interest was made on the verbal prayer I fail to appreciate the same. As per the procedure of the Alipore Court I don't think that there is any scope for making any such verbal prayer. As has been rightly pointed out by Mr. As regards the observation of the learned District Judge that attachment of interest was made on the verbal prayer I fail to appreciate the same. As per the procedure of the Alipore Court I don't think that there is any scope for making any such verbal prayer. As has been rightly pointed out by Mr. Pal even for adjournments written submissions are being made. In that context I entirely. agree with Mr. Pal that the learned District Judge has realised subsequently that he made the mistake in attaching interest without there being any such application for attachment and therefore, in order to sustaining said illegal order he has purported to have made the case of verbal prayer which the respondents themselves do not make. Attachment of interest is a very serious thing and therefore, there should have been a proper application for the same. I, therefore entirely agree with Mr. Pal that there was neither any application for attachment of interest nor there was any verbal prayer for attachment of such interest and in fact no such verbal prayer for attachment of such interest could have been made and even if the same was made the same could not have been sustained. In that context in my opinion the order of the Supreme Court dated 13th October, 1982 on which reliance has been placed by the petitioners is very much on the point and in view of that the learned District Judge had no competence, jurisdiction and/or authority either to attach the interest on Fixed Deposits of Rs. 1.11 Crores or to make the said ad interim order of attachment of interest on the said Fixed Deposits to be made absolute. 52. In view of the aforesaid I hold that the Ordinance of 1944 is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and the same is ultra vires. In the premises aforesaid all the proceedings in O.S. No. 67 of 1982 instituted by the third respondent before the District Judge, 24 Parganas at Alipore, Calcutta and all orders passed thereunder and/or in pursuance thereof including the order of attachment dated 21st January, 1984, 18th April, 1984 and 23rd July, 1984 passed by the learned District Judge, 24 Parganas at Alipore in O.S. No. 67 of 1982 are also illegal, invalid and without and/or in excess of jurisdiction and or without any authority of law and void ab initio. I also hold that the order dated 12th July, 1984 passed by the Special Judge (Vigilance), Patna in Special Case No. 172 of 1983 cannot be enforced or relied upon here in Calcutta either by the respondents or by the learned District Judge and consequently the Order No.5 dated 23rd July, 1984 passed by the District Judge, 24 parganas at Alipore in Calcutta in O.S. No. 67 of 1982 and all proceedings thereunder and/or in pursuance thereof are also illegal, invalid and without and/or in excess of jurisdiction and/or without any authority of law. I further hold that in any event the Order No.5 dated 23rd July, 1984 passed by the learned District Judge 24 Parganas at Alipore is on merits also illegal, invalid and without and or in excess of jurisdiction and/or without any authority of law and the same is void. I further hold that the ad interim order of attachment of interest on Fixed Deposits of Rs.1.11 Crores and the order making the said interim order of attachment of interest on Fixed Deposits absolute passed by the learned District Judge, 24 Parganas at Alipore in O.S. No. 67 of 1982 in any event cannot be sustained being contrary to the decision of the Supreme Court dated 13th October, 1982 passed m Civil Appeal No. 3241 of 1982 and the same is illegal on the face of the record and as such is without and/or in excess of jurisdiction and/or without any authority of law and void ab initio. 53. In the premises all proceedings and in particular the orders dated 21st January, 1984, 18th April, 1984 and 23rd July, 1984 passed by the learned District Judge 24 Parganas at Alipore in the O.S. No. 67 of 1982 are set aside and quashed. 54. For the reasons aforesaid this application is allowed in part. Rule is made absolute to the extent indicated in the judgment. Let appropriate writs be issued. There will be no order as to costs. Stay asked for is refused. All parties to act on the signed copy of the minutes of the operative part of the judgment and order.