Judgment :- 1. The petitioner is a public limited company. It is an assessee on the files of the third respondent. The question raised in this Original Petition is, whether in making the assessment for the year 1974-75, the petitioner assessee is entitled to the interest on the advance tax paid beyond the due date. It was held in the negative, by the Income Tax Officer, in Ext. P2 order. The Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) upheld the plea of the assessee. In second appeal, the Appellate Tribunal, in Ext. P4 order dated 31-10-1981, held that the belated payments are not to be taken into account as advance tax for the purpose of S.214 of the Income Tax Act and so interest is inadmissible for such belated payments. The Tribunal held so, in view of the decision of this Court in A. Sethumadhavan v. C.I.T. (122 IT R.587: 1980 KLT 152). The appeal preferred by the assessee in Sethumadhavan's case was heard along with other cases and a Bench of this Court held that payments of advance tax made within the financial year but not within specified dates should be treated as advance tax and the assessee is entitled to interest on excess tax so paid. The decision of the Division Bench is dated 22-1-1982 and reported in Santha S. Shenoy v. Union of India (135 ITR 39: 1982 KLT 318). The judgment of the learned Single Judge in Sethumadhavan's case was reversed. The petitioner filed Ext.P5 before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal on 17-6-1982 praying that in view of the Division Bench decision of this court, reported in Santha S. Shenoy v. Union of India (135 ITR 39: 1982 KLT 318), the Tribunal may be pleased to pass appropriate orders and rectify Ext. P4 order dated 31-10-1981 and hold that interest is admissible even for belated payments of advance tax. By Ext.P6 order dated 14-10-1982, the Appellate Tribunal dismissed the petition filed by the petitioner/ assessee under S.154 of the Income Tax Act. P4 order dated 31-10-1981 and hold that interest is admissible even for belated payments of advance tax. By Ext.P6 order dated 14-10-1982, the Appellate Tribunal dismissed the petition filed by the petitioner/ assessee under S.154 of the Income Tax Act. It was held that rectification under S.154 of the Income Tax Act must be of a mistake, which is a mistake in the light of the law in force at the time when the order sought to be rectified was passed and the subsequent decision of the High Court has no retrospective operation as in the case of subsequent legislation or the decision of the Supreme Court. In this Original Petition, the challenge is against Exts. P2, P4 and P6 orders negativing the claim of the petitioner/ assessee for interest on the advance tax paid beyond the due date. 2. We heard counsel for the petitioner as also counsel for the. respondent/ Revenue. The assessing authority in Ext.P2 as also the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal in Ext.P4 have held that the assessee is not entitled to the interest on the advance tax paid beyond the due date. It is common ground that this view is based solely on the decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in A. Sethumadhavan v. C.I. T. (122 ITR 587: 1980 KLT 152). It is true that when the Tribunal rendered the decision (Ext. P4) dated 31-10-1981, the decision of the single judge in Sethumadhavan's case was the law on the subject. Subsequently, on 22-1-1982 a Bench of this Court reversed the said decision, which is reported in Santha S. Shenoy v. Union of India (135 ITR 39:1982 KLT 318.) Since the very decision relied on by the Appellate Tribunal to hold that the assessee is not entitled to interest on the advance tax paid beyond the due date was reversed by a Bench of this Court in the decision reported in Santha S.Shenoy's case (135 ITR39 :1982 KLT 318), the petitioner invoked the jurisdiction of the Appellate Tribunal under S.154 of the Income Tax Act and sought rectification of Ext. P4 appellate order in that behalf. The Tribunal refused the relief prayed for, by Ext.P6 order dated 14-10-1982. P4 appellate order in that behalf. The Tribunal refused the relief prayed for, by Ext.P6 order dated 14-10-1982. The question posed for consideration is this: "Where an authority has decided, on the basis of a decision of the High Court which is subsequently reversed, would there be a rectifiable mistake coming within S.154 of the Income Tax Act?" 3. Salmond on Jurisprudence, Tenth Edition, by Glanville L. Williams at page 189 state's as follows: " the theory of case law is that a judge does not make law; he merely declares it;. and the overruling of a previous decision is a declaration that the supposed rule never was law. Hence any intermediate transactions made on the strength of the supposed rule are governed by the law established in the overruling decision. The overruling is retrospective, except as regards matters that are res judicata or accounts that have been settled in the meantime." Salmond on Jurisprudence, Twelfth Edition, by P.J. Fitzgerald, at page 148 states as follows: ".... the theory of case law is that a judge does not make law; he merely declares it; and the overruling of a previous decision is a declaration that the supposed rule never was law. Hence any intermediate transactions made on the strength of the supposed rule are governed by the law established in the overruling decision. The overruling is retrospective, except as regards matters that are res judicata, or accounts that have been settled in the meantime." An order of assessment based upon an interpretation or application of law which is ultimately found to be wrong in the light of judicial pronouncements rendered subsequently, discloses a mistake apparent from the record. When the court decides a matter, it does not make the law in any sense but all it does is, that it interprets the law and states what the law has always been and must be understood to have been. Where an order is made by an authority, on the basis of a particular decision, the reversal of such decision in further proceedings will justify a rectification of the order based on that decision. (See-Bhagawandas Kevaldas v. N.D. Mehrotra (36 ITR 538); Par shuram Pottery Works Co. Ltd. v. D.R.Trivedi (100 ITR 651 at p. 657) and Bhauram Jawahirmal v. C.I.T. (121 ITR 487 at p. 490). 4. (See-Bhagawandas Kevaldas v. N.D. Mehrotra (36 ITR 538); Par shuram Pottery Works Co. Ltd. v. D.R.Trivedi (100 ITR 651 at p. 657) and Bhauram Jawahirmal v. C.I.T. (121 ITR 487 at p. 490). 4. In the light of the above position in law, we are of the view that the order passed by the Appellate Tribunal (Ext. P4) dated 31-10-1981, relying on the decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in Sethumadhavan's case (122 ITR 587: 1980 KLT 152), discloses a mistake apparent from the record, in the light of the subsequent overruling of the very decision relied on by the Appellate Tribunal, by a Bench of this Court in the decision reported in Santha S. Shenoy's case (135 ITR 39:1982 KLT 318). When the Bench of this Court overruled the decision of a single judge in Sethumadhavan's case (122 ITR 587:1980 KLT 152), the said decision was never the law. The law on the point at all times was as stated by the Bench in the decision reported in Santha S. Shenoys's case (135 ITR 39: 1982 KLT 318). It cannot admit of any doubt that Ext. P5 application dated 17-6-1982 is within four years from the date of Ext. P4, and was one filed within the time allowed by law. So understood, we are of the view that Ext. P4 order, passed by the Appellate Tribunal in the appeal, discloses a mistake apparent from the record, namely, that the assessee, is not entitled to interest on the advance tax paid beyond the due date which should be rectified. This should have been done by the Appellate Tribunal in exercise of the powers vested in it under S.254(2) read with S.154 of the Income Tax Act. 5. The decision of the Appellate Tribunal to the contrary in Ext. P6 is unsustainable. The Appellate Tribunal has, in the circumstances, refused to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it under law, Ext. P6 therefore deserves to be annulled. We hereby do so. We direct the Appellate Tribunal to restore Ext. P5 to its file and dispose of the same, in the light of S.254(2) read with S.154 of the Income Tax Act, and in accordance with law. 6. P6 therefore deserves to be annulled. We hereby do so. We direct the Appellate Tribunal to restore Ext. P5 to its file and dispose of the same, in the light of S.254(2) read with S.154 of the Income Tax Act, and in accordance with law. 6. We should state, that the view of the Appellate Tribunal, that rectification contemplated by S.254(2) or S.154 of the Income Tax Act must be of a mistake which is a mistake in the light of the law in force at the time when the order sought to be rectified was passed,is a clear error. A binding decision rendered by a court is always retrospective and the decision which is overruled was never the law. The overruling decision should be deemed to have been in force even on the day when the order sought to be rectified was passed. We are further of the view that the Appellate Tribunal was in error in holding that the subsequent decision of the High Court has no retrospective operation as in the case of subsequent legislation or the decision of the Supreme Court. A subsequent binding decision of the Supreme Court or of the High Court has retrospective operation and overruling is always retrospective. We are afraid that the Appellate Tribunal misunderstood the ratio of two decisions, referred by it, in Jiyajeerao Cotton Mills Ltd. v. I. T. O. (130 ITR 710 Calcutta) and C.I.T. v. Assam Oil Co. Ltd. (133 I. T. R.204 at p. 214). The said decisions are distinguishable. The question that arose for consideration in Jiyajeerao Cotton Mills case (130 ITR 710) was, whether the decision of the Supreme Court resolving conflict of judicial opinion on a particular point obliterates the existence of a debatable point prior to such decision? It was held that the law laid down by the Supreme Court cannot be said to have retrospective operation in the sense that although a debate or doubt or a conflict of judicial opinion is resolved and settled by the Supreme Court, yet still that does not obliterate the existence of such debate or doubt or conflict that existed prior to the decision of the Supreme Court setting at rest such debate or doubt or conflict. In C. I. T. v. Assam Oil Co. In C. I. T. v. Assam Oil Co. Ltd. (133 ITR 204) was.a case of reassessment, as per the decision of the High Court that a particular kind of expenditure is not deductible and it was stated to be "information" within the meaning of S.147 of the Act. The plea in the said case was that the subsequent reversal of the decision by the Supreme Court will render the reassessment proceedings void ab initio. It was held that the Supreme Court does not make the law from the date it is pronounced but the Supreme Court declares it to be so from the very inception. But the knowledge about that law is not always there. The question that arose for consideration in that case was whether the decision of the High Court will be "information" on the basis of which the reassessment proceedings were validly taken under S.147(b) of the Act. The said question is entirely different. Even so, in C.I. T. v. Assam Oil Co. Ltd. (133 ITR 204), the Calcutta High Court referred to the decisions reported in Walchand Nagar Industries Ltd. v. Gaitonde (V.S), ITO (44 ITR 260); Parshuram Pottery Works Co. Ltd v. Trivedi (D.R.) WTO (100 ITR 651); Kuppuswamy Mudaliar (R.) & Sons. v. Board of Revenue (45 S.T.C. 152); Jamat Mydeen (KM.) v. State of Madras (22 S T.C. 45); and Govindaraju Chetty v. C.T.O. (22 S.T.C. 46) and concluded that on principle it is true that the Supreme Court does not make the law from the date the decision is pronounced, but the Supreme Court declares it to be so from the very inception. The two decisions of the Calcutta High Court, referred by the Appellate Tribunal, are not relevant in deciding the question that arose for consideration before the Tribunal, namely, that when the Tribunal decided the appeal on the basis of the decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in Sethumadhavan's case (122 ITR 587: 1980 K LT 152) which was subsequently reversed by a Bench of this Court in Santha S. Shenoy's case (135 ITR 39: 1982 KLT 318) there would be a rectifiable mistake within the meaning of S.254(2) read with S.154 of the Income Tax Act. In our opinion, the answer can only be in the affirmative. The decision of the Appellate Tribunal to the contrary is illegal. 7. In our opinion, the answer can only be in the affirmative. The decision of the Appellate Tribunal to the contrary is illegal. 7. S.254(2) and S.154 of the Income Tax Act enable the concerned authorities to rectify any "mistake apparent from the records". The said expressions have a wider content than the expression "error apparent on the face on the record" occurring in 0.47, R.1 C. P. C. The restrictions on the power of review under 0.47 R.I C. P. C. do not hold good in the case of S.254(2) and S.154 of the Income Tax Act. Even so, a subsequent binding decision taking a different view in law was held to be a good ground for review which will constitute an error apparent on the face of the record within the meaning of 0.47 R.1 C. P. C. (See Pathrose v. Kuttan alias Sankaran Nair (1969 KLT 15); and Chandrasekharan Nair v. Purushothaman Nair (1969 KLT 687). These two decisions were overruled by a Bench of this Court in Board of Revenue v. Akbar Sahib (1973 KLT 497). But, the Supreme Court reversed the Bench decision, aforesaid, holding that the Bench was not justified in refusing to entertain the review petition on super technical considerations which were ill-founded. (See State of Kerala v. P.K. Syed Akbar Sahib (AIR 1988 SC 702). So, it appears that even for the purpose of 0.47 R. I C. P. C. which is more restrictive, a subsequent binding authority taking a different view of law is a good ground for review, on the ground that the order sought to be reviewed passed on antecedent decision, which stands overruled, constitutes an error apparent on the face of the record. So far as this case is concerned, it is unnecessary for us to base our decision on the provisions of 0.47 R.1 C. P. C. which is more restrictive. 8. The Original Petition is allowed. Ext. P6 is quashed. The Appellate Tribunal is directed to restore Ext. P5, the petition filed by the petitioner dated 17-6-1982 (M.P.No.9 (Coch)/1982), and dispose of the same in accordance with law and in the light of the observations contained herein above.