JUDGMENT S. Padmanabhan, J. 1. In this second appeal by the defendants, the short question posed for consideration is whether the building is a hut and the appellants are kudikidappukars. The matter was referred to the Land Tribunal. Finding was against the appellants. Accepting that finding, the Subordinate Judge decreed the suit. The decision was confirmed by the District Judge in appeal. 2. The building was in the occupation of another tenant who was evicted through a rent control proceeding and the land and building was assigned to the plaintiff. Thereafter substantial changes were effected and the building was let out to the first defendant in 1970. The contention is that in spite of the alteration or modifications, the building is one constructed before 1590 and the cost of construction at that time alone could be taken into account ignoring all the amounts spent on the building subsequently by the owner. 3. At the time of letting to the defendants in 1970, the building had four rooms with tiled roof and an enclosed veranda covered by asbestos roof. Two rooms have wooden ceilings and all the rooms have concrete flooring. The compound is enclosed with a gate. The commissioner assessed the cost of constructional Rs. 5,09,95 and monthly rent on the date of construction at Rs. 50/-. There is no dispute between the parties that the building was there before 1890 and it was only repaired, remodelled and extended subsequently. Though the appellants claimed to have done these items of work, that contention was negatived and the finding is that the building in its present condition was let out to the defendants. Even though the word reconstruction was not used by the plaintiff, on the basis of the allegations and evidence, the District Judge found that the building was reconstructed with substantial investment by the plaintiff and it was the reconstructed building that was let out in 1970. These findings do not call for interference being factual ones by appreciation of evidence including admissions of the second defendant, involving no substantial question of law. 4. Five decisions relevant in this respect were brought to my notice. These findings do not call for interference being factual ones by appreciation of evidence including admissions of the second defendant, involving no substantial question of law. 4. Five decisions relevant in this respect were brought to my notice. They are, Lakshmi v. Kunhipperachan ( 1978 KLT 122 ), Mammu v. Ali ( 1978 KLT 629 ), Thomas Mathew v. Joseph Mani (1981 KLT SN Page 68 Case No. 123) (the full text of this decision was also seen by me), Vasumathy v. State of Kerala ( 1984 KLT 447 ) arid Mrs. B. A. Cornel v. N. Rodrigues ( 1981 KLT 302 ). The first four are Single Bench decisions and the last by a Full Bench. Lakshmi v. Kunhipperachan ( 1978 KLT 122 ) and the short note decision in Thomas Mathew's case (1981 KLT SN Page 68 Case No. 123) were rendered by Bhaskaran, J. (as he then was). These two decisions took the stand that cost at the time of construction of the building is only the cost at the time of the original construction of the structure without including any cost subsequently incurred by the land owner for repairs or remodelling whether before or after the letting. Following the Full Bench decision in Mrs. B. A. Cornel's case ( 1981 KLT 302 ), the short note decision further said that when construction was by stages, the cost incurred by stages before letting also could be included. Mammu's case ( 1978 KLT 629 ), after referring to Lakshmi's case ( 1978 KLT 122 ) also, said that hut must be understood to be the one permitted to be occupied and this can only mean the structure as it is at the time of permission and it is not possible to take a part of the structure alone into consideration (possibly the structure at the time of original construction alone excluding the additions or improvements made later) in finding out whether it is a hut or not. That decision even held that additions and alterations made by land owner subsequent to the permission or letting, if they were for the use of the occupier, could also be taken into account in deciding the cost in order to consider whether it is a hut or not. 5. The Full Bench in Mrs. That decision even held that additions and alterations made by land owner subsequent to the permission or letting, if they were for the use of the occupier, could also be taken into account in deciding the cost in order to consider whether it is a hut or not. 5. The Full Bench in Mrs. B. A. Cornel's case ( 1981 KLT 302 ) considered these two decisions and said that there is no conflict in the ratio of the two decisions. At the same time referring to S.2(25)(b) of the Land Reforms Act, the Full Bench said that what the definition requires is only that the building permitted to be occupied must be a hut on the date of such permission and hence the crucial date with reference to which whether a building is a hut or not is to be decided in the date on which permission to occupy was granted. That decision also referred to a case of construction of building at different stages prior to the permission and held that in such cases construction will be those including all the stages. Finally at Para 7, the Full Bench referred to a case of "reconstruction in the sense that the original building which was a hut had been pulled down and a new building put up" and said "we are not called upon to decide any such decision". I do not think that, as argued before me, the Full Bench said that it will amount to reconstruction only if the original structure was completely pulled down and a new one erected in its place Such an interpretation will create an anomalous situation resulting in consequences which the legislature never meant. The short note decision and Vasumathy's case ( 1984 KLT 447 ) gave quietus to such as interpretation. But the reference in the Full Bench decision to reconstruction by pulling down the original construction along with reference to construction by stages and the observation that there is no conflict in the ratio of Lakshmi's case ( 1978 KLT 122 ) and Mammu's case ( 1978 KLT 629 ) persuaded the short note decision to conclude that what the Full Bench also held was that the cost of construction is the one at the time of the original construction alone with the exception of cases in which construction prior to permission is by stages. But that decision also said "construction at different stages could reasonably be presumed to extend to cases of modifications and additions to the structure effected before it was permitted to be occupied by another". That means his Lordship also agrees that modifications and additions to the original construction before permission could enter the valuation to decide whether the building is a hut or not. In the present case, there is no contention that any modification, addition or alteration was made after permission and hence that question does not arise. 6. The short note decision and the Full Bench thus practically accepted as correct what Mammu's case ( 1978 KLT 629 ) said. Though the cost of construction is as on the date of construction, that date of construction includes the subsequent dates of modifications, additions or alteration also prior to the permission. The question of such additions or alterations or modifications after permission done by the land owner dealt with in Mammu's case ( 1978 KLT 629 ) is not considered here as it is (unnecessary). Thus practically the Full Bench and the three Single Bench decisions agree that any modification or addition by the land owner to the structure before permission could and must enter the valuation to decide whether the building is a hut or not. When the Full Bench authoritatively said that the crucial date to decide whether the building is a hut or not is the date on which permission to occupy was granted, that is an end of the matter. The interpretation to the contrary, if any, given in the short note decision based on Para 7 of the Full Bench decision on a matter which was not decided A there cannot prevail. Though the Full Bench said that there is no conflict in the ratio laid down in Lakshmi's case ( 1978 KLT 122 ) and Mammu's case ( 1978 KLT 629 ) the full text of the short note decision proceeded on the assumption that the two decisions took extreme stands and the apparent conflict was resolved by the Full Bench by making a reconciliatory approach and giving a harmonious construction to the relevant provisions. This harmonious construction was interpreted to be an affirmation of the stand in Lakshmi's case ( 1978 KLT 122 ) that cost of construction is the cost at the time of the original construction subject only to variation in cases of construction by stages 7. These decisions were considered by another eminent Judge is Vasumathy's case ( 1984 KLT 447 ). That decision said that whether something done to an existing building is a mere repair or improvement on the one hand, or whether it could be treated as extension, addition, renovation or reconstruction on the other, is a question of fact depending upon the nature or extent of the work, and when an old thatched roof is completely dismantled (as in this case) and a new titled roof is substituted, what is involved is a reconstruction by stages before the structure acquired the final form in which it was let out. That decision also understood the Full Bench as laying down that the crucial date to decide whether the building is a hut or not is the date of permission. When there is no modification, alteration or addition, the cost must necessarily be that on the date of the original construction. But the" full text of the short note decision itself accepts "The principle laid down by the Full Bench with respect to construction at different stages could reasonably be presumed to extend to cases of modifications and additions to the structure effected before it was permitted to be occupied by another". In such cases as held in Vasumathy's case ( 1984 KLT 447 ) "its construction cost would still have to be determined with reference to the point of time when work was completed." That point of time of completion is the last date on which the addition, alteration or modification was made with additional expenditure. Quoting the Full Bench decision, the short note decision in its full text also said "the cost of construction to be assessed is that of the structure that existed immediately prior to the permission to occupy it". Quoting the Full Bench decision, the short note decision in its full text also said "the cost of construction to be assessed is that of the structure that existed immediately prior to the permission to occupy it". That means that all the decisions agree that in cases where the construction is by stages which include modifications, additions or alterations to the original construction, the date of construction which includes, the date of completion of construction is the date on which the building reached it completed form at the time of permission to occupy. 8. As held in Vasumathy's case ( 1984 KLT 447 ), what has to be looked into is the structure as it stands at the time of application. The stages or periods at which it reached that form must next be considered. The actual cost as at each of those stages must be found out. The totality is the cost of construction at the time of construction from which amount, if any, spent by the occupier will have to be deducted and the balance treated as cost of construction for deciding eligibility for kudikidappu. That is the cost at the time of construction which includes construction at different stages comprising alterations, additions or modifications after the original construction. The definition in S.2 (25) makes a difference between 'hut' and 'homestead', both of which are included in the 'kudikidappu'. 'Homestead' is the construction made by the kudikidappukaran with permission and the cost of construction is irrelevant in such cases. 'Hut' is the building belonging to the person who permitted the occupation and the cost of construction and rent under Explanation II are applicable to 'hut' alone. The ''cost of construction at the time of construction" will therefore adversely affect only those who want to grab substantial structures put up at the land owner's cost and for which he agreed to pay rent, by taking advantage of the legislation intended to benefit landless agricultural labourers and others residing in structures of low cost. "Cost at the time of construction" includes cost at the different stages of construction including cost of modifications, additions or alterations when they were made. The phraseology is used only in contra distinction with the cost assessed at a later date which includes the date of application, the date of assessment or the date when value is fixed by court. "Cost at the time of construction" includes cost at the different stages of construction including cost of modifications, additions or alterations when they were made. The phraseology is used only in contra distinction with the cost assessed at a later date which includes the date of application, the date of assessment or the date when value is fixed by court. Cost of construction includes cost of materials and labour charges both of which may go up as time passes on. The legislature did not want to deny the benefits to the kudikidappukaran on the basis of such inflated cost. That is all. The actual expenses incurred by the land owner in making available the amenity to the kudikidappukaran in its money value at the respective times of incurring expenditure alone were intended to enter the field of cost construction. Otherwise it will lead to an anomalous position never intended by the legislature. Restriction in the matter of claiming kudikidappu on the basis of cost of construction or rental value at the time of construction was only in cases of huts and not homesteads. That means the legislature did not want to deprive land owners, who invested substantial amounts in the construction, of their rights by giving fixity and in such cases small low cost buildings alone were intended to be included for the purpose of giving kudikidappu right. 9. Say for instance the land owner puts up a small room in 1890 with a sufficient concrete foundation, which may sustain one more floor, at a cost of less than Rs. 750. Subsequently without pulling the room down, he adds few more rooms or even one more floor in 1960 at a cost of a lakh of rupees p and lets out the building for a rent of Rs. 500/- per month. If the original cost of construction in 1890 alone is to enter the account, on the ground that it is not a reconstruction since the original room was not pulled down and the tenant given the benefit of kudikidappu, that will be something against what the legislature intended to protect. In this case also even though the building at the time of original construction cost the land owner only less than Rs. In this case also even though the building at the time of original construction cost the land owner only less than Rs. 750/-, what the appellants got at the time of the rent arrangement in 1970 was a pucca building for which the cost of construction at the time construction in different stages including the alterations and additions is worth more than Rs. 5000/-. The legislature never intended the benefit of kudikidappu given to such persons and the appeal is only the outcome of an attempt to grab the building and land under the cover of the legislation. No question of law much less any substantial question of law is involved in the second appeal. 10. A request was made that in case the appeal is dismissed, the appellants may be permitted time of one year to vacate the premises as they have to find out another accommodation. The request is too much since the litigation is already ten years old. However, I am granting period of four months from today on condition that the appellants will without any protest surrender possession on the expiry of that period. Subject to what is stated above, the second appeal is dismissed in limine.