BALAKRISHNA, J. ( 1 ) THIS writ petition is preferred seeking a direction to the 1st respondent which is the karnataka State Transport Authority to quash the Notification No. STA/5/scp 45/87- 88 published in the Karnataka Gazette dated 28-4-1988 as rival application for grant of stage carriage permk, vide Annexure-C and also for a mandamus prohibiting the 1st respondent from considering and clubbing the application of the 2nd respondent dated 2-1-1988 for grant of stage carriage permit filed before the 1st respondent in lieu of permit No. P. St. P. 6/66 originally held by the 3rd respondent, since time expired. ( 2 ) THE essential facts of the case may, briefly, be stated as follows : the petitioner, who is a stage carriage operator, filed an application for grant of inter-state stage carriage permit on the route bangalore to Dharma puri and back via Chandapura, Hosur and Krishnagiri on 1-2-1980 in the place of the renewal of the permit held by the 3rd respondent in permit no. P. St. P. 6/66 as a rival applicant. The application of the petitioner was clubbed along with the application for renewal of the permit filed by the 3rd respondent, considered together and disposed of by the 1st respondent by resolution granting renewal in favour of the 3rd respondent and rejecting the application of the petitioner. Thereafter, the petitioner challenged the said resolution in w. P. No. 15493 of 1980. At the same time, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the karnataka State Transport Appellate tribunal, Bangalore, questioning the correctness of the resolution passed by the 1st respondent and the Tribunal, by order dated 14-5-1982, dismissed the appeal. Against the said order of dismissal, the petitioner filed w. P. No. 21867 of 1982 before this Court. Subsequently, both Writ Petition Nos. 15493 of 1980 and 21867 of 1982 were clubbed and heard together by this Court and by a common order they were allowed on 18-3-1983. According to the order passed by this Court in the said writ petitions, the renewal of permit granted in favour of the 3rd respondent was set aside and the case was remanded to the 1st respondent for fresh consideration in accordance with law. Against this order, the 3rd respondent filed Writ Appeal Nos.
According to the order passed by this Court in the said writ petitions, the renewal of permit granted in favour of the 3rd respondent was set aside and the case was remanded to the 1st respondent for fresh consideration in accordance with law. Against this order, the 3rd respondent filed Writ Appeal Nos. 496 and 497 of 1983 before a Division Bench of this Court which dismissed the appeals on 9-11-1987, vide Annexure-A. The 3rd respondent challenged the order of the division Bench before the Supreme Court in s. L. P. Nos. 15312 and 15313 of 1987 which came to be dismissed on 26-4-1988, vide Annexure-B. ( 3 ) ON 2-1-1988, the 2nd respondent which is the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation applied before the 1st respondent for grant of stage carriage permit on the route Bangalore to Dharmapuri and back via krishnagiri in lieu of renewal of the permit of the 3rd respondent in permit No. P. St. P. 6/66 expiring on 22-3-1988, as a rival applicant. The applicant was published in the Karnataka gazette dated 28-4-1988 in Notification No. STA/5/scp 45/87-88 vide annexure-C. It is this Notification which is now under challenge by the petitioner. ( 4 ) THE contention of the petitioner is that it is not open to the 1st respondent to club the applications of the 2nd respondent along with the applications of the petitioner and the 3rd respondent for consideration and disposal and that the 1st respondent has not complied with the direction issued by this court to the effect that the application for renewal of the 3rd respondent should be considered and disposed of along with the application of the petitioner. In other words, the contention of the petitioner is that the 1st respondent is not within its jurisdiction in entertaining the application of the 2nd respondent and for cluobing the same along with the applications of the petitioner and the 3rd respondent. ( 5 ) THE question which arises for consideration in this writ petition is whether the 1st respondent is justified in clubbing for consideration and disposal the applications of the petitioner and the 2nd respondent for grant of stage carriage permit along with the application of the 3rd respondent for renewal of the permit in respect of the route which is the same and ripe for consideration.
( 6 ) FOR the purpose of examining the question thus arising for consideration, it is necessary to look into the directions issued by the learned single Judge, the Division bench of this Court and the Supreme Court in the relevant proceedings. The learned single Judge, while disposing of W. P. Nos. 15493 of 1980 and 21867 of 1982, held that the authority had observed that the material produced before it were not sufficient to substantiate the allegations made by the writ petitioner against the contesting respondent so as to conclude that the renewal of the permit issued to the contesting respondent is not in public interest and requires to be rejected. The approach made by the authority and, therefore, the Appellate Tribunal which adopted the same reasoning regarding the question of renewal of the permit of the contesting respondent was not in accordance with the provisions of section 58 (2) of the Motor Vehicles Act and, in particular, the proviso to Section 58 (2) of the Act. Therefore, the order of renewal granted in favour of C. R. Gowda, the contesting respondent in the said writ petitions, was set aside and the case was remitted to the State Transport Authority to consider the application of the Writ petitioner along with the application of C. R. Gowda for renewal of permit bearing in mind the observations made in the judgment. In this judgment, there is nothing to indicate either in the direction issued by the learned single Judge or in the course of the observations and findings, that consideration of applications for grant of permit or renewal of permit would exclude any other application in respect of the same route ripe for consideration. In Writ Appeal Nos. 496 and 497 of 1983, decided on 9-11-1987 by a Division Bench of this Court, in para 12 is the operative operation. Para 12 reads thus :"12. For the reasons recorded above, these appeals fail and are dismissed. But in the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs. The K. S. T. A. is further directed to consider the application of the third respondent for grant of permit on the route in question and the application of the appellant for renewal of the permit, afresh in accordance with law.
But in the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs. The K. S. T. A. is further directed to consider the application of the third respondent for grant of permit on the route in question and the application of the appellant for renewal of the permit, afresh in accordance with law. The matter shall finally be disposed of by the K. S. T. A. within six weeks of the receipt of this order. "therefore, the direction issued by a division Bench of this Court therein is to the effect that the application of the 3rd respondent for grant of permit and the application of the appellant for renewal of permit should be considered afresh in accordance with law. There is no direction that any other application in respect of the same route for grant of stage carriage permit should not be considered even if it is ripe for consideration. As far as the Supreme Court is concerned, the Special Leave Petitions were dismissed without any direction ( 7 ) NEITHER before the learned single judge, nor before the Division Bench of this court, there was any contention putforth by any of the parties to the proceedings that no other application in respect of the route in question should be considered even if such an application is ripe for consideration and in respect of the same or substantial the same route and that the application of the present petitioner for grant of permit and the application for renewal of the permit of the 3rd respondent along should be considered and disposed of by the 1st respondent. Such a point was neither pleaded, nor canvassed at any stage of the proceedings. There is no indication to the contrary either in the judgment of the learned single Judge or in the judgment of the Division Bench or in the records relating to these proceedings.
Such a point was neither pleaded, nor canvassed at any stage of the proceedings. There is no indication to the contrary either in the judgment of the learned single Judge or in the judgment of the Division Bench or in the records relating to these proceedings. ( 8 ) IT was contended on behalf of the petitioner that, since the 2nd respondent had not filed its application as on 1-2-1980 for grant of stage carriage permit as a rival applicant and also since the application for grant of permit came to be filed by the 2nd respondent on 2-1-1988 as a rival applicant, such an application ought to have been filed 120 days earlier to the expiry of the permit, or atleast 105 days earlier to the expiry of the permit on payment of penal fee, the permit expiring on 22-3-1988. According to the petitioner, the rival application of the 2nd respondent was filed only 81 days prior to the date of expiry of the permit of the 3rd respondent and, therefore, the application does not survive in the eye of law. It is not necessary for me to go into this question since it is a point to be urged by the petitioner before the 1st respondent for consideration of this question of law. It is open to the petitioner to raise such an objection before the 1st respondent when it considers all the applications. ( 9 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon a judgment of the Supreme court rendered in Civil Appeal No. 798 of 1963 in the case of Hanuman Transport Co. Ltd. , v Meenakshi alies Ramabhai and another, disposed of on 20-12-1963. The ratio of the said decision is based on facts which are different from the facts of the instant case. In the case decided by the supreme Court, one Gopala Shetty was an applicant before the Regional Transport authority for grant of permit along with several other applicants. However, whereas other applicants who were disappointed went up in appeal against the order of the r. T. A. , Gopala Shetty did not choose to go in appeal.
In the case decided by the supreme Court, one Gopala Shetty was an applicant before the Regional Transport authority for grant of permit along with several other applicants. However, whereas other applicants who were disappointed went up in appeal against the order of the r. T. A. , Gopala Shetty did not choose to go in appeal. When the matter was ultimately decided by the Supreme Court, it was held that the Tribunal did not have the power to give the benefit of its remand order to a nonappealing, unsuccessful applicant and that the legal position was that there would be only four application before the R. T. A. after the matter was remanded to it by the tribunal. Gopala Shett's application was not one of them and consequently, it had no jurisdiction to consider that application and grant the permit on that basis. Therefore, the High Court was in error in issuing a writ quashing the grant of permit to the appellant and in restoring the order of the R. T. A. in favour of the 1st respondent in that case. I do not think that this decision would be of avail to the petitioner in support of his contention. ( 10 ) THE petitioner cited a decision of a division Bench of the High Court of Kerala reported in (1987) 11 Reports (Ker) 58. In the said decision, it was held that applications made in response to an invitation by the r. T. A. under Section 57 (2) for grant of stage carriage permit ought to be made on or before the date fixed by the authority and since the appellant's application had been filed 8 days after the last date fixed in the notification, the same was liable to be rejected. Once again, I have to observe that the facts of this case are totally different from the facts of the case in hand. In this writ petition, the fact design is different in as much as no time limit was fixed by the R. T. A. for filing applications for grant of stage carriage permit and there was no question of an application having been filed after the last date fixed in the notification under Section 57 (2) of the Motor Vehicles Act. Therefore, the decision cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is inapplicable to the facts of this case.
Therefore, the decision cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is inapplicable to the facts of this case. ( 11 ) THE learned Counsel for the 2nd respondent has relied upon a decision of the division Bench of this Court rendered in k. S. R. T. C v K. S. TA AIR 1984 Karnataka 4. In the said case, the order impugned was that of a learned single Judge which reads as follows :"in the light of my above discussion, I allow these writ petitions. Issue a writ in the nature of mandamus to the respondent to consider and dispose of the applications made by the petitioners along with the rival applications of others for the same route or substantially the same route. "the Court held :"in our opinion, the refusal of the 'sta' to consider the application of the petitioner dehors the inter-State agreement on the grounds set out in the order would show that there is a failure to exercise jurisdiction vested on it besides constituting an error of law apparent on the face of the record. Even where an equally efficacious alternative remedy exists, where, however, fundamental rights are affected where rules of natural justice are violated, or where there is a failure on the part of the authority concerned to confine itself within the bounds of its legitimate jurisdiction or where there is a failure to exercise a jurisdiction vested in it or where there is an error of law apparent on the face of the record, a person aggrieved can invoke the extra ordinary jurisdiction of this Court under article 226 without reference to any remedy however equally efficacious it be. "again, the Court observed in para 23 of the judgment :"we, accordingly, hold that all the applications, of petitioner and respondents 6,8 and 10 along with such other applications as may relate to the same route or substantially the same route as are ripe for consideration shall have to be clubbed, considered and disposed of by the 'sta' together and that the directions issued by the learned Chief Justice granting petitioner's application requires to be set aside. We hold and answer Point (C) accordingly.
We hold and answer Point (C) accordingly. "in the said decision, the contention considered under Point (C) was that the applications of respondents 6,8 and 10 were also pending and ripe for consideration; and the omission to club and consider all the applications together was violative of the rules of natural justice ; apart from constituting a violation of the specific directions of this court in W. P. 34927/82. . . . . . . . . . . . The facts of the decision in AIR 1984 Karnataka 4 are similar to the facts of the instant case with regard to the question of clubbing the applications for grant of stage carriage permit or renewal of permit when all of them are ripe for consideration in relation to the same route. ( 12 ) IN Writ Petition Nos. 27330, 27331 and 34927 of 1982, decided on 14-10-1982, the learned single Judge of this Court has held as follows:"even in a case where a mandamus has been issued by this Court to a Transport authority to consider an application expeditiously or before a date except in a case where the mandamus expressly directs that particular application alone should be considered separately without clubbing it along with the other applications, the Transport Authority cannot read that mandamus issued by this court as directing that all rival applications for the same or substantially the same route should not be considered together. On the other hand, the transport Authority should read such a mandamus as consistent with the above principle of law and other principles that govern the applications. " ( 13 ) "in a decision given in the case of hanuman Transport Co. Ltd. , v S. T. A. T. , reported in ILR 1985 Karnataka 4132, it was held by this Court that when the applications relate to the same or substantially the same route, all such applications, if ripe for consideration, are required to be considered together as otherwise the application which is not considered is likely to be affected having regard to the fact that the question of need will be common to both the applications.
" ( 14 ) THUS, the consensus of judicial opinion is that where the applications relate to the same route or substantially the same route, for the purpose of grant of permit, it is incumbent upon the authority to club all the applications together, consider and dispose them of in accordance with law provided all the applications are ripe for consideration. This is a legal principle evolved by the Courts and affirmed by the Supreme Court. There cannot be any departure from this principle. No statutory provision under the Motor vehicles Act prohibiting such a consideration by clubbing the applications together is pointed out by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. In the circumstances, I am fortified in the view that the 1st respondent will not be exceeding either the authority or the jurisdiction to entertain the application of the 2nd respondent for grant of permit as a rival applicant for the purpose of clubbing and disposing of together with the applications of the petitioner and the 3rd respondent in respect of the same route. The fact that the route in question is common to all the three applicants is not in question at all. ( 15 ) I do not see how the petitioner will be aggrieved if the application of the 2nd respondent is to be considered along with the application of the petitioner and the 3rd respondent. I am unable to discover any legal injury as a result of such a consideration to the petitioner. The right to be considered for grant of permit vested in the 2nd respondent is neither foreclosed by any direction of this Court or the Supreme court in the connected litigation nor precluded by any of the provisions of law in the statute book. The right to be considered for the purpose of grant of stage carriage permit as a rival applicant stands on its own apart from the direction of the Court to consider together and dispose of the applications of the petitioner and the 3rd respondent. Since the route is common to all the three applicants, the exclusion of one in the course of consideration would deprive the excluded applicant of the benefit of grant of permit it the authority were to proceed to grant a stage carriage permit to either of the two applicants appearing before the authority.
Since the route is common to all the three applicants, the exclusion of one in the course of consideration would deprive the excluded applicant of the benefit of grant of permit it the authority were to proceed to grant a stage carriage permit to either of the two applicants appearing before the authority. "expressio unius est exclusio alterious" - the maximum that could be said is that unless there is a clear and specific direction from the Court prohibiting the consideration of any applicant other than the petitioner and the 3rd respondent, it is impossible to hold that the consideration of the 2nd respondent's application for grant of stage carriage permit is excluded. Looking from any angle, I am of the opinion that there is no merit in this writ petition. I may also observe that this writ petition is premature since the petitioner has approached this Court at the stage of notification and before any order is passed by the 1st respondent. Hence, I hold that the 1st respondent is justified in clubbing for consideration and disposal the applications of the petitioner and the 2nd respondent for grant of stage carriage permit along with the application of the 3rd respondent for renewal of the permit in respect of the route which is the same and ripe for consideration. ( 16 ) IN the result, for the reasons stated above, the writ petition fails and is dismissed accordingly. --- *** --- .