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1988 DIGILAW 346 (ORI)

BISANDAYAL AGARWALLA v. NANDAKISHORE GOENKA

1988-12-03

HARI LAL AGRAWAL, L.RATH

body1988
JUDGMENT : H.L. Agrawal, C.J. - This writ application arises out of a proceeding started under the provisions of the Orissa House Rent Control Act, 1967 (for short "the Act") against the Petitioner for his eviction from the shop premises in which be is carrying on business on the grounds that: (1) the landlord requires the premises in good faith for the occupation OF his son who wants to start a medicine shop and. (2) the tenant is a wilful defaulter in payment of rent. 2. The case was contested by the Petitioner who denied both the grounds and took a stand that since he did not accede to the demand of the landlord for enhancing the rent, the present action has been started. 3. The Controller (O. P. No. 2) by his order (Annexure 1) rejected the ground of wilful default but ordered eviction on the other ground accepting the landlord's case of personal requirement. An appeal was taken,by the tenant where a cross-objection was filed by the landlord against the finding of the House Rent Controller with regard to the ground of default. But both the appeal and the cross-objection were dismissed by the appellate authority (O. P. No. 3) by his order in Annexure-2. Thereafter, the Petitioner has come before this Court in this writ application. 4. Mr. Ashok Mukherjee, learned Advocate appearing for the Petitioner-tenant, assailed the impugned orders firstly on the ground that the requirement of the premises by the landlord for a major son could not be deemed to be a requirement of the landlord within the meaning of Section 7 (4) of the Act which reads as follows: (4). The landlord may, subject to the provisions of this Act, apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put him in possession of the house, if he requires the house in good faith for the occupation or use of himself, any member or his family or of any person or persons for whose benefit to house is held by him. The expression 'landlord' has been defined in Section 2 (4) of the Act as follows: 2. (4) 'Landlord' includes any person who is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent of a house whether on his own account or on behalf of another or on behalf of himself and Ors. . (Underlining is mine). The argument of Mr. The expression 'landlord' has been defined in Section 2 (4) of the Act as follows: 2. (4) 'Landlord' includes any person who is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent of a house whether on his own account or on behalf of another or on behalf of himself and Ors. . (Underlining is mine). The argument of Mr. Mukherjee is based upon the definition of 'family' occurring in the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (for short, "the 1976 Act") which reads as follows: 2. (f) 'Family', in relation to a person, means the individual, the wife or husband, as the case may be, of such individual and their unmarried minor children. On the basis of this definition, Mr. Mukherjee submitted, that a major son could not be considered to be a member of the 'family' and, therefore, the requirement of a landlord for a major son could not constitute' a bona fide, requirement "for the occupation or use of himself, any member of his family, or To a question put by the Court as to wby the definition of 'family' could be borrowed from the 1976 Act when the intention of the house Rent Control Act does not appear to give any artificial or narrow meaning to the expression 'family' understood in the common parlance as well as within the purview of the Hindu Law, he submitted that, since the premises in question situate in the town of Cuttack and the provisions of the 1976 Act also apply to the, urban areas including the town of Cuttack, the expression 'family' must be understood in the same context. The argument on the face of it is entirely misconceived and erroneous. The ambit of the 1976 Act is to provide for the imposition of a ceiling on vacant land in urban agglomerations, for the acquisition of such land in express of the ceiling limit to regulate the construction of buildings oil such land and....." It is well known that in almost all the States ceiling laws have been, enacted for, agrarian reforms and finding out larger areas from the big land holders in the rural areas for settling them with people belonging to the weaker sections of the society and for that purpose an artificial definition of 'family' has been given for narrowing down the Extent of a coparcenary. This definition is not compatible with the inclusive definition's of the expression 'landlord' in die House' Rent Control Act, nor can there be any such intention of the legislature. It cannot be disputed that an undivided son must be held to be a member of the family, and the requirement of the house for occupation of any member of the family of the landlord, or for whose benefit the house is held by him, if proved, is also the requirement of the landlord within, the mischief of Sub-section (4) of Section 7 of the House Rent Control Act. 5. It has been held by several authorities that the expression 'landlord' has to be liberally construed. The law does not aim that the requirement of the members of the family or the dependants would not be a relevant consideration for the purpose of deciding the question. 6. No argument was raised by Mr. Mukherjee that under the general law the son would not be a member of, the family with his father (landlord). 7. It is well settled that in interpreting the Statutes, the words and phrases used therein should 'be normally understood in their natural, ordinary,and popular meaning!, subject to the context. The inclusive definition of the word 'landlord' by the legislature never appears to have been intended to give a narrower definition, particularly, the artificial definition of 'family' given in the 1976 Act which had to be given in the context of the legislative intendment of that Act. The, correct rule of interpretation is to take the words as the legislature has given them and to take the meaning which the words give naturally implied where the construction of those words is intended to be controlled or altered with reference to any context or the preamble etc.. Otherwise, the. Statute must receive a construction according to its plain words. None of the expression 'landlord' and "his bona fide" requirement" is capable of two constructions: In any case there is no warrant for interpreting the expression "family" in the House Rent Control Act with reference to a 'foreign' Statute. 8. Let us now consider a few decisions on the subject where the requirement of the dependence and the members of the family (including a .major son) of a landlord has been held to be a bona fide requirement within the meaning of the analogous legislations in other States. 8. Let us now consider a few decisions on the subject where the requirement of the dependence and the members of the family (including a .major son) of a landlord has been held to be a bona fide requirement within the meaning of the analogous legislations in other States. I would first cite an old decision of the Patna High Court in the case of Bidhubhusan Sen v. Commissioner, Patna Division and Anr. AIR 1953 Pat. 496. While considering, an analogous provision of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, the Court construed the meaning of the expression "his own occupation" and held as follows: "The expression 'his own occupation' in S. 11 (3) (a) cannot be restricted only to the occupation on the landlord himself but should be given the wider and liberal meaning so as to include the occupation of persons who are leaving with the landlord and are economically dependent on him. Hence, where the landlord requires the premises for establishing-his nephew (sister's son) who is living with him and dependant on him, in business he would be entitled to an order in his favour'. The Supreme Court in the case of Jai Kishan v. Mst. Mumtaz Begum AIR 19848. C. 1890, directly answered the point. In that case, an action was taken by the landlady for eviction of a tenant under the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act. 1961 on the ground that the landlady bona fide required the, premises, in question for personal use and occupation which inter alia consisted of two,hop rooms. In that case the "personal occupation" was for the purpose of enabling her sons to carryon business in the said premises. It was held to be the requirement of the landlady herself. 9. I may also cite a converse case in Baldev Sahai Bangia Vs. R.C. Bhasin where a tenant had shifted to a foregn country leaving the other members of the family, namely, the brother, mother and sister, in the tenanted house and the landloard sought eviction on the ground that with the exit of the tenant from the house, the other members of the family could not be held as members of the family. It was held that even after the exit of the main tenant, it could not be said that the other members ceased to be the members of the family and were to be evicted on such a ground. 10. It was observed that the word 'family' occurring in the Delhi Rent Control Act (Act 59 of 1958) has not to be given a restricted meaning but a wider meaning so as to include not only the head of the family but also all .members or descendants from the common ancestors who are actually living with the same head. The Supreme Court in the case of Msco. Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others declined to interpret the expression 'industry' occurring in a notification issued under the Customs Act with reference to its definition in the Industrial Disputes Act and observed that the expression 'industry' in the Industrial Disputes Act could not be depended upon white construing other Statutes or statutory instruments and that it should be confined to the Industrial Disputes Act. 11. Although after the authoritative citations it is not necessary to embark upon any further discussion, yet let us see as to how the expression 'family' has been dealt with otherwise, In Words and Phrases (Permanent Edition, Vol. 16) at page 308-311, the word 'family' has been defined as follows: The father, the mother, and the children ordinarily constitute a 'family'. In the Chambers Dictionary also, the word 'family' has been defined thus: Family - the household, or all those who live in one house (as parents, cbildren, servants parents and their children). Again, in the Concise Oxford Dictionary, 'family' has been defined thus: Family - Members of a household, parents children, servants, etc. set of parents and children, or of relations, living together or not, persons children, All descendants of a common ancestor. The above wide definition would apply, with a stronger force in our country, particularly to people governed by the Hindu Law where blood relation do not cease to be, members of the 'family' simply on, account of the fact that they go out for some time. 12. Another argument rather flimsy, was made by Mr. Mukherjee that the landlord having set up a false plea of the Petitioner being a defaulter indicated that he wanted eviction of the Petitioner from the premises on any frivolous ground. 12. Another argument rather flimsy, was made by Mr. Mukherjee that the landlord having set up a false plea of the Petitioner being a defaulter indicated that he wanted eviction of the Petitioner from the premises on any frivolous ground. The finding regarding the falsity of this plea impinges upon the bona fides of his claim of requirement. It is difficult to accept this submission and it must be rejected being too far fetched and misconceived. It cannot be held that if a litigant who presses more than one ground for securing his relief and fails to substantiate some or anyone of them, then his whole case must be rejected. 13. Yet another submission equally an exercise in futility was made by Mr. Mukherjee. He submitted that the Rent Control Act having, expired on 4th May, 1988, i.e., at a time when this Court was considering the impugned orders, they should be annulled on this ground alone. It is not disputed that at the time the eviction application was filed and it was decided, not only by the first authority but also by the appellate authority the Act was very much in force. It is, well settled that even after the disability of eviction bad been incurred by the Petitioner notwithstanding the expiry of the Act, the landlord bad the right to enforce the cause of action accrued in his favour which did not die on the expiry of the Act. This proposition being so obvious and well settled, I do not think it necessary to enter into a detailed discussion and much less, cite any authority. 14. On a circumspection of the facts and circumstances of the case and the submissions made by counsel for the parties, I find that the writ application, is devoid of merit. It is accordingly dismissed with costs. Hearing fee is assessed at Rs. 250/-. L. Rath, J. 15. I agree. Final Result : Dismissed