BALAKRISHNA, J. ( 1 ) THESE writ petitions are preferred against the resolution of respondent-2 passed in Subject No. 149/87-88 dated 18/19-12-1987 under Annexure-A and also against the order of respondent-1 passed in U. R. P. Nos. 28 and 29/88 dated 12-5-1988 under Annexure-B. ( 2 ) ANNEXURE-A is the extract of the proceedings of the Regional Transport authority meeting held on 18/19-12-1987 at Mangalore. Annexure-B is the order passed by the Karnataka State Transport appellate Tribunal, Bangalore, dated 12-5-1988 in U. R. P. Nos. 11. 28 and 29/88. ( 3 ) IN Subject No. 149/8788, with the intent to assess the need and consider the proposal for opening of the route Manchakallu to Udupi and back via misque Junction, Mattar, Attinje, Nalku beedi, Moodubelle, Kunthala, Nagara, dendurkatte, Ramapura, Kukkikatte, korangarapady, Bailur, Udupi, the R. T. A. held its meeting on 18/19-12-1987 at mangalore, Dakshina Kannada District. The determination of the need was having regard to the provisions of Section 47 (1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 ('the act' for short) and to fix number of trips under Section 47 (3) of the Act. After consideration of the information and material available to the R. T. A. , the R. T. A. reached the conclusion that there is absolute need for introduction of a bus service on the proposed interior route in the interest of the travelling public accordingly, it resolved to open the route from Manchakallu to Udupi and back via misque junction, Mattar, Attinje, Nalku beedi. Moodubelle, Kunthala, Nagara, dendurkatte, Ramapura, Kukkikatte, korangarapady, Bailur, Udupi, as a shuttle service to perform four round trips per day by one vehicle. ( 4 ) IN U. R P. Nos. 28 and 29/88, the petitioners in these writ petitions, preferred revision petitions before the Karnataka state Transport Appellate Tribunal, bangalore ('the Tribunal' for short ). After hearing the revision petitioners, the Tribunal passed orders on 12-5-1988 on merits confirming the impugned resolution of the R. T A. and dismissing the revision petitions. ( 5 ) THE petitioners, who are the holders of stage carriage services in the district of Dakshina Kannada operating stage carriage services between Manchakal and Udupi and back and also Man- chakal to Moodabelle and back, are aggrieved by the impugned resolution and the order of the R. T. A. and the Tribunal respectively. ( 5 ) THE petitioners, who are the holders of stage carriage services in the district of Dakshina Kannada operating stage carriage services between Manchakal and Udupi and back and also Man- chakal to Moodabelle and back, are aggrieved by the impugned resolution and the order of the R. T. A. and the Tribunal respectively. ( 6 ) ACCORDING to the petitioners, the route between Manchakal and Udupi and back and also Manchakal to Moodabelle and back consisting of the entire route is common besides the portion of the route in question being common, the opening of the route is not based on sufficient consideration and does not meet the requirements of law as envisaged by the provisions of Section 47 (1) of the Act. According to the petitioners, the impugned resolution and the order suffer from mistake of fact apparent on the face of the record within jurisdiction and that the opening of the route affects the services of the petitioners materially. ( 7 ) THE short point for consideration is whether the petitioners have made out a case for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in relation to their grievance. ( 8 ) THE main contention of the petitioners is that both the R T. A and the tribunal have committed a serious mistake of fact in believing that there is no existing direct bus service between Manchakal and Udupi via the proposed route in question and that if the mistake had not been committed, the decision to open the route would not have materialised. In other words, the decision of both the r. T. A and the Tribunal are based on the error of fact aforementioned but for which the decision would have been otherwise and, therefore the petitioners have sought for a writ of certiorari to quash the resolution of respondent-2 under Annexure A as well as the order of the Tribunal in u R A. Nos. 28 and 29/88 under annexure-B. ( 9 ) THE learned Counsel appearing for respondent-3, besides arguing on merits, has raised a preliminary objection that the writ petitions does not lie even if there is an error of fact apparent on the face of the record of the resolution and the order passed by the R. T. A. and the tribunal within their jurisdiction. It is also strongly contended by the learned counsel for respondent 3 that there are no two bus services in existence between manchakal and Udupi via the proposed route and, therefore, the contention of the petitioners is misconceived. it is also contended that no material was placed before the Tribunal to negative the finding of the Secretary, R. T. A. that there is no direct bus service between Manchakal and Udupi via the proposed route. it is pointed out by the learned Counsel for respondent-3 that there is no specific plea even in the writ petitions to that effect. ( 10 ) THE learned High Court Government Pleader appearing for respondents-1 and 2 urged that the resolution passed tor opening a new route is in the nature of an administrative order and it cannot be a subject matter for judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution and, for this proposition, relied upon the decisions in Mohd. Ibrahim v. S. T A. Tribunal, Madras, AIR 1970 SC 1542 (Full bench) and Abdul Rehman v. S T A tribunal, AIR 1978 SC 949 and, moreover, the orders impugned are concurrent in nature emerging from due consideration by a specially constituted forum. Hence, it was submitted that the writ petitions should not be entertained at all. The learned Government Pleader has also submitted that the petitioners are at liberty to make an application for grant of stage carriage permit in respect of new route apart from agitating their rights for proper fixation of timing schedule which would not affect their legitimate interests in the operation of their services. The relevant provision of law for consideration is Section 47 (1 ) (a) to (f) of the Act which reads thus:"47. The relevant provision of law for consideration is Section 47 (1 ) (a) to (f) of the Act which reads thus:"47. Procedure of Regional Transport Authority in considering application for stage carriage permit : (1) A Regional Transport Authority shall, in considering an application for a stage carriage permit, have regard to the following matters, namely : - (a) the interest of the public generally ; (b) the advantages to the public of the service to be provided, including the saving of time likely to be effected thereby and any convenience arising from journeys not being broken ; (c) the adequacy of other passanger transport services operating or likely to operate in the near future, whether by road or other means, between the places to be served ; (d) the benefit to any particular locality or localities likely to be afforded by the service ; (e) the operation by the applicant of other transport services, including those in respect of which applications from him for permits are pending. (f) the condition of the roads included in the proposed route or area and shall also take into consideration any representations made by persons already providing passenger transport facilities by any means along or near the proposed route or area, or by any association representing persons interested in the provision of road transport facilities recognised in this behalf by the State Government, or by any local authority or police authority within whose jurisdiction any pact of the proposed route or area lies. "section 47 (1 ) (a) to (f) describe the matters to which the R. T A. shall have due regard while considering an application for a stage carriage permit. ( 11 ) FACTORS such as the interest of the public generally, the advantages to the public of the services to be provided, the adequacy or inadequacy of other passenger transport services operating or likely to operate, the benefit to any particular locality resulting, the operation by the applicant of other transport services, the condition of the roads in the proposed route are the various factors among others which should weigh in the mind of the authority for the purpose of deciding the question of opening the route. ( 12 ) THERE can be no two opinion that the determination of these factors which ultimately go into the decision to open a new route involve determination of questions of fact giving raise to findings of fact. The adequacy or inadequacy of such a determination, the sufficiency or insufficiency of the material contemplated under the said provision of law also involve appreciation of questions of fact. ( 13 ) UNLESS there is a total non- consideration of the material which ought to have been considered or where there is a perverse appreciation of facts, it is hard to reconcile how, under Art. 226 of the constitution, this Court could exercise its extraordinary power. It is a well settled principle of law that the High Court, while dealing with a quasi judicial order, will not, ordinarily, re-assess the evidence on which the conclusion in that order is rested (Nissar Ahmed, v. State of Mysore and Am. . 1970 (2) Mys. L. J. 199; In state of Andhra Pradesh and others v. Chitra Venkata Rao, AIR 1975 SC 2151 , it was held that an error of law which is apparent on the face of the record could be corrected by a writ but not an error of fact however grave it may appear to be. In Ramachandrappa v. Dist. Magistrate, bangalore and another, 1976 (2) Kar. L J. 354, this Court held that the High Court in the exercise of its power under Article 226 does not act as a Court of appeal. Similarly, in Shiva Murthy v. State of karnataka, 1980 (1)Kar. LJ. S. N 61, the view taken by this Court was that the high Court is not a Court of appeal to re assess the evidence under Article 226. In the case of Jagadish Prasad Shastri v. State of U. P. and others, MR 1971 SC 1224, the Supreme Court held that the high Court should not interfere in case of disputed facts. ( 14 ) THERE is a plethora of Judicial decisions on the principles referred to above sounding a common note of caution regarding the restraint that has to be exercised by the High Court in the course of the exercise of its power under Article 226 of the Constitution where not only the questions of fact are involved but also disputed questions of fact. I may also make it clear that if it had been pointed out convincingly that either the r. T. A. or the Tribunal had decided any question of law incorrectly or that there had been any error of law within or outside the jurisdiction, I would have quashed the impugned orders. It is difficult for me to hold that the grievance of the petitioners involves a jurisdictional question or a jurisdictional error. ( 15 ) EVEN assuming that the argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is true that both the R. T. A. and the tribunal have been misled to think that these was no direct bus service between manchakal and Udupi via the proposed route in question, it is difficult to hold that the decision of the entire case rested on this point. An examination of the discussion made by both the R. T. A. and the Tribunal on the need for opening the route reveals that not only adequate attention has been paid to the requirements contemplated under Section 47 (1) of the Act, but also a clear application of judicial mind before deciding to open a new route. Mere inadequacy here and there of one or two factors would not vitiate the resolution of the R. T. A. and the order passed by the Tribunal. As already pointed out, unless there is utter perversity in the appreciation of evidence or a serious error of fact apparent on the face of record which, according to me, is not the case in these writ petitions, it is not possible to hold that the impugned resolution and the order are not sustainable in law. The well-known and the recognised method of securing information and material has been adopted by the R. T. A. in the nature of a route survey report not from the Inspector of Motor vehicles, but from the Secretary, R. T. A. himself. I do not find any material irregularity in procedural formality and I also do not find any legal infirmity in the report submitted by the Secretary, R. T. A. In this context, it is relevant to extract a portion of the judgment of the Supreme court rendered in the case of Mohd. I do not find any material irregularity in procedural formality and I also do not find any legal infirmity in the report submitted by the Secretary, R. T. A. In this context, it is relevant to extract a portion of the judgment of the Supreme court rendered in the case of Mohd. Ibrahim v. S. T A. Tribunal, Madras, AIR 1970 SC 1542 :"the Regional Transport Authority on the other hand while acting under section 47 (3) of the Act is the master of its own procedure because it does not deal with individual or competing rights of operators but is required to arrive objectively at its own conclusion independent of any application or representation by operators. "applying the said principle to the facts of these cases based on the material on record, I am of the opinion that the purpose and requirements of Section 47 (1) and (3) of the Act have been duly met by the R. T. A. and it could be fairly and reasonably said that the R. T. A. has discharged its statutory duty objectively in deciding to open a new route notwithstanding the stiff opposition offered by the petitioners themselves. Discretion has been exercised on reasonable grounds. I may refer to an observation of Lord Wrenbury in the present context :"a person in whom is vested a discretion must exercise his discretion upon reasonable grounds. A discretion does not empower a man to do what he likes merely because he is minded to do so------he must in the exercise of his discretion do, not what he likes but what he ought. In other words, he must by the use of his reason, ascertain and follow the course which reason directs. He must act reasonably. "further more, there is no reason to interfere with the impugned order since the petitioners have not demonstrated to my satisfaction that there is misunderstanding or ignorance of an established fact or acting upon an incorrect basis of fact in order to constitute a serious error of material fact. ( 16 ) THE submission made by the learned Government Pleader on behalf of respondents-1 and 2 carries conviction. ( 16 ) THE submission made by the learned Government Pleader on behalf of respondents-1 and 2 carries conviction. It is true that the petitioners have ths liberty to contest the timings and to obtain the fair and reasonable schedule of timings for the operation of their services in the light of the opening of the new route before the competent authority and that right or liberty is not taken away in the circumstances of these cases. ( 17 ) FOR the reasons stated above, I do not consider it just and proper to interfere with the impugned resolution of the r. T A. and the impugned order of the tribunal under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. ( 18 ) THE Writ Petitions, therefore, fail and are dismissed. No order as to costs. Writ petitions dismissed. --- *** --- .