JUDGMENT : P.C. Misra, J. - These two appeals arise out a common order disposing of Mise. Cases Nos. 69 and 70 of 17 arising cut of O.S. No. 1 of 1987 pending before one of the Hon'ble Judges of this Court for trial. In Mise Case No. 69/87 the Plaintiff prayed for discovery of some documents under Order 11, Rule 12 CPC the production of which was prayed for in another application under Order 11, Rule 14 CPC registered as Misc. Case No. 7087 The Hon'ble Single Judge after hearing, both parties directed Defendants 1 to 3 to make discovery and produce the documents described in items (8)(C)(D) of the petition within a time fixed by the Court. 2. Since both the appeals are interlinked, they were heard analogously at the request of the parties and are disposed of by this judgment. The suit out of which the aforesaid Mise Cases arose is one for recovery of a sum of Rs. 1 crore as damages from the Defendants for the alleged libelous publication in the Magazine. The illustrated Weekly of India of which Bennett Coleman and Company ltd (Defendant No. 1) is the Proprietor, Pritish Nandy (Defendant No. 2) is the Editor and Publisher and Sri S.N. Abdi (Defendant No. 3) is the Special CorRespondent In the plaint it was alleged that the Defendants are joint tort-feasor and are jointly and severally liable to pay the damages claimed: In the written statement of Defendant No. 1 it denied its liability to pay the damages saying that there is absolutely no nexus between Defendant No. 1 and the alleged defamation as neither the Board of Directors of the Company of Defendant No. 1 nor the whole time Directors have had anything to do with the alleged contents of the issue of the Illustrated Weekly of India and that the Defendant No. 1 cannot be held responsible for what the Editor publishes in the Magazine because he has the full freedom to publish what no deems fit for publication in the Magazine. Since the plaint alleges that Defendant No. 1 being the Principal/employer/Master of Defendant No. 2 and that Defendant No. 2 has printed published circulated the said issue of illustrated Weekly in the course of and within the ambit of his employment under Defendant No. 1 Defendant No. 1 would be vicariously liable for damages Defendant No. 1 in its written statement has denied its liability stating that the Defendant No. 2 the editor of the magazine, is at no point of time the agent of Defendant No. 1 and that Defendant No. 2 has printed and published the said alleged offending article in the Magazine in exercise of his freedom as an Editor. Defendants 2 and 3 have taken similar stand in their defence. The Plaintiff in his application under Order 11, Rule 12. CPC prayed for directing Defendants 1 and 2 to make discovery of documents mentioned in sub-pares (A) to (E) of para 1 of his application alleging that in view of the aforesaid pleadings, those documents are relevant for adjudication of the case. Out of the aforesaid documents, the learned Counsel appearing for the Plaintiff did not press for discovery/production of the documents mentioned in items (A) and (E), and therefore, the learned Single Judge considered the desirability of discovery and production of the remaining documents. The present Appellants (Defendants 1 and 3) and proforma Respondent No. 2 filed their objection to the said applications stating that the documents in question are not relevant and that the move of the Plaintiff is bona fide. With respect to the documents described in item (D) it was stated that the same has been seized by the police in connection with G.R. Case No 959/86 pending in the Court of the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Rourkela. The learned Single Judge after considering the contentions of both parties, allowed both the applications by directing Defendants 1 to 3 to give discovery of and produce upon oath the documents described in items (B), (C) and (D) of para 1 of the application. The Appellants challenged the legality of the said order in both these appeals. Their Lordships then stated the contentions and found: 3. The Appellants challenged the legality of the said order in both these appeals. Their Lordships then stated the contentions and found: 3. Before we discuss the question of law in support of which several decisions have been cited as aforesaid, it may be noted that this Court not being a chattered High Court, it has no jurisdiction to entertain suits in the original side. Transfer of a suit from the court of Subordinate Judge to this Court for trial in the original side is almost an unprecedented or a rara event in this High Court. Admittedly Defendants are being represented in the suit by Senior Counsel who filed Civil Revisions against the order impugned in these appeals. The Civil Revision were filed in the Court on 11-4-1988, a lit tie more than a month before the Summer Vacation of the courts, but the same were placed for admission before a Single Judge of this Court, on 24-6-1988 soon after the courts reopened on 17-6-1988 after Summer Vacation. As it was felt that a learned Single Judge of this Court cannot exercise revisional jurisdiction against an order passed by the same court, the Appellant who were Petitioners in the said revisions moved the Hon'ble the Chief Justice for placing the Civil Revisions before a Division Bench, which according to the learned Counsel was competent to exercise the revisional jurisdiction. The Civil revision were ultimately placed before a Division Bench which examined the question of maintainability and ultimately found that a learned Single Judge would not be a Court subordinate to the Division Bench even though a Division Bench may exercise Appellate jurisdiction in certain circumstances. Decisions relied upon by the Appellants of some other High Courts in support of their contention that a Division Bench is competent to revise the order of a learned Single Judge were not accepted by the Court and the civil revisions were dismissed on that ground It is under these circumstances, the Appellants filed SLP in the Hon'ble Supreme Court challenging the order of this Court passed in civil revisions as well as filed independent SLP challenging the various order of the learned Single Judge. According to them, they were advised-simultaneously during the discussion on 1-8-1988 and 2-8-1988 by a Senior Advocate Mr. Soli Sorabij to file letters Patent Appeals in this Court which were in fact filed four days thereafter. According to them, they were advised-simultaneously during the discussion on 1-8-1988 and 2-8-1988 by a Senior Advocate Mr. Soli Sorabij to file letters Patent Appeals in this Court which were in fact filed four days thereafter. In view of the contentions raised by the learned Counsel for the Respondent No. 1, the question for consideration is whether the Appellants persued their remedy diligently and whether the aforesaid circumstances should be taken as sufficient justification explaining the delay caused. Mr. Patnaik learned Counsel for Respondent No. 1 has argued at length with reference to the subsequent orders passed by the learned Singh Judge to emphasize that the suit was being posted for commencement of trial and even then the Appellants did not take the matter seriously to effectively challenge different orders against which they have now filed appeals under matters Patent. He has also argued that filing of the Civil Revisions against the orders of a Single Judge before a Division Bench of the same High Court cannot but be a reckless advice by the counsel for which reason they would not be entitled to the protection by condo nation of delay, He also pointed out that even after the filing of the civil revisions no step appears to have been taken for getting the same listed for admission and matters were left to take their own course in the usual way without paying any attention whatsoever to the urgency of the situation and the consequent suffering of the Plaintiff. After going though the various orders passed by the learned Single Judge, we find that various applications were being filed from time to time by the Plaintiff under different provisions of the CPC and each application was being fought out by these Appellants As a matter of fact, on 9-3-1928 the learned Single Judge passed orders in respect of many such applications including the orders impugned in these appeals. Though law of limitation permits 90 days for filing of civil revisions, the civil revisions were filed on 11-4-1988 by these Appellants. There is nothing on record to indicate as to whether or not any move was made by the Appellants to get the civil revisions listed, but the civil revisions got listed some time after the Courts reopened after the Summer Vacation. The Civil revisions were ultimately disposed of on 7-7-1988 by a Division Bench of this Court. There is nothing on record to indicate as to whether or not any move was made by the Appellants to get the civil revisions listed, but the civil revisions got listed some time after the Courts reopened after the Summer Vacation. The Civil revisions were ultimately disposed of on 7-7-1988 by a Division Bench of this Court. The Civil Revisions were not dismissed as the orders impugned therein were applicable and, therefore, not revisable, but on the ground that the learned Single Judge was not a court subordinate to the Division Bench of this Court within the meaning of Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. The decision reported in AIR 1901 S.C. 1786 was no doubt noticed in the said judgment, but neither any contention appears to have been raised non there is any observation by the said Bench to the effect that the orders in question being appeasable the same were not amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of the Court. The Civil Revisions were admittedly filed on the advice of Senior Counsel of this Court and in the circumstances we do not think that the counsel for the Appellants can be said to have taken no reasonable care or did not give proper attention in choosing the remedy. 4. Mr. Patnaik learned Counsel appearing for Respondent No. 1 has relied on a number of decisions of this Court as well as of different High Courts including the decisions of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 19705 S.C. 1951 in support of his contention that wrong advice by counsel is not per se sufficient cause to justify condo nation of delay. Discussion of the individual cases is not necessary as the Hon'ble Supreme Court has consolidated and exposed the law on the subject in clear terms in the decision mentioned above. Their lordships observed that mistake of a counsel may in certain circumstances be taken into account in condo nation of delay although there is no general proposition that mistake of a counsel by itself is always a sufficient ground It depends upon the question whether the mistake was bona fide or was merely advice to cover up the ulterior purpose such as laches on the part of the litigant or an attempt to save limitation in an under-hand way. In a very recent decision of the Supreme Court reported in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Another Vs. Mst. In a very recent decision of the Supreme Court reported in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Another Vs. Mst. Katiji and Others, their Lordship have indicated that the Courts should adopt a liberal approach in considering a prayer for condonation of delay. The justification for adopting a liberal approach has been indicated by their Lordships wherein their lordships have expressed that there is no presumption that the delay has occasioned deliberately or on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fide. Their lordships have also placed an record the consequence of refusing to condone the delay and compared the same with the consequence which may follow if the delay is condoned and advised to make justifiably liberal approach in such matters. 5. Applying the aforesaid principles, we are unable to hold that the omissions of the Appellants to choose the remedy against the impugned orders by filing appeals under letters Patent at an earlier stage cannot but be a bona fide mistake on the part of the counsel for these Appellants and not advice to cover up the laches or a mala fide move to get the delay condoned. It has been clearly stated in the subsequent affidavit filed on behalf of the Appellants that though they did consult very senior reputed Advocates practicing in the Supreme Court for the purpose of filing Special leave Petitions, none did advise to file the letters Patent Appeals except Mr. Soli Sorabji, Senior Advocate who incidentally appeared in the case reported in Shah Babulal Khimji Vs. Jayaben D. Kania and Another, Their lordships in the decision reported in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Another Vs. Mst. Katiji and Others, have indicated that every day's delay must be explained does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. The doctrine according to their lordships must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner and it has been further indicated that the expression "sufficient cause" is sufficiently elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub-serves the ends of justice. 6. Though the application praying for condonation of delay is captioned to be an application u/s 5 and 14 of the limitation Act, the principles of latter Section has practically no application to the facts of these cases except the period during which the Civil Revisions were pending in this Court. 6. Though the application praying for condonation of delay is captioned to be an application u/s 5 and 14 of the limitation Act, the principles of latter Section has practically no application to the facts of these cases except the period during which the Civil Revisions were pending in this Court. Taking into consideration, the facts and circumstances discussed above, we feel inclined to condone the delay in presentation of the appeals It is also consistent with the approach generally made by this Court in such matters. 7. Coming to the other preliminary objection relating to maintainability of the appeals, reference was made to the decision reported in Shah Babulal Khimji Vs. Jayaben D. Kania and Another, in which their Lordships have very elaborately dealt with the scope of the letters Patent Appeal from orders of a Single Judge. In the judgment pronounced to-day in A.H.Os. 37 and 39 of 1988 we have discussed tile guidelines as laid by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case reference to which may be made for the purposes of these appeals. Their lordships have held that whenever a trial Judge decides a controversy which affects valuable rights of one of the parties, it must be treated to be a judgment within the meaning of letters Patent whether or not the said order is appeal able under Order 43, Rule 1 IPC. The concept of the expression 'judgment' used in letters Patent, as their lordships have indicated, cannot be equated with the definition contained in the Code of Civil Procedure. In the said case, it has been held that every interlocutory order cannot be regarded as a judgment but only those orders would be 'judgment' which decide matters of moment or affect vital and valuable rights of the parties and which works serious injustice to the party concerned Approaching the matter from another angle, an order substantially affecting the rights of the parties or which decides matters of moment touching the rights or liabilities of the parties cannot strictly speaking be termed as interlocutory order. According to the principle laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in earlier cases, it is neither warranted nor justified to infer that the order which is not final must be an inter locutory order. 8. According to the principle laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in earlier cases, it is neither warranted nor justified to infer that the order which is not final must be an inter locutory order. 8. In the present case, the learned Single Judge disposed of an application under Order 11, Rule 12 and an application under Order 11, Rule 14 CPC both of which relate to the discovery and production of the same set of documents. Rule 12 of Order 11 deals with discovery of documents. It provides that any party to a suit may apply to the Court for an order directing another party to the same suit to make discovery on oath all the documents which are or have been in his possession or power relating to any matter in question therein. It gives the discretion to the Court either to refuse or adjourn the same if it is satisfied that such discovery is not necessary or not necessary at that stage of the suit or make such order either generally or limited to certain classes of documents depending upon the circumstances of the case. If the Court is satisfied that the documents of which discovery is sought for, relate to any matter in question, it may issue a direction accordingly. He party against whom such an order has been made is required under Rule 13, of the said Order to file an affidavit specifying which (if any) of the documents therein mentioned, he objects to produce in the prescribed form with such variance as the circumstances may require A party directed under this rule to make discovery of documents is not bound to produce them unless an order for production of the same has been passed by the Court. Rule 14 empowers the Court to make order for production by any party to the suit, on oath of such documents which are in his possession or power relation to any matter in question in such suit. As already stated the Plaintiff-Respondent No. 1 simultaneously filed both the applications i.e. for discovery and production of documents which the learned Single Judge disposed of by a common order directing discovery as well as production of the documents in question as the documents were common in both the applications Mr. As already stated the Plaintiff-Respondent No. 1 simultaneously filed both the applications i.e. for discovery and production of documents which the learned Single Judge disposed of by a common order directing discovery as well as production of the documents in question as the documents were common in both the applications Mr. Mohanty learned Counsel appearing for the Appellants strenuously urged that the impugned order which simultaneously directs for discovery and production of the documents substantially affects the rights of the Defendants inasmuch as they were deprived of the opportunity of filing an affidavit under Rule 13 of Order 11 CPC specifying the documents which they object to produce His further contention is that so far as the documents under item No. D of the application is concerned, they had clearly stated in their counter supported by an affidavit that the same had been seized by the police in G.R. Case No. 259 of 1986 pending in the Court of Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Rourkela, thereby stating that the said documents are neither in their possession nor power. According to Mr. Mohanty appearing for the Appellants, the learned Single Judge having not given any opportunity to the present Appellants to file an affidavit in terms of Rule 11 and by directing discovery and production of documents which are admittedly not in their possession or power, they have been seriously prejudiced as non-compliance of the directions would result in penal consequence of striking out their defence. It is also contended that the impugned order not only affects their vital and valuable rights, but works serious injustice to them. In this view of the matter, it has been urged by the Appellants that the impugned order satisfied the tests laid down by the Supreme Court in the above mentioned case to be treated as a "judgment" within the meaning the of letters Patent. Mr. Patnaik appearing for Respondent No. 1 fairly conceded that the Statuary right given to a party against whom an order of discovery has been made to file an affidavit specifying his objection to produce any of the documents, cannot be taken a way nor the learned Single Judge purports to take away such right. Mr. Patnaik appearing for Respondent No. 1 fairly conceded that the Statuary right given to a party against whom an order of discovery has been made to file an affidavit specifying his objection to produce any of the documents, cannot be taken a way nor the learned Single Judge purports to take away such right. Accepting the aforesaid interpretation, the necessary consequence would be that it was open to the Appellants to file such an affidavit in spite of the direction to produce the documents contained in the said order He has further urged that the learned Single Judge has noticed the objection of the present Appellants that the documents under item (D) had been seized by the police in connection with a criminal case and has, therefore, made an observation in the impugned order itself that if that be so the Plaintiffs are free to call for the said documents from the appropriate authority. It may be a correct proposition of law as contended by Mr. Patnaik that an application under Rules 12 and 14 of Order 11 CPC can be simultaneously filed, but the order for discovery and production should not be passed at the same time without giving opportunity to the party to file his objection as contemplated under Rule 13 of the said Order. In view of the concession made by Mr. Patnaik as stated earlier, we would merely clarify that the impugned order does not prohibit the present Appellants to file an affidavit objecting to the production of the documents in respect of which order of discovery has been made III this back ground, we feel that as the impugned order does not expressly spell out of such opportunity and the direction for production of the document, was given simultaneously, there was a scope for confusion. The Appellants shall suffer no injury it they are given such opportunity i.e. to file the affidavit as provided ill Rule 13 of Order 11 CPC within a date to be fixed by the learned Single Judge. In the context of the aforesaid clarification it can no longer be said that the impugned order affects any of the vital or valuable rights of the Appellants to as to classify the same as "judgment" within the meaning of letters Patent. 9. During the course of argument Mr. In the context of the aforesaid clarification it can no longer be said that the impugned order affects any of the vital or valuable rights of the Appellants to as to classify the same as "judgment" within the meaning of letters Patent. 9. During the course of argument Mr. Patnaik, learned Counsel for Plaintiff Respondent No. 1 referred to the necessity of the discovery and production of documents mentioned in his applications which according to him are necessary to establish that the Defendants are jointly and severally liable to pay the damages claimed in the suit and the liability of Defendant No. 1 is also on account of the relationship of Defendant No. 1 with Defendants 2 and 3 as Principal and Agent or Employer and Employee or Master and Servant. Mr. Mohanty objected to the production of the documents enumerated under items (B) and (C) saying that the same seeks to disclose the remuneration or salary payable to Defendants 2 and 3 which is as a matter of secrecy, as usually maintained by news papers and the disclosure of which is irrelevant so far as the Plaintiff's suit is concerned. Mr. Patnaik in his reply stated that the Plaintiff is only interested to establish their inter se relationship for the purpose of establishing the vicarious liability of Defendant No. 1 and that the liability of Defendants 1 to 3 is joint and several, and not the amount of pay/remuneration payable by Defendant No 1 to Defendants 2 and 3 It would, therefore, be open to Mr. Mohanty to object the production of documents or parts of the documents which would disclose the quantum of pay/remuneration, if at all payable to Defendants 2 and 3 and such objection being taken, it would be open to the learned Single Judge to pass appropriate orders as it would think fit and proper. 10. In the result, both the appeals are dismissed subject to the clarification made in the preceding paragraphs No costs. Final Result : Dismissed