Judgment S. Shamsul Hasan, J. Plaintiffs are the petitioners here in this application against an adverse order passed under Section 14 of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) 2. The opposite party, undisputedly, have been a tenant in the premises in question since 1968 and are paying a rent of Rs.275/- per month since then till today. Attempt to get the rent enhance by the petitioners have failed. The plaintiffs’ petitioners have filed the suit seeking eviction of the opposite party, a public sector under taking, on the ground of personal necessity. Succinctly stated, the personal necessity is that plaintiff no.1, who has been a practising lawyer of the Patna High Court and the working editor of the Bihar Bar Council Journal, published from Patna, now wants to shift his practice to Samastipur, which is his home district, his village Dhurlakh being about 2 kms. Away, Further his brother who is living in his home village wants also to shift to Samastipur to continue his law practice in Samastipur, because it is inconvenient for him to traval the distances from the village to the town everyday. 3. What was required to be examined by the Court below was (i) whether the requirement of the plaintiff petitioners amounted to a personal necessity at all and (ii) if so, whether it was bonafide ? It cannot be doubted that a person who is in the large profession can seek the eviction of a tenant to start his practice in a building that belongs to him. This has been held to be a good personal necessity. The next question, however, is of more important whether the personal necessity is bonafide one or not ? The Court below has held that the personal necessity is not a bonafide one and the purpose for the suit is to get as enhancement of the rent or may say so – having failed to get enhancement, recourse has been taken to this proceeding. The reason for coming to the adverse finding are as follows :- (i) It is incredible that a person practising in a High Court would even think of shifting to a lower court and by a didactic expression states that generally people want to go to higher place and not to a lower place. The reason for coming to the adverse finding are as follows :- (i) It is incredible that a person practising in a High Court would even think of shifting to a lower court and by a didactic expression states that generally people want to go to higher place and not to a lower place. (ii) The plaintiffs have got other houses in the town of Samastipur. (iii) Plaintiff Sadhu Sharan Sahai has got a house in Patna at Boring Road, which according to the plaintiffs is a rented one but no proof according to the Court below has been brought on the record in regard to this (iv) The reasons for his resigning from the post of Managing Editor of the Bihar State Bar Council Journal has not been indicated, and (v) It is completely inconvenient for plaintiffs no.2 to shift from his village to Samastipur thus unsettling the status quo of 35 years. In my view, all these reasons are not only untenable in law but utterly ridiculous and the munsif concerned should be more circumspect in dealing with this question and not be ridiculously pedantic as he has been. If a man decides to shift from the High Court to a District Court, it cannot be described as going from a higher place to a lower place. The whole inference of the court below is devoid of any commonsense. It depends on the situation, a person is place in. There is nothing to indicate that this assertion of the plaintiffs is false and the plaintiffs had no desire to go there. The inferences arrived at by the Court below, therefore, were entirely conjecture There have been numerous instances when for private reasons, people have abandoned their practice from High Court and shifted to lower Courts and there is nothing unusual about this. 4. The second ground that the plaintiffs have other houses is no longer a good ground for defeating the claim of personal necessity nor only on the basis of the decisions but the law itself. The plaintiff has right to choose the premises which he needs for his personal use. 4. The second ground that the plaintiffs have other houses is no longer a good ground for defeating the claim of personal necessity nor only on the basis of the decisions but the law itself. The plaintiff has right to choose the premises which he needs for his personal use. The next ground that the plaintiffs are unable to prove whether plaintiff Sadhu Sharan Sahai has a flat in Patna on rent is hardly of any consequence Even if he has a private house of his own, he can still decide to shift to Samastipur and that would not affect his claim of personal necessity. His resignation from the Bar Council clearly indicates at least that he desires to bring about some change in his way of life. One does not have to state reasons whenever a person resigns from a particular office. The need of the brother also cannot be rejected merely on the ground that it is unsettling a settled situation If the shifting from Patna to Samastipur was coming down, surely shifting from the village to Samastipur was an effort to climb up. On that ridiculous logic of the Court below also the necessity of plaintiff no.2 could not be doubted. 5. Learned counsel for the opposite party Mr. Y.V. Giri vehemently submitted that all this talk of personal necessity is, according to him, a camouflage to get enhancement of rent and, therefore, it should not be accepted as valid personal necessity, I am not prepared to accept this submission because I do not see any nexus between the two situations. A landlord may at the same time, seek an enhancement of rent and claim eviction on the ground of personal necessity. The evidence led on behalf of the plaintiffs, as stated in the impugned judgment, was placed in extenso before me. I feel that the plaintiffs have completely succeeded in establishing a case of bonafide personal necessity which could not be detracted in cross examination It was further argued that in civil revision re- appraisal of evidence is not required Firstly it is now well settled that revisional jurisdiction under section 14 of the B.B.C. Act, does not operate within the same restrictions as an application under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The scope is much larger and that apart, the appraisal of evidence by the trial court was so utterly ridiculous that an interference is the only thing that is justified. It had no valid reasons to come to the finding it did in law or on fact. As I have said, the evidence on behalf of the plaintiffs was utterly convincing and cogent. 6. I, therefore, hold that the plaintiffs have been able to make out a good case for personal necessity and the defendants opposite party are entitled to be evicted on that ground. 7. In the result, this application is allowed with cost and the judgment of the court below is set aside. The plaintiffs are now entitled to evict the defendants tenants opposite party from the premises in suit in accordance with law. Application allowed. 1989 BBCJ 126 PATNA HIGH COURT S. SHAMSUL HASAN, J. Sadhu Sharan Sahai & anr. – Petitioner Vs. National Seeds Corporation Ltd. & ors. - Opp. party C.R. no. 444 of 1988 Decided On : 6-10-1988 Advocates Appeared : For the Petitioners : M/s Satyendra Krishna Prasad & Kaushal Kumar For the Opposite Party : M/s Y.V. Giri and Jyoti Saran. Bihar Building (Lease, Rent & Eviction) control Act, 1982, Sec. (11) (c) – Court has to find out whether (i) the requirement of landlord amounts to personal necessity at all, and (ii) whether the personal necessity is bonafide Court rejecting the claim of the landlord on conjectures and that the landlord has right to choose between the premises as to which one will satisfy his need-order rejecting claim vitiated. (Para 3 & 4) Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) control Act, 1982, Sec. 14(8) – Power exercised by High Court is not restricted as that exercised under Section 115. C.P.C – the scope of revisional power under this section is much larger – where appraisal of evidence was so utterly ridiculous High Court will interfere. (Para 5) Against the judgment dated 18th December, 1987, passed in Eviction Suit No. 13 of 1984 by Sri Hari Lal Singh, Munsif 2nd Court, Samastipur S. Shamsul Hasan, J. Plaintiffs are the petitioners here in this application against an adverse order passed under Section 14 of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) 2. The opposite party, undisputedly, have been a tenant in the premises in question since 1968 and are paying a rent of Rs.275/- per month since then till today. Attempt to get the rent enhance by the petitioners have failed. The plaintiffs’ petitioners have filed the suit seeking eviction of the opposite party, a public sector under taking, on the ground of personal necessity. Succinctly stated, the personal necessity is that plaintiff no.1, who has been a practising lawyer of the Patna High Court and the working editor of the Bihar Bar Council Journal, published from Patna, now wants to shift his practice to Samastipur, which is his home district, his village Dhurlakh being about 2 kms. Away, Further his brother who is living in his home village wants also to shift to Samastipur to continue his law practice in Samastipur, because it is inconvenient for him to traval the distances from the village to the town everyday. 3. What was required to be examined by the Court below was (i) whether the requirement of the plaintiff petitioners amounted to a personal necessity at all and (ii) if so, whether it was bonafide ? It cannot be doubted that a person who is in the large profession can seek the eviction of a tenant to start his practice in a building that belongs to him. This has been held to be a good personal necessity. The next question, however, is of more important whether the personal necessity is bonafide one or not ? The Court below has held that the personal necessity is not a bonafide one and the purpose for the suit is to get as enhancement of the rent or may say so – having failed to get enhancement, recourse has been taken to this proceeding. The reason for coming to the adverse finding are as follows :- (i) It is incredible that a person practising in a High Court would even think of shifting to a lower court and by a didactic expression states that generally people want to go to higher place and not to a lower place. (ii) The plaintiffs have got other houses in the town of Samastipur. (ii) The plaintiffs have got other houses in the town of Samastipur. (iii) Plaintiff Sadhu Sharan Sahai has got a house in Patna at Boring Road, which according to the plaintiffs is a rented one but no proof according to the Court below has been brought on the record in regard to this (iv) The reasons for his resigning from the post of Managing Editor of the Bihar State Bar Council Journal has not been indicated, and (v) It is completely inconvenient for plaintiffs no.2 to shift from his village to Samastipur thus unsettling the status quo of 35 years. In my view, all these reasons are not only untenable in law but utterly ridiculous and the munsif concerned should be more circumspect in dealing with this question and not be ridiculously pedantic as he has been. If a man decides to shift from the High Court to a District Court, it cannot be described as going from a higher place to a lower place. The whole inference of the court below is devoid of any commonsense. It depends on the situation, a person is place in. There is nothing to indicate that this assertion of the plaintiffs is false and the plaintiffs had no desire to go there. The inferences arrived at by the Court below, therefore, were entirely conjecture There have been numerous instances when for private reasons, people have abandoned their practice from High Court and shifted to lower Courts and there is nothing unusual about this. 4. The second ground that the plaintiffs have other houses is no longer a good ground for defeating the claim of personal necessity nor only on the basis of the decisions but the law itself. The plaintiff has right to choose the premises which he needs for his personal use. The next ground that the plaintiffs are unable to prove whether plaintiff Sadhu Sharan Sahai has a flat in Patna on rent is hardly of any consequence Even if he has a private house of his own, he can still decide to shift to Samastipur and that would not affect his claim of personal necessity. His resignation from the Bar Council clearly indicates at least that he desires to bring about some change in his way of life. One does not have to state reasons whenever a person resigns from a particular office. His resignation from the Bar Council clearly indicates at least that he desires to bring about some change in his way of life. One does not have to state reasons whenever a person resigns from a particular office. The need of the brother also cannot be rejected merely on the ground that it is unsettling a settled situation If the shifting from Patna to Samastipur was coming down, surely shifting from the village to Samastipur was an effort to climb up. On that ridiculous logic of the Court below also the necessity of plaintiff no.2 could not be doubted. 5. Learned counsel for the opposite party Mr. Y.V. Giri vehemently submitted that all this talk of personal necessity is, according to him, a camouflage to get enhancement of rent and, therefore, it should not be accepted as valid personal necessity, I am not prepared to accept this submission because I do not see any nexus between the two situations. A landlord may at the same time, seek an enhancement of rent and claim eviction on the ground of personal necessity. The evidence led on behalf of the plaintiffs, as stated in the impugned judgment, was placed in extenso before me. I feel that the plaintiffs have completely succeeded in establishing a case of bonafide personal necessity which could not be detracted in cross examination It was further argued that in civil revision re- appraisal of evidence is not required Firstly it is now well settled that revisional jurisdiction under section 14 of the B.B.C. Act, does not operate within the same restrictions as an application under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The scope is much larger and that apart, the appraisal of evidence by the trial court was so utterly ridiculous that an interference is the only thing that is justified. It had no valid reasons to come to the finding it did in law or on fact. As I have said, the evidence on behalf of the plaintiffs was utterly convincing and cogent. 6. I, therefore, hold that the plaintiffs have been able to make out a good case for personal necessity and the defendants opposite party are entitled to be evicted on that ground. 7. In the result, this application is allowed with cost and the judgment of the court below is set aside. 6. I, therefore, hold that the plaintiffs have been able to make out a good case for personal necessity and the defendants opposite party are entitled to be evicted on that ground. 7. In the result, this application is allowed with cost and the judgment of the court below is set aside. The plaintiffs are now entitled to evict the defendants tenants opposite party from the premises in suit in accordance with law. Application allowed.