JUDGMENT 1. - This appeal by the plaintiff is directed against the decree dated March 26, 1977, of the District Judge, Pratapgarh, dismissing the plaintiffs' suit by reversing the judgment and decree dated March 25, 1975, of the Munsif, Kapasan, who had decreed the plaintiff's suit for Rs. 5,000/-. 2. Gordhan Lal, plaintiff, filed a suit on November 11, 1972, in the Court of Munsif, Kapasan, for a decree of Rs. 5,000/- against the defendant Shankar Lal, who is respondent herein. It was alleged that the defendant had purchased a bus RJY 1185 for Rs. 11,000/- from the plaintiff on January 11, 1968. A sum of Rs. 5,000/- was paid at the time of purchase. A sum of Rs. 4,000/- was to be paid by Falgun Sudi Poonam, Samvat 2024 corresponding to March 14, 1968 and the remaining amount of Rs. 2,000/- was agreed to be paid later. A promissory note was also executed by the defendant on January 13, 1968. According to the plaintiff it was also stipulated that if the amount of Rs. 4,000/- was not paid, the plaintiff will have a right to stop the bus. The amount of Rs. 4,000/- was not paid in time and therefore the plaintiff asked the defendant to stop plying the bus. The defendant then left the bus himself. Subsequently, however, the defendant instituted criminal proceedings against the plaintiff and his son. In those proceedings the defendant appeared as a witness and in his statement dated December 12, 1969 made before the Munsif Magistrate, Kapasan, admitted that a sum of Rs. 4,000/- was payable by the defendant to the plaintiff. Treating this as an acknowledgement the plaintiff filed the present sait for Rs. 4,000/-as principal and Rs. 1,000/- as interest, total Rs. 5,000/-. 3. The suit was contested by the defendant. He stated that the entire purchase price had been paid and nothing remained outstanding against him to be paid to the plaintiff. He further denied having given the statement on December 18, 1969 and alleged that the suit was barred by limitation. 4. The Munsif & Judicial Magistrate, Kapasan, by the judgment dated March 25, 1975 decreed the plaintiff's suit holding inter alia that a sum of Rs. 4,000/- was outstanding against the defendant; that the defendant had given a statement on December 18, 1969, wherein he admitted his liability to pay Rs. 4. The Munsif & Judicial Magistrate, Kapasan, by the judgment dated March 25, 1975 decreed the plaintiff's suit holding inter alia that a sum of Rs. 4,000/- was outstanding against the defendant; that the defendant had given a statement on December 18, 1969, wherein he admitted his liability to pay Rs. 4,000/- by Falgun Sudi Poonam, Samvat 2024; and that the plaintiff's suit was within limitation. 5. Against the aforesaid judgment & decree the defendant filed an appeal before the District Judge, Pratapgarh, Camp at Chittorgarh, who, by the judgment dated March 26, 1977 set aside the judgment & decree passed by the Munsif, Kapasan and dismissed the plaintiff's suit on the ground that the statement made by the defendant on December 18, 1969 did not amount to an acknowledgement and the suit filed by the plaintiff on November 11, 1972 was barred by limitation. The learned District Judge, upheld the findings of the Trial Court that a sum of Rs. 4,000/- was payable by the defendant to the plaintiff and that the later was rightly entitled to claim the amount of Rs. 1,000/- as interest. The learned District Judge also did not disturb the finding that he defendant had made a statement before the criminal Court on December 18, 1969. 6. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and decree of the District Judge, the plaintiff has filed the present appeal in this Court. 7. I have heard learned Counsel for the appellant. No one has appeared for the defendant despite service. Counsel for the appellant has urged that the statement made by Shankar Lal in the criminal case on December 18, 1969, amounts to an acknowledgement and it would give a fresh start of limitation. 8. The question for consideration before me is whether the admissions made by the defendant in his statement in the criminal case amount to an acknowledgement within the meaning of Section 19 of the Limitation Act. Learned Counsel for the appellant has in this connection relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Shapoor Foredoom Mazda v. Durga Prasad Chamaria & ors. wherein it was held:- "It is thus clear that acknowledgement as prescribed by Section 19 merely renews debt; it does not create a new right of action. Learned Counsel for the appellant has in this connection relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Shapoor Foredoom Mazda v. Durga Prasad Chamaria & ors. wherein it was held:- "It is thus clear that acknowledgement as prescribed by Section 19 merely renews debt; it does not create a new right of action. It is a mere acknowledgement of the liability in respect of the right in question; it need not be accompanied by a promise to pay either expressly or even by implication. The statement on which a plea of acknowledgement is based must relate to a present subsisting liability though the exact nature or the specific character of the said liability may not be indicated in words. Words used in the acknowledgement must, however, indicate the existence of jural relationship between the parties such as that of debtor and creditor, and it must appear that the statement is made with the intention to admit such jural relationship. Such intention can be inferred by implication from the nature of the admission, and need not be expressed in words. If the statement is fairly clear then the intention to admit jural relationship may be implied from it. The admission in question need not be express but must be made in circumstances and in words from which the court can reasonably infer that the person making the admission intended to refer to a subsisting liability as at the date of the statement. In construing words used in the statements made in writing on which a plea of acknowledgement rests oral evidence has been expressly excluded but surrounding circumstances can always be considered. Stated generally courts lean in favour of a liberal construction of such statements though it does not mean that where no admission is made one should be inferred, or where a statement was made clearly without intending to admit the existence of jural relationship such intention could be fastened on the maker of the statement by an involved or far fetched process of reasoning. Broadly stated that is the effect of the relevant provisions contained in Section 19, and there is really no substantial difference between the parties as to the true legal position in this matter. Broadly stated that is the effect of the relevant provisions contained in Section 19, and there is really no substantial difference between the parties as to the true legal position in this matter. It is often said that in deciding the question as to whether any particular writing amounts to an acknowledgement as in construing wills, for instance, it is not very useful to refer to judicial decisions on the point. The effect of the words used in a particular document must inevitably depend upon the context in which the words are used and would always be conditioned by the tenor of the said document, and so unless words used in a given document are identical with words used in a document judicially considered it would not serve any useful purpose to refer to judicial precedents in the matter. However, since decisions have been cited before us both by the learned Attorney-General and Mr. Viswanatha Sastri we propose to refer to them very briefly before turning to the document in question. The question as to what is an acknowledgement has been answered by Fry, L.J. as early as 1884 A.D. in Green v. Humphreys, 1884-26 Ch. D 474 at p. 481 . This answer is often quoted with approval. "What is an acknowledgement", asked Fry, L.J., and he proceeded "in my view an acknowledgement is an admission by the writer that there is a debt owing by him, either to the receiver of the letter or to some other person on whose behalf the letter is received but it is not enough that he refers to a debt as being due from somebody. In order to take the case out of the statute there must upon the fair construction of the letter, read by the light of the surrounding circumstances, be an admission that the writer owes the debt. With respect, it may be added, that this statement succinctly and tersely gives the substance of the provisions contained in Section 19 of the Limitation Act." 9. The position of law is thus clear that the acknowledgement envisaged by Section 19 need not be accompanied by a promise to pay. What is required under Section 19 is that the acknowledgement must relate to a present subsisting liability. The words used must indicate the existence of jural relationship between the parties. 10. The position of law is thus clear that the acknowledgement envisaged by Section 19 need not be accompanied by a promise to pay. What is required under Section 19 is that the acknowledgement must relate to a present subsisting liability. The words used must indicate the existence of jural relationship between the parties. 10. In the present case the defendant in his statement dated December 18, 1969, in terms admitted that he had purchased the bus for Rs. 11,000/- out of which Rs. 5,000/- were paid in cash and a sum of Rs. 4,000/- was to be paid by Falgun Sud Poonam. There was admission by the plaintiff to the effect that he owed a debt to the plaintiff. When this statement was made the liability of a defendant to pay the debt was subsisting.The words used indicate the existence of jural relationship between the parties. In my view this amounts to an acknowledgement within the meaning of Section 19 of the Limitation Act and will give a fresh start of limitation to the plaintiff. The learned District Judge was clearly in error in holding that the suit was barred by limitation. 11. In the result, the appeal is allowed; the judgment and decree passed by the District Judge, Pratapgarh, is set aside and that of the Munsif, Kapasan, is restored. There shall be no order as to costs of this appeal.Appeal allowed. *******