ORDER 1. The petitioner was appointed as a class 1V employee by the Principal of Jain Degree College, Muzaffarnagar which is affiliated to the Meerut University under a letter of appointment dated 26-2-80 issued to her stating that she was being appointed as a class IV employee on a probation of one year and that she should join her duties immediately. By a letter dated 25-2-82 the Principal of the College informed the petitioner that her period of probation was being extended. It appears that there were some complaints against the work and conduct of the petitioner as a result of which she was placed under suspension with effect from 13-11-1982. The letter of suspension states t hat there were very serious complaints against her which. according to the preliminary enquiry, have been found to be correct. It further states that she was being placed under suspension with effect from 13- 11-82 till the conclusion of the regular disciplinary enquiry. The order of suspension was followed by a regular charge sheet served on the petitioner on 7-1-83 listing as many as eleven charges against the petitioner and also indicating the evidence which the Principal had collected in respect of those charges against the petitioner. She was asked to submit her written version with regard to the charges within seven days. In reply, the petitioner submitted a detailed reply on 14-1-83 refuting the charges as utterly false and concocted. For all practical purposes, therefore, the disciplinary proceedings had concluded save for the final orders. No orders were, however, passed by the Principal. Instead on 22-2-83 a letter was addressed to the petitioner stating that her period of probation was expiring on 26-2-83 with effect from which her service shall be deemed to have been terminated where after the petitioner shall have no concern with the institution. The petitioner promptly addressed a written complaint dated 26- 2-83 to the District Inspector of Schools refuting the charges and submitting that the order terminating the services was in direct breach of Statute 23.03 of the First Statutes of the Meerut University as the impugned action was one of punishment covered by Statute 23.02. Admittedly the approval of the District Inspector of Schools was neither sought nor granted for the termination of the petitioner's service. 2. Admittedly the approval of the District Inspector of Schools was neither sought nor granted for the termination of the petitioner's service. 2. The District Inspector of Schools enquired into the matter and passed an order dated 2-4-83 (annexure 8 to the petition) stating that the Principal had merely informed him of the action taken against the petitioner instead of obtaining his approval as was mandatory under the Statutes. From a-reading of the order of the District Inspector of Schools. it is apparent that he was clearly of the view that the action taken against the petitioner was punitive in nature and it warranted approval of the District Inspector of Schools prior to the termination of the service by the Principal under Statute 23.6 and consequently the termination of the petitioner's service was of only unsustainable in law. 3. It appears t hat in spite of this order the petitioner was not taken back in employment as a result of which upon her complaint the Regional Dy. Director of Education passed an order on 28-5-83 directing the District Inspector of Schools to arrange for the payment of salary to the petitioner failing which an order for single operation of the salaries account be passed. Meanwhile, it seems the Management approached the Addl. Deputy Director of Higher Education, Allahabad, against the order of the District Inspector of Schools dated 2-4-83. The Addl. Deputy Director of Higher Education took cognizance of the same and by an order dated 22- 9-83 (Annexure 11) directed the District Inspector of Schools that till further orders salary should not be paid to the petitioner. The order further called upon the District Inspector of Schools to submit the entire history of the case and his comments as to how he was treating the termination of the petitioner's service as a punitive action warranting the approval of the District Inspector of Schools. It is this order which has been challenged by means of this petition. 4. For the petitioner it was vehemently contended that the Deputy Director of Higher Education had no jurisdiction to go into the legality or otherwise of the order passed by the District Inspector of Schools. Such a power, it was contended, vests only in the Regional Dy. It is this order which has been challenged by means of this petition. 4. For the petitioner it was vehemently contended that the Deputy Director of Higher Education had no jurisdiction to go into the legality or otherwise of the order passed by the District Inspector of Schools. Such a power, it was contended, vests only in the Regional Dy. Director of Education under Statute 23.04, in case the matter is taken in appeal to that authority from the decision of the District Inspector of Schools under Statute 23.03. 5. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and given the matter our careful consideration, we are clearly of the opinion that the petition must succeed. For appreciating these contentions, it will be necessary to have a look at the relevant statutes. The relevant statutes 23.02, 23.03 and 23.04 are being extracted here for convenience sake : "23.02. The appointing authority referred to in Statute 23.01 shall have the power to take disciplinary action and award punishment against the class of employees of which he is appointing authority. 23.03. Every decision of the appointing authority referred to in Statute 23.02 shall, before it is communicated to the employee, be reported to the District Inspector of Schools and shall not take effect unless it has been approved by him in writing, Provided that nothing in this clause shall apply to any termination of service on the expiry of the period of which the employee was appointed. Provided further that nothing in this clause shall apply to an order of suspension pending enquiry, but any such order may be stayed, revoked or modified by the District Inspector of Schools. 23.04 An appeal against the order of the District Inspector of Schools under Statute 23.03 shall lie to the Regional Deputy Director of Education." 6. It is apparent that the decision rendered by the District Inspector of Schools clearly falls within the four corners of Statute 23.03. It is a decision which disapproves the action taken by the Principal terminating the services of the petitioner upon the conclusion of a disciplinary enquiry initiated against the petitioner. Indeed the enquiry had, but for the decision of the disciplinary authority, already concluded as mentioned above. It is also clear that in the opinion of the District Inspector of Schools the order terminating the petitioner's services was punitive action. Indeed the enquiry had, but for the decision of the disciplinary authority, already concluded as mentioned above. It is also clear that in the opinion of the District Inspector of Schools the order terminating the petitioner's services was punitive action. Statute 23.04 providing for an appeal against the order of the District Inspector of Schools under Statute 23.03 was hence clearly attracted. Consequently it is only the Regional Deputy Director of Education who could examine the correctness of the order of the District Inspector of Schools in an appeal under Statute 23.04. 7. Sri R.K. Jain, learned counsel for the contesting respondents, however, submitted that Statute 23.03 would not be attracted in the present case as firstly, the order terminating the petitioner's services may not by way of punishment but the result of a simple exercise of power vested in the Principal to terminate the service of the petitioner during the period of probation on the ground that her work and conduct was not satisfactory. It was urged that upon the conclusion of the disciplinary enquiry two courses were open to the Principal either to terminate the service of the petitioner on the ground of unsatisfactory work as she was still on probation or to pass an order dismissing her outright. The Principal, in the present case, it was argued, chose the former course. 8. We are unable to agree. The background and the sequence of events leave no manner of doubt that the termination order was clearly one passed by way of punishment. It is settled law that in judging the true character of such an order it is permissible to the courts to go behind the order, consider the background and surrounding circumstances in which it was passed in order to ascertain whether the order, thought couched as an order of termination simplicities is, in truth and substance, one of punishment. The mere language used in the order purporting to bring about termination of employment is not conclusive of the true character of the order. 9. So judged, there is little doubt that the order was one passed to remove the petitioner from service on grounds of misconduct. The mere language used in the order purporting to bring about termination of employment is not conclusive of the true character of the order. 9. So judged, there is little doubt that the order was one passed to remove the petitioner from service on grounds of misconduct. To begin with the petitioner was placed under suspension under an order which specifically stated that she was being suspended with immediate effect because there were serious allegations against her which, according to a committee appointed to enquire into the matter, have been found to be correct. A disciplinary enquiry was consequently going to be initiated against her, that she shall not leave station without the previous permission. This was followed by a regular charge sheet dated 6-1-83 listing charges containing serious imputation of character against the petitioner. The charge sheet further stated that according to the report of the committee all the charges have been found to be correct. She was however, being given an opportunity to submit her explanation within 7 days, a detailed written explanation was submitted by her on 17-1-83, and all that remained to be done was to pass final orders in the disciplinary proceedings. It is at this stage that the Principal turned round and passed an order terminating her services with effect from the last date of her extended period of probation. These facts coupled with the allegations and counter-allegations made in this case before us leave no manner of doubt that the petitioner's services were terminated because of alleged serious allegations of misconduct. Indeed Sri R. K. Jain, counsel for the Principal, vehemently repeated before us that the petitioner was guilty of immoral acts stating that she was found in compromising position by several witnesses. The District Inspector of Schools was hence not wrong in taking the view that his approval was necessary under Statute 23.03. 10. The second limb of Sri R. K. Jain 's argument was that the petitioner was appointed for a period of probation of one year which could, under the Statute, be extended up to the maximum of three years. On the expiry of 3 years, therefore, the petitioner's services were to come to an end in any case and consequently the present was a case where the appointment could be treated as one for a fixed term covered by the first proviso to Statute 23.03. 11. On the expiry of 3 years, therefore, the petitioner's services were to come to an end in any case and consequently the present was a case where the appointment could be treated as one for a fixed term covered by the first proviso to Statute 23.03. 11. The submission is devoid of any merit. The petitioner's appointment was not for fixed term. It was a regular appointment. The mere fact that she was put on probation did not imply that her appointment was for a fixed term, merely, the period of probation, A clear distinction exists between appointment for fixed term of which alone the first proviso to Statute 23.03 applies, and a case where a person is appointed in a substantive capacity but put an probation for a fixed period. At the end of the period of probation the appointment does not come to an end. If the work of the appointee is not found satisfactory an express order shall be necessary to bring about termination of employment. The first proviso to Statute 23.03, therefore, has no application. 12. In the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed The impugned order dated 22-9- 83 passed by the Additional Deputy Director of Higher Education, Allahabad (Annexure 11) is quashed The petitioner shall be entitled to payment of all her salary as a consequence of the order passed by the District Inspector of Schools, dated 2-4-83 and shall continue to be entitled to receive salary until her services are t mated in accordance with law. No ord as to costs.