ORDER S.D. Agarwal, J. - This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India arising out of proceedings under Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 2. The property in dispute is house No. 360 Chowk, Karam Ali, Meerut. It is a small house having one small room, a small verandah and a small courtyard. Smt. Momina Begum, petitioner No. 1 along with her sons and daughters are alleged to be the tenants of this property. Masood Ali, respondent No. 2 alleges himself to be the landlord. It is to be noted that Smt. Momina Begum is the real sister of Masood Ali. 3. An application under section 21(1)(a) of the Act was made by Masood Ali on the ground that he needs the accommodation in dispute for his personal use. The case set up by him was that he belongs to the city of Meerut. He has been living at Allahabad and has now retired. He has further stated that due to his advanced age and also on account of the fact that there is none to look after him at Allahabad, most of his relations being permament residents of city of Meerut, he has decided to shift to his own house in question at Meerut. It is, consequently, urged that his need for the house in question is bona fide. Masood Ali when he filed an application under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act was 71 years old in the year 1977. He would, therefore be now 82 years old. 4. The Prescribed Authority considered the matter in great detail and ultimately by a judgment dated 23-12-1980 dismissed the application for release. The finding recorded by him was that in fact, this property was not at all acquired by Masood Ali, but the release application has been filed with a view to establish his title to the house in dispute. Aggrieved by this judgment, Masood Ali filed an appeal under Section 22 of the Act. The Second Additional District Judge, Meerut allowed the appeal, set aside the order of the Prescribed Authority and further allowed the application under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act by his judgment dated 15th March, 1984. Aggrieved by this decision dated 15th March, 1984, the present petition has been filed in this Court. 5. The Second Additional District Judge, Meerut allowed the appeal, set aside the order of the Prescribed Authority and further allowed the application under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act by his judgment dated 15th March, 1984. Aggrieved by this decision dated 15th March, 1984, the present petition has been filed in this Court. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioners has contended firstly that the application under section 21(1)(a) of the Act was not maintainable as the petitioners are mere licensees and not tenants and unless a relationship of landlord and tenant is established, an application under Section 21(1)(a) does not lie. The Second submission is that the Order XXIII, Rule 1 sub-clause(4) .of the Code of Civil Procedure bars Masood Ali from instituting a fresh suit for ejectment as the earlier suit filed by him for ejectment had been withdrawn. The last submission made by learned counsel for the petitioners is that the appellate authority acted illegally and with material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction in permitting the sale deed to be filed as an additional evidence without affording an opportunity to the petitioners to rebut the same, and consequently, the finding of bona fide need recorded by the appellate authority was vitiated in law. 6. In reply, learned counsel has refuted all the arguments raised by the petitioners and an additional argument has been urged that in view of Explanation to Section 21(1) of the Act to the effect that if a tenant has built or has otherwise acquired in a vacant state a residential building in the same city, no objection by the tenant is entertainable. The argument is that the petitioners have a residential building in the city of Meerut which has been vacated and, consequently, they cannot be heard to say that the landlord does not have a bona fide need of the house in question. 7. I will dispose of first the argument raised on behalf of the respondents. 8. The argument is that the petitioners have a residential building in the city of Meerut which has been vacated and, consequently, they cannot be heard to say that the landlord does not have a bona fide need of the house in question. 7. I will dispose of first the argument raised on behalf of the respondents. 8. The Explanation (i) to Section 21(1) of the Act, which has been relied upon, is as follows : "(i) Where the tenant or any member of his family (who has been normally residing with or is wholly dependent on him) has built or has otherwise acquired in a vacant state or has got vacated after acquisition a residential building in the same city, municipality, notified area or town area, no objection by the tenant against an application under this sub-section shall be entertained". In the application under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act, which has been filed as Annexure II to the petition. I do not find that any averment has been made to the effect that the petitioners have built or otherwise acquired in a vacant state a residential building in the city of Meerut. In the absence of any such averment. it cannot be said that the petitioners' objection to the release application was not entertainable. This argument made on behalf of respondents, in my opinion, is wholly misconceived. 9. In regard to the first contention raised by learned counsel for the petitioners, it is not doubt true that Smt. Momina Begum is the real sister of Masood Ali. Suit No. 343 of 1976 was filed by Masood Ali against Snit. Momina Begum. In this suit, in paragraph 1, Masood Ali, the plaintiff of the said suit had categorically stated that Momina Begum was the licensee of the house in dispute. This suit was contested by Momina Begum. The written statement of the said suit is Annexure VI to the writ petition. In this written statement. Smt. Momina Begum set up a case that in fact this property in dispute was given to her by her mother on 15th May, 1931 at the time of her marriage. In effect, she set up an "oral gift ' in her favour. In this written statement. Smt. Momina Begum set up a case that in fact this property in dispute was given to her by her mother on 15th May, 1931 at the time of her marriage. In effect, she set up an "oral gift ' in her favour. She further stated that date, she had been residing in the said house, but she has further stated that on 15th May, 1946, a registered gift deed was executed in favour of Masood Ali by her mother and in the said gift deed it has also been categorically stated and admitted by her husband Master Usman that he is a tenant in the said house at the rate of Rs. 2/8/- Annas per month. Ultimately, in paragraph 15, she categorically stated that after the death of Master Usman, she became the tenant of the said house. This is a clear admission by her that she is the tenant of the house in dispute. In the application under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act also, in paragraph 6, it had been categorically stated that the petitioners are the tenants in the premises in dispute. In reply to this paragraph, she admitted the contents of paragraph 6 of the application. It is, therefore, clear that the petitioners admitted that they are the tenants in the property in dispute. In view of clear admissions both in the written statement of suit No. 343 of 1976 as well as in reply to the application under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act, it cannot be said that finding recorded by the appellate authority that the relationship of landlord and tenant is established, was manifestly erroneous. If that be so, the application was clearly maintainable. The first submission made by learned counsel for the petitioners, consequently. in my opinion. does not have substance. 10. In regard to the second submission made by learned counsel for the petitioners that Order XXIII Rule I sub-clause (4) of the Code of Civil Procedure bars the respondent No. 2 to file a fresh suit, it is not available to, be urged by the petitioners as this is not a suit which has been filed for ejectment and as such, it is not necessary to go into the merits of this submission. The application is for getting the property released on the ground of bona fide need and not on the ground of either determination of tenancy or revocation of licence. In the circumstances, I do not find any force in the second submission also. 11. In regard to the third submission made by learned counsel for the petitioners, in my opinion, this submission has substance. The question whether the landlord Masood Ali requires the property in dispute for his bona fide need is the question to be determined in an application for release. To determine the bona fide need, it is also necessary to examine as to whether the landlord has got sufficient accommodation for his residence or not. 12. In paragraph 21 of the petition, the petitioners have categorically stated that actually the landlord was residing in house No. 229-A Lukerganj, Allahabad, which is in the name of his wife Smt. Mehmooda Begum. It has been further stated that there are several rooms in this house and that the landlord and his family members are comfortably living in the same. They have also pointed out that the address given in the application under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act was 229-A, Lukerganj, Allahabad. The case of the petitioners is that the mere filing of a sale deed in respect of house No. 42, Lukerganj, Allahabad, for which too no opportunity of rebuttal was given, the bona fide need of the landlord is not established. The Court below should have considered as to whether the accommodation in house No. 229-A, Lukerganj, Allahabad was sufficient for the needs of the landlord or not. 13. Annexure V is the order sheet. From the order dated 19th September, 1983, it does appear that the landlord filed a copy of the sale deed of the house No. 42, Lukerganj, Allahabad. On 19th September, 1983, the application for filing this document was directed to be taken up on the date fixed. From the order sheet which has been filed, it does not appear that any specific order was passed admitting the said document. In the absence of specific orders admitting the document, the appellate authority was not justified in relying upon the sale deed and ,record finding on the said basis. This procedure has definitely resulted in grave in justice to the petitioners. In the absence of specific orders admitting the document, the appellate authority was not justified in relying upon the sale deed and ,record finding on the said basis. This procedure has definitely resulted in grave in justice to the petitioners. If the document was to be admitted, the petitioners should have been afforded an opportunity to rebut the said document. No opportunity appears to have been granted to the petitioners, as no specific order admitting the said document had been passed. From the order of the appellate authority, it does appear that the main basis for holding that the need of the landlord is bona fide is because of the fact that the landlord had filed a sale deed dated 22nd June, 1970 in respect of house No. 42, Lukerganj, Allahabad transferring the said house in favour of Thakur Das for a consideration of Rs. 7,000/-. The question whether the landlord was residing in the house No. 229, Lukerganj, Allahabad or not was not at all considered. This would vitiate the findings of bona fide need. The house in which it has been alleged that the landlord is residing having not been considered, but a house having been sold, which has nothing to do with the residence having been considered, clearly shows that the appellate authority did not apply its mind to the question of bona fide need in the proper perspective. The third submission made in behalf of the petitioners, in my opinion, is well-founded and finding of bona fide need, consequently, is vitiated in law. 14. In the interest of justice, it is directed that in case the sale deed 22nd June, 1970 executed by the landlord is to be taken into consideration by the appellate authority, the appellate authority shall pass an appropriate 1988 All. L. J./60 VIII (1) order admitting the said document and, thereafter, shall afford an opportunity to the petitioners to file evidence in rebuttal. It is only then that the sale deed dated 22-6-1970 shall be considered for the purposes of arriving at a finding in respect of bona fide need. 15. In view of the above, it is necessary in the interest of justice that the matter be remanded to the appellate authority for a decision afresh in accordance with law. 16. In the result, the petition is allowed. 15. In view of the above, it is necessary in the interest of justice that the matter be remanded to the appellate authority for a decision afresh in accordance with law. 16. In the result, the petition is allowed. The order dated 15th March, 1984 passed by the Second Additional District Judge, Meerut is quashed. The case is remanded to the appellate authority for deciding it afresh in accordance with law in the light of observations made above. The parties are directed to bear their own costs.