P. K. Bahri, J. ( 1 ) THIS criminal writ petition has been brought under Article 226 of the Constitution of India read with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, seeking quashment of detention order dated March 7, 1988, passed by the Joint Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Finance, under Section 3 (1) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (for short cofeposa Act ) against Jasbir Singh. ( 2 ) FACTS leading to the passing of the detention order, in brief, are that the Customs Preventive Staff of the Customs Collectorate, Delhi, on September 17, 1987, apprehended one Surinder Kumar, who was carrying two boxes, at the exit gate of inward parcel office. New Delhi Railway Station and it was told by Surinder Kumar that he had been handed over railway receipt by his employer Harvinder Singh and he had taken delivery of the said boxes on the basis of the said railway receipt after signing the fictitious name of Rakesh Kumar. The said boxes were opened in the presence of independent witnesses and the boxes were shown to contain 15,000 pieces of electronic digital disco lady watches of foreign origin of the value of Rs. 3,00,000. 00. As no evidence was furnished regarding import of the said foreign origin wrist watches, the same were seized under Section 110 of the Customs Act. As a follow up action, the premises of Harvinder Singh were searched on the same day and more imported wrist watches were recovered from his shop No. 174-A, New Lajpat Rai Market, Delhi. At the time of the said search, one Charanjit Singh, employee of Harvinder Singh, was present. His statement was recorded and he revealed that he has been working with his brother-in-law Gurinder Singh at shap No. 13, New Lajpat Rai Market, Delhi, in the name and style ofm/s. Jeet Traders and shop No. 174-A, New Lajpat Rai Market, belongs to Harvinder Singh, who is working there in the name and style ofm/s. Ashu Traders and Harvinder Singh is the elder brother of Gurinder Singh. He has also stated that Harvinder Singh was dealing with the business of smuggled wrist watches of foreign origin and Joginder Singh, Rajan Kumar and Surinder Kumar were his employees. Then, he furnished the addresses of those persons. He has also stated that Harvinder Singh was dealing with the business of smuggled wrist watches of foreign origin and Joginder Singh, Rajan Kumar and Surinder Kumar were his employees. Then, he furnished the addresses of those persons. The residential premises No. BH-116 Shalimarbagh, of Harvinder Singh was searched but nothing was recovered from that house. Another house of Harvinder Singh bearing No. 15-BB, Block LIG, DDA Flats, Shalimar Bagh, was searched on September 18, 1987 and in the presence of the present petitioner and another employee of Harvinder Singh, namely, Ranjan Kumar, electronic wrist watches of the value of Rs. 65,84q. 00 were recovered and no evidence was produced showing their import and thus, they were also seized under Section 110 of the Customs Act. On September 18, 1987, on the basis of the disclosure statement of Surinder Kumar, Joginder Singh was apprehended carrying one box at New Delhi Railway Station, Platform No. 6 and that box was found to contain 5,000 pieces of electronic digital disco lady wrist watches of the value of Rs. 1,10,000. 00 which were also seized under Section 110 of the Customs Act. Surinder Kumar in his statement under Section 108 of the Customs Act deposed that he was engaged by Harvinder Singh and was giver the railway receipt and he knew the contents of the said boxes which were got released from the Railway Station and earlier also he had brought such type of boxes containing the foreign origin wrist watches from New Delhi Railway Station at the instance of Harvinder Singh and those goods used to be brought to a hotel near Novelty Cinema and he, Ranjan Kumar and the petitioner used to make packets of the said wrist watches for further delivery of the said packets to the customers as directed by Harvinder Singh and it was usually Joginder Singh who used to visit Bombay for bringing the said foreign origin wrist watches by booking the same from Bombay and the delivery used to be obtained from the Railway Station by signing fake names and the hotel room used to be booked in the name of Ranjan. The petitioner also allegedly made a statement on September 18,1987, under Section 108 of the Customs Act admitting all these facts. He also made a statement that earlier Harvinder Singh had a shop at 303, Rajindra Jaina. The petitioner also allegedly made a statement on September 18,1987, under Section 108 of the Customs Act admitting all these facts. He also made a statement that earlier Harvinder Singh had a shop at 303, Rajindra Jaina. Market, Chandni Chowk, Delhi and the said shop was closed 20-25 days earlier and new business in the name of M/s. Ashu Traders was started a shop No. 174-A, New Lajpat Rai Market and they were working there and running the business of sale and purchase of smuggled wrist watches and they used to pack the watches as per requirements of the customers and they used to be delivered to different customers on directions of Harvinder Singh. ( 3 ) STATEMENT of Joginder Singh under Section 108 of the Customs Act was also recorded in which all those incriminating facts were admitted by him. His premises at Bombay was also searched but nothing incriminating was found. They were all arrested and produced before the Magistrate on September 19, 1987. Surinder Singh got bail on medical ground and also the petitioner was granted bail on October 8, 1987. Statement of Gurinder Singh was also recorded and so also of Harvinder Singh. Harvinder Singh was arrested on December 9, 1987, but he got the bail on December 17, 1987 ( 4 ) IT is also the case of the prosecution that on February 17, 1986 4,000 pieces of wrist watches of the value of Rs. 81,600. 00 were seized from shop No. 303. Rajindra Jaina Market, Chandni Chowk, which was owned by Harvinder Singh and his brother Surinder Singh, and Ranjan Kumar and the petitioner were also involved in that case and they were arrested and released on bail later on. ( 5 ) VARIOUS grounds have been pleaded in the writ petition challenging the detention order but at the time of arguments counsel for the petitioner confined the challenge only on the following grounds -. firstly, that certain material documents enumerated in para 5 (IV) (a) to (i) having been not placed before the detaining authority has the effect of vitiating the detention order. It has been argued that the satisfaction reached by the detaining authority was mechanical and stood vitiated on account of failure of the sponsoring authority to place the said material documents before the detaining authority. It has been argued that the satisfaction reached by the detaining authority was mechanical and stood vitiated on account of failure of the sponsoring authority to place the said material documents before the detaining authority. Secondly, counsel for the petitioner has made reference to grounds of detention given in paras (8) and (9) and has urged that these grounds are vague inasmuch as they do not make clear as to whose statement the reference is being made and who are the persons who actually had started the new business at shop No. 174-A, New Lajpat Rai Market and thus, the petitioner has been deprived of fair opportunity of making an effective representative against the detention order. Thirdly, that the detention order is vitiated inasmuch as no Hindi translation of the document appearing at page 155 of the list of documents supplied alongwith the grounds of detention was supplied to the petitioner. So, it was urged that as a material document on which the reliance has been placed by the detaining authority for passing the detention order having. been not supplied to the petitioner in the Hindi language has the effect of vitiating the detention order. Fourthly, it has been argued that the purpose of detention being not germane to the grounds of detention also makes the order of detention bad and lastly, it was argued that in the grounds of detention a disjunctive word or has been based which makes the detention order vague and it shows lack of application of mind by the detaining authority while passing the detention order. ( 6 ) I will deal with these points in seriatim. The documents to which reference has been made in para 5 (IV) pertained to the first incident of recovery of illicit goods made on February 17, 1986. The detention order is based on two separate incidents, one of recovery made on February 17, 1985 and the other of the recoveries effected in September, 1987. A perusal of the documents enumerated in the said paragraph of the writ petition makes it evident that those documents were vital and they ought to have been (placed before the detaining authority so that the detaining authority could fairly consider as to whetherthe detention order is liable to be passed or not on the ground of recovery effected in February 1986. So, the satisfaction of the detaining authority stands vitiated in respect of the ground with regard to the recovery effected in February 1986. However, the detention order cannot be set aside on this ground alone because two separate grounds have been taken while passing the detention order and even if one of the grounds is found to be not made, the detention order could be upheld by showing that at least satisfaction of the detaining authority is not vitiated in respect of the second ground on which the detention order is based. Section 5-A of the COFEPOSA Act reads as follows : "grounds of detention severable-where a person has been detained in pursuance of an order of detention under Sub-section (1) of Section 3 which has been made on two or more grounds, such order of detention shall be deemed to have been made separately on each of such grounds and accordingly- (a) such order shall not be deemed to be invalid or inoperative merely because one or some of the grounds is or are- (i) vague, (ii) non-existent, (iii) not relevant, (iv) not connected or not proximately connected with such person, or (v) invalid for any other reason whatsoever, and it is not therefore possible to hold that the Government or officer making such order would have been satisfied as provided in Sub-section (1) of Section 3 with reference to the remaining ground or grounds and made the order of fdetention; (b) the Government or officer making the order of detention shall be deemed to have made the order of detention under the said Sub-section (1) after being satisfied as provided in that sub-section with reference to the remaining ground or grounds. " ( 7 ) IT is obvious that the documents to which reference has been made and which were not placed before the detaining authority has nothing to do with regard to the occurrence of September 1987. So, the only effect of the said lapse would be that one of the grounds of detention relating to one incident of recovery of smuggled watches of February 1986 could be held to be invalid but as these documents have nothing to do with regard to the second ground of detention regarding the recovery of smuggled watches in September 1987, so the order of detention cannot be held to be invalid in view of Section 5-A of the COFEPOSA Act. A similar question arose for decision in Criminal Writ Petition No. 146/87, Smt. Madhu Khanna v. Union of India and Others, decided on September 25, 198/ and it was held that detention order could not be vitiated even if it is so to be held that certain copies of documents which were bound to be supplied to the detenu were not supplied as those documents only pertained to a particular instance of recovery of smuggled gold and had no bearing with regard to the recovery of smuggled gold in respect of the second incident. So, I repel this ground. ( 8 ) IT has been argued that there has been no proper application of mind by the detaining authority with regard to the grounds of detention inasmuch as in para 8 of the grounds of detention it is not clarified as to whose statement is being referred to while giving the facts. The words used in this para are to the following effect : "in his statement dated 18-9-87, recorded under Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962, you inter alia admitted the recovery of wrist watches/watch movements of foreign origin. . . . . . " The grammatical error made in this particular pairagraph by not using the word your instead of his , I do not think that it can be held that there was no proper application of mind by the detaining authority. If the whole of the para is read, it makes very clear that the detaining authority was making reference to the statement of the petitioner made by him under Section 108 of the Customs Act. Counsel for the petftioner referred to Jaisingh and Others v. State of Sammu and Kashmir, AIR 1985 SC 764 and Criminal Writ No. 230/86, Smt. Veenakapoor v. M. L. Wadhawanand Others, decided on November 11, 1986, where the detention orders have been set aside on the ground that only mechanical approach has been adopted by the detaining authority. Counsel for the petftioner referred to Jaisingh and Others v. State of Sammu and Kashmir, AIR 1985 SC 764 and Criminal Writ No. 230/86, Smt. Veenakapoor v. M. L. Wadhawanand Others, decided on November 11, 1986, where the detention orders have been set aside on the ground that only mechanical approach has been adopted by the detaining authority. In the case before the Supreme Court, Jai Singh the detenu was being referred as third person in the grounds of detention and it did not make clear whether the grounds of detention were meant for him and in this context the Hon ble Supreme Court held that it was mechanical representation of the police dossier as the detaining authority had only added the word you before the name of the detenu at different places. Such is not the case here. The reading of the whole of the grounds of detention makes it evident as to for whom the grounds of detention are meant and it is obvious that in para 8 the statement made by the petitioner under Section 108 of the Customs Act had been referred to. In the case of Smt. Veena Kapoor (supra) the detention order was completely in third person and did not make it clear as to Vimal Kapoor, who was the detenu, was to file the representation as at no place the word you had been used in describing the detenu. A Division Bench of this Court following the case of Jai Singh (supra) struck down the detention order but the facts are totally distinguishable. As I read the grounds of detention, I find that there is nothing vague about the facts mentioned in the grounds of detention. Counsel for the petitioner has laid emphasis on the language used in para (8) of grounds of detention in support of the contention that the same is quite vague. I have read the whole of para (8) and I find that the petitioner had stated that initially Harvinder Singh was having a shop at Rajindra Jaina Market in the name and style of M/s. Lucky Traders where petitioner was working and at Harvinder Singh s instance that shop was closed and the business was started in the name of M/s. Ashu Traders at the shop in Lajpat Rai Market and they started working there. It does not mean that the use of the word they is quite vague because it is obvious that if the word they is examined in the light of the facts preceding the said word enumerated in the said ground, it makes it clear that it is Harvinder Singh s business which was started at shop No. 174-A where the petitioner started working. So, it cannot be held that there is any vagueness in the facts mentioned in the said para of the grounds of detention which disabled the petitioner from making any effective representation against the order of. detention. I negative this ground also. ( 9 ) IT has been argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that Hindi translation of the document appearing at page 155 of the list of documents supplied alongwith the grounds of detention was not supplied to the petitioner and thus the petitioner was prevented from making any effective representation. It is the requirement of law. It is argued that all documents on which reliance is placed by the detaining authority for passing the detention order should have been supplied to the detenu and the failure of the detaining authority to supply any copy of document in the language known to the petitioner amounts to denial of opportunity to the petitioner to make effective representation. It is admitted before me that document at page 155 of the list of documents supplied to the petitioner pertained to a medical certificate of Gurinder Singh which was of latter date from the date of the incidents showing that he had undergone some appendicitis operation. It was totally an innocuous document and was annexure to some application of Gurinder Singh. It is true that in the order of detention it is mentioned that the order of detention is based on the documents of which copies are supplied to the petitioner but the question which arises for decision is whether non-supply of a Hindi translation of such an innocuous and irrelevant -document would vitiate the detention order or not. It is settled law that it is the duty of the detaining authority to supply such material and documents on which the detention order is based pari passu grounds of detention. It is settled law that it is the duty of the detaining authority to supply such material and documents on which the detention order is based pari passu grounds of detention. Dealing with such a question this Court in the case of Madhu Khanna (supra) has laid down that only the documents and material which are inculpatory and incriminating should be considered as the foundation for passing the detention order and only such documents and material are liable to be supplied to the Detenu. The document in question is not a document of such a nature which -could be the basis for passing the detention order. In this context, I may refer to the observations made by the Supreme Court in Prakash Chandra v. Commissioner and Secretary, Govt. of Kerala, AIR 1986 SC 687 : "there is no rule of law that common sense should be put in cold storage while considering constitutional provisions for safeguards against misuse of powers by authorities though these constitutional provisions should be strictly construed. " IT was further observed : "the concept of "grounds" used in the context of detention Article 22 (5) of the Constitution and in Sub-section (3) of Section 3 of COFEPOSA, therefore, has to receive an interpretation which will keep it meaningfully in tune with a contemporary notions. While the expression "grounds" for that matters includes not only conclusions of fact but also allthe "basic fact on which those conclusions were founded, they are different from subsidiary facts or further particulars or the basic facts. " I may emphasise that in the grounds of detention no reference has been made specifically to this particular document. So, the detention order, as a matter of fact, is not based on this particular document. The detention order,in my view, cannot be set aside for non-supply of Hindi translation of the said medical certificate of Gurinder Singh which is not a document which could be, by any stretch of reasoning, called as a material or incriminating document for passing the detention order. So, I negative this particular ground also. ( 10 ) NEXT, it has been argued that the purpose of detention is : germane to the grounds of detention. So, I negative this particular ground also. ( 10 ) NEXT, it has been argued that the purpose of detention is : germane to the grounds of detention. I do not understand this particular contention because the facts given in the grounds of detention, as enumerated by me above, make it clear that the detention order has been passed on account of the nefarious activities being indulged in by the petitioner along with others. I negative this around also. ( 11 ) THEN, it has been argued that in the detention order it is not made clear as to what sort of activity is being referred to by using disjunctive word or . The detention order shows that it has been passed with a view to preventing the petitioner from dealing in smuggled goods otherwise than by engaging in transporting or concealing or keeping smuggled goods. The detention order is couched in the language of Section 3. The petitioner and not found engaging in transportation or concealing or keeping smuggled goods and that is why it was mentioned that the detention order was passed for preventing him from dealing in smuggled goods inasmuch as the petitioner was found dealing. in smuggled goods in the manner that he was facilitating the handling and disposing of the smuggled goods by making packets of the smuggled goods. Counsel for the petitioner has cited Jagannath Misra v. state of Orissa, AIR 1966 SC 1140 . In the cited case, the order of detention has been made with a view to prevent the detenu from acting in a manner prejudicial to the safety of India and maintenance of public order etc. the order of detention all the six grounds on which the order of detention could be passed have been enumerated but in the affidavit filed as a return to the writ, it was mentioned that the Home Minister satisfied that the petitioner was liable to be detained in order to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the safety of India and maintenance of public order etc. the Supreme Court held that the order has been passed without application of mind and the use of the word etc. in the affidavit was said to be indicative of casualness. Such is not the case here. So, this judgment is of no help to the petitioner. I negative this particular contention as well. the Supreme Court held that the order has been passed without application of mind and the use of the word etc. in the affidavit was said to be indicative of casualness. Such is not the case here. So, this judgment is of no help to the petitioner. I negative this particular contention as well. ( 12 ) COUNSEL for the petitioner has shown to this Court the actual detention order and the grounds of detention served on the petitioner and has pointed out that only last page of the order is signed by the detaining authority which is a photo copy while the other pages are typed pages, and he has argued that this shows non-application of mind by the detaining authority. I find no merit in this contention. After all, the detaining authority was to pass detention orders in respect of many persons involved in the occurrence in question and there is nothing wrong in getting the detention orders prepared typed and then last page is prepared as a photo copy in those cases and signed by the detaining authority. It does not mean that the detaining authority did not apply its mind to the facts before passing the detention order. ( 13 ) COUNSEL for the petitioner also tried to argue that there is delay of six months in passing the detention order. This argument is now not available in view of the ratio laid down in Rajendrakumar Natvarlal Shah v. State of Gujarat and Others, JT 1988 (2) SC 409. No other point has been urged before me. So, I hold that there is no merit in this writ petition. ( 14 ) I, hereby, dismiss this writ petition and discharge the rule.