Judgment :- A rare type of case, yet one which has raised many intellectually stimulating questions. It arises out of a litigation resorted to for the protection of the plaintiffs reputation. The suit was decreed by the trial court but dismissed by the appellate court. The plaintiff has tenaciously pursued the matter by this second appeal before this Court. 2. The cause of action has arisen in the utopians of the former Malabar area. Hard working cultivators of Travancore, confers nted with a shrunken space, have Massively migrated to Malabar for over half a century by now. Some have cleared forests and reared rubber plantations. Many have profitable ventures in pepper and in coffee. Even those who had thus moved with essentially planting projects diversified their interests in later times. Some have taken to trade; some others to other avocations; transport, works contract and the like. The plaintiff in this case is one who is better known as a contractor, and as it generally happens, as a rich one of the time, and in the area. 3. Having settled down in Malabar earlier, and for a fairly long time, the plaintiff and disestablishment had taken deep roots. Heclaims and the evidence justifies the claim, that he was well known among the compact population of that newly developed area. 4. When family's increase, and children multiply, other institutions become essential human requirements. Hospitals, hotels and schools thus spring up. A school was established in that otherwise unapproachable area. Even when schools were open, teachers were unavailable: such was the hangover of the antecedent educational backwardness of Malabar. 5. Those who had better educational facilities and consequently better educational equipment were always ready and willing to migrate anywhere, if only employment is available. The 1st defendant, so set out to this area to become a teacher in the school. 6. The relationship between them was ideal, initially; it, however, soured later, intensely. The result was litigation. The case is, therefore, Contractor v. Teacher. 7. The facts, quite often, are stranger than fiction. They have been so in the present case. Newly started school needs new recruits for the establishment. Adequate facilities for the stay of the teachers, when they hail from distant places, may not easily be available in such developing but not yet developed, areas. The case is, therefore, Contractor v. Teacher. 7. The facts, quite often, are stranger than fiction. They have been so in the present case. Newly started school needs new recruits for the establishment. Adequate facilities for the stay of the teachers, when they hail from distant places, may not easily be available in such developing but not yet developed, areas. The situation creates difficulties to a newly appointed teacher; more so, if it is a' lady teacher'. 8. The plaintiff-contractor extended a helping hand to the 1st defendant, teacher, to tide over the difficulty. (The parties are somewhat distantly related too). The plaintiff permitted the 1st defendant to stay in his house. He was a married man and with children. Ordinarily therefore, a paying guest, and that too, a teacher, need not create problems. 9. To see that a daughter is married is a matter of justifiable anxiety on the part of an affectionate father. That was so in the case of the 2nd defendant, the father of the 1st defendant. The marriage of the 1st defendant was duly and finally fixed. The marriage took place in the native land near Changanacherry. (There appears to have been some unpleasant incidents in the course of the marriage ceremony. Not so grave or serious as to mar the marriage function. There is controversy as to the role played by the plaintiff and his men on the one hand and the defendants on the other in those incidents.) The fact that the plaintiff attended the marriage is clear. Whether anyone of the groups or both, behaved improperly is not an issue to be tried in the case. The Incidents were a prelude to the further deterioration in the relationship between the parties. 10. Soon after the marriage, the first defendant shifted her residence from the plaintiff s house to that occupied by another teacher of the school, Mrs. Elizabeth. The trouble started sometime later. 11. According to the plaintiff, the first defendant maliciously spread a slander tarnishing his character. The slander was that, it was unsafe for a woman of values and virtues, to live in the house of the plaintiff. An apprehension of a threat to chastity was put forward as the ground for the change of residence of the first defendant. The story got currency among the teachers of the school; and it spread in the locality, jairly quickly. An apprehension of a threat to chastity was put forward as the ground for the change of residence of the first defendant. The story got currency among the teachers of the school; and it spread in the locality, jairly quickly. The information trickled down to other groups as we Trrnrrcaeh-the cars of the plaintiff himself. 12. Different people react dissimilarly in identical situations. Some might have dismissed the talk, as a trivial matter. Some others might retort: gossip is a girlish trait; and may even quote Shakespeare: "Talking is a woman's warfare". The plaintiff did not, however, let it pass. 13. The plaintiff as a prominent person in that area would claim that he was much upset by the slander campaign. He felt aggrieved that his position and prestige in the society had been lost by the slander. A demand for repairing the mischief done that way was improperly spurned by the defendants. The evidence in the case is that the lawyer's notices Exts.A2 and A3 issued to both the defendants were returned with an endorsement indicative of an improper, and an unreasonable attitude. The endorsement reads: "Addressee refused. Hence returned to sender." 14. If the plaintiff felt infuriated, he cannot be blamed at all. There was provocation enough for the initiation of litigation. The next step, understandably, was the suit itself. Damages were claimed against the defendants in a sum of Rs.5,000/-. 15. The defence repudiated the allegation contained in the plaint. In the written statement, there was no pejorative suggestion as against the plaintiff. The defendants denied the authorship and circulation of the slander. According to them, the pressure of time prevented the 1st defendant from attempting a personal invitation for the marriage. This annoyed the plaintiff. The suit was the resultant reaction of his injured vanity. 16. The trial court, on a evaluation of the evidence, came to the conclusion that the defendants spread the objectionable statement, though they did not have any intention to cause a loss of reputation to the plaintiff. The suit was decreed. 17. The decree was appealed against. The court below took a different view. It was felt that the pleadings were defective; and the evidence, unsatisfactory. The appeal was accordingly allowed. The result was the dismissal of the suit. 18. The plaintiff, upset by the unfavorable decree, has come up in appeal challenging the adverse finding of the appellate court. 19. 17. The decree was appealed against. The court below took a different view. It was felt that the pleadings were defective; and the evidence, unsatisfactory. The appeal was accordingly allowed. The result was the dismissal of the suit. 18. The plaintiff, upset by the unfavorable decree, has come up in appeal challenging the adverse finding of the appellate court. 19. Extensive areas were covered in the course of the arguments by both sides. Much of the time was spent on the contention about the defective nature Often plaint. In particular, it was urged, with much of vehemence, that an extract of the 'words used by the second defendant and a reference to the precise situation and context in which such words were used, were conspicuously absent in the plaint. That according to counsel was a fatal defect. Recent rulings and textual passages were relied on in support of the conclusion reached by the court below. They 'was an attempt at 'a merciless dissection of the plaint with a view to expose its defects and deficiencies. Lastly, an exhaustive evaluation of the evidence too (nojXlegitimate exercise in second appeal) was also Attempted by either side. 20. On pleadings geneia tincjjaMieen fairly settled by authoritative pronouncements, The current view is one approving of relaxation in the rigour as regards fae pleadings. A very recent ruling of the Suprte Court is RamSarup Gupta v. Bishun Natvin Inter College, AIR 1987 SC 1242. an-«pito }emeru of law on that aspect, is contained in the passage reading: "The object and purpose of pleading is to enable the adversary pXriy to know the case it has to meet. In order to have a fair trial it is imperative that the party should state the essential material facts so that other party may not be taken by surprise. The pleadings however should receive a liberal construction; no pedantic approach should be adopted to defeat justice on hair splitting technicalities. Sometimes, pleadings-are expressed in words which may not expressly make out a case in accordance with strict interpretation of law, in such a case it is the duty of the Court to as certain the substance of the pleadings to determine the question. It is not desirable to place undue emphasis on form, instead the substance of the pleadings should be considered. It is not desirable to place undue emphasis on form, instead the substance of the pleadings should be considered. Whenever the question about lack of pleading is raised the enquiry should not be so much about the form of the pleadings, instead the Court must find out whether in substance the parties knew the case and the issues upon which they went to trial. Once it is found that in spite of deficiency in the pleadings parties knew the case and they proceeded to trial on those issues by producing evidence, in that event it would not be open to a party to raise the question of absence of pleadings in appeal." 21. Whatever may be the generality of the relaxed rigour in relation to the pleadings generally, that should not be so in the case of a slander suit - such was the emphasis attempted by counsel for the respondent. Reliance was mostly made on the decisions of the English Courts. The House of Lords spoke at length on this question in Fullam V.Newcastle Chronicle, (1977) 3A11.E.R.32. Whether a differential approach was possible in the Indian situation was a further question to be considered. A decision of the Cochin Chief Court, in a secular litigation between spiritual personnel, Mar Timotheus Metropolitan v. Yohannan Kathanar, (1914) V Cochin Law Reports 173, is noteworthy in this context. Reference had been made there to the decisions in Capital and Counties Bank v. Henty,7 Appeal Cases 741, Bradlaugh v. The Queen, 3 Q.B.D. 607 and Harris v. Warre, 4 C.P.D. 125. 22. In an admirably independent approach, the Cochin Chief Court discarded the highly technical rule of English pleadings in the Indian setup. Paragraph 7 contains The entirety of the discussion on that aspect. It will not be an unnecessary waste of precious time if the passage is extracted in its entirety, it reads as follows: 23. A substitution of the provisions of the Cochin c.P.C. With the corresponding current sections of the Indian Code will give the lavv of the present times. 24. With utmost respect, I would adopt what statement of law as the correct guiding principle for the Indian situation. 7L5. Although in the context of libel, the rigour of English pleadings has been adopted b-y the Indian High Court as is evident from Nannu v. Ram Prasad, AIR 1926 All. 672, BrijtolPrasad v. Moftanf Lal Das, AIR 1940 Nag. 24. With utmost respect, I would adopt what statement of law as the correct guiding principle for the Indian situation. 7L5. Although in the context of libel, the rigour of English pleadings has been adopted b-y the Indian High Court as is evident from Nannu v. Ram Prasad, AIR 1926 All. 672, BrijtolPrasad v. Moftanf Lal Das, AIR 1940 Nag. 125 and in W.May v. AswiniKumar, AIR 1958 Calcutta 269 and other cases. The approach and the line of thinking which had commended itself to the Cochin Chief Court, had not been presented before those courts." The Cochin case is one of an action in slander itself. Even in that context, the reasoned differentiation, calling for a different approach in relation to the pleadings, was clearly indicated by that court. I have no hesitation in following that reasoning and approach and to hold that the principles laid down in the English decisions including those in the recent decisions rendered by the House of Lords, would not apply in all their rigour in relation to the pleadings in the Indian set up. True, the Privy Council in Ghirdharee Sing v. Koolahul Sing, 1840 Moore's Indian Appeals 344, leaned in, favour of looking to 'the essential justice of the case', without considering whether matters of form have been strictly attended to. The prevailing conditions (a century and half later and forty years after the ushering in of the Indian republic) warrant appropriate modulation in she approach of the courts. Even then, the handicaps of past disabilities could be duly reckor»e J. 26. The pleadings in the present case, when roughly translated, read as follows: "At about the Tim, the 2nd defendant quarreled with the members of the plaintiff's family on some matters and recently shifted the residence from the plaintiff s house. Later, the 1st defendant came to Kozhikode to meet the 2nd defendant and defendants land 2 told many that the 2nd defendant shifted the residence from the plaintiffs house as the plaintiff attempted to commit rape on the 2nd defendant and that the very chastity of the 2nd defendant would be in jeopardy in case of her continued residence there and that that was the reason for her shifting the residence." 27. In a sense, even the rigorous requirements of English pleadings would be satisfied by these allegations. In a sense, even the rigorous requirements of English pleadings would be satisfied by these allegations. The words imputing an offence are clear enough; the context is distinctly described; the persons to whom the slanderous words were. Uttered, are properly named. The defendant cannot possibly have any doubt about the case they had to meet. 28. There was some discussion at the Bar whether the averments contain a specific imputation against the plaintiff of an offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code. If there is a reference to murder or theft, slander is properly pleaded -conceded counsel for the respondent. An attempt at invading chastity is not an offence as against a man, emphasised counsel. That was so even as against the women in England under the common law, was the further elaboration of the concept. As for women, relief came in England with the passage of the Slander of Women Act. Men there are as yet uncovered. 29. In India, there continued to be cleavage in judicial opinion on that topic as reflected in the decisions of the Calcutta High Court on the one hand and those of Madras and Bombay High Court on the other. (See Aghore Nauth Bannered v. The Calcutta Tramways Co.Ltd., ILR 1885 Calcutta 232, Parvathi v. Mannar, 1§85 ILR Madras 175 and Bai Bhicaiji v. Perojshaw Jivanji,1916 ILR Bombay 401). Man has no face to lose, nor reputation to suffer, even if he is brandejd as indulging in promiscuous sexual relationship. Arguments of counsel for the respondent proceeded that way. 30. If an imputation of an offence is actionable, then the defendant can have no escape route. An allegation that a person has attempted to commit adultery will necessarily constitute an allegation of an attempt to commit an offence. In the scheme of the Indian Penal Code, an attempt to commit an offence, is itself an offence. Even an attempt at outraging the modesty of a woman will be an offence. (Vide S.354 of the I.P.C.) Viewed that way, the allegations extracted above, doubtless, contain statements attributing an offence to the plaintiff. It will then satisfy the requirements of a proper pleading in an action for slander. I therefore repel the contention that the pleadings in the present case were deficient and that the non-suiting of the plaintiff on that ground by the appellate court is justified. It will then satisfy the requirements of a proper pleading in an action for slander. I therefore repel the contention that the pleadings in the present case were deficient and that the non-suiting of the plaintiff on that ground by the appellate court is justified. The appellate court committed an error of law in relation to its understanding of the law on the pleadings. 31. This leads to the final and next stage of the discussion. That is about the existence of satisfactory evidence to decree the suit. 32. Six witnesses had been examined on the side of the plaintiff. A strong circumstance, namely the endorsement by the postal authorities, about a refusal to Receive the registered letter sent by the plaintiff, is more important than most of the oral testimony. Counsel for the respondent could not properly justify an attitude by which a registered article was refused by the defendants. The teacher and her father, with fairly good worldly experience, should not have acted so unreasonably or so arbitrarily. An adverse impression against them could rightly be formed from the circumstance. In the absence of other factors. it may even be a decisive or crucial factor in the thought process and the resultant conclusion. 33. The defendants had no case that plaintiff had misbehaved toward the 1st defendant at any time or in any manner. Counsel for the respondent submitted that the woman would be the victim whatever be the source and sphere of such a sticky accusation. There is force in that submission. Quite often, even while reeling with pain from a wounded self-respect, a woman prefers to live with her pursed mouth and painful murmur. 34. Counsel for the respondent submitted that if the plaintiffs version is correct, it would mean that a teacher, newly married, was unjustifiably and cruelly making an allegation against a helpful man, who gave her a roof when she was crying for a shelter and caring for a carrier. Such a conduct would be strange and unusual. Stranger still would be her conduct of attributing bad conduct on his part, which can even ignite a domestic discord and blast the family board. Normally, civilized human conduct would be inconsistent with spreading of a scandal against a man who was helpful. But then, it is equally easy to pose another question. Stranger still would be her conduct of attributing bad conduct on his part, which can even ignite a domestic discord and blast the family board. Normally, civilized human conduct would be inconsistent with spreading of a scandal against a man who was helpful. But then, it is equally easy to pose another question. Will a person enjoying a good reputation and holding a prominent position, one who had shown some amount of magnanimity and helpfulness to a needy girl, think of originating a scandal in which he is robed as a robber of chastity, a scandal importing in to his own home, and in the society, the smog of slander? One without courage of conviction is unlikely to assume an aggressive role and level an attack against the defendants as ungrateful souls spreading asinster canard. Rarer still will be the initiation of an actual litigation with its attendant publicity, by a person merely pretending virtue. All men may not be angels who place their dulcimers on the Choral Pitch; but then an immoral hypocrat is unlikely to invest much of time, trouble and money in the vindication of a reputation. The arguments for the two sides are therefore somewhat well balanced. The court will have to act on the actual evidence available in the case in that situation. 35. The defence, as noted earlier, had a theory that the plaintiff had nursed an ill feeling when a personal invitation was not extended to him by the defendants in connection with the marriage of the 1st defendant. If the defendants were pressed for time, as they would have it as an explanation now, the plaintiff ordinarily would have very much appreciated it. It is unimaginable that for such a silly cause, a reasonable and well-meaning man would have rushed to litigation with a self-directed false allegation. I have no hesitation to reject that story of the defence. 36. As for the plaintiff, there comes the difficulty. He had named T. Raghavan master, C.T. George, T.K. Narayanan Nair and Abu backer Hajji, as the persons to whom defendants directly stated the false allegations about him. Of them, it was claimed Narayanan Nair and Abubacker Hajji had questioned plaintiff himself about it. Paragraphs of the plaint makes reference to the persons who had directly questioned the Plain tiff about the story. Of them, it was claimed Narayanan Nair and Abubacker Hajji had questioned plaintiff himself about it. Paragraphs of the plaint makes reference to the persons who had directly questioned the Plain tiff about the story. In that situation, the acceptable evidence of one among them could ordinarily be expected for sustaining the plaint claim. Some of them are teachers of the same school. No doubt, in that situation, there will be a disinclination on their part to cause discomfort to a fellow teacher. It cannot, however, be assumed that no one among the group is prepared to speak to the truth, when they have nothing to spite the plaintiff. The non-examination of any of such persons specifically named in the plaint is a fatal factor shaking the plaintiffs case. 37. PWs 1 toSonlyspeak about the generalities on reputation of the plaintiff, his influence in the society and his acceptability even as a just arbitrator in the petty disputes of the people of the locality. That may not be sufficient to establish the wanton violence done to plaintiff's reputation. 38. P. W.6 is an independent witness; one of the localities and one who has given evidence with an amount of naturalness. He claimed to have gone to the house of Elizabeth teacher, the place where the firs defendant was staying, after her marriage. He stated that the words as referred to in the plaint were stated to him by the 1st defendant. He also spoke about the presence of the father when she made the statement; the 1st defendant, the father of the 2nd defendant, had endorsed the statement of the 2nd defendant. 39. If the evidence is accepted, that would be sufficient to pass a decree in favour of the plaintiff. 40. It was for a medical consultation that P. W.6 went there. He cut his finger with something like a sickle. Elizabeth teacher's husband was a Home doctor. He thought of getting the wound dressed by that Doctor. Does it stand to reason that anyone would go to a Homeo path for dressing a bleeding wound? Queried counsel for the respondent. The rural set up, and the cultural and educational background, of the witness, have all to be reckoned in judging his conduct. It is difficult to summarily dismiss it as an impossible conduct. 41. However, more serious difficulties exist in relation to the acceptance of his evidence. Queried counsel for the respondent. The rural set up, and the cultural and educational background, of the witness, have all to be reckoned in judging his conduct. It is difficult to summarily dismiss it as an impossible conduct. 41. However, more serious difficulties exist in relation to the acceptance of his evidence. In his chief examination, PW6 stated that PW2 was present when the first defendant talked to him the slanderous words. That is not the case of PW2. PW2 is positive in his evidence that he "knew about the defendants' objectionable actions only from the plaintiff. There is, therefore, an irreconcilable conflict in the version as given by PW2 and PW6. 42. Counsel for the plaintiff submitted that the statement of PW6 did not necessarily mean that PW2 was in the hearing range when the defendant uttered the objectionable words to PW6. It is difficult to accept the suggestion as a wholly convincing explanation for the glaring disparity in the version of the two witnesses. A reading of the testimony of P. W.6 would not bring to mind a crowded consultation room and a que of waiting patients. If P. W.6 could see, and state about his having seen, P.W.2 in the house of Elizabeth teacher, that must ordinarily be in the presence o f P.W.2 himself. As noted earlier, P. W, 2 does not have such a case at all. This situation, to considerableDegree shatters the reliability of the evidence of P. W.6. The plaintiff apparently put his money on the wrong horse. 43. There is yet one more strong enough circumstance, disfavoring a ready acceptance of the uncorroborated testimony of P.W.6. That is the belated inclusion of the witness in the witness list. The suit had been filed in 1977. The name ofP.W.6was absent in the array of persons particularly enumerated in paragraph 3 of the plaint. His name appears in the witness list for the first time in 1979. The court will then have a feeling that there is not enough assuring evidence and supportive materials justifying an interference with the finding of fact on the question by the appellate court. 44. Possibly, it is a shortfall in the evidence unexpected or unanticipated by the plaintiff. Yet it is there. The plaintiff had presumably an over-doze of optimism. Only the actual battle in the legal court brought to him a realization of his inadequate equipage. 44. Possibly, it is a shortfall in the evidence unexpected or unanticipated by the plaintiff. Yet it is there. The plaintiff had presumably an over-doze of optimism. Only the actual battle in the legal court brought to him a realization of his inadequate equipage. Even then, he has to face defeat, with the doubtless dismay, but a partial satisfaction of having done his best. A feeling that those, whose names were mentioned in the plaint may not be as helpful as was imagined earlier, might have persuaded him to leave out such persons from the witnesses examined on his side. That too maybe an unexpected (and for him quite unfortunate) eventuality. That eventuality too, cannot visit on the defendants, penal consequences. It may be that the defendants were perilously near the liability zone. It is particularly so when the explanation put forward as the motive for the plaintiffs suit is so tenuous and so artificial. 45. A general impression of this Court that the plaintiff had courage of conviction and had done well to resort to an action for the protection of his reputation would probably be ample reward for all the trouble that he had taken. In the situation, that could be his only consolation; and in substantial terms, that is a good consolation in the prevailing situation. He can now consign to oblivion the whole experience casa squalid episode in a shabby period in the lives of all the parties. 46. With the above observation, I dismiss the second appeal. An appreciation of a daring action in the protection of one's own reputation as attempted by the plaintiff, would justify this Court in declining costs to the respondent. I direct the parties to bear their respective costs. 47. This State enjoying the ecstasy of literacy, has witnessed many legal battles, when reputation was a target of attack. Decided cases would indicate that a wounded self respect made even an otherwise disciplined spiritual novice sue his ecclesiastical superior as in Mar Timotheus Metropolitan v. Yohannan Kathanar, (1914) V Cochin Law Reports 173, or as in (the case of a Hindu spiritual head) M. Samantha Filial v. Vencategiri Sastriai, 1908 T.L.R. Vol.XII Page 72; or again as in (a Muslim spiritual head) Ismal Kattuvava Rowter v. Marakar Lebba Abdul Kadir Lebba, 1908 T.L.R. Vol.XIII Page 190. Mr. Mr. A.B. Salem, an advocate, who functioned as Chief of a local authority, fought and won one such battle, when, with an innuendo on his religious persuasion, an article in 'Argus' referred to "Judiacal Perfidy", and thus ca¬lumnised his Jewish faith, (That case would be helpful guide to any lawyer as to the thoroughness with which pleadings are to be made and the care with which evidence has to be adduced. Quite often, the words of wisdom of Vidhura (as occurring in that massive epic Mahabharatha) are forgotten. The words read: "You protect your reputation. Reputation is the strongest force. The great sages say that the life of one who has lost his reputation is a useless one. Oh!sunofGandhari,a man lives till such time as his reputation remains unundermined. A man's life extends till such time as the existence of a good reputation. With the destruction of the reputation, man also perishes". (See Bhishma's Vakya in Adiparvam, Paragraph 203). Even in the background of a defeat suffered by the plaintiff, this litigation may have a lesson to give: Slanderers beware.