JUDGMENT - S.M. DAUD, J.:---These petitions by persons claiming to be a lessee and lessor respectively impugn an order passed by the Addl. Commissioner Konkan Division in an appeal under section 33 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, hereinafter referred to as the U.L.C. Act. 2. Land bearing Survey No. 151-A City Survey Nos. 461 and 462 etc.etc. of village Nahur, Taluka Kurla was formerly part of the Bhandup Estate which held it along with other properties as Inam land. This type of grant along with others were abolished vide section 5 of the Bombay Personal Inam Abolition Act, 1952 hereinafter to be known as the 'Abolition Act'. A proper understanding of the controversy to be resolved requires a categorisation of the lis personae. First, are the petitioners, to be referred to by their surnames i.e. Shah and Patil. The latter claims to be an 'inferior holder' of the land-his rights having been enlarged into full-fledged ownership by the Abolition Act. Shah claims to be the son and heir of Patil's lessee under a document dated 11 October, 1960 styled as an agreement to lease. Pitted against these gentlemen are the Bafnas whose victory in the impugned order has given rise to the instant petitions. Under gift deed dated 14th January, 1971 they as trustees of the Bafna Charitable Trust have accepted a donation of the land in dispute from the Bhandup Estate. As far back as 1968 and in fact prior thereto, there had existed a dispute between the Estate and Patil as to the latter's status. On 2 September, 1968, the Commissioner held that Patil had been recorded as a protected tenant and that if he claimed a higher right, the proper forum was a Civil Court. Eventually Patil did file a suit and the same is said to be pending. 3. With the coming into force the U.L.C. Act, the Deputy Collector as the Competent Authority called upon Shah's father (then alive) to submit a statement under section 6(1) of the said Act. The same was scrutinised resulting in a declaration under section 8(4). This was followed by a Notification dated 21 November, 1985 under section 10(1) declaring the land as vacant and therefore expropriable. Shah moved the Government for exemption under section 20 of the U.L.C. Act, on March 2, 1988 the same was granted. The same was scrutinised resulting in a declaration under section 8(4). This was followed by a Notification dated 21 November, 1985 under section 10(1) declaring the land as vacant and therefore expropriable. Shah moved the Government for exemption under section 20 of the U.L.C. Act, on March 2, 1988 the same was granted. The Bafnas in the section 33 appeal against Shah-but not Patil-impugned the order of the competent authority under section 8(4) of the U.L.C. Act. Shah raised objections such as locus-standi of Bafnas and limitation in answer to the appeal. In regard to the first point, Shah's contention was that Bafnas not being parties to the U.L.C. Act proceedings and not having been served with a copy of the orders passed, could not be persons 'aggrieved' within the meaning of section 31. Next the appeal preferred by them in 1988 was obviously beyond time. A more substantial ground was that the order sought to be set aside by the Bafnas had been superseded by the Government's section 20 notification. The Commissioner as an authority subordinate to the Government could not set aside this exemption notification. Patil a party vitally affected was not impleaded to the appeal and therefore the order was non est. The Commissioner negatived these contentions and held that the declaration under section 8(4) in so far as it pertained to Survey No. 151-A was liable to be set aside. Shah Patil re-agitate these contentions in the instant petitions and the Bafnas defend the order impugned. 4. The only issue is whether the appeal was not maintainable on all or any of the grounds taken by Shah and Patil. Mr. Dhanuka argues that the right of appeal under section 33(1) is no doubt given to a person aggrieved but only if the aggrieving order is communicated to him. 4. The only issue is whether the appeal was not maintainable on all or any of the grounds taken by Shah and Patil. Mr. Dhanuka argues that the right of appeal under section 33(1) is no doubt given to a person aggrieved but only if the aggrieving order is communicated to him. Section 33 reads as follows : (1) Any person aggrieved by an order made by the competent authority under this Act, not being an order under section 11 or an order under sub-section (1) of section 30, may, within thirty days of the date on which the order is communicated to him, prefer an appeal to such authority as may be prescribed (hereafter in this section referred to as the appellate authority); Provided that the appellate authority may entertain the appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal in time. (2) On receipt of an appeal under sub-section (1), the appellate authority shall, after giving the appellant an opportunity of being heard, pass such orders thereon as it deems fit as expeditiously as possible. (3) Every order passed by the appellate authority under this section shall be final.'' Mr. Hidayatulla for the Bafnas replies that a clause in relation to service and limitation which relate to procedure cannot affect the substantive right given by the first part of sub-section (1) of section 33. This in my view, is the right way to interpret the section. The right to appeal is vested in any person aggrieved. To limit this expression to one who was a party to the proceeding in the first instance would be to affect unheard different classes of persons. This class would include those like the Bafnas who claim a proprietary interest in the land which is the subject matter of the section 8 enquiry. It may be argued that the section 8 enquiry commences in respect of a statement submitted by the holder of vacant land vis-a-vis section 6 and therefore it is but proper to restrict the right of appeal to persons who figured in the enquiry. Acceptance of this proposition would be to encourage land-grabbing and worse. It may be argued that the section 8 enquiry commences in respect of a statement submitted by the holder of vacant land vis-a-vis section 6 and therefore it is but proper to restrict the right of appeal to persons who figured in the enquiry. Acceptance of this proposition would be to encourage land-grabbing and worse. The language of the opening part of section 33 being unrestricted an interpretation in consonance with fairness has to be preferred over that which is capable of great mischief. 4.2. The plea of limitation does not present any difficulty. The period of 30 days is for those served with the order to be impugned in the appeal. On sufficient cause being made out, the appeal can be entertained after the expiry of 30 days. The Commissioner condoned the delay and I see no reason to take a different view. 4.3 Patil's non-joinder to the appeal is said to be vital omission vitiating the judgment delivered therein. The transaction between Patil and Shah is an agreement to lease dated 11 October, 1960. The recitals of the agreement have virtually denuded Patil of any interest in the land. The lease's duration is 15 years and midway Shah has been given the option to purchase the land. Be that as it may, the interest that Patil had or has, was effectively defended by Shah and Patil's absence has not really contributed to the adverse verdict. 4.4 The crucial flaw-so it is contended on behalf of the petitioners is the extinction of the Commissioner's power to entertain an appeal having regard to the notifying of the section 20 exemption granted by the State Government. It is argued that the Act makes clear the primacy of the State Government among the administering and quasi judicial authorities created thereunder. Reference in this connection is made to different sections of the Act. That being the position, the Commissioner under section 33 could not set at naught an order of the State Government. There is an element of plausibility in this contention. A closer look would however indicate the flaw therein. Section 33 makes every order of the competent authority barring thereunder section 11 or 30(1), appellable. The acquisition under section 10 is pursuant to proceedings under the preceding sections. That acquisition was averted by an application of Shah to get exemption under section 20. A closer look would however indicate the flaw therein. Section 33 makes every order of the competent authority barring thereunder section 11 or 30(1), appellable. The acquisition under section 10 is pursuant to proceedings under the preceding sections. That acquisition was averted by an application of Shah to get exemption under section 20. The basis of the whole edifice culminating in exemption order, is, the declaration under section 8(4). That order being of the competent authority and appellable, it would be an error to hold that the right to appeal disappears because of the section 20 notification. 4.5 On merits, it is not possible to find fault with the order of the Commissioner. If not sustained, the Bafnas would have lost title to the land by recourse to a statute and an authority which had no jurisdiction to arbitrate on questions of title. This would be incongruous seeing that the verdict in regard to the entries in the revenue papers went in favour of the Bafnas predecessor- in-interest and the civil suit initiated by Patil to get over it is still in its infancy. A review/revision application taken to the State Government against the above judgment again failed to enable Patil to get over the adverse order. To sum up the very inception of the U.L.C. Act proceedings was vitiated and the Commissioner was right in reversing order of the competent authority under section 8(4) thereof. 5. A small clarification is necessary before I come to the end. The Commissioner has directed the deletion of Survey No. 151-A and C.T.S. Nos. 461 and 462 etc. as expropriable land in the hands of Shah. But this is foreclosing the rights of Shah which cannot be said to be concluded until the suit instituted by Patil comes to an end. The appropriate order would be to direct the deletion to be final upon Patil's suit failing whether on merits or otherwise. Subject to this clarification, I reject both the writ petitions, leaving parties to bear their own costs. Petitions rejected. -----