JUDGMENT 1. - This is a plaintiffs first appeal filed against the judgment and decree dated October 20, 1976, passed by the District Judge, Bhilwara, dismissing the plaintiffs suit for the recovery of Rs. 14,160/-. 2. The suit was filed on December 21, 1971, for the recovery of Rs. 14,160/- in the Court of District Judge, Bhilwara, against Shri.Sambbu Singh respondent herein The suit was based on a promissory note alleged to have been executed by Sambhu Singh on June 28, 1970, for Rs. 12,000/-. It was alleged that the defendant had taken a loan of Rs. 12,000/- on June 28, 1970 and promised to pay the same on demand with interest @ 12% per annum and had executed a promissory note and a receipt the same day. The plaintiff claimed a decree for Rs. 12,000/- as principal and Rs. 2,160/- as interest, total Rs. 14,160/-. 3. The defendant, in his written statement denied having received any amount from the plaintiff. It was alleged that the defendant was not at Bhilwara on June 28, 1970 and did not take any loan at any time from the plaintiff. He did not even know the defendant. It was stated that the defendant had not executed any pro-note or receipt in favour of the plaintiff. It was averred that the defendants father had taken a compressor for his tractor from one Shri Ramswaroop Gupta. The defendant asked Shri Ramswaroop Gupta to sell the said compressor to him. Shri Ramswaroop Gupta in that connection, got a blank promote form signed from the defendant. Later on Shri Ramswarop Gupta came to the defendants village and took away the compressor in the absence of the defendant. It was pleaded that by callusing with the plaintiff Shri Ramswaroop Gupta had got the present suit filed, although the defendant had not monetary transaction with the plaintiff. 4. The District Judge, by judgment dated October 20, 1976, has dismissed the plaintiffs suit on the ground that it was not established that the pro-note and the receipt were for consideration. 5. Dis-satisfied with the judgment of the District Judge, the plaintiff has filed the present appeal in this Court. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties. Shri Dinesh Maheshwari, counsel for the appellant, has urged that the plaintiffs suit was the based on promissory note and the receipt executed on June 28, 1970. 5. Dis-satisfied with the judgment of the District Judge, the plaintiff has filed the present appeal in this Court. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties. Shri Dinesh Maheshwari, counsel for the appellant, has urged that the plaintiffs suit was the based on promissory note and the receipt executed on June 28, 1970. The signatures on the promissory note and the receipt .are admitted by the defendant. Therefore, argues learned counsel, a presumption under the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, hereinafter referred as to The Act, was clearly available that the promissory note was drawn for consideration. Shri Maheshwari submitted that the defendant had failed to rebut this presumption and the learned District Judge, by placing a wrong burden on the plaintiff, had committed a mistake in holding that the promissory note and the receipt were without consideration. Shri Dave, counsel for the respondent has, on the other hand, fully supported the judgment of the learned District Judge. 7. True, Section 118 of the Act gives rise to a presumption that the negotiable instrument was made or drawn for consideration and the onus to prove that no consideration in-fact passed to the executant was on the party who relied on the said instrument. Dealing with the question how the presumption could be rebutted the Supreme Court in Kundan Lal Rallaram v. Custodian, Evacuee Property, AIR 1961 SC 1316 . said: "The question is, how the burden can be discharged. The rules of evidence pertaining to burden of proof are embodied in Chapter VII of the Evidence Act. The phrase "burden of Proof has two meanings- one the burden of proof as a matter of law and pleading and the other the burden of establishing a case; the former is fixed as a question of law on the basis of the pleadings and is unchanged during the entire trial, whereas the latter is not constant but shifts as soon as a party adduces sufficient evidence to raise a presumption in his favour. The evidence required to shift the burden need not necessarily be direct evidence i.e. oral or documentary evidence or admissions made by opposite party; it may compromise circumstantial evidence or presumptions of law or fact. To illustrate how this doctrine works in practice, we may take a suit on a promissory note. The evidence required to shift the burden need not necessarily be direct evidence i.e. oral or documentary evidence or admissions made by opposite party; it may compromise circumstantial evidence or presumptions of law or fact. To illustrate how this doctrine works in practice, we may take a suit on a promissory note. Under Section 101 of the Evidence Act, "Whoever desires any Court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist." Therefore, the burden initially rests on the plaintiff who has to prove that the promissory note was executed by the defendant. As soon as the execution of the promissory note is proved, the rule of presumption laid down in Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act helps him to shift the burden to the other side. The burden of proof as a question of law rests, therefore, on the plaintiff; but as soon as the execution is proved, Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act imposes a duty on the Court to raise a presumption in his favour that the said instrument was made for consideration. This presumption shifts the burden of proof in the second sense, that is, the burden of establishing a case shifts to the defendant. The defendant may adduce direct evidence to prove that the promissory note was not supported by consideration and, if he adduced acceptable evidence, the burden again shifts to the plaintiff and so on. The defendant may also rely upon circumstantial evidence and, if the circumstances so relied upon are compelling, the burden may likewise shift again to the plaintiff. He may also rely upon presumptions of fact, for instance those mentioned in Section 114 and other sections of the Evidence Act." ************ "Briefly stated, the burden of proof may be shifted by presumptions of law or fact, and presumptions of law or presumptions of fact may be rebutted not only by direct or circumstantial evidence but also by presumptions of law or fact. We are not concerned here with in rebuttable presumptions of law." 8. The position of law is, thus, clear that in order to rebut the presumption of Section 118 of the Act it is not necessary for the defendant to prove want of consideration by producing positive evidence on his behalf. We are not concerned here with in rebuttable presumptions of law." 8. The position of law is, thus, clear that in order to rebut the presumption of Section 118 of the Act it is not necessary for the defendant to prove want of consideration by producing positive evidence on his behalf. It is open to him to rely on the admissions of the plaintiff himself or to refer to the flaws in the evidence of the plaintiff. He may also discharge the burden by showing that the circumstances appearing in the case makes the plaintiffs story inherently incredible. As summed up by the Supreme Court in Kundan Lal's case the presumptions of Section 118 could be rebutted not by direct but by circumstantial evidence or by raising other presumptions of law or fact. 9. In the present case the defendant has admitted his signatures on the documents Ex. 1 & Ex. 2 and therefore this execution is not more in dispute. Obviously, a presumption under Section 118 of the Act was available and it was for the defendant to prove the contrary. I have, therefore, to see how far the defendant was able to discharge his burden and rebut the presumption of Section 118 of the Act. In support of his case, the defendant, besides examining himself as DW-1, has produced three more witnesses, namely, Natwar Singh, Ram Singh and Dungar Singh. Out of them, Ram Singh and Dungar Singh were held to be false by the learned District Judge. As regards Natwar Singh, he has himself admitted that he had no knowledge about the compressor of Ramswaroop Gupta. Therefore, the defendants positive case consists of his self sole testimony. By itself as contended by the counsel for the appellant, his sole testimony may not be adequate to discharge satisfactorily the onus which lay on the defendant to prove want of consideration, but the learned District Judge has mentioned nine strong and sound reasons to come to the conclusion that it was not established that the pro-note and the receipt were for consideration. After giving my earnest consideration to the question I am of the view that the defendant, by his own statement and the facts and circumstances elicited in the cross-examination of the plaintiff and his witnesses, has successfully rebutted the presumption of Section 118 of the Act. After giving my earnest consideration to the question I am of the view that the defendant, by his own statement and the facts and circumstances elicited in the cross-examination of the plaintiff and his witnesses, has successfully rebutted the presumption of Section 118 of the Act. As per the statements of the plaintiff and his witnesses the consideration of the pro-note, that is a sum of Rs. 12,000/-, was paid to the defendant at Bhilwara, on June 28, 1970, at the time of the execution of the documents Ex-1 and Ex-2. Curiously, the defendant was an absolute stranger to the plaintiff, who was not knowing him from before and had not seen him at any time before the execution of the document. It is difficult to believe that a sum of Rs. 12,000/- would be paid to a stranger, only on the asking of his son. His son has not been produced in evidence. The plaintiff resides at Banera, while the defendant belonged to another village Barada in Tehsil-Chitiorgarh. Why and, in what circumstances the plaintiff carried the cash of Rs. 12,000/- to Bhilwara and paid the same to the defendant there has cot been explained at all. Ordinarily a debtor approaches the creditor and not the other way round. Significantly the scribe and the other witnesses produced by the witnesses all belong to Banera. In what connection they all had gone to Bhilwara had not been shown to the Court. The learned District Judge has held that the possibility that signatures on blank forms in some way or the other had been obtained and the contents later on filed in, could not, in the circumstances, be ruled out. One important aspect which makes the entire story of payment of money, at the time of execution of the documents, as wholly unbelievable is that none of the plaintiffs witnesses including the plaintiff was able to give even a rough description of the defendant. The plaintiff Phool Chand has, in cross examination, admitted:- "Ukt rupaiye rokar vagairah bahiyat durz nahin hai. Sambhu Singh prativadi ka gaon Barada hai, Main wahan Barada kabhi nahin gaya, Shambhu Singh prativadi ko main 1970 se janta hoon. Pahle se mera bachcha janta hai, Sambhu Singh ko maine pradarsh 1 wa pradarsh 2 ko likhaparhi ke purv nahin dekha........ Sambhu Singh prativadi ki umra maloom nahin. Sambhu Singh kitna lamba hai nahin bata sakta. Sambhu Singh prativadi ka gaon Barada hai, Main wahan Barada kabhi nahin gaya, Shambhu Singh prativadi ko main 1970 se janta hoon. Pahle se mera bachcha janta hai, Sambhu Singh ko maine pradarsh 1 wa pradarsh 2 ko likhaparhi ke purv nahin dekha........ Sambhu Singh prativadi ki umra maloom nahin. Sambhu Singh kitna lamba hai nahin bata sakta. Moochhen rakhta hai ya nahin - yaad nahin. Baal kale hain ya safed pata nahin. Kaphe dino ke baat ho jane se nahin bata sakta." 10. The witness has failed to give even a rough description of the defendant. The inference is irresistable that he did not see him before. It is, therefore, difficult to accept that he paid a sum of Rs. 12,000/- to the defendant with whom he never met before. The defendant was aged 35 years but surprisingly the plaintiffs witness Samrath Singh stated in cross-examination that Sambhu Singh was 55-60 years of age and had white mustaches, Ramswaroop, the scribe of the documents, also admitted that he did not know Shambhu Singh from before. This witness also failed to give any description of the defendant. He has admitted:- "Pooranchand ka ladka oos waki nahin tha. Shambhu Singh ke muchen thi ya nahin, dhyan nahin. Shambhu Singh ki umra andaz se bhi nahin bataa sakta. Yeh bhi nahin kah sakta ki umra 60 saal ki thi ya nahin. Kud 51/2 feet lamba tha ya kitna mujhepata nahin." 11. Such being the position brought out in cross-examination, it is difficult to reverse the finding of the learned District Judge that the consideration i.e. Rs. 12,000/'- was not paid by the plaintiff to the defendant on June 28, 1970, alleged to have been paid at the time of the execution of the documents. The defendant has said that he did not receive any consideration from the plaintiff. The presumption of Section 118 of the Act stood rebutted and the finding of the District Judge that the documents Ex-1 and Ex-2 were without consideration was correct and uphold the same. 12. The result is there is no merit in the appeal and th6" same is hereby dismissed with costs.Appeal dismissed. *******