HIREMATH, J. ( 1 ) THE appellant herein is the Deputy Commissioner and Court of Wards Dharwar managing the Savanur estate. It is unnecessary to trace the genealogy for the reason that the plaintiffs were claiming under ghouse Khan grand-son of Mubarak Khan and when the Court of Wards issued notices to the plaintiffs/respondents to pay rent they disputed the competence of the appellant to recover rent claiming that they are the owners of the respective properties in their possession, they having purchased the same from Ghouse Khan. The Court of Wards had assumed management of the Savanur estate even during the life time of Mubarak khan and it was Nawab of Savanur who had assumed management as the Court of Wards and after the merger of the Savanur State in the year 1948 in the Indian Union it was court of Wards at Dharwar that stepped into the shoes of the Savanur Court of Wards and assumed management of the estate. This is not disputed. The plaintiffs/respondents resisted the notices issued by the Court of wards for recovery of rent and contended that they are not liable to pay the rent. The courts below found that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiffs and Ghouse Khan and there- after between the plaintiffs and the Court of wards. While considering this ground they also incidentally referred to the question of title set up by the respondents through ghouse Khan. It is also brought on record that earlier steps were taken under Section 28 and 29 of the Bombay Court of Wards act, by the appellant for eviction on the same ground and the order that was passed by the competent authority was challenged before the Revenue Appellate Tribunal and that appeal was dismissed. The Courts below however came to the conclusion that the said order does not in any way come in the way of the plaintiffs in prosecuting the suit. Accordingly the trial Court gave a decree in favour of the plaintiffs in- the following terms:-"in the result this suit is decreed as prayed for restraining the defendant from adopting coercive measures to recover any alleged rent from the plaintiffs in respect of the suit properties". Thus the decree of the Court below is limited to the extent of restraining the appellant from adopting coercive measures to recover rent. Thus the decree of the Court below is limited to the extent of restraining the appellant from adopting coercive measures to recover rent. It is not disputed that there was no independent agreement between the respondents and the appellant with regard to the rent or tenancy; their case was because they were tenants under Ghouse Khan they were liable to pay rent to the Court of Wards. In view of the title set up by the plaintiffs and in view of the absence of any such agreement being proved decree has been given in favour of the respondents. ( 2 ) IN this second appeal the points of law set down for determination are:- 1) Whether the suit in the present form is maintainable in view of Section 8 of the Karnataka Revenue Appellate tribunal Act, 1947? 2) Whether the suit abates with regard to plaintiffs 1,4 and 6? ( 3 ) TAKING the second point in the first instance, the trial Court itself observed that plaintiff-1 was reported to be dead on 22-4- 1969 and also dismissed the application of his legal representatives to come on record and therefore it is apparently clear that the suit proceeded without the legal representatives of the first plaintiff coming on record. Obviously the other plaintiffs did not represent the estate of the first plaintiff and therefore though the provisions of Order 1 rule 1 of the CP. Code were invoked to maintain a suit of this nature on the ground that similar questions of law and fact would arise if separate suits were brought that does not save the consequences of the estate of the plaintiff No. 1 not being represented in the suit. Therefore the suit of plaintiff-1 who is respondent No. 1 herein abated in the trial court itself. ( 4 ) IT was reported before the trial Court that the 4th plaintiff died on 6-9-1970. Though a report was also made that the 6th plaintiff also died, the Counsel representing them did not say anything as the judgment of the trial Court discloses. At para 17 the trial cuuu observed that he has contended that the plaintiff No. 4 died on 6-5-1970; that the 6th plaintiff had also died and then their legal representatives were not brought on record. The learned Advocate for the plaintiffs was not in a position to say anything in that regard. At para 17 the trial cuuu observed that he has contended that the plaintiff No. 4 died on 6-5-1970; that the 6th plaintiff had also died and then their legal representatives were not brought on record. The learned Advocate for the plaintiffs was not in a position to say anything in that regard. Thus it is for the first time now that the legal representatives of these plaintiffs are sought to be brought on record on the same grounds and it is rather surprising that even in the first appellate Court it was not reported that these plaintiffs 4 and 6 had died and that their legal representatives were to be substituted. The very appellant herein filed an appeal in the first appellate Court impleading the same respondents inspite of a report that the appellant had filed before the trial Court reporting the death of plaintiffs-4 and 6. Therefore, it has now become doubtful if plaintiffs-4 and 6 had. died during the pendency of the suit or they died during the pendency of the appeal or even thereafter. In the absence of any definite material on record and on the appellant's own showing that they were very much party respondents in the first appellate Court it would be rather unreasonable to hold that they were no longer alive when the suit before the trial court came to be disposed off. Therefore on this point it is held that the suit of plaintiffs 4 and 6 did not abate whereas that of plaintiff no. 1 had abated. ( 5 ) IN the second appeal however steps have been taken to implead the legal representatives of plaintiffs 1, 4 and 6. In view of my finding that the suit itself had abated on the death of plaintiff No. 1, there is no question of his legal representative again being brought on record in this appeal. However, legal representatives of plaintiffs 4 and 6, that is, respondents-4 and 6 were proposed to be brought on record by filing interlocutory applications I. As 1 to 3. They were served with notice and they never turned up. It is therefore directed that legal representatives of these two respondents be substituted in the appeal memo forthwith. Similarly the memo for treating the other legal representatives that is the legal representatives of respondent No. 4 is allowed. ( 6 ) THE next point is one of jurisdiction. They were served with notice and they never turned up. It is therefore directed that legal representatives of these two respondents be substituted in the appeal memo forthwith. Similarly the memo for treating the other legal representatives that is the legal representatives of respondent No. 4 is allowed. ( 6 ) THE next point is one of jurisdiction. The appellant had issued notice to each of the plaintiffs for payment of rent and thereafter took steps under Section 202 of the bombay Land Revenue Code 1879 read with section 29 of the Bombay Court of Wards act 1905 for the purpose of recovering rent from the plaintiffs/respondents. Section 28 of the Court of Wards gives such a power to the Court of Wards to evict persons in occupation of the properties by taking recourse under Section 202 of the Bombay Land revenue Code. Thus the notices issued to the appellant and to the respondents were under Section 202 of the Code and the same were challenged before the Mysore Revenue appellate Tribunal by the respondents and this appeal came to be dismissed. Section 8 of the Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal act 1957, as it stood before the State was named as Karnataka State runs as follows:"notwithstanding anything contained in any law, but subject to the provisions of section 55, every decision of the Tribunal shall be final and shall not be called in question in any Court of law". Section 5 however gives the tribunal the power of review. Therefore when Section 8 makes it amply clear that the decision of the tribunal shall not be questioned in any court of law, the trial Court tried to explain away the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in para 15 of its judgment. It observed inter alia that it is a simple case of the plaintiffs that they are in actual and lawful possession of the suit properties and therefore the appellant should not use coercive measures to recover the alleged rent from them. Since the plaintiffs had purchased the suit properties prior to the assumption for superintendence by Court of Wards at Dharwar, the defendant should take necessary steps to set aside the sale deeds executed in their favour. Since the plaintiffs had purchased the suit properties prior to the assumption for superintendence by Court of Wards at Dharwar, the defendant should take necessary steps to set aside the sale deeds executed in their favour. It is pertinent to note that the plaintiffs did not themselves come to the Court with a prayer for declaration of their title to these properties, when notices were issued calling, upon them to pay rent and the Tribunal upheld the action taken by the Court of wards under Section 202. It was upto the plaintiffs to mould their relief in the manner that could be permitted by law. Instead of that they only approached the Court with a suit for bare injunction to restrain the Court of Wards/appellant from taking what they call coercive measure to recover the rent from them. If once it is held that they are liable to pay rent it is for the Court of Wards to decide how the order should be implemented and there cannot be a suit for injunction only to restrain them from using coercive measures as though it smacks of contention that they were willing to pay rent voluntarily. The Courts below were therefore not right in not properly appreciating the scope of section 8 of the said Act and it must be held in this appeal that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is clearly barred. In that view of the matter the appeal is allowed and judgment and the decrees of the Courts below in favour of respondents 2 to 6 are set aside and the suit is dismissed. As already held suit of plaintiff-1/respondent No. 1 had abated. Parties however to bear respective costs in this appeal. --- *** --- .