JUDGMENT 1. This petition has been filed by an individual who claims to have been employed in the Uttar Pradesh State Cement Corporation, Ltd., as a workman. 2. He is aggrieved by what he has characterised as retrenchment of his employment by the said corporation. It appears that the petitioner's service were discontinued sometime in 1979. Thereafter he appears to have applied for taking him back in service. Having failed to persuade the employers he approached this Court by means of a petition asserting that he was not paid any compensation such as is contemplated under S. 6 N of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act and consequently his alleged retrenchment is completely void and ineffectual in law. A direction should, therefore, be issued to the said corporation to take the petitioner back in service with the benefits of continuity of service with all the consequential benefits. 3. This Court, however, by an order, dated 4 February 1985, dismissed that petition on the ground that the petitioner had an effective alternative remedy available to him by way of approach to the appropriate authorities under the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act. Thereafter the petitioner filed an application in the prescribed form before the Conciliation Officer. The matter remained pending before the Conciliation Officer for some time but the Conciliation Officer failed to bring about any settlement between the petitioner and his employers and he reported the failure to the State Government. The State Government thereafter passed an order, dated 25 October 1985, declining to refer the dispute sought to be raised by the petitioner, on the ground that it was not a fit case for reference under S. 4K. of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act. 4. Aggrieved by this order, the petitioner has approached this Court again, this time for a writ of mandamus directing the State Government to refer the dispute raised by the petitioner for adjudication to a Tribunal or Labour Court. 5. The petition has been contested by the respondents. The Uttar Pradesh Mate Cement Corporation has also filed a counter affidavit. No counter-affidavit has, however, been filed on behalf of State Government though the learned standing counsel was repeatedly granted time for filing a counter-affidavit. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the impugned order is liable to be quashed on the facts which were established on record. The Uttar Pradesh Mate Cement Corporation has also filed a counter affidavit. No counter-affidavit has, however, been filed on behalf of State Government though the learned standing counsel was repeatedly granted time for filing a counter-affidavit. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the impugned order is liable to be quashed on the facts which were established on record. An industrial dispute as defined under S. 2A of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act clearly existed and there was no valid ground for not referring the dispute for the adjudication of the appropriate Tribunal under S. 4K of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act. The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the grounds upon which the State Government has declined to refer the dispute were irrelevant and improper. The request of the petitioner has been refused on extraneous consideration, etc. 7. The impugned order disclosed no reason why the State Government does not consider the dispute fit for reference under S. 4K of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act. It does not say that an industrial dispute does not exist nor does it say that though such a dispute exists, it is not appropriate for reasons which were relevant for .deciding whether the case should be referred for adjudication or not referring the dispute. On the contrary, the State Government has mentioned in the impugned order that on a consideration of the merits of the petitioner's claim does not find it a fit case for reference under S. 4K. 8. In the case of Ram Avtar Sharma and others v. State of Haryana and others, 1985(11) LLN 280 the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the scope of S. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, in depth. It also examined the nature of powers which the Government exercises under that provision as well as the grounds upon which a request for reference can be granted or refused. The Supreme Court has ruled that while the power which is exercisable under S. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act is administrative and not quasi-judicial, the Government cannot decline to refer the dispute on grounds which are not germane to the exercise of power under the Industrial Disputes Act and the scheme underlying the same. Their Lordships summed up the law thus in Paras. 5 and 7, at pages 283 and 284 : "..... Their Lordships summed up the law thus in Paras. 5 and 7, at pages 283 and 284 : "..... Thus, there is a considerable body of judicial opinion that while exercising power of making a reference under S. 10, the appropriate Government performs an administrative act and not a judicial or quasi-judicial act. Now if the Government performs an administrative act while either making or refusing to make a reference under S. 10(1), it cannot delve into the merits of the dispute and take upon itself the determination of his. That would certainly be in excess of the power conferred by S. 10. Section 10 requires the appropriate Government to be satisfied that an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended. This may permit the appropriate Government to determine prima facie whether an industrial dispute exists or the claim is frivolous or bogus or put forth for extraneous and irrelevant reasons not for justice or industrial peace and harmony. Every administrative determination must be based on grounds relevant and germane to the exercise of power. If the administrative determination is based on irrelevant, extraneous or grounds not germane to the exercise of power it is liable to be questioned in exercise of the power of judicial review." 9. Two postulates, therefore, emerge out of this pronouncement. First that the power under S. 10 is essentially administrative and not quasi-judicial in nature. But even this administrative determination must be based on grounds relevant and germane to the exercise of power such as the sub-serving of the cause of industrial peace or harmony or of justice. Second, that it cannot while exercising power under S. 10 delve into the merits of the dispute and assume the role of an adjudicator which properly belongs to the Industrial Tribunal under the Act, though the Government has the limited power to find out whether the claim put forward is frivolous or bogus in which case Government would be fully justified in not referring the dispute for adjudication. 10. With these postulates we proceed to examine the facts of the present case. The impugned order states that on an examination of the merits of the case the Government does not find it a fit case for reference. 10. With these postulates we proceed to examine the facts of the present case. The impugned order states that on an examination of the merits of the case the Government does not find it a fit case for reference. It is apparent in view of the decision cited above [195 L5-II L.L.N. 280], that the Government could not decline to refer the dispute for adjudication simply because in its opinion based on examination of the same. The Supreme Court has ruled that such an approach would amount to arrogation by the Government to itself the role which properly belongs to an adjudicator which, in the present case, are an Industrial Tribunal or Labour Court. Beyond stating that on an examination of the merits of the case it does not find the present to be a fit case or reference, the Government has disclosed no other reasons. There is no discussion in the order and no reason has been supplied even in this Court as the State Government has not filed any counter-affidavit. The impugned order is hence liable to be quashed with a direction to the State Government to consider the matter and pass a fresh order supported by reasons in the light of the observation made in this judgment and the law laid down by the Supreme Court. 11. In the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed, the impugned orders passed by the State Government (annexures 9 and 19) are quashed. The State Government shall now reconsider the entire matter and pass fresh orders giving reasons in support thereof in accordance with law, keeping in view the observations made by us. It will do so within one month from the date on which a certified copy of this order is filed before it. 12. There will be no order as to costs.