JUDGMENT D. S. Sinha, J. - By means of this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution the petitioner challenges the legality of the order, dated 8 March 1978, annexure II to the writ petition, whereby his services as peon of Deoria Kasya Sahkari Bank, Deoria, have been terminated. 2. According to the petitioner, he was appointed a peon on a regular vacancy on probation in accordance with the Uttar Pradesh Co-operative Societies Employees Services Regulations, 1973, after a selection by a duly constituted selection board and approval. The petitioner contends that the order of termination has been passed on account of mala fide intention of respondent 3 who w ants to induct his own men. 3. The petitioner challenges the order of termination on the ground that the committee of management alone being appointing authority, could terminate his services. But in the instant case the services have been terminated by the General Manager/Secretary, District Co-operative Bank, Ltd., Deoria. The other objection of the petitioner is that no approval of the committee of management has been obtained. Further objection is that there is no resolution of the managing committee terminating the service of the petitioner. By means of a supplementary affidavit a new ground has been taken by the petitioner for attacking the validity of the impugned order. This ground is to the effect that the petitioner having completed 240 days of continuous service his services cannot be terminated without following the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, hereinafter called the Act, which regulate the matter of retrenchment of a workman. 4. We have heard Sri M. S. Negi and Sri H. S. N. Tripathi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and the contesting respondents respectively. 5. Sri Tripathi, learned counsel for the respondent, contends that the appointment of the petitioner was illegal and as such it bestowed no right upon him. He, therefore, asserts that the petitioner, having been illegally appointed, has no right to challenge the termination of his services. 6. It is not necessary to investigate this contention of Sri Tripathi as it has not been disputed that the petitioner has been continuously working since November 1973, and is workman as contemplated by the Act and the protective provisions of the said Act are available to the petitioner. 7. 6. It is not necessary to investigate this contention of Sri Tripathi as it has not been disputed that the petitioner has been continuously working since November 1973, and is workman as contemplated by the Act and the protective provisions of the said Act are available to the petitioner. 7. Under the provisions of the Act if a workman completes 240 days of working, his services cannot be terminated without following the procedure for retrenchment specially without paying the retrenchment compensation. In the instant case it cannot be disputed that the services of the petitioner have been dispensed without following the procedure for retrenchment as envisaged under the Act. The termination of the services of the petitioner, therefore, becomes bad in law and liable to be set aside. 8. Since the petition succeeds on the aforesaid newly added ground it is not necessary for us to adjudicate upon the other submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 9. In the result the petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order terminating the services of the petitioner, dated 8 March 1978, annexure II to the petition, is quashed. The petitioner shall be treated to be continuing in the service and entitled to all the benefits thereof. There shall be no order as to costs.