JUDGMENT M.M. Gopal, Member - This is a second appeal against the judgment dated February 20, 1985 by which the learned Additional Commissioner has allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment of the trial court dated June 23, 1981. The trial court had decreed the suit. 2. Heard the learned counsels for the parties at length and perused the file. 3. The facts of the case are that a suit under Section 299-B of U.P. Act 1 of 1951 simplicitor was filled on December 10, 1979 by Piyarey and others against Mohammad Qasim and others. It is alleged that originally Azimullah was recorded tenant and after him his son Khuda Bux is entitled to inherit. Then his daughter Shakina and then her daughter Asghari and then the sons of Mst. Asghari, the present plaintiffs have acquired the right over the land in suit. 4. On March 21, 1981 written Statement was filed by Mohammad Qasim and others. They denied the right of the plaintiffs and alleged that Azimullah and Faizullah were two brothers. Azimullah died without any son and his brother became the owner and later on the branch of Faizullah, i.e., Jhummu, Habib and others succeeded the property and they were recorded over the land in suit. It is also alleged that they are the real owners. 5. The trial court by its judgment dated June 23, 1981 decreed the suit and held that Azimullah was recorded in 1282 Fasli and after that there was a judgment of 1942 by which the name of Chunna was recorded and later on the branch of the defendants was recorded and that order was in summary proceedings and it was not binding on the question of deciding the title of the parties. Hence the trial court did not rely on that judgment and held that the plaintiffs are the heirs of Azimullah. They succeeded and have acquired right. 6. The first appellate court by its judgment dated February 20, 1985 allowed the appeal and set aside the finding given by the trial court and have come to the conclusion that the defendants are recorded over the land in suit for more than 50 or 60 years. They succeeded and have acquired right. 6. The first appellate court by its judgment dated February 20, 1985 allowed the appeal and set aside the finding given by the trial court and have come to the conclusion that the defendants are recorded over the land in suit for more than 50 or 60 years. Chunna was recorded over the land in suit in the years 1314 Fasli as is evident from the order of A.R.O. of the year 1942 and then he has discussed the question of possession and allowed the appeal. 7. The learned counsel for the appellant has contended that the first appellate court had wrongly decided the Judgment of Area Rationing Officer dated May 29, 1942 and while dealing with the judgment, it has been observed by the first appellate court that it was a summary proceedings and the appellants were not parties in that case hence the lower appellate court as contended by the learned counsel, has wrongly relied on this judgment. 8. Secondly, it is contended that the question of estoppel and acquiescence does not arise because the plaintiffs were not party in that proceedings and the order was passed behind their back. 9. Thirdly, it is contended that while discussing the question of possession, the lower appellate court has not discussed the evidence of the plaintiff and has also not discussed the admission in respect of some part of the pedigree made by the D.W.2. In this way, the lower appellant court has not properly discussed the issued or the relevant points respect of title and in respect of possession. 10. Fourthly, the question of adoption in Mohammadan Law does not arise, hence the theory of adoption cannot be accepted and there is no evidence to substantiate it (except the finding given by the learned A.R.O. in the judgment dated May 29, 1942). 11. The learned counsel for the other side has contended that he reasonings for discarding the finding given by the trial court has been given by the first appellate court and there is a long standing entry. The possession should be presumed in his favour and as nothing was done by the plaintiff for so many years they are estopped now from denying the title on the basis of estoppel and acquiescence. 12. The possession should be presumed in his favour and as nothing was done by the plaintiff for so many years they are estopped now from denying the title on the basis of estoppel and acquiescence. 12. There is no doubt that the order of the summary proceedings are not binding in a case for deciding the title but it does mean that it has got no value. It is the order of the settlement year and it was passed by A.R.O. and it has got in own value so far as the entry is concerned. The principle of estoppel and acquiescence does not arise in respect of the order or judgment but in respect of the conduct of the parties. So far as the question of title is concerned, the first appellant court has decided it on the basis on the evidence of the record. The defendants or their ancestors were recorded since 1314 Fasli and there is evidence to that effect. There is no documentary evidence in favour of the plaintiffs after 1282 Fasli. The branch of the plaintiffs was not ever recorded and no proceedings was ever taken by the branch of the plaintiffs and so far as the question of oral evidence is concerned there are only two witnesses. One of the plaintiffs and other witnesses. One of the plaintiffs they have stated against the entries made in the revenue paper only because one astray statement of a defence witness in respect of the fact that he knew Khuda Bux son of Azimullah, it cannot be of such importance that the whole finding may be upset and this statement also does not given any right to the parties. Lastly the question of adoption in Mohammadan Law is not the point to be decided in this case. It was mentioned in the judgment of A.R.O. of 1942 just in narration of the facts and later on other members of the family were also recorded. Hence this point is neither decided by the courts below nor is to be decided for the purpose of disposal of the second appeal, by this court. Hence all the grounds raised by the learned counsel for the appellant has got no importance. 13. None of the grounds are of such importance that any interference in the judgment of the learned Additional Commissioner may be done. Hence all the grounds raised by the learned counsel for the appellant has got no importance. 13. None of the grounds are of such importance that any interference in the judgment of the learned Additional Commissioner may be done. Moreover, the plaintiff has to stand on its own legs and there is practically no documentary evidence to support the case of the plaintiffs. The consistent entries of the last 50 or 60 years cannot be brushed aside merely by the so called oral evidence. The revenue entries have got their own sanctity and such long entries are of more importance unless it is shown in respect of rate case, that some fraud was committed. 14. It is apparent that the first appellate court has given its finding after discussing the relevant provisions and evidence. it cannot be said that this finding is based on no evidence or no reasoning has been given by the lower appellate court. 15. I therefore, see no force in the second appeal and it is dismissed. The parties shall bear their own costs.