MANABENDRA NATH ROY, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is directed against the order of acquittal passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Cooch-Behar, in Criminal Case No 91 of 1977, dated 6-8- 79, under Section 379 of Indian Penal Code. ( 2 ) THE case out of which the present appeal has arisen is that the appellant of this appeal - complainant before the Judicial Magistrate (herein-after referred to as appellant) filed a complaint under Section 379 of the Indian Penal Code against the accused - respondents (hereinafter refered to as respondents) alleging that the appellant was in possession and enjoyment of a Jala bearing No 45 for a long time. ( 3 ) IN 1384 B. S. he took also lease of it from the Larkabar Co-operative Fishermen's Society for one year and was in possession and enjoyment of the same. On 5-12-77 the respondents 1 to 10 trespassed into the disputed Jaw and caught about two Maunds of fish worth about Rs. 700/- to 800/-inspite of protest from the side of the appellant. ( 4 ) THE case of the respondents is that they are innocent and they did not catch any fish as alleged by the appellant. ( 5 ) THE learned Magistrate after hearing both sides and considering the evidence and materials on record found that the appellant was not in exclusive possession of the disputed Jala and as such, he acquitted the respondents of this case. ( 6 ) AS against this order of acquittal this appeal by special leave has been filed. ( 7 ) IT is contended on behalf of the appellant that the order of acquittal passed by the learned Magistrate is bad, that on consideration of the evidence and materials on record. he should have held that the appellant was in exclusive possession of the disputed Jala and he should have also held that the respondents caught fish from the disputed Jala in which the appellant was in exclusive possession. Accordingly, the learned Magistrate should have convicted the respondents under Section 379 of the Indian Penal Code. ( 8 ) NOW, the point for our determination is whether or not the order of acquittal is liable to be set aside and converted into an order of conviction. Accordingly, the learned Magistrate should have convicted the respondents under Section 379 of the Indian Penal Code. ( 8 ) NOW, the point for our determination is whether or not the order of acquittal is liable to be set aside and converted into an order of conviction. ( 9 ) WE have already said that the learned Magistrate has held that it has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant was in exclusive possession of the disputed Jaw at the relevant time. ( 10 ) IT appears that the appellant produced documents vide Exts. 1 to 4, but those were taken back from the Lower Court by the appellant and inspite of repeated demands by his learned. Advocate, the appellant has not produced the same. Ext. 1 as mentioned in the judgment of the learned Magistrate does not show that the appellant was in exclusive possession of the disputed Jaw as stated in the judgment of the learned Magistrate. Exts 2 to 4 are receipts, but two of these receipts are of a date earlier than that of the aforesaid Ext. 1 and none of them prove exclusive possession of the appellant. It is contended on behalf of the appellant that these Exts. 1 to 4 along with other evidence on record would go to show that the appellant was in exclusive possession of the disputed Jala. ( 11 ) IT is now well settled that if the view taken by the learned Magistrate is not unreasonable or perverse, it should not be set aside and the order of acquittal should not converted into an order of conviction. It is also well settled that if two views can be arrived at from the evidence and materials on record of a case and the appellate authority accepts the alternative view, then also the order of acquittal cannot be converted into an order of conviction substituting the alternative view in place of the view taken by the learned magistrate. In other words, the order of acquittal passed by the learned Magistrate should not be set aside and it should not be converted into an order of conviction unless it is seen that the view taken by the learned Magistrate is unreasonable or perverse. In other words, the order of acquittal passed by the learned Magistrate should not be set aside and it should not be converted into an order of conviction unless it is seen that the view taken by the learned Magistrate is unreasonable or perverse. ( 12 ) IN the present case before us the only view that can be taken from the evidence and materials on record which we have carefully considered, is that it has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant was in exclusive possession of the disputed J ala at the relevant time. ( 13 ) IN that view of the matter, we are unable to agree with the contention of the appellant and to set aside the order of acquittal passed by the learned. Magistrate, and to convert it into an order of conviction. ( 14 ) THE learned Lawyer appearing on behalf of the State has also supported the order of acquittal passed by the learned Magistrate. ( 15 ) THIS appeal, therefore, fails as there is no substance in it. This appeal be dismissed accordingly. Let the records be sent down.