ORDER V. Ratnam, J. 1. The 1st defendant in O.S. No. 315 of 1984, Sub-Court, Coimbatore, is the petitioner in this Civil Revision Petition. That suit was laid by respondents 1 to 7 herein against the petitioner and respondents 8 to 10, praying for the relief of partition and separate possession of the suit properties. According to the case of the petitioner, summons in the suit was served on him and he engaged a counsel and the suit was posted to 28-8-1984, but that on 22-8-1984, respondents 1, 8, 9 and 10 arid two of the Advocate-relations of the petitioner, approached the petitioner and represented that there was no need to contest the suit, as they were agreeable for a compromise on the basis of allotting 1/6 share each to the 1st plaintiff and defendants 1 to 4, and 1/6 share to plaintiffs 2 to 7 together, in respect of the suit items. The further case of the petitioner was that his signatures were obtained on several papers, blank as well as written up, and that the petitioner was informed to be present in Court on 23-8-1984 for reporting the compromise. The petitioner claimed that he was asked to answer questions that may be put by the Court on that day in the affirmative and that petitioner also did so. On that day, the Court being satisfied that the parties to the suit had adjusted the subject matter of the suit by a compromise in writing, passed a decree in terms of the compromise. That compromise, according to the petitioner, was brought about by playing a fraud on him and obtaining his signatures by means of misrepresentation and undue influence as well. So stating, the petitioner filed an interlocutory application purporting to be under Sections 94 and 151 and Order 23, Rule 3, Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as 'the Code' for short) praying that the Court may set aside the judgment and decree passed in terms of the compromise on 23-8-1984 in O.S. No. 315 of 1984 and to reopen the case. That application was dismissed by the court below on the ground that the judgment and decree passed on the compromise cannot be allowed to be reopened under Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code and that the remedy of the petitioner would be to prefer an appeal. That application was dismissed by the court below on the ground that the judgment and decree passed on the compromise cannot be allowed to be reopened under Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code and that the remedy of the petitioner would be to prefer an appeal. It is the correctness of this that is questioned by the petitioner in this Civil Revision Petition. 2. Learned Counsel for the petitioner contended, referring to Section 96(3) and the proviso to the Order 23, Rule 3 and 3-A of the Code that as the petitioner could not file an appeal or even an independent suit questioning the compromise, it was the duty of the Court in the exercise of its powers under the Proviso to Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code, to make an enquiry regarding the lawful nature of the compromise and the court below was, therefore, in error in rejecting the application filed by the petitioner. Reliance was also placed in this connection by the counsel for the petitioner upon the decision in Maimum Nisa v. Mohammad Khodabin. 3. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the respondents submitted under the Explanation to Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code, an agreement or compromise, which is void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act, 1872, shall not be deemed to be lawful, and, as in this case, the case of the petitioner was that the compromise is either void or voidable, such a compromise would be taken outside Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code and also outside Order 23, Rule 3-A, and therefore, the petitioner could challenge the lawful nature of the compromise in other independent proceedings. 4. Before proceeding to consider the rival submissions made it would be necessary to refer to the relevant provisions of the Code in the matter of passing decree on the basis of compromise between the parties and the available remedies thereafter, both prior to, and after Act 104 of 1976. Under Section 96 of the Code dealing with appeals from the original decrees, it is provided under Sub-section (3) that no appeal shall lie from a decree passed by the Court with the consent of the parties. Under Section 96 of the Code dealing with appeals from the original decrees, it is provided under Sub-section (3) that no appeal shall lie from a decree passed by the Court with the consent of the parties. Under Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code, as it stood prior to the amendment by Act 104 of 1976, it was provided that where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that a suit has been adjudged wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise or where the defendant satisfies the plaintiff in respect of the whole or any part of the subject-matter of the suit, the Court shall order such agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be recorded, and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith. Order 43, Rule 1(m), prior to the amendment by Act 104 of 1976, provided for an appeal from an order under Rule 3 of Order 23 recording or refusing to record an agreement, compromise or satisfaction. By Act 104 of 1976, certain amendments were introduced to Order 23, Rule 3 and Order 43, Rule 1(m). The amended Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code read as follows: Where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise in writing and signed by the parties or where the defendant satisfied the plaintiff in respect of the whole or any part of the subject matter of the suit, the Court shall order such agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be recorded, and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith so far as it relates to the parties to the suit, whether or not the subject matter of the agreement, compromise or satisfaction is the same as the subject matter of the suit. The Proviso to Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code is as under: Provided that where it is alleged by one party and denied by the other that an adjustment or satisfaction has been arrived at, the Court shall decide the question; but no adjournment shall be granted for the purpose of deciding the question, unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, thinks fit to grant such adjournment. An explanation was also added by Act 104 of 1976 to Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code to the effect: An agreement or compromise which is void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act, 1872 shall not be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of this rule. Rule 3-A to Order 23 was also introduced, which is as under: Bar to suit: No suit shall lie to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise on which the decree is based was not lawful. Again, by Act 104 of 1976, the remedy of appeal provided under Order 43, Rule 1(m) against an order under Rule 3 of Order 23, recording or refusing to record an agreement, compromise or satisfaction, was deleted and Order 43 of Rule 1-A was introduced. That reads as follows: 1-A. Right to challenge non-appealable orders in appeal against decree: (1) Where any order is made under this Code against party and thereupon any judgment is pronounced against such party and a decree is drawn up, such party may, in an appeal against the decree, contend that such order should not have been made and the judgment should not have been pronounced. (2) In appeal against a decree passed in a suit after recording a compromise or refusing to record a compromise, it shall be open to the appellant to contest the decree on the ground that the compromise should, or should not, have been recorded. 5. The complaint of the petitioner in this case is, that the compromise had been procured by exercise of fraud, coercion and undue influence and by virtue of the Explanation introduced by Act 104 of 1976 to Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code, such a compromise would be either void or voidable, and, therefore, that cannot be deemed to be lawful for purposes of Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code. Even so, the question is, whether the petitioner can seek to reopen the proceedings in the manner claimed by him under Order 23, Rule 3, or, he has to avail himself of some other remedy. Even so, the question is, whether the petitioner can seek to reopen the proceedings in the manner claimed by him under Order 23, Rule 3, or, he has to avail himself of some other remedy. There is no dispute in this case that the judgment and decree passed on the compromise had already been passed by the Court on being satisfied that the subject matter of dispute in the suit between the parties had been adjusted wholly or in part by a lawful agreement or compromise. Reliance placed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner upon the proviso to Order 23, Rule 3, does not in any manner assist him in seeking to reopen the compromise on the basis of Which, the court had already passed the judgment as well as the decree. Under the proviso, the Court is empowered to decide the question of adjustment or satisfaction having been arrived at between the parties, when one party alleges such an adjustment or satisfaction and the other party disputes the same. The latter part of the proviso stating that no adjournment shall be granted for the purpose of deciding the question; unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, thinks fit to grant such adjournment, would show that the decision on the question of adjustment or satisfaction asserted by one party and disputed by the other, has to be arrived at by the Court prior to the recording of the same and the passing of the judgment and decree based on the recorded compromise. In other words, when a party to a compromise accepts it and the other party denies it, then the Court is empowered, before being satisfied that the suit had been adjusted between the parties by lawful agreement or compromise, to go into that question and decide the same and then record it and for that purpose, the suit shall not be adjourned, unless the Court feels, for reasons to be given in writing, that such adjournment should be given. The proviso contemplating a decision by Court of the question of adjustment or satisfaction asserted by one party and disputed by the other, prior to the recording of the compromise and the passing of the judgment and decree based on the compromise cannot be invoked, as in this case, subsequent to the recording of the compromise, the passing of the judgment and decree based on the compromise was done after the Court was satisfied that the suit had been adjusted wholly or in part by a lawful agreement or compromise between the parties. The reliance placed on the proviso to Order 23, Rule 3 cannot assist the petitioner in seeking to reopen the judgment and decree passed on the basis of the recording of the compromise by the Court after being satisfied that it was a lawful agreement of compromise. 6. The bar enacted under Order 23, Rule 3-A regarding the institution of suit seeking the relief of setting aside the decree on the ground that the compromise, on which the decree is founded, was not lawful, seems to be total and absolute, and does not admit of any exceptions. That rule is an independent provision and the bar enacted thereunder has to be given effect to. Order 23, Rule 3-A bars the institution of suits on the ground that the compromise, on the basis of which, the Court passed the decree, was not lawful. Under the Explanation to Order 23, Rule 3, added by Act 104 of 1976, an agreement or compromise, which is void or voidable under the provisions of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, shall not be lawful within the meaning of that rule. What is contemplated as a lawful agreement or compromise for the purposes of Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code, is, that the agreement or compromise, in order to be recorded and form the basis of the judgment and decree of Court, should be free from the challenge of their being void or voidable under the provisions of the Indian Contract Act. The Explanation merely seeks to indicate what kinds of agreements would be lawful agreements or compromises, which can form the basis for the Court to record the same and pass a decree thereon. The Explanation merely seeks to indicate what kinds of agreements would be lawful agreements or compromises, which can form the basis for the Court to record the same and pass a decree thereon. The Explanation is really clarificatory, because, there was a doubt entertained earlier, whether agreements, which would be voidable within the meaning of Section 19 of the Indian Contract Act were within, or, excluded from, the operation of Rule 3 of Order 23 of the Code. The proviso and Explanation appended to Order 23 Rule 3 introduced by Act 104 of 1976, have, therefore, to be taken as restricted in their application to the recording of the compromise and the passing of orders thereafter provided for under Order 23 Rule 3.There is, thus, no scope whatever for reading the Explanation appended to Order 23, Rule 3, by Act 104 of 1976, into Rule 3-A and give a restricted meaning to the words 'not lawful' occurring therein. Order 23, Rule 3-A of the Code along with the proviso and the Explanation, and Order 23, Rule 3-A, are independent provisions, totally different in their scope. While Order 23, Rule 3 deals with the power of the Court to record a compromise and pass judgment and decree on the basis of the compromise arrived at between the parties and enable the Court also to hold an enquiry in connection therewith, and also indicates the kinds of agreement or compromise lawful for the purpose of that rule, Order 23, Rule 3-A deals exclusively with the bar of suit questioning the compromise decree passed by the Court on the ground that the agreement or compromise was not lawful. The expression 'not lawful occurring in Order 23, Rule 3-A of the Code is very wide and would take in a variety of cases, in which the lawful nature of a compromise can be challenged and is not confirmed only to the lawful nature of a compromise or adjustment in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. In other words, whatever be the ground of challenge to the lawful nature of the compromise, the remedy of a suit is barred under Order 23, Rule 3A. In other words, whatever be the ground of challenge to the lawful nature of the compromise, the remedy of a suit is barred under Order 23, Rule 3A. In this view of the matter, the argument of the learned Counsel for the respondent that as the compromise, even according to the petitioner, is either void or voidable and therefore unlawful under the Explanation to Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code, and it would also stand outside Order 23, Rule 3A, is unacceptable. 7. Even so, the petitioner cannot complain that he has no further remedy whatever. The provision for an appeal under Order 43, Rule 1(m) against an order under Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code, recording or refusing to record an agreement, compromise or satisfaction, and its deletion by the provisions of Act 104 of 1976, have already been noticed. A new provision, viz., Order 43, Rule 1A has been introduced by Act 104 of 1976, as noticed earlier and under Rule 1A(i) of Order 43, a right of appeal is conferred against a decree drawn up pursuant to a judgment pronounced against a party, on the basis of an order made under the provisions, of the Code, and in such an appeal, it is open to the party, against whom an order is passed and a judgment and decree is made, to contend that such an order should not have been made and the judgment should not have been pronounced. Thus, Sub-rule (1) of Order 43, Rule 1-A, accords a general remedy of appeal to question all orders, on the basis of which, judgments and decrees followed, independently of Order 43, Rule 1, of the Code Under Order 23, Rule 3, the Court is first enjoined to order the agreement or compromise to be recorded and thereafter, to pass a decree in accordance therewith. Thus, when the judgment and decree passed against a party is referable to an order of Court recording an agreement or compromise, it would follow that it would be open to the party, against whom the order is passed and the judgment and decree is consequently made, to contend in the appeal provided for under Order 43, Rule 1-A, that the order of the Court recording the agreement or compromise, should not have been passed and consequently a judgment passed on that also should not have been pronounced. Though the provision in Order 43, Rule 1-A(i) would appear to be intended to apply generally to all orders passed under the provisions of the Code, leading to the pronouncement of a judgment and decree on the basis of such an order, with reference to a decree passed in suits after recording a compromise or refusing to record a compromise, a specific provision is made under Order 43, Rule 1-A(ii) of the Code. That Permits An Appeal Against The decree itself, passed either after recording a compromise or refusing to record a compromise, and in such an appeal, it shall be open to the appellant to challenge the decree even on the ground that the compromise should or should not have been recorded. Sub-rule (ii) of Order 43, Rule 1-A, clearly confers a right of appeal against a decree passed after recording a compromise or refusing to record a compromise under Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code and it further provides that it is open to the appellant to question the decree on the ground that the compromise should not have been recorded. Thus, on a consideration of the relevant provisions, as they stood prior to the amendments introduced by Act 104 of 1976, and after the amendments introduced by Act 104 of 1976, it is seen that though under Section 96(3) of the Code, a consent decree is not appealable and a second suit challenging the validity of the compromise is also barred under Order 23, Rule 3-A, yet, a remedy is provided under Order 43, Rule 1-A(i) and (ii) by way of an appeal against the decree to the party aggrieved and in such an appeal, it shall be open to the party against whom the judgment is pronounced, after an order is made under provisions of the Code, or, on the basis of either recording or refusing to record a compromise, to challenge the decree passed. There is, therefore, no substance in the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner is without any remedy, and, therefore, the proceedings have to be reopened in the manner claimed by the petitioner. 8. That leaves for consideration the decision in Maimum Nisa v. Mohammad Khodabin relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. There is, therefore, no substance in the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner is without any remedy, and, therefore, the proceedings have to be reopened in the manner claimed by the petitioner. 8. That leaves for consideration the decision in Maimum Nisa v. Mohammad Khodabin relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. In that case, the compromise was challenged on the ground that fraud was practised not only upon a party to the compromise, but also upon the Court, and, on that footing, the compromise was sought to be set aside and the proceedings reopened. The application in that regard was dismissed on the finding that there was no fraud committed on Court and that the application could not be entertained under Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code In considering the correctness of this order, Birendra Prasad Sinha, J., took the view that in order to consider whether or not an agreement has been reached between the parties, the Court will, of necessity, embark upon an enquiry as to the allegations of a party that his consent or signature on the document has been obtained by fraud, undue influence or coercion and that even if that course was not permissible under Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code, the Court could always exercise its inherent powers under Section 151 of the Code, and ascertain whether any fraud had been practised is not. The view expressed in this decision has not taken note of the amended provisions of Order 23, Rule 3 and Order 43, Rule 1-A(i) and (ii) of the Code. Apart from it, in the view I have already taken regarding the scope of the proviso under Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code, the enquiry relating to the lawful nature of the agreement or compromise must precede the passing of the order recording the compromise as well as the judgment and decree pursuant to the order, and cannot be resorted to after the passing of the order and also the judgment and decree, based on the order, in respect of which, a specific remedy by way of appeal has not been provided under Order 43, Rule 1-A of the Code, as noticed earlier. It is well settled that when there is a specific provision, be it a remedy by way of an appeal or an original remedy by way of an appeal resort to Section 151 of the Code cannot be freely had and in view of the express provision made by the amending Act 104 of 1976, already noticed, it is difficult to accept the view expressed in the decision referred to above, that resort to inherent powers could be had for the purpose of ripping open a compromise on the ground that it is vitiated by fraud, coercion or undue influence or other vitiating circumstances. Therefore, the decision relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner cannot in any manner advance the case of the petitioner. Thus, on a consideration of the facts and the circumstances as well as the relevant provisions of the Code, as they stood prior to the amending Act 104 of 1976, and subsequently it is clearly established that the application filed by the petitioner seeking to set aside the decree passed on a compromise recorded under the provisions of Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code is not maintainable and rightly rejected by the court below. Consequently, the Civil Revision Petition fails and is dismissed. There will be, however, no order as to costs.