K. P. MOHAPATRA, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is directed against the judgment passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Rourkela, convicting the appellant for an offence under section 302 of Indian Penal Code (TIPC for short) and sentencing him to undergo imprisonment for life. ( 2 ) THE facts of the Prosecution case may be recounted in brief. The appellant belonging to village Baunsajora-Tunguritoly lived with his widowed mother (P. W. 2 ). His paternal uncle (hereinafter referred to as the deceased), a widower lived in the same village, but in a separate house of his own along with his daughter (P. W. 3 ). It is alleged that on 4. 4. 1983 at about 4. 00 p m. the appellant stabbed the deceased several times on the chest, abdomen and different parts of his body by means of a knife (M. O. IV) while the latter had come to his house. As a result, the victim died instantaneously. The appellant thereafter proceeded to Hatibari Police Out Post, produced the blood stained knife and surrendered to custody. P. W. 1, a co-villager received information about the assault and death from the daughter of the deceased and lodged FIR (Ext. 1) almost simultaneously at Hatibari Police Out-Post. Within hours the investigating officer arrived at the place of occurrence, commenced investigation and after close thereof submitted charge-sheet against the appellant. ( 3 ) THE plea of the appellant was denial simpliciter. ( 4 ) P. W. 9 was the medical officer of Kumarmunda Primary Health Centre who conducted the postmortem examination of the dead body of the deceased on 5. 4. 1983 and found as many as 14 stab injuries on the chest, abdomen and other parts of the body of tile deceased. According to his opinion, all the injuries were ante-mortem in nature and could be caused by sharp cutting weapon, such as a knife (M. O. IV ). Many of the injuries were grievous in nature. Death was due to circulatory failure as a result of excessive haemorrhage on account of all the injuries. Each of the grievous injuries was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause instantaneous death. The post-mortem report and another report are Exts. 9 and 10 respectively. From the evidence of the medical officer it appears that death of the deceased was homicidal and at the hearing this fact was not disputed. Each of the grievous injuries was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause instantaneous death. The post-mortem report and another report are Exts. 9 and 10 respectively. From the evidence of the medical officer it appears that death of the deceased was homicidal and at the hearing this fact was not disputed. ( 5 ) P. W. 2 is the widowed mother of the appellant. She stated that in the month of Chaitra on a Sunday afternoon she was sleeping on a mat in the court-yard of her house. The deceased came surreptitiously covering his face by a cloth and slept along with her. She woke up and protested telling the deceased that it was not the proper time on his part to sleep with her in the court-yard. At that time the appellant happened to come there and saw the deceased sleeping close to her. When the deceased saw the appellant, he ran away. On the following day (Monday) she returned home in the afternoon after collecting mahua flowers. While she was taking midday meal, the deceased again came to her house. At that time the appellant arrived and stabbed the deceased by means of a knife on his chest causing bleeding injury. The deceased fell down on the verandah and died on the spot. The appellant immediately ran away. In the absence of any material obtained in cross-examination, the version of the appellant's mother is bound to be believed. P. W. 3, a girl aged 14 years is the daughter of the deceased. She stated that on a Monday at about 4. 00 p. m. she returned from the jungle and heard some noise coming from the appellants house, such as, MOKE CHHAD, MOKE CHHAD (leave me, leave me ). She came inside the house and saw that his father was being stabbed by the appellant by means of a knife. He fell down sustaining bleeding injuries and died on the spot. The appellant then ran away holding the knife. P. W. 2 was present at the place. She asked her to run away and so she ran to the house of another person and informed about the occurrence. In the absence of any material being elicited in her crossexamination, her evidence is also bound to be believed and accepted. P. W. 4 belonged to a neighbouring hamlet. P. W. 2 was present at the place. She asked her to run away and so she ran to the house of another person and informed about the occurrence. In the absence of any material being elicited in her crossexamination, her evidence is also bound to be believed and accepted. P. W. 4 belonged to a neighbouring hamlet. One has to pass through the hamlet to proceed from Baunsajora-Tunguritoli to Hatibari. On 4 4j983 which was a Monday he was digging earth from the side of the road at about 4. 00 p. m. He saw the appellant proceeding towards Hatibari. He asked him of his destination. The appellant replied that he was proceeding to Hatibari Police Out-Post. When the witness further questioned about the purpose, the appellant stated that he had killed his paternal uncle (deceased) by stabbing by means of a knife and was proceeding to report about the occurrence at Hatibari Police Out Post. He also showed a knife to the witness which was stained with blood. Though questioned, the appellant did not disclose the reason for killing the deceased. The witness identified the knife, marked M. O. IV. In cross-examination he admitted that no third person was present when the extra-judicial confession was made by the appellant before him. The evidence of the witness is such that there are no materials to disbelieve the same. On the other hand, it appears that the witness and the appellant being simple villagers, the factum of extra judicial confession having been made was quite possible and at any rate was not improbable. P. W. 5 was present at Hatibari Police Out Post when the appellant arrived there and produced the knife (M. O. IV ). The Sub-Inspector of Police immediately seized the knife by seizure list (Ext. 3) and took the appellant to custody. The knife appeared to have been stained with blood. P. W. 6 stated that on 4. 4. 1983 at about 4. 00 p. m. P. W. 3 came to his house and informed him that the appellant had killed her father by stabbing by means of a knife immediately he accompanied her and found that the deceased was lying dead with bleeding injuries on his chest and stomach on the verandah of the house of the appellant. He came to Hatibari Police Out-Post and found the appellant there. He came to Hatibari Police Out-Post and found the appellant there. The reports of the Chemical Examiner and Serologist (Exts. 16 and 17) would show that the knife (M. O. IV) was stained with human blood. From the aforesaid evidence, it is crystal clear that the appellant in a fury stabbed the deceased by means of the knife (M. O. IV) several times on different parts of the body causing his instantaneous death. ( 6 ) MR. K. C. Mohanty, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, urged that even if the prosecution case is believed in toto, a case under section 302, IPC was not made out. He pointed out that the evidence of P. W. 2, the mother of the appellant was very suggestive of something unusual which could not be tolerated by the appellant and so he became furious, lost his power of self control and committed the homicide. To be very clear, Mr. Mohanty submitted that the appellant either saw P. W. 2 and the deceased in a compromising position or the latter attempting to make love to the former on the Sunday afternoon and soon after his arrival, the deceased ran away. On account of this incident, the appellant entertained suspicion about the conduct of the deceased and when he found him again entering into his house on the next day, he became furious and attacked him with the knife causing his instantaneous death. In view of these peculiar facts, Mr. Mohanty pressed into service exception I of section 300 so as to bring the case within the ambit of section 304, part I, IPC. Mr. D. P. Sahu, learned Standing Counsel, however, urged that even though the appellant High have been provoked at the appearance of the deceased on the second day, it was neither grave nor sudden, and so it was a clear case under section 302, IPC. ( 7 ) AFTER considering the evidence of P. W. 2, the widowed mother of the appellant and taking into consideration the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, we are left with little doubt that the case clearly comes within exception I of section 300, IPC. First. P. W. 2 was a widow aged about 60 years. ( 7 ) AFTER considering the evidence of P. W. 2, the widowed mother of the appellant and taking into consideration the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, we are left with little doubt that the case clearly comes within exception I of section 300, IPC. First. P. W. 2 was a widow aged about 60 years. Secondly, the appellant saw in his own eyes that on the Sunday afternoon either P. W. 2 and the deceased were in a compromising position in broad daylight or the latter was attempting to make love to the former. Thirdly, at his sudden appearance inside the house, the deceased left in a hurry. So, his intentions were not at all clear more so because he was himself a widower and probably sex-hungry. And fourthly, when for the second time he saw the deceased surreptitiously entering into his house while P. W. 2 was at home, he must have entertained the belief that the deceased would repeat the performance of the previous day. This was the sudden provocation and so for a young adivasi like him it was not at all unusual to lose the power of self- control so as to attack the deceased by means of a knife. The provocation was grave indeed, because to every son the mother is sacred. Violation of the mother on the face of a son could be intolerable, so much so that in such circumstances it is not unusual to commit murders. We are, therefore, inclined to give the appellant the benefit of exception I of section 300 and hold that he committed an offence under section 304, Part I, and not one under section 302, IPC. ( 8 ) BEFORE we part with the case, we notice with distress that a competent defence counsel was not appointed by the learned Sessions Judge, Sundargarh Additional Sessions Judge, Rourkela, to defend the appellant during trial. The State defence counsel did not at all cross examine the prosecution witnesses barring asking a few indifferent questions. The learned Additional Session. Judge also remained passive during trial. He did not put a single question to any of the prosecution witnesses, although as an alert Judge he should have done so when he found that the defence counsel was not making serious efforts to cross examine the prosecution witnesses. Practices such as above have never been appreciated. The learned Additional Session. Judge also remained passive during trial. He did not put a single question to any of the prosecution witnesses, although as an alert Judge he should have done so when he found that the defence counsel was not making serious efforts to cross examine the prosecution witnesses. Practices such as above have never been appreciated. In Ranchod Mathur Wasawa v State of Gujarat Krishna Iyer, J. spoke for the Court and said that particular attention should be paid to appoint competent advocates, equal to handling complex cases, not patronising gestures to raw entrants to the Bar. This Court has also expressed in some decisions that the Judges should not playa passive role while trying cases, more so in cases relating to serious offences of murder. We hope and trust that competent defence counsel should be appointed under section 304 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by the Sessions Judges of the State who should be capable enough to handle serious and complex cases relating to serious offences when there shall be need, and they should play an active role during trial so that truth can be searched out and justice done. During hearing of the appeal, at one point of time we thought of remanding the case for retrial after appointment of a competent defence counsel, but we restrained ourselves, because five years have already elapsed since the date of occurrence and more time would be consumed for the purpose of retrial. Moreover, material witnesses might not be available at a distant point of time. So, we ourselves took up the responsibility of finding out the truth as far as possible from the evidence on record so as to give a finality to the proceeding. ( 9 ) FOR the reasons stated above, the appeal is allowed in part. Conviction of the appellant is altered from section 302 to section 304, Part I, IPC and the sentence of rigorous imprisonment is reduced to six years. Appeal partly allowed. .