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1988 DIGILAW 366 (KAR)

GOPAL RAMANARAYAN v. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX

1988-08-12

S.A.HAKEEM, S.RAJENDRA BABU

body1988
REJENDRA BABU, J. ( 1 ) THE assessee in this case has by a declaration dated 5th of January 1971, treated his property that is, "investment and partnership interest to the extent of 31 paise in a Rupee in the firm of "ramco SWADESHIS, coimbatore" as the property of the hindu Undivided Family (hereinafter referred to as HUF) consisting of himself, his wife, his three sons and one daughter. On 10th January 1973, a partial partition was effected which was reduced into writing by a memorandum. In the said partial partition, it was provided that "general journal" entries be made in the books of the HUF to the effect that Rs. 50,000/- be allotted to each of the 3 sons and Rs. 25,000/- be allotted to the daughter, while Rs. 1 lakh be allotted to the smaller HUF of the assessee and his wife. Jawhar, one of the sons of the assessee attained majority on 30. 1. 1973. However, in spite of the declaration made on 5. 1. 1971 and the partial partition made on 10. 1. 1973 the balance in the name of the assessee remained unchanged in the books of the firm. ( 2 ) WE are concerned in this case with the assessment for the year 1974-75. In that year, the assessee claimed that to the extent of a sum of Rs. 2,75,000/-, there was a partial partition in the HUF and requested for an order under Section 171 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter called the Act ). The income Tax Officer rejected this claim. He held that the assessee having thrown his interest in the firm into common hotch-pot of the HUF as indicated above, Section 64 of the Act was attracted and assessed such income in his hands. ( 3 ) ON appeal, the Assistant Commissioner upheld the claim of the assessee of partial partition and directed the Income Tax officer to pass a separate order recognising such partition. However, the other contentions raised by him were rejected, particularly, those based on the provisions of Section 64 (1) and 64 (2) of the Act. He preferred further appeal to the Tribunal. Since the contentions were common in the assessee's appeal for the years 1973-74, 1974-75 and 1975-76, the same were consolidated and decided together by the Tribunal by an order dated 23-2-1979. He preferred further appeal to the Tribunal. Since the contentions were common in the assessee's appeal for the years 1973-74, 1974-75 and 1975-76, the same were consolidated and decided together by the Tribunal by an order dated 23-2-1979. The Department also filed an appeal against the order for the year 1974-75 and 1975-76 challenging the acceptance of the partial partition. These appeals were also considered together with the consolidated cases and the said appeals of both the assessee and the Department were dismissed. While for the assessment year 1973-74 a return of income of HUF was filed showing the previous year as ending on 31-3-1973, the I. T. O made a protective assessment in respect of HUF, but included the entire income for the said HUF, in the hands of the assessee as an individual. For the assessment year 1974-75, the HUF filed a return of income showing the previous year as ending on 9-1-1974. Again the I. T. O. made a protective assessment and brought the entire income of the HUF in the hands of the assessee as an individual. For both these years, the only income shown by the HUF is the share income from M/s. Ramco swadeshis and interest income from the same. In respect of all the questions that arise for consideration in this case, the tribunal has held against the assessee. Hence the assessee sought for reference of the several questions, but the Tribunal has referred to us the following questions for our opinion : 1. Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, any part of the share income including interest from the firm of M/s. Ramco Swadeshis was includible in the hands of the assessee? 2. Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in law in holding that interest paid to the members of the Hindu undivided family should not be deducted to ascertain the share income from the firm of M/s Ramco swadeshis for the purpose of applying provisions of Section 64 (2) read with section 64 (1) 3. Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in law in holding that the income from the converted property for the purpose of inclusion under section 64 (1) in the hands of the assessee should be determined without taking into account the provision to be made under Hindu Law for the maintenance and marriage of the unmarried daughter? 4 ). Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in law in holding that the share of income accruing to the minor hindu Undivided Family consisting of the assessee and his wife was includible in the hands of the assessee under Section 64 (1) read with Section 64 (2)? 5 ). Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in rejecting the claim for deduction of interest of Rs. 14,056/-? 6 ). Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in law in holding that the provisions of Section 64 are applicable also in relation to accretions to the converted property subsequent to the date of conversion of such property?" ( 4 ) NOW we shall take up the first question for consideration. The answer to the problem depends upon the interpretation of Section 64 of the Act. Hence an analysis of the provisions of Section 64 (2) of the Act is necessary which falls in following conspectus: (1) The individual must have thrown his self acquired property in the common stock of the joint family or impressed with self acquired property with the character of the joint family property on or after 31st December 1969. The property so thrown in HUF hotchpot or impressed with the character of joint family property is termed as converted property. (2) It would be deemed that the individual has transferred assets through the family to the members of the joint family for being held by them jointly. (3) Such converted property or any part thereof in so far as it is attributable to the interest of the individual in the property of the family is declared to be asset belonging to that individual. (3) Such converted property or any part thereof in so far as it is attributable to the interest of the individual in the property of the family is declared to be asset belonging to that individual. (4) Under explanation-II the interest of the member in the converted property would be equal to the share in the property of the joint family assuming that there is total partition of the family property on the relevant valuation date. The individual share of a member of the joint family property is termod a proportionate share in the family property. (5) Under clause (c) the proportional share attributable to the spouse or minor son in the family would be deemed, transfer by the individual to the spouse or minor son and will be includible in the net income of the transfer as per sub-section (1) of Section 64 of the Act above even if there is no partition. (6) Under latter para of clause (c) if there is partial or total partition of converted property then the share of such converted property received by the spouse or minor children will be includible in the net-income of the transferor as provided in sub-section. This is exactly the view expressed by this court in respect of an analogous provision in section 4 (1a) of the Wealth Tax Act in the decision reported in Muthukali Chettiar v c. I. T. (150 I. T. R. 359 (Kar.)) Therefore, in our view, the matter is concluded by the said decision. However, Sri Prasad, learned counsel for the assessee earnestly and seriously raised several contentions and asked for our due consideration. Considering the seriousness and anxiety with which the arguments were submitted, we propose to deal with the contentions raised by him. ( 5 ) SRI Prasad submitted that Section 64 (2) of the Act provides for certain fictions and they are mutually destructive of each other, so that, the whole sub-section becomes unworkable and inoperative. His submission is that when an individual throws his separate property into the common hotchpot of the huf, such converted property will be deemed to be transferred either to the family or to the members of the joint family as provided in Section 64 (2) (a) of the Act. His submission is that when an individual throws his separate property into the common hotchpot of the huf, such converted property will be deemed to be transferred either to the family or to the members of the joint family as provided in Section 64 (2) (a) of the Act. He contends that if the transfer is to the family there is no question of any income being derived from the family property attributable to the individual in the property of the family as there is no defined share in so far as the individual or minor son and spouse is concerned, and hence Section 64 (2) (b) and prior part of Section 64 (2) (c) of the Act become unworkable, if the deemed transfer in clause (a) of the said section is to the members of the HUF then there is no income derived from family property to be attributed to individuals as set-out in clause (b) and there can be no question of partition as set out in the latter part of clause (c ). The arguments, in our view, are only a web of sophistry woven to shroud the plain meaning of the provisions of law, ( 6 ) THE provisions in any enactment will have to be read as an integrated whole in order to understand the scheme. There are three aspects in the various clauses appearing in Section 64 (2) of the Act. So far as clause (a) is concerned, there is a notional transfer to the family; while clause (b) deems a transfer to the individual; and clause (c) to his minor son or spouse in different situations to which reference will be made later. The expression used in clause (b) is that the transfer is deemed to have taken place through the family to the members of the family for being held by them jointly. The expression used in clause (b) is that the transfer is deemed to have taken place through the family to the members of the family for being held by them jointly. The supreme Court in the case of Bhagwan Dayal v Reoti Devi (AIR 1962 S. C. 287.) and in the case of State Bank of India v Ghamandi Ram (AIR 1969 S. C. 1330) have discussed the nature of ownership of the property of Hindu joint Family and stated that all the property of a Hindu Joint Family is held in collective ownership by all the corporaters in a quasi corporate capacity Joint family property is held in trust for the joint family members then living and thereafter to be born. One of the incidents of such ownership is till partition each member has got ownership extending over the entire property conjointly with the rest and as a result of such co-ownership, the possession and enjoyment of the property is common. This position was further elaborated in cases reported in Mahavir prasad Badridas v M. S. Yagnik ( AIR 1960 bom. 191 ,) and Chhotey Lai v Jhandey Lal (AIR 1972 A11. 424 (FB)) to the effect that the Hindu Law does not recognize a Joint hindu Family or coparcener as a juristic personality capable of holding property, as an entity separate from the members of the family. The true position in such a case is that the members collectively own the joint family property each having an interest. Therefore, it must be held that when the legislature used the expression of a deemed transfer to the members of the joint family for being held by them jointly through the family, this legal position was borne in mind. In view of this position in law, clause (a) can be understood to mean a transfer to the members of the family to be held by them conjointly and therefore the transfer is to the joint family. When the transfer is to the members of the family for being held by them jointly, it will be only through the family. This view finds support from the expressions used in clauses (b) and (c) such as "attributable to the interest of the individual, spouse or in minor son in the property of the family. When the transfer is to the members of the family for being held by them jointly, it will be only through the family. This view finds support from the expressions used in clauses (b) and (c) such as "attributable to the interest of the individual, spouse or in minor son in the property of the family. " further the explanation is also to the same effect using the expression "interest of the individual, spouse or in minor son of the individual" in the property of the family. Therefore, the only way of understanding clause (a) is that there is a transfer to the joint family. The argument of Sri Prasad ignores the effect of the explanation. If this explanation is dovetailed into the clauses (b) and (c), it means that the income derived from the converted property, in so far as it is attributable to the interest of the individual or spouse or minor son of the individual in the property is concerned, the consequence would be that there is notional partition in the family on the last day of the accounting year, and on that basis, fixes the shares of the minor son or the spouse or the individual and calculates the income derived from the converted property. The resultant position is as follows : The scheme of the different clauses appearing in section 64 (2) is that clause (a) is to overcome the difficulty that conversion of individual property into joint family properties to that of the members' interest in the joint family property is taxable as the transferor's income and not the income of the joint-family. Second part of clause (c) deals with a case where subsequent to the conversion there is partition amongst the members of the family. The clause indicates that the income derived from the converted property even after the partition by the spouse and minor sons of the individual will be included in his assessment. Thus it is of no consequence whether there has been a partition or not, the reason being that until partition is effected a notional share of his income is taken, and after partition the income from the assets or shares actually allotted to the wife or minor son will be taken into account. Thus it is of no consequence whether there has been a partition or not, the reason being that until partition is effected a notional share of his income is taken, and after partition the income from the assets or shares actually allotted to the wife or minor son will be taken into account. The only case where it may make a difference will be where on a partition, the individual or the spouse or the minor child relinquishes his or her share in the property, in which case an aliquot part of the income of the individual and spouse would be included in the former assessment till partition, but not thereafter, because there is no share allotted to such individual and/or spouse. In such a case, if it is to be held that what is contemplated in clause (a) is transfer to the members of the joint family to be held jointly, a joint or common tenancy will be created and therefore will not make any difference so far as the operation of the clauses are concerned. Indeed, in an identical situation where individual converted his separate property into joint family property by depositing certain sum in individual's account, with the firm and later on impressing that amount with the character of HUF property, by becoming a partner of the firm, interest and share income from the firm was included in the assessee's individual assessment, the High Court of Allahabad in the case of Mulk Raj v C. I. T. (120 I. T. R. 387) held that:"this sub-section was inserted by the taxation Law (Amend.) Act, 1970, with effect from 1st April, 1971. This sub-section supersedes the general law that where a coparcener throws his separate property into the common stock of the family and thereby converts it into joint family property, or where such property is subsequently partitioned among the family members including the coparcener's wife and minor children, there is no direct or indirect transfer by the coparcener to the wife or the minor children, nor a transfer by him for the benefit of the wife or minor children. The effect of this provision is that where a member has converted his separate property into joint family property on or after 1st January, 1970, the part of the income from the converted property proportionate to that member's interest in the joint family property is taxable as his income and not as income of the joint family. The words "in so far as it is attributable to the interest of the individual in the property of the family"occurring in cl. (b) of this sub-section were omitted by the Taxation Laws (Amend.) Act, 1975, with effect from 1st of April, 1976. It would be seen that the provisions contained in Section 64 (2) are very clear and admit of no doubt and the appellate Tribunal was right in confirming the inclusion of interest and the share income in the income of the assessee. " in our view also the provisions are absolutely clear and do not admit of any doubt and therefore we have no hesitation in answering the first question in the affirmative and against the assessee. ( 7 ) THE second question is as to the deductibility of the interest paid to members of huf, by the firm, to ascertain the share income from the firm while applying Section 64 with respect to the assessee. The HUF consists of the assessee, his wife, one major son, two minor sons, and one minor daughter. The Tribunal has held that by reason of Section 64 (2) (c) of the Act the share income of the assessee, his wife and minor sons will have to be included in the income of the assessee. While computing the share income from the firm by excluding the interest paid to the wife and minor sons of the assessee, such interest income will have to be included in the assessee's income once again in view of section 64 (2) (c) of the Act. This view is indisputable and has got to be accepted. The only question that calls for consideration is payment of interest to Jawahar, the major son assessee. The deduction in this behalf has been allowed at 10% as against a claim of 18%. The Tribunal has found that there was no agreement between the firm and Jawahar and the claim was based on book entry. The only question that calls for consideration is payment of interest to Jawahar, the major son assessee. The deduction in this behalf has been allowed at 10% as against a claim of 18%. The Tribunal has found that there was no agreement between the firm and Jawahar and the claim was based on book entry. While examining the accounts of the firm and HUF the AAC found that 10% interest was paid to the firm on monies due to it and it is that the book entry that 18% interest was paid to Jawahar was only make believe and not trustworthy. He also did not adopt the market rate in the special circumstances of the case of the relationship of parties and rate of interest collected by the firm being only 10%. These conclusions are based on appreciation of evidence and facts of the case. Hence we cannot take a view different from that of the Tribunal and the AAC. We have to answer this question also in the affirmative and against the assessee. ( 8 ) THE third question is in regard to claim for deduction of expenses for the maintenance and marriage of unmarried daughter. It was conceded, very rightly for the assessee, in the course of arguments, that even assuming for the purpose of argument, that Section 64 (1) of the Act was not attracted to the facts of the case, in respect of the converted property, the question of deducting expenses for the maintenance and marriage of the unmarried daughter does not arise at all. It is obvious that even if the same had been assessed in the hands of the HUF, such a deduction could not have been granted. Therefore, Sri Prasad did not press the question to be answered. We answer the same against the assessee. ( 9 ) THE fourth question relates to the includibility of the interest income accruing to the minor HUF of the assessee and his wife after partition from his sons. As could be seen from the statement of the case, question No. 4 referred to us is in relation to assessibility of the interest income accruing to minor HUF of assessee and his wife in the hands of assessee and not share income as the shares had not been subject matter of partition at all. As could be seen from the statement of the case, question No. 4 referred to us is in relation to assessibility of the interest income accruing to minor HUF of assessee and his wife in the hands of assessee and not share income as the shares had not been subject matter of partition at all. Hence as submitted by the counsel for both the parties the question is confined to interest income only and we have to answer the same. Sri K. Srinivasan, learned counsel for the Revenue, raised a preliminary point that the question does not arise as the same has not been referred to in the order of the Tribunal while disposing of the appeal. However it may be seen that at para-16 of the statement of the case the tribunal states that this contention was raised before the Tribunal but since this issue had not been dealt with separately it could be taken as having been decided against the assessee. Sri Prasad. learned counsel for the assessee, contends that the taxable entity in so far as the smaller HUF is concerned is neither a spouse nor a minor son but the HUF and therefore Section 64 (2) (c) of the Act was not attracted to this situation at all. Sri srinivasan countering this argument submitted that, that question has been concluded by a decision of this Court in muthukaii Chettiar's case 150 I. T. R. 359 (Kar), referred to earlier. Therefore the first point to be decided in answering this question is whether the said decision has dealt with and answered the point raised herein. In Muthukaii Chettiar's case, 150 I. T. R. (Kar), this Court was concerned with the question whether notional share attributable to an individual in converted property could be clubbed and assessed in the hands of smaller HUF consisting of husband and wife. This Court observed that the individual with his wife may constitute a smaller HUF but as the wife was not entitled to a share in the partition, in computing the interest of the individual as provided in Explanation-3 to section 4 (1a) of Wealth Tax Act which is similar to Explanation-2 to Section 64 (2) (c) of the Act in the converted property, are assessable in his status as individual. In that care the question was only one of computation and not of applicability of the fictional transfer created in Section 64 (2) (c) and therefore is of no assistance to the Revenue. The latter part of Section 64 (2) (1) deals with income from converted property which is partitioned and is received by minor son or spouse. For purposes of Income Tax Law huf (and not coparcenary) is an assessable unit of entity. The tax status of HUF depends upon the antecedent history of jointness of the property and on the composition of the family. In this case the smaller HUF consists of the assessee and his wife. There is no male member apart from the assessee in the family the other sons having already separated. Not being a coparcener, the wife of the assessee has neither a right in the property nor right to demand its partition nor indeed a right to restrain the assessee from dealing with it in any manner he likes. She had a right of maintenance prior to partition from bigger huf and that right alone continues and this prior right does not get enlarged after partition. Thus until a son is born to him again the assessee has right to deal with property thereof as his own. The assessee had thrown his separate property into the common stock on 5-1-1971 and was held by the bigger HUF, but a partial partition was effected on 10-1-1973 allotting a portion of the converted property while retaining the bigger HUF status in the remaining property. Thus there is an antecedent history of jointness impressed on the properties allotted at the partition to smaller huf, In regard to the major son Jawahar, income of his share is allotted at the partition and separate assessment has been done in his hands and not clubbed with assessee. Therefore, similarly, smaller HUF will have to be treated as a separate assessable unit. Hence we have to hold that the property of the Joint family docs not cease to belong to the family merely because the family is represented by a single co- parcener who possesses rights which an owner may possess. This income from property allotted at partition to smaller huf will, therefore, have to be assessed in the status of HUF and cannot be clubbed with that of the assessee under Section 64 (2) (c) of the Act. This income from property allotted at partition to smaller huf will, therefore, have to be assessed in the status of HUF and cannot be clubbed with that of the assessee under Section 64 (2) (c) of the Act. It therefore follows that our answer to this question is in the negative and in favour of the assessee. For this conclusion and reasoning we have derived support from the decision of Surjit Lal Chabda v C. I. T. 101 I. T. R. 776. ( 10 ) ON the fifth question, the amount referred to therein represents the interest paid on the borrowings from two other firms and is not a borrowing from the HUF, and hence the question is concluded by the decision of this Court in ITRC 62/80 (DD. 19-10-1983) in respect of the brother of the assessee and hence the learned counsel for the assessee did not press the question to be answered. We, therefore, answer the fifth question against the assessee. ( 11 ) THE last question relates to the assessability of the income arising from accretion to converted property in the hands of the assessee for the purpose of Section 64 of the act. The contention raised on behalf of the assessee is that what could be included under section 64 of the Act with that of the assessee is income referable to converted property and not income arising out of accretions or income from such property. The learned counsel for the assessee referred to the decision in Popat Lal v C. I. T. , 36 ITR 577 we have gone through the said decision and find that the same is not applicable to facts of this case at all. The learned counsel for the assessee referred to the decision in Popat Lal v C. I. T. , 36 ITR 577 we have gone through the said decision and find that the same is not applicable to facts of this case at all. In the case of S. Srinivasan v Commissioner of Income Tax the Supreme Court found difference between a case where interest is earned on a deposit or a loan and a case where interest is earned on amounts of which the minors and spouse are permitted use of the accumulated profits by the firm and held that the latter were in the category of accumulated profits arising from the firm itself and they were entitled to partnership interest (in this case through the family) and hence assessable in the hands of the individual to whose wife and children such income accrued while applying section 16 of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922, which provision is analogous to Section 64 of the Act. Applying the said ratio to the facts of this case, we hold that the Tribunal was right in rejecting, this claim. We, therefore, answer Question No. 6 in the affirmative and against the assessee. --- *** --- .