JUDGMENT K.N. Misra 1. IN the present writ petition dispute relates to three plots, namely, plots Nos. 763, 1321 and 1355 of Khata No. 24 situate in village Utraula, District Gonda. These plots were recorded in the names of Bachchu Lal deceased opposite party no. 4 in the basic year records. Bachchu Lai died during the pendency of this writ petition and his heirs and legal representatives are substituted. Although name of Bachchu Lal was recorded as Sirdar tenant on Khata No. 24 in the basic year Khatauni, but the name of petitioner Tahir son of Ramjan was recorded in Class 9 in part II of basic year records. Upon the publication of records under section 9 of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, hereinafter referred to as ' as the Act ', petitioner filed objection claiming Sirdari rights in the aforesaid plots on the basis of adverse possession. Two more objections were filed in respect of the plots in question. Smt. Mulha widow of Bismilla filed objection claiming Sirdari rights in the Khata in dispute on the basis of possession. Another objection was filed by one Riyazul Rauf claiming to be Sirdar tenure holder of the plots in dispute. Smt. Mulha did not pursue her objection. It was accordingly dismissed for want of prosecution. Riyazul Rauf and petitioner Tahir claimed Sirdari rights in separate objections which were contested by deceased opposite party no. 4 Bachchu Lal who asserted to be tenure-holder and in possession over the land in dispute. Riyazul Rauf claimed that he had filed a suit under section 209 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act against Bachchu Lal. This suit No. 112 of 1957 was decreed exparte and possession was delivered on 13-7-1959. The Consolidation Officer after considering the relevant entries in revenue records, rejected the claim of Riyazul Rauf and held that exparte decree was obtained by him when Bachchu Lal was lodged in jail. He also held that Riyazul Rauf was in possession only upto 1367 Fasli. The Consolidation Officer after considering the relevant entries in revenue records, rejected the claim of Riyazul Rauf and held that exparte decree was obtained by him when Bachchu Lal was lodged in jail. He also held that Riyazul Rauf was in possession only upto 1367 Fasli. The claim of petitioner Tahir was rejected by the Consolidation Officer merely on the ground that it had been established as to on what basis his name was recorded in the revenue records since 1368 F. Learned counsel held that since entries in favour of Tahir recorded from 1368 F. were not made in accordance with the law, and, as such, he could not be held to have acquired Sirdari rights on the basis of those entries. He, however, did not discuss any other evidence led by the parties. Aggrieved by order dated 27-2-1975 passed by the Consolidation Officer petitioner as well as Riyazul Rauf filed appeals which were dismissed, vide order dated 11-2-1976 passed by the Settlement Officer Consolidation. He also rejected the claim of the petitioner on the same ground as was rejected by the Consolidation Officer. Appeal filed by Riyazul Rauf was also rejected. Aggrieved by it petitioner preferred a revision. No revision was filed by Riyazul Rauf. Before the revisional court petitioner filed a copy of the decree dated 28-11-1970 passed in suit filed by Bachchu Lal against petitioner Tahir u/Sec. 229-B and 209 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. This suit was said to have been decided on the basis of compromise filed by the parties, a true copy of which has been annexed as Annexure 4 to the writ petition. IN this compromise it is recited that plaintiff Bachchu Lal is Sirdar and in possession over plot No. 1321 while defendant Tahir is in possession as Sirdar tenant over plot nos. 763 and 1355 and the plaintiff Bachchu Lal had no concern with these plots and the same be recorded in the name of defendant Tahir. This suit was thus decreed in terms of the compromise on 28-11-70. Learned Deputy Director of Consolidation permitted petitioner to file the said documents. He also summoned the original records of said suit filed under sec. 229-B/209 of the Act decided on 28-11-1970, wherein petitioner Tahir was declared to be Sirdar-tenant of the aforesaid two plots in dispute, namely, plots nos. 763 and 1355. Learned Deputy Director of Consolidation permitted petitioner to file the said documents. He also summoned the original records of said suit filed under sec. 229-B/209 of the Act decided on 28-11-1970, wherein petitioner Tahir was declared to be Sirdar-tenant of the aforesaid two plots in dispute, namely, plots nos. 763 and 1355. The revision of the petitioner was, however, dismissed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation via order dated 13-9-1977 by holding that the compromise decree did not operate as res-judicata although the same may operate as estoppel, but since pleadings with regard to estoppel had not been specifically raised by the petitioner, and. as such, he could not get any benefit of the said compromise decree Thus relying upon a decision of the Court reported in 1973 RD 339, learned Deputy Director of Consolidation held that the question with regard to binding effect of the aforesaid decree between the parties could not be permitted to be raised in the revision for want of pleadings to that effect. So far as Class 9 entries are concerned, learned Deputy Director of Consolidation observed that no evidence had been led by the revisionist Tahir to show that any PA 10 was issued and served on the recorded tenure-holder. Learned Deputy Director of Consolidation considered no other evidence with regard to possession and title as set up by the petitioner and rejected the revision by the impugned order on 13-9-1977. These orders have been challenged by the petitioner in the present writ petition. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner Sri Jai Pal Singh holding brief of Sri Hari Shanker Sahai, Advocate, vehemently urged that in the suit tiled by the deceased opposite party no. 4 Bachchu Lal against the petitioner under section 229-B/209 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, a compromse was arrived at between the parties which was filed and verified and thereupon on its basis the suit was decreed on 28-11-1970. Learned counsel stressed that although the genuineness of the compromise decree passed in the said suit between the parties was not challenged but the original record was also summoned to ascertain genuineness of the same. Learned counsel, however, urged that the Deputy Director of Consolidation committed manifest error in not taking into consideration the aforesaid compromise decree passed in the said suit to which the parties were bound. Learned counsel, however, urged that the Deputy Director of Consolidation committed manifest error in not taking into consideration the aforesaid compromise decree passed in the said suit to which the parties were bound. The decree could not be ignored and the same was binding on opposite party No. 4 who since 1970 had not taken steps to avoid the same nor it was ever challenged by him. Learned counsel urged that the case of the petitioner could not have been rejected merely on technicalities of pleadings as has been done by the Deputy Director of Consolidation and in support of his contention he referred to a decision in Jugun v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Gorakhpur, 1984 Revenue Judgment 142, wherein it has been held that the technical rule of pleadings does not apply to the consolidation authorities and consolidation courts have to decide the cases after considering evidence on record tendered by the parties in support of their respective claims. Learned counsel thus urged that the Deputy Director of Consolidation committed a manifest error in not taking into consideration the aforesaid decree dated 28-11-1970 and in not ordering the petitioner to be recorded as Sirdar-tenant of plot Nos. 763 and 1355. Learned counsel further contended that the said decree would not become ineffective and unenforcible in law merely on the statement of the petitioner recorded in the case wherein he had under some confusion and mis-understanding could not state about the said decree passed in aforesaid suit on compromise especially when the genuineness of the said decree could not be doubted and it stood verified by the perusal of the original record which was summoned by the Deputy Director of Consolidation. Learned counsel further contended that the Deputy Director of Consolidation wrongly observed in the impugned order that the petitioner had not led any evidence to establish the fact that PA 10 was issued and served upon opposite party No. 4 in respect of the land in dispute recording possession of the petitioner. Learned counsel further contended that the Deputy Director of Consolidation wrongly observed in the impugned order that the petitioner had not led any evidence to establish the fact that PA 10 was issued and served upon opposite party No. 4 in respect of the land in dispute recording possession of the petitioner. He referred to the order passed by the Consolidation Officer wherein it has been mentioned that the petitioner had filed extract of Khasra of 1364 F to 1379 F. and Khatauni for 1377 F. to 1379 F. and also extract of PA 10, copy of which was obtained from the record of 1368 F. Petitioner has also filed extract of Khatauni 1377 F. wherein he is recorded in clause 9. Learned counsel thus urged that the Deputy Director of Consolidation committed a manifest error in rejecting the claim of the petitioner on assumption of wrong facts and taking erroneous view with regard to the aforesaid decree in question He, thus, urged that the order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation and also passed by subordinate consolidation authorities deserve to be quashed and the petitioner deserves to be declared as Sirdar tenants in respect of the aforesaid two plots namely 763 and 1355 for which he was held to be Sirdar tenant and over which he has proved his continuous possession right from 1368 F. onwards. It was pointed out by the learned counsel that clause 9 entry was made in pursuance of the order passed oh the issue of PA 10 in respect of the land in dispute. Learned counsel thus urged that the order passed by the consolidation authorities rejecting the claim of the petitioner deserves to be quashed and the petitioner deserves to be declared Sirdar tenant of the land in dispute. In reply learned counsel for the opposite party Sri Raj Kumar urged that since the petitioner had not alleged in his objection anything with regard to the aforesaid decree dated 28-11-1970. and, as such, the Deputy Director of Consolidation committed no error in not permitting the petitioner to raise the plea of having acquired Sirdari rights on the basis of the alleged compromise decree which does not operate as res-judicata between the parties nor it can operate as estoppel by record as the objection filed by the petitioner contains no such pleading pressing rule of estoppel in support of his claim. Learned counsel placed reliance upon the Supreme Court decision in Pulavarthi Venkata Subba Rao v. Valluri Jagannadha Rao, AIR 1967 SC 591 wherein it was held :- "A compromise decree is not a decision by the Court. It is the acceptance by the Court of something to which the parties had agreed. A compromise decree merely sets the scale of the Court on the agreement of the parties The Court does not decide anything. Nor can it be said that a decision of the Court was implicit in it. Only a decision by the Court can be res-judicata whether statutory under section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, or constructive as a matter of public policy on which the entire doctrine rests. Such a decree cannot strictly be regarded as decision on a matter which was heard and finally decided and cannot operate as res-judicata such a decree might create an estoppel by conduct between the parties, but such an estoppel must be specially pleaded. "(emphasis supplied). 3. Referring to this decision learned counsel urged that since petitioner had not specifically pleaded in the objection with regard to said decree to operate as estoppel by conduct of the parties, and, as such, the same could not be looked into nor on its basis Sirdari rights could be granted to the petitioner in respect of the aforesaid two plots No 763 and 1355. Learned counsel further contended that since opposite party No. 4 was merely a Sirdar tenant of the said plots and, as such, the said compromise decree was void and a nullity because Sirdar rights could not be transferred through a compromise decree. In support of his contention learned counsel referred to a decision of this court in Inayat Ali v. State of U.P. through Deputy Commissioner, Lucknow, 1967 ALJ 790 wherein it has been held that the interest of a Sirdar shall not be transferable except as expressly permitted by the provisions of the Act itself. The expression "shall not be transferable" occurring in section 153 (i) is wide enough to cover both voluntary and involuntary transfers. 4. Learned counsel further urged that since opposite party No 4 was a Sirdar tenant, and, as such, no compromise could be entered between the parties recognising sirdari rights of the petitioner in the aforesaid two plots. The expression "shall not be transferable" occurring in section 153 (i) is wide enough to cover both voluntary and involuntary transfers. 4. Learned counsel further urged that since opposite party No 4 was a Sirdar tenant, and, as such, no compromise could be entered between the parties recognising sirdari rights of the petitioner in the aforesaid two plots. Such a compromise would amount the illegal transfer in respect of these plots, which could not be done either voluntarily or involuntarily. Thus according to the learned counsel the Deputy Director of Consolidation committed no error in not giving effect to said compromise decree especially when the petitioner had not based his claim on it. It was also urged by the learned counsel that the Consolidation Officer as well as the appellate and revisional courts have committed no error in rejecting the clause 9 entry in favour of the petitioner and also to Khasra entries regarding possession of the petitioner from 1369 F. onwards as the entries in revenue record were not made in accordance with the provisions of U.P. Land Record Manual. Learned counsel urged that although extract of P.A. 10 was filed by the petitioner but no evidence was led to the effect that it was also served on the petitioner. Clause 9 entry was thus not made in accordance with the provisions of the Land Record Manual, and, as such, the same has rightly been rejected. He thus submitted that no interference is called for by this court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. I have carefully considered the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record very carefully. 5. It is no doubt correct to say that a compromise decree being not a decision by court, cannot operate as res-judicata between the parties, but such decree would be binding on the parties as it would create an estoppel by conduct between them. It would be binding on them unless it is shown that it was secured by practising fraud, coercion or misrepresentation of facts. However, the pleadings with regard to such decree creating an estoppel by conduct is required to be specifically pleaded and the genuineness of the compromise decree has got to be established for basing the claim of title on it. However, the pleadings with regard to such decree creating an estoppel by conduct is required to be specifically pleaded and the genuineness of the compromise decree has got to be established for basing the claim of title on it. It is, however, to be seen whether in the proceedings under the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, the claim based on a compromise decree, the genuineness of which cannot be doubted, can be negatived or not merely for want of specific pleadings with regard to such compromise decree to operate as estoppel between the parties. In a Full Bench decision of this court in Vijai Sinha v. State of U.P., 1969 AWR (HC) 482 it has been held that the various courts constituted under the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act can neither he held to create a civil jurisdiction nor governed by the Code of Civil Procedure in the matter of procedure. In Chandra Bhal Misra v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Basti, 1980 RD Summary of Cases 66 Hon'ble K.P. Singh, J. observed :- " The consolidation authorities are required not to observe technicalities but to do justice to the parties. It is matter of experience that the objections filed before the consolidation authorities do not contain strict rules of pleading as before civil courts. Hence the consolidation authorities should not be invluenced from the form of pleadings but they should take into account the substance raised by the parties before him. " 6. Hon'ble R.M. Sahai, J. in Shambhu v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, also expressed the view that the pleadings in consolidation proceedings should not be construed strictly. In Nagubai Amal v. B. Shama Rao, AIR 1956 SC 593 the Supreme Court has laid down that the absence of a specific pleading and non-framing of issue could be a mere irregularity where the parties have not been taken by surprise and no prejudice has been caused to them. 7. It is a matter of common knowledge that the objectors, who are mostly illiterate persons, file their objections before the Assistant Consolidation Officer in their offices located in rural areas where they do not get assistance of lawyers at that stage and, therefore, technical rule of pleadings cannot be applied for throwing away the just and proper claim based on unimpeachable oral and documentary evidence led in support of the claims of the objectors. The Consolidation authorities should, therefore, not lean towards technicalities of pleadings while deciding the case between the parties on merits. If for invoking the rules of estoppel certain facts are required to be mentioned, which are such as may require proof, then those facts would certainly require to be pleaded. But in a case where a document is filed to establish the claim, then unless its genuineness is denied by opposite party, the same would not deserve to be thrown out and ignored for want of pleading A compromise decree certainly operates as estoppel by conduct between parties and, therefore, it could not be thrown out in consolidation proceedings merely on the technical rules of pleadings as has been done in the present case. Learned Deputy Director of Consolidation has not doubted the genuineness of the compromise decree, the original record of which was summoned and perused by him. He thus committed an error in not placing reliance upon that decree merely on the said technical ground that it was not pleaded in the objection. 8. Learned counsel for the opposite party has, however, urged that the Deputy Director of Consolidation should not have admitted at all the compromise decree for the first time in revision and thus he committed no error in ignoring it although the ground on which it has been ignored may not be sustainable on the basis of rule of stare decisis on the point consistently held by this Court that the pleadings in consolidation proceedings should not be construed strictly and the claim be not rejected on the technical ground of defective pleadings. I do not find any merit in the contention of the learned counsel that at the revisional stage Deputy Director of Consolidation could not admit evidence filed in support of this claim. To me there appears no statutory bar to the effect that the Deputy Director of Consolidation at the revisional stage cannot admit additional evidence tendered by parties in support of their respective claims and record a finding on merits considering the same. Since under section 48 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act the Deputy Director of Consolidation has got jurisdiction to decide questions both on the point of fact and law and, as such, he can admit a document in evidence in the interest of justice exercising discretion judiciously and also affording opportunity of rebuttal to the opposite party. Since under section 48 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act the Deputy Director of Consolidation has got jurisdiction to decide questions both on the point of fact and law and, as such, he can admit a document in evidence in the interest of justice exercising discretion judiciously and also affording opportunity of rebuttal to the opposite party. The argument of the learned counsel for the opposite party is accordingly rejected being unsustainable. 9. In the instant case the Deputy Director of Consolidation had permitted the petitioner to file the said additional evidence, namely, the certified copy of the compromise decree dated 28-11-1970 filed in the aforesaid suit and the original record of the case was also summoned and perused by the Deputy Director of Consolidation. The opposite party had not filed any evidence in rebuttal. Thus no suspicion could be raised about the genuineness of the compromise decree between the parties and they would, therefore, be bound by it by rules of estoppel. The Deputy Director of Consolidation has thus committed a manifest error in not taking into consideration the compromise decree dated 28-11-1970 and erred in rejecting it on mere technicalities of pleadings, specially when no further evidence was required to be led with regard to the said compromise decree in the absence of any specific denial by opposite party no. 4 with regard to passing of such decree in a suit filed by the opposite party himself against the petitioner. 10. Besides the above, if the Deputy Director of Consolidation was of the opinion that some specific pleading with regard to the said decree should have been made by the petitioner so as to determine the question of title in respect of the land in dispute on its basis, then he should have afforded to the petitioner an opportunity to amend the objection and thereupon he should have determined as to whether the parties were bound by the said decree by Rule to estoppel by conduct and record or not. Having not done so he fell in error in refusing to consider the said compromise decree and its binding effect on the parties merely on technicalities of pleadings, it is fairly well settled by numerous decisions on the point that the technicalities of pleadings or procedure in tiling the objections and adducing evidence is inapplicable to the consolidation proceedings. Having not done so he fell in error in refusing to consider the said compromise decree and its binding effect on the parties merely on technicalities of pleadings, it is fairly well settled by numerous decisions on the point that the technicalities of pleadings or procedure in tiling the objections and adducing evidence is inapplicable to the consolidation proceedings. Thus the ends of justice demand that the Deputy Director of Consolidation in exercise of wide revisional powers for determining both questions of fact and law should have directed the petitioner to amend the pleadings incorporating thereto the plea about the binding nature of the aforesaid compromise decree between the parties in respect of the land in suit and thereupon he should have proceeded to consider the same on merits, giving due opportunity of hearing to the parties in respect of the claim of parties founded on such compromise decree. It has also been pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the extract of P.A. 10 in respect of the land in dispute was filed by the petitioner and the same was on record. The Deputy Director of Consolidation has thus further erred in rejecting the claim of the petitioner on a mis-statement of fact with regard to it. It has also been urged that the Deputy Director of Consolidation has not taken into consideration the entire oral and documentary evidence on record while determining the question of possession of the petitioner over the land in dispute and has wrongly rejected the revenue record entries taking erroneous view by wrongly holding that the same were not recorded in accordance with the prescribed procedure. Having perused the impugned order, I find that the Deputy Director of Consolidation has not considered the entire oral and documentary evidence led by the parties in support of their alleged possession over the land in dispute. He has also not adverted himself correctly to the revenue record entries in respect of the land in dispute. Thus the impugned order cannot be sustained on this ground as well 11. He has also not adverted himself correctly to the revenue record entries in respect of the land in dispute. Thus the impugned order cannot be sustained on this ground as well 11. In the result the writ petition succeeds and is hereby allowed and the order dated 13-9-1977 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Gonda is hereby quashed and he is directed to restore the revision to its original number and decide the same on merits in accordance with the law and in the light of the observations made above after giving due opportunity of hearing to the parties. No order as to costs. Petition allowed.