Judgment :- 1. Respondents herein, divorced wife and minor children, obtained an order against the revision petitioner, former husband of the first respondent and father of respondents 2 and 3, under S.125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short 'the Code') directing the revision petitioner to pay maintenance to the children at the rate of Rs. 25/- and Rs. 20/- per month respectively. The claim of the divorced wife was rejected. The Sessions Court in revision directed the former husband to pay maintenance to the divorced wife at the rate of Rs. 55/- per month and the order was confirmed by the High Court in 1984. Respondents herein subsequently filed C. M. P. No. 2292/84 under S.127 of the Code seeking alteration, by way of enhancement, of the quantum of maintenance ordered to be paid to them on the ground of change of circumstances such as increase in cost of living etc. Revision petitioner filed a counter denying the alleged change of circumstances. The learned Magistrate passed an order enhancing the quantum of maintenance payable to the respondents to Rs. 100/-. Rs. 50/- and Rs. 40/- per month respectively. This order is now challenged. 2. Learned Single Judge who heard the revision petition has referred the same to a Division Bench in view of the contention that the application under S.127 of the Code should have been disposed of not under the provisions of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 (for short'the Act'). 3. The Act came into force on 19-5-1986. S.7 of the Act requires that every application by a divorced woman under S.125 or 127 of the Code pending before any Magistrate on the commencement of the Act shall notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, and subject to the provisions of S.5 of the Act, be disposed of by such Magistrate in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The contention is that since the application under S.127 of the Code was pending before the Magistrate on the date of coming into force of the Act, the same should have been disposed of under S.3 of the Act. The contention is that since the application under S.127 of the Code was pending before the Magistrate on the date of coming into force of the Act, the same should have been disposed of under S.3 of the Act. According to learned counsel for the revision petitioner, under S.3 of the Act, maintenance is payable by the former husband to the divorced wife only for the period of iddat and not for the post - Iddat period and hence the lower court should have cancelled the order directing the former husband to pay maintenance to the divorced wife for the period beyond the Iddat period. Learned counsel further made it clear that the enhancement of quantum of maintenance ordered for the children is not challenged. 4. S.3 of the Act reads thus: (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, a divorced woman shall be entitled to (a) a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance to be made and paid to her within the Iddat period by her former husband; (b) where she herself maintains the children born to her before or after her divorce, a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance to be made and paid by her former husband for a period of two years from the respective dates of birth of such children; (c) an amount equal to the sum of mahr or dower agreed to be paid to her at the time of her marriage or at any time thereafter according to Muslim Law; and (d) all the properties given to her before or at the time of marriage or after her marriage by her relatives or friends or the husband or any relatives of the husband or his friends. (2) Where a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance or the amount of mahr or dower due has not been made or paid or the properties referred to in clause (d) of sub-s. (1) have not been delivered to a divorced woman on her divorce, she or any one duly authorised by her may on her behalf, make an application to a Magistrate for an order for payment of such provision and maintenance, mahr or dower or the delivery of properties, as the case may be. (3) Where an application has been made under sub-s. (2) by a divorced woman, the Magistrate may, if he is satisfied that (a) her husband having sufficient means, has failed or neglected to make or pay her within the Iddat period a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance for her and the children; or (b) the amount equal to the sum of mahr or dower has not been paid or that the properties referred to in clause (d) of sub-s. (1) have not been delivered to her, make an order, within one month of the date of the filing of the application, directing her former husband to pay such reasonable and fair provision and maintenance to the divorced woman as he may determine as fit and proper haying regard to the needs of the divorced woman, the standard of life enjoyed by her during her marriage and the means of her former husband or, as the case may be, for the payment of such mahr or dower or the delivery of such properties referred to in clause (d) of sub-s. (1) to the divorced woman; Provided that if the Magistrate finds it impracticable to dispose of the application within the said period, he may, for reasons to be recorded by him, dispose of the application after the said period. (4) If any person against whom an order has been made under sub-s. (3) fails without sufficient cause to comply with the order, the Magistrate may issue a warrant for levying the amount of maintenance of mahr or dower due in the manner provided for levying fines under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), and may sentence such person, for the whole or part of any amount remaining unpaid after the execution of the warrant, to imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year or until payment if sooner made, subject to such person being heard in defence and the said sentence being imposed according to the provisions of the said Code. (emphasis supplied) 5. We asked learned counsel for the revision petitioner what particular advantage his client hopes to derive by the application of the provisions of the Act, since S.3 of the Act entitles a divorced woman to have a reasonable and fair provision made, to have mahr or dower amount paid and to have all the properties given to her as contemplated therein. Learned counsel submitted that the divorced muslim wife is not entitled to maintenance beyond the period of Iddat and apart from maintenance for the period of Iddat no other provision is required to be made under S.3 (1)(a) of the Act and in order to do justice between the parties revision petitioner should be permitted to raise this contention even at this belated stage. Learned counsel was unable to say if mahr or dower has been paid or if the properties have been delivered. 6. Sub-s. (1) of S.3 declares what divorced woman is entitled to in the context of divorce. Her rights are enumerated in clauses (a) to (d). She is entitled to a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance to be made and paid to her within the period of Iddat by her former husband and where she herself maintains the children, she is entitled to reasonable and fair provision and maintenance to be made and paid by the former husband for a period of two years from the dates of birth of the children. She is entitled to get an amount equal to the sum of mahr of dower agreed to be paid to her, at the time of marriage or at any time thereafter according to Muslim law. She is entitled to all the properties given to her before or at the time of marriage or after her marriage by her relatives or friends or the husband or any of his relatives or friends. This is the mandate of S.3 (1) of the Act. 7. Clause (b) of S.3(1) of the Act cannot be invoked here; it creates right in the mother, when she herself maintains the children, to make a claim in regard to the children for a period of two years from the respective dates of birth of the children. That is a right conferred on the mother and does not affect the right of the children to make a claim under S.125 of the Code, either through the mother or otherwise. The Act does not take away such right. S.7 requires only an application by a divorced woman under S.125 or 127 of the Code to be disposed of under the Act. The Act does not take away such right. S.7 requires only an application by a divorced woman under S.125 or 127 of the Code to be disposed of under the Act. S.7 does not contemplate an application under S.125 or 127 of the Code filed by or on behalf of the children either by the mother or by anyone to be disposed of under the Act. The right of and the remedy available to the children under S.125 or 127 of the Code are unaffected by the Act. 8. We are concerned mainly with clause (a) of S.3 (1) of the Act. It contemplates two distinct and separate matters, namely, 'making of a reasonable and fair provision and payment of maintenance for the Iddat period. The sum and substance of the contention of the former husband in this case is that the provision and maintenance refer to the same thing, that is, maintenance for the period of Iddat and the divorced wife is not entitled to any provision other than maintenance during the period of Iddat or to any provision after the period of Iddat. Sreedharan J. in the decision in Ali v. Sufaira (1988 (2) KLT 94) has rejected a similar argument. With great respect we are inclined to agree with this view. 9. Under clause (a) of sub-s. 3 (1) of the Act, divorced wife is entitled to reasonable and fair provision to be made and maintenance to be paid within the Iddat period. The clause emphasizes that provision is to be made and maintenance is to be paid. Of course provision is to be made to secure livelihood of the wife. That need not be in the shape of money: it could be in the shape of provision by grant of immovable property of other valuable assets or other income yielding property. Provision has to be made within the Iddat period: it has to be fair and reasonable. Provision must certainly be capable of being realised or secured by her. Besides the provision to be made, she is also entitled to be paid maintenance during the period of Iddat. The expressions reasonable and fair provision and maintenance to be made and paid cannot be understood to have been used disjunctively. In the context 'and' cannot mean 'or'. The two expressions convey different idea sand give rise to two different connotations. Besides the provision to be made, she is also entitled to be paid maintenance during the period of Iddat. The expressions reasonable and fair provision and maintenance to be made and paid cannot be understood to have been used disjunctively. In the context 'and' cannot mean 'or'. The two expressions convey different idea sand give rise to two different connotations. The argument is that just as maintenance is to be paid to cover the needs of the divorced woman during the Iddat period, reasonable and fair provision is to be made only for the Iddat period. Relevant part of clause (a) cannot be read as "reasonable and fair provision or maintenance". According to learned counsel, there is no difference between reasonable and fair provision and maintenance. If there is no difference between the two ideas and they mean the same thing, one of the expressions is redundant; there is no justification to take a view that the introduction of the words reasonable and fair provision by the Parliament was intended to be a meaningless exercise. It must necessarily have a different connotation. 10. This view receives support from the back-drop of the Act. The Supreme Court observed in Shah Bano's case (1985 (2) SCC 556) that under the Muslim Law husband has a duty to pay maintenance to the divorced wife even for the post -Iddat period. The Supreme Court referred to the expression Mata in Aiyat 241 of the Holy Koran and the argument that it means provision and not maintenance and held that this was a distinction without difference. This gave rise to agitation by a section of the muslim male population. To contain the agitation, settle the controversy and protect the rights of divorced women, legislation was introduced in Parliament and the Act was thereby enacted. It was thought that thereby the feelings of that section of the muslim community would be assuaged. It is significant to note that the preamble of the Act declares that the Act was intended to protect the rights of muslim women who have been divorced by or have obtained divorce from their husbands and to provide for matters connected thereto or incidental thereto. It is significant to note that the preamble of the Act declares that the Act was intended to protect the rights of muslim women who have been divorced by or have obtained divorce from their husbands and to provide for matters connected thereto or incidental thereto. The same concern to protect the interests of the divorced muslim women is reflected in the "statement of objects of reasons" of the Act, which states, inter alia, that "this decision (in Shah Sana's case) has led to some controversy as to the obligation of the muslim husband to pay maintenance to the divorced wife. Opportunity has, therefore, been taken to specify the rights which a muslim divorced woman is entitled to at the time of divorce and to protect her interests". Since the main purpose of the statute is to protect the interests of the divorced muslim woman, even if there is any ambiguity in the language of the statute, or even if two interpretations are equally possible, that interpretation which is reasonable and would protect the interests of divorced muslim women has to be adopted by the court. In the present case there is no ambiguity or uncertainty in S.3 (1) (a). The words used are plain, clear, certain and unambiguous; they clearly involve declaration of two separate and distinct rights, that is, to obtain maintenance for the period of Iddat and to have a reasonable and fair provision made. 11. What does provision mean? Does it have the same meaning as maintenance? We will examine this aspect having regard to the observations in Shah Bano's case and later intervention of the Parliament during the period of the post-Shah Bano agitation. We think it necessary to delineate the fine distinction between the two ideas. Maintenance is generally intended to mean lodging, boarding, medical attention and other necessaries of life, but not merely necessities of life. In the case of children, the expression would naturally include cost of education also. Provision according to Chambers 20th Century Dictionary means act of providing; measures taken before hand. Provide according to the same dictionary means to make ready before hand, to prepare for future use. In Willin Dickies on Accountancy, Third Edition, at page 184 it is stated that "provision means the amount set aside out of profits and other surpluses ". Provision according to Chambers 20th Century Dictionary means act of providing; measures taken before hand. Provide according to the same dictionary means to make ready before hand, to prepare for future use. In Willin Dickies on Accountancy, Third Edition, at page 184 it is stated that "provision means the amount set aside out of profits and other surpluses ". In Metal Box Company of India Ltd. v. Their Workmen (AIR 1969 SC 612), the Supreme Court, in the context of the Income-Tax Act stated: "An amount set aside out of profits and surpluses to provide for any known liability of which the amount cannot be determined with substantial accuracy is a provision." The view has been followed by the Supreme Court in Workmen of William Jacks & Co. Ltd. v. The Management (AIR 1971 SC 1821) and in Vazir Sultan Tobacco Company Ltd's case (132 ITR 559). Provision is the amount set aside to provide for known liability which cannot be quantified accurately; it is a provision for future use. Besides paying maintenance to the divorced wife for the Iddat period, former husband has to provide reasonably and fairly for the future needs of the divorced wife, i.e., use of the divorced wife after the period of Iddat period and till her marriage or death. 12. Sub-sections (2) and (3) of S.3 support the view that provision and maintenance connote different matters. Sub-s. (2) enables divorced woman or her authorised agent to make an application to the Magistrate for an order for payment of such provision and maintenance, mahr or dower or the delivery of properties, as the case may be. When a reasonable and fair provision has not been made or maintenance or mahr or dower has not been paid or properties have not been delivered, on an application as aforesaid, the Magistrate is enabled by sub-s. (3) to make an order on his due satisfaction, directing the former husband to pay such reasonable and fair provision and maintenance as he may determine as fit and proper or as the case may be for the payment of such mahr or dower or the delivery of properties to the divorced woman. The legislature has taken pains to keep the two ideas of provision and maintenance distinct and separate in these sub-sections also. 13. The legislature has taken pains to keep the two ideas of provision and maintenance distinct and separate in these sub-sections also. 13. It is argued on the strength of sub-s. (4) that the implementation of the order of the Magistrate can be only regarding maintenance and, therefore, legislature could not have intended that the divorced wife is entitled to a provision as distinct and separate from maintenance. Sub-s. (4) indicates that if the order of the Magistrate is not complied with without sufficient cause, the Magistrate may issue a warrant for levying the amount of maintenance or mahr or dower due in the manner provided for levying fines under the Code and may sentence such person in the manner provided. Sub-section (4) refers to the failure to comply with the order passed under sub-s. (3). The order under sub-s. (3) relates not merely to payment of maintenance or mahr or dower but also to payment of reasonable and fair provision and delivery of properties. The warrant for levying is mentioned in connection with non-payment of maintenance. Sub-section (a) does not mention provision in this connection, may be because provision can be a provision for payment of money or by setting apart property or asset of any description and there cannot be any warrant for levying in enforcement of a direction for setting apart property or other asset. 14. If the non-mention of "provision" in S.3 (4) must lead to the conclusion that Parliament did not intend that the former husband should apart from paying maintenance for the Iddat period, make a reasonable provision for post - Iddat period, what conclusion is to be drawn from the omission in S.3 (4) to provide for implementing the order of the Magistrate for delivery of property referred to in S.3 (1) (d) ? Does it follow that the Magistrate cannot effectuate or implement the order passed for delivery of property ? It cannot be that Parliament which has been concerned to protect the rights and interests of divorced women intended that the order for delivery of property is to remain a dead-letter or should have the effect merely of a declaratory decree to effectuate which the divorced woman has to file a civil suit for recovery of property. It cannot be that Parliament which has been concerned to protect the rights and interests of divorced women intended that the order for delivery of property is to remain a dead-letter or should have the effect merely of a declaratory decree to effectuate which the divorced woman has to file a civil suit for recovery of property. In the absence of specific provision in the Act, we have to examine the provisions of the Code and the inherent, implied or ancillary powers of the Court. 15. The provisions of Chapter XXXIV of the Code regarding disposal of property cannot apply to such situations. So far as we could see, the only provision in the Code regarding restoration of property (other than the provisions in Chapter XXXIV) is S.145. Under S.145, the Magistrate, if he decides that one of the parties was or should be treated as being in possession of the subject matter of the dispute, shall issue an order declaring such party to be entitled to possession thereof until evicted therefrom in due course of law and forbidding all disturbances of such possession until such eviction. If it is a case where the successful party had been forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed within two months next before the date on which Police Officer's report or other information had been received by the Magistrate under S.145(1) of the Code, the Magistrate may restore to possession the party forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed. But the Code does not contain any specific provision laying down the manner in which possession is to be restored. It cannot be that the Magistrate can only direct restoration but cannot enforce the direction. 16. S.482 of the Code, which deals with inherent powers of the High Court, does not specifically refer to subordinate criminal courts. The Code of 1898 as originally enacted did not contain any specific provision regarding inherent powers. S.561-A referring to inherent powers of the High Court was introduced only by way of the amendment Act of 1923, evidently in view of the decision in C. C. Dunn v. King Emperor (AIR 1922 All. 107) in which the Allahabad High Court held that it had no inherent power to direct expunging of objectional matters in record. S.561-A referring to inherent powers of the High Court was introduced only by way of the amendment Act of 1923, evidently in view of the decision in C. C. Dunn v. King Emperor (AIR 1922 All. 107) in which the Allahabad High Court held that it had no inherent power to direct expunging of objectional matters in record. However, it is beyond any controversy that S.561-A contains only statutory recognition of the existence of inherent powers and did not vest any new power or increased jurisdiction in the High Court. It has to be noticed that even before the 1923 amendment, several High Courts had taken the view that the High Courts as well as Subordinate Criminal Courts have inherent powers. See Bhudhe Lal v. Chatta Gope (AIR 1918 Calcutta 750). Pigot and others v. Alimuhammed Mandal and others (AIR. 1921 Calcutta 30) and in the matter of Lakshman Govinda Mirgude (ILR 26 Bom. 552). This position continued even after the 1923 amendment. Almost all the High Courts have taken the view that in spite of the absence of reference to subordinate criminal courts in S.561-A, such courts have inherent powers, of course, within well-established circumscribing limits. See Shamas-ud-Din v. Ramdayal Singh and others (AIR 1924 Calcutta 630), Sonia Koshti v. Emperor (AIR 1927 Nagpur 117), Bipat Gope and others v. Emperor (AIR 1937 Patna 369). Akhil Bandhu Ray and others v. Emperor (AIR 1938 Calcutta 258), Mansraj H. Bhate v. Emperor (AIR 1940 Nagpur 390), Emperor v. Rautmal Kanumal Marvadi (AIR 1940 Bombay 40). Pannalal Lahoti and others v. Hyderabad State (AIR 1951 Hyderabad 113), Ram Chereyi v. Babu Ramdas (AIR 1951 Allahabad 435), Hariram v. State (AIR 1956 MB 17), P. Janaki Amma v. Chunduru Appanna (AIR 1957 AP 771), Ramibai v. Nathu and others (AIR 1961 MP. 25), Rekha Jena v. Manoranjan Das (AIR 1965 Cuttack 566), Sankersan Nath v. Sachidananda Das (1969 Crl. L.J. 575-Orissa), Subhlal Gope and another v. State of Bihar (AIR 1971 Patna 151) and Public Prosecutor v. K. P. Reddy and others (1973 I Andhra W.R. 291). 17. We now refer to the decisions rendered by this Court. 25), Rekha Jena v. Manoranjan Das (AIR 1965 Cuttack 566), Sankersan Nath v. Sachidananda Das (1969 Crl. L.J. 575-Orissa), Subhlal Gope and another v. State of Bihar (AIR 1971 Patna 151) and Public Prosecutor v. K. P. Reddy and others (1973 I Andhra W.R. 291). 17. We now refer to the decisions rendered by this Court. In In Re Raman Narayanan (1972 KLT 901), a Division Bench of this court, without pronouncing on the extent of the inherent power, held that the absence of any reference to any other criminal court (i. e. other than High Court) in S.561-A does not necessarily imply that such courts can in no circumstances exercise inherent power and that courts may act on the principle that every procedure should be understood as permissible till it is shown to be prohibited by law (per Moidu J.). It was observed that in the absence of express provision, every court, whether civil or criminal, has in its' very constitution inherent power to do the right and undo a wrong in the administration of justice (per Narayana Pillai, J.). Padmanabhan, J. in In Reference By District and Sessions Judge, Tellicherry 1986 KLT 62) observed: "What is necessary to be done in the interests of justice and not prohibited must be taken as permitted. Even though existing inherent powers saved under S.482 of the Code are available only for the High Courts, the Subordinate Courts are also not powerless. They are also having what could be called auxiliary powers to do what is necessary for dispensation of justice even in the absence of specific provision if there is no provision." The learned judge reiterated this view in Madhavi v. Thupran (1987 (1) KLT 488). 18. Reference is made to an earlier decision of the Allahabad High Court in Manni Lal v. Emperor (AIR 1937 All.305). The case dealt with inherent power of the criminal appellate court to remand criminal cases. The decision is certainly distinguishable since the power to remand is covered by express provision of the Code and, therefore, inherent power cannot be invoked to order remand. Our attention is invited to the decision of the Supreme Court in Bindshwani Prasad Singh v. Kalisingh (AIR 1977 SC 2432). In this case the Magistrate dismissed a private complaint, in the absence of the complainant, by way of a judicial order. Our attention is invited to the decision of the Supreme Court in Bindshwani Prasad Singh v. Kalisingh (AIR 1977 SC 2432). In this case the Magistrate dismissed a private complaint, in the absence of the complainant, by way of a judicial order. Subsequently on an application filed by the complainant, the Magistrate took cognisance of the offence and issued process. The Supreme Court held that judicial order of a criminal court cannot be reviewed in exercise of the inherent power and observed that S.561-A applies only to the High Court and not to subordinate criminal courts unlike S.151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the decision in A. S. Gaurya and another v. S.N. Thakur (AIR 1986 SC 1440), the Supreme Court considered the legality of the order passed by the Magistrate restoring a complaint to file after reviewing the earlier order dismissing the complaint. The Supreme Court pointed out that the Code does not contain any provision enabling the criminal court to exercise an inherent power of review. It has to be seen, as pointed out in Sardar G. Singh v. Hardeep Singh (1987 (2) KLT 35) that review is specifically barred by S.362 of the Code (S. 369 of the old Code) and as such inherent powers cannot be exercised to review a judicial order. The decisions of the Supreme Court were in the context of order of review, which is clearly barred. Inherent powers cannot be exercised in the face of an express provision of law. We do not understand the Supreme Court as laying down the broad proposition that subordinate criminal courts have no inherent powers at all. 19. We will now advert to another decision of the Supreme Court, which, in our opinion, has settled the position. In Savithri v. Govindsingh Rawat (AIR 1986 SC 984), the court considered whether Magistrate, on an application under S.125 of the Code has jurisdiction to pass an interim order of maintenance. The Court held "....it is the duty of the court to interpret the provisions in Chapter IX of the Code in such a way that the construction placed on them would not defeat the very object of the legislation. The Court held "....it is the duty of the court to interpret the provisions in Chapter IX of the Code in such a way that the construction placed on them would not defeat the very object of the legislation. In the absence of any express prohibition, it is appropriate to construe the provisions in Chapter IX as conferring an implied power on the Magistrate to direct the person against whom an application is made under S.125 of the Code to pay some reasonable sum by way of maintenance to the applicant pending final disposal of the application Every court must be deemed to possess by necessary intendment all such powers as are necessary to make its' orders effective. This principle is embodied in the maxim 'udi aliquid conceditur, conceditur et id sine quo res ipsa esse non potest (Where anything is conceded, there is conceded also anything without which the thing itself cannot exist).... Whenever anything is required to be done by law and it is found impossible to do that things unless something not authorised in express terms be also done then that something also will be supplied by-necessary intendment. " (emphasis supplied) This decision clearly supports the proposition that criminal courts have inherent or implied powers. 20. Courts, civil or criminal, are constituted for the purpose of administering justice in accordance with law. Codes of procedure, civil and criminal, have been enacted to regulate the procedural aspects and to ensure that enquiries and trial are held in accordance with principles of fair play. Provisions of the Codes are designed to further the ends of justice and not to frustrate the ends of justice. The legislature has tried to lay down elaborate rules in respect of all matters specifically mentioned in the Codes. Yet it has to be appreciated that it is not humanly possible for any legislature to visualise, anticipate and provide for all matters and contingencies that may arise in courts for all times. Ever-changing needs and situations may require judicial determination: it cannot be that courts are powerless to act in the absence of specific provisions in the Codes. Courts have since olden times evolved theory of inherent, implied or ancillary powers and applied the same to regulate their proper and effective functioning and in the discharge of their duties to get over technicalities and to secure ends of justice. Courts have since olden times evolved theory of inherent, implied or ancillary powers and applied the same to regulate their proper and effective functioning and in the discharge of their duties to get over technicalities and to secure ends of justice. The challenge of administering justice is often met by invocation of inherent powers resting on never-changing principles of reason and fair play. The Privy Council observed in Emperor v. N. Ahammed (AIR 1945 P. C. 18) in connection with S.561-A of the Code "The section gives no new powers, but only provides that those which the court already inherently possesses shall be preserved and is inserted lest it should be considered that the only powers possessed by the court are those expressly conferred by the code and that no inherent power has survived the passing of the Code." The Privy Council observed in Jayalnath v. Emperor (AIR 1945 P.C. 94) that: "It merely safeguards all the existing inherent powers possessed by the High Courts necessary (among other purposes) to secure the ends of justice." 21. Inherent powers of courts are in addition to powers specifically conferred on them. They are complementary to these powers. Courts are free to exercise these powers, when the exercise of these powers is not in any way in conflict with what has been expressly provided by the Code or against the intention of the legislature. See Padamsen v. State of U.P. (AIR 1961 SC 218) and Mahoharlal v. Raja Seth Hiralal (AIR 1962 SC 527). Inherent powers cannot override the express provisions of law. If there are specified provisions in the Code dealing with particular topic and they expressly or by necessary implication exhaust the scope of the power of the court or the jurisdiction that may be exercised in relation to a matter, inherent powers cannot be invoked. See State of U. P. v. Mohammed Naim (AIR 1964 SC 703) and Ramchand & Sons v. Kanhayalal (AIR 1966 SC 1899). 22. It is a well known rule of statutory construction that a tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions for the purpose of doing justice between the parties unless there is any indication to the contrary in the statute. See Grindlays Bank Ltd v. Central Govt. Ind. Tribunal and others (AIR 1981 SC 606). See Grindlays Bank Ltd v. Central Govt. Ind. Tribunal and others (AIR 1981 SC 606). An express grant of statutory power carries with it by necessary implication the authority to use all reasonable means to make such grant effective. (See Sutherland's Statutory Construction, Third edition, Art.5401 and 5402). Where an Act confers jurisdiction, it impliedly also grants the power of doing all such acts or employing such means, as are essentially necessary to its' execution. See Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, eleventh edition at page 350. This passage is quoted with approval in Income tax Officer, Cannanore v. M.K. Mohammed Kunhi (1969)71 ITR 815 and Dharmadas v. S.T.A.T. (1962 KLT 505 (FB)). Every court is deemed to possess such inherent power, in the absence of any provision either prohibiting or providing for the exercise of such power, in respect of any matter as is really essential for its effective and smooth functioning in accordance with law. Such power is inherent in its very constitution. This power, naturally, has to be exercised sparingly and with due care and caution and only in appropriate cases either to give effect to orders of court or to prevent abuse of process of court or to secure the ends of justice; it has to be exercised judiciously and not arbitrarily or capriciously. The exercise must be based on sound general principles and not in conflict with them or with the intention of the legislature as indicated in the statutory provisions. 23. It must necessarily follow that a divorced woman who secures an order for delivery of property as contemplated in S.3(1) (a) and 3 (2) (a) of the Act is entitled to approach the Magistrate's court to implement the order and secure to her possession of the property. The court, in the absence of an appropriate provision in S.3 (4) of the Act, has the duty and jurisdiction to effectuate and implement the order in exercise of its' inherent or implied or ancillary powers. Therefore, the omission pointed out in S.3 (4) is of no moment and does not lead to the conclusion that the Parliament intended to confer on the divorced wife the right only to secure maintenance for the Iddat period and not reasonable provision for the post - Iddat period. 24. Therefore, the omission pointed out in S.3 (4) is of no moment and does not lead to the conclusion that the Parliament intended to confer on the divorced wife the right only to secure maintenance for the Iddat period and not reasonable provision for the post - Iddat period. 24. Learned counsel for the revision petitioner placed strong reliance on S.4 of the Act to support the contention that the former husband has no liability to make any provision for the post - Iddat period. S.(4) reads thus: "4. Order for payment of maintenance (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this Act or in any other law for the time being in force, where a Magistrate is satisfied that a divorced woman has not re-married and is not able to maintain herself after the Iddat period, he may make an order directing such of her relatives as would be entitled to inherit her property on her death according to Muslim law to pay such reasonable and fair maintenance to her as he may determine fit and proper, having regard to the needs of the divorced woman, the standard of life enjoyed by her during her marriage and the means of such relatives and such maintenance shall be payable by such relatives in the proportions in which they would inherit her property and at such periods as he may specify in his order: Provided that where such divorced woman has children, the Magistrate shall order only such children to pay maintenance to her, and in the event of any such children being unable to pay such maintenance, the Magistrate shall order the parents of such divorced women to pay maintenance to her. Provided further that if any of the parents is unable to pay his or her share of the maintenance ordered by the Magistrate on the ground of his or her not having the means to pay the same, the Magistrate may, on proof of such liability being furnished to him, order that the share of such relatives in the maintenance ordered by him be paid by such of the other relatives as may appear to the Magistrate to have the means of paying the same in such proportions as the Magistrate may think fit to order. (2) Where a divorced woman is unable to maintain herself and she has no relatives as mentioned in sub-section (1) or such relatives or any one of them have not enough means to pay the maintenance ordered by the Magistrate or the other relatives have not the means to pay the shares of those relatives whose shares have been ordered by the Magistrate to be paid by such other relatives under the proviso to sub-section (1) the Magistrate may, by order, direct the State Wakf Board established under S.9 of the Wakf Act, 1954 (Act 29 of 1954) or under any other law for the time being in force in a State, functioning in the area in which the woman resides, to pay such maintenance as determined by him under sub-section (1) or, as the case may be, to pay the shares of such of the relatives who are unable to pay, at such periods as he may specify in his order." 25. S.4 of the Act is an enabling provision. If the divorced wife has not re-married and is unable to maintain herself after the Iddat period, the Magistrate may direct her relatives as would be her heirs on her death to pay such reasonable and fair maintenance to her as he may deem fit. It shall be payable by such relatives in the proportion in which they would inherit her property. There is a special provision regarding the exclusive liability of the children and in their absence or inability to pay, on the parents. The ultimate liability is cast on the State Wakf Board. S.4 does not contemplate order being passed directing the former husband to pay maintenance for the post-Iddat period. S.4 has to be read along with S.3, for, both sections form part of the legislative scheme enacted to protect the rights and interests of the divorced muslim women. Under S.3, former husband is liable for the payment of maintenance for the Iddat period and to make reasonable and fair provision for the post-Iddat period. Quantification has to be made, under sub-section 3 (b) of S.3. having regard to the needs of the divorced woman, standard of living enjoyed by her during her marriage and the means of her former husband. Former husband may die; his means may be slender and the reasonable and fair provision made for the future may not be adequate. Quantification has to be made, under sub-section 3 (b) of S.3. having regard to the needs of the divorced woman, standard of living enjoyed by her during her marriage and the means of her former husband. Former husband may die; his means may be slender and the reasonable and fair provision made for the future may not be adequate. The provision might not for some reason or the other, be enforced. In all these contingencies, (the narrative is not exhaustive but only illustrative) the constitutional directive in the directive principles of state policy (specifically Art.38.39) would require measures to avoid destitution of the woman. Parliament has devised a strategy for providing additional safeguards to protect the interests of the divorced woman. If in spite of reasonable and fair provision made for the post-Iddat period, she faces destitution, S.4 comes to her rescue. We do not agree that the scheme of S.4 casting on relatives of the divorced woman liability for,maintenance should lead to a narrow and technical interpretation of S.3. 26. Learned counsel for the contesting parties seek support for their contentions on the relevant parts of the Holy Koran. Learned counsel have invited our attention to various editions and translations of the Holy Koran. We propose to refer only to the most authoritative texts: The Holy Koran Translation by Abdullah Yusuf Ali at page 96: Ayat No. 241 For divorced women Maintenance (should be provided) On a reasonable (scale) This is a duty on the righteous. Ayat No. 242 Thus doth God Make clear His Signs To you : in order that Ye may understand The Quran by Md. Zafrullah Khan (page 38) For divorced women also there shall be provision according to what is fair. This is an obligation binding on the righteous. Thus does Allah make His Commandments clear to you that you may understand. (emphasis supplied) The meaning of Quran (Vol. I) published by Board of Islamic Publications, Delhi Ayat 240-241 Those of you, who shall die and leave wives behind them, should make a will to the effect that they should be provided with a year's maintenance and should not be turned out of their homes. But if they leave their homes of their own accord, you shall not be answerable for whatever they choose for themselves in a fair way; Allah is All-Powerful, All-wise. But if they leave their homes of their own accord, you shall not be answerable for whatever they choose for themselves in a fair way; Allah is All-Powerful, All-wise. Like-wise, the divorced women should also be given something in accordance with the known fair standard. This is an obligation upon the God-fearing people Ayat 242 Thus Allah makes clear His Commandments for you: It is expected that you will use your commonsense. Running commentary of the Holy Quran (1964 Edn.) by Dr. Allanadh Khadim Rahmani Nuri Ayat 241 And for the divorced woman (also) a provision (should be made) with fairness (in addition to her dower); (This is) a duty (incumbent)on the reverent. (emphasis supplied) Holy Quran Translated by Mohammed Ali Ayat 241 And for the divorced woman, provision (must be made) in kindness. This is incumbent on those who have regard for duty. (emphasis supplied) 27. Almost all the Translations are unanimous in regard to the content and meaning of Ayat 241, namely, that a fair or reasonable provision should be made for the divorced woman. S.3 of the Act has incorporated therein the expression "reasonable provision", as distinguished from the expression "maintenance", evidently moving away from the observation of the Supreme Court in Shah Bano's case that distinction between the two expressions is without difference. The Parliament also appears to have accepted the traditional view that right to maintenance ceases after the expiration of Iddat after talaq. Parliament dissociated itself from the view expressed by the Supreme Court in Shah Bano's case that "provision" and "maintenance" mean the same thing and, therefore, divorced woman is entitled, according to the personal law, to maintenance even after expiration of Iddat period; Parliament intended to make it clear that the divorced woman is entitled to maintenance only for the Iddat period but is entitled to a distinct and reasonable provision for the post - Iddat period. This is the only reasonable construction to be placed on S.3 of the Act on a consideration of the plain tenor of the provisions of the Act, the mischief sought to be avoided, the object sought to be achieved, the Shah Bano's case and its aftermath. 28. We, therefore, hold that S.3 of the Act will not relieve the former husband of all his responsibilities for the post - Iddat period. 28. We, therefore, hold that S.3 of the Act will not relieve the former husband of all his responsibilities for the post - Iddat period. He has to make a reasonable and fair provision for the divorced wife for the post - Iddat period. 29. If the revision petitioner is to be permitted to raise this new plea at this belated stage (he did not raise this plea before the learned Magistrate) the case will have to go back for further pleadings and further evidence to work out the rights of the divorced wife under S.3 of the Act. Revision petitioner has been negligent in not raising the plea at the appropriate stage. In these, circumstances, we do not permit him to raise the plea at this belated stage. 30. In the result, we find no ground to interfere and dismiss the revision petition.