JUDGMENT - S.W. PURANIK, J.:---The petitioners are the original plaintiffs in Regular Civil Suit No. 683/86 filed by them against the respondent sole-Amravati University. The said civil suit was filed by the petitioners for a declaration that the award passed by Land Acquisition Officer on 19-9-1986 was not communicated to the petitioners within two years of the coming into force of the amended section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act and hence the entire acquisition proceedings and the award had lapsed. 2. In the said suit, the petitioners also claimed the interim relief of injunction against the Amravati University restraining it from disturbing the possession of the plaintiffs over the suit land pending disposal of the suit. 3. In the trial Court, the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, granted ad interim injunction against the University. 4. The original defendant, Amravati University therefore, preferred Misc. Civil Appeal No. 124/86 before the District Judge, Amravati. The said appeal after hearing both the parties was allowed and the temporary injunction issued by the trial Judge was vacated and the application for temporary injunction itself was dismissed. This order was passed on 13-9-1988 and it is this order which is impugned by the original plaintiffs in this Civil Revision. 5. Certain lands situated at Mouja Wadali, Pragna Badhera, Tahsil and District Amravati belonging to the applicants were under acquisition. The admitted facts are as under : On 5-12-1984, section Notification was issued along with urgency clause, On 28-2-1984, section 6 Notification was issued. On 8-7-1985, the challenge to section 6 Notification was rejected by the High Court. 20-4-1988, the Supreme Court also dismissed the petitioners Special Leave Petition. In the mean time, on 24-9-1984, section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act came into force. On 19-9-1986, the Award was passed by the Land Acquisition Officer. On 24-9-1986, notices of the Award were issued to the petitioners. On 12-10-1986, possession of the acquired land was handed over to the University-respondent. On 9-10-1986, the plaintiffs filed the suit challenging the validity of the Award as stated in the opening paragraphs. On 30-10-1986, temporary injunction was granted by the trial Court. On 13-9-1988, respondents appeal was allowed by Additional District Judge and injunction was vacated. 6. On 12-10-1986, possession of the acquired land was handed over to the University-respondent. On 9-10-1986, the plaintiffs filed the suit challenging the validity of the Award as stated in the opening paragraphs. On 30-10-1986, temporary injunction was granted by the trial Court. On 13-9-1988, respondents appeal was allowed by Additional District Judge and injunction was vacated. 6. Shri R.S. Padhye, Advocate appearing for the applicants mainly based his pleadings on the rulings and interpretation of sections 11, 11-A, 12 and 18 of the Land Acquisition Act and contended that the Supreme Court by its decision reported in (Harish Chandra v. Dy. Land Acquisition Officer)1, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1500 and (State of Punjab v. Qaisar Jehan Begum)2, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1604 have interpreted consistently the provisions of section 18(2)(b) of the Land Acquisition Act and have held that : "A literal and mechanical construction of the words "six months from the date of the Collector's award", occurring in the second part of Clause (b) of the proviso would not be appropriate and the knowledge of the party affected by award, either actual or constructive, being an essential requirement of fair-play and natural justice, the expression used in the proviso must mean the date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known by him either actually or constructively." 7. Mr. Padhye, therefore, submitted that the award even if signed and made on a particular date can only be deemed to have been made on the date it is brought to the notice of the party aggrieved. Consequently, he urged that in the instant case, under the provisions of section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act, the award ought to have been made within 2 years from 24-9-1984, the date on which section 11-A came into force. But the Award passed by Land Acquisition Officer on 19-9-1986 was never communicated to the petitioners within two years from 24-9-1984 and hence was not made within two years as required by section 11-A. In pursuance of section 11-A, therefore, the entire acquisition proceedings have lapsed and the respondents are not entitled to take possession or act under the said acquisition. 8. On the other hand, Mr. 8. On the other hand, Mr. V.R. Manohar, appearing for the respondent University contended that the rulings of the Supreme Court in A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1500 and A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1604 (supra) relied upon by the petitioners are not applicable to the present case. Firstly because, the rulings were declared much prior to section 11-A came on the Statute and secondly because in the said rulings liberal interpreation is done of section 18(2) of the Land Acquisition Act so as to give adequate time to the aggrieved party for making a reference for enhanced compensation under section 18. He urged that section 11-A has no connection with section 18. He also urged that according to the records, the possession of the lands in question has already been taken over by the University on 2-10-1986. 9. It is in the light of these submissions that the interpretation of section 11- A falls for consideration in the Civil Revision Application and whether "shall make an award" as mentioned in section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act has to be construed in the like manner as in section 18, that is to say, to sign and to communicate the contents of the "Award" to the party affected. 10. The word used in section 11-A are "shall make an award........ within a period of two years..". In section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act sub-clause 501-A the word used are : "If the person making it was present or represented before the Collector at the time when he made his award or the amendment within six weeks from the date of the Collector's award or the amendment." Sub-clause (b) of the said sub-clause (2) reads; "In other cases, within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under section 12, sub-section (2) or within six months from the date of the Collector's award of the amendment whichever period shall first expire." 11. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid rulings were dealing with proviso (b) of sub-clause (2) of section 18. They have liberally construed the said section to hold that the Award for the purpose of this section is deemed to have been made from the date of the knowledge of the aggrieved party. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid rulings were dealing with proviso (b) of sub-clause (2) of section 18. They have liberally construed the said section to hold that the Award for the purpose of this section is deemed to have been made from the date of the knowledge of the aggrieved party. This was so liberally construed by the Supreme Court on the footing that an Award of compensation is an offer on behalf of the State to the land owner and since section 18 gives a right to the aggrieved land owner for making a reference for enhanced compensation then the limitation must be computed from the date the said award or offer is communicated to the party. As rightly pointed out by the Counsel for the respondent at the time the Supreme Court ruling were delivered in 1961 and 1963, section 11-A had not appeared on the Statute, Book. It was inserted by Act 68 of 1984 and come into force on 24-9-1984. Under the proviso to section 11-A, if a declaration as already been made and published prior to the commencement of the Amendment Act, 1984, then the Award shall be made within a period of 2 years from such commencement. In the instant case, therefore, the Award should have been passed on or before 23-9-1986. The award has in fact been signed by the Land Acquisition Officer on 19-9-1986 i.e. within a period of 2 years. But admittedly, the notice of the said Award was not received by the petitioner within the period of two years. It is on this factual circumstance that the petitioners contend that the acquisition proceedings have lapsed under section 11-A, the Award not having been made within 2 years from the coming into force of the amendment and the basis of this submission is that the Award is deemed to be made on the date of its communication as interpreted by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid rulings. 12. I am afraid, the said ruling would not be available for purposes of interpretation of section 11-A, because the Supreme Court while interpreting section 18 were concerned with the computation of limitation of the aggrieved party to make reference to Civil Court. 12. I am afraid, the said ruling would not be available for purposes of interpretation of section 11-A, because the Supreme Court while interpreting section 18 were concerned with the computation of limitation of the aggrieved party to make reference to Civil Court. This is so done on the ground that the aggrieved party must have adequate knowledge of the Award by which he is aggrieved so as to enable him to prefer reference. Under Clause (a) of the proviso to sub-clause (2) of section 18, where the party is present at the time when the Award is made the limitation is only 6 weeks. But under Clause (b) in all others cases. The limitation is only 6 weeks from the date of receipt of notice from the Collector or within 6 months from the date of Collector's award. It is in the light of these circumstance that the Supreme Court held that communication to the party of the award passed is a must before computation of the limitation begins. Such is not the case in respect of section 11-A. Under section 11-A, the land owner is not the aggrieved party in the event the award is not signed and made within the period of two years, but is in fact the party which succeeds, because under that section the acquisition proceedings automatically lapse after 2 years. Thus, it is the right of the acquiring body which lapses, and therefore, the liberal interpretation placed by the Supreme Court on section 18(2)(b) cannot be brought into use by the land owner for any purpose under section 11- A of the Land Acquisition Act. 13. Further, one finds the phrase "made his award" in sub-clause (a) of the proviso to section 18(2). It clearly stated that if the person making it was present or represented before the Collector at the time when he made his Award or the amendment within 6 months from the date of Collector's Award or the amendment. Thus, even the legislature construes "making of the award" as the date on which the Collector signs the award. The same construction will have to be placed on section 11-A for the phrase "the Collector shall make an Award.....". Thus, even the legislature construes "making of the award" as the date on which the Collector signs the award. The same construction will have to be placed on section 11-A for the phrase "the Collector shall make an Award.....". By making such an Award, that is to say, by putting his signature and seal to the award, the Collector passes a valid Award if it is so made within 2 years from the date of publication of the declaration or within 2 years of the commencement of the amended section 11-A in the event the declaration was made prior to the amendment. Failure to make Award in either case, results in the lapsing of the entire proceeding for acquisition of the land. In other words, it is the right of the acquiring authority which lapses if the Collector fails to sign and seal his award within 2 years as stated in that section. The land owner cannot in any event take advantage of late communication of such award, because for purpose of section 18, the computation may run from the date of communication, but for purpose of automatic lapse of acquisition proceedings he is not a party who is aggrieved thereby. 14. Even a look at section 12 of the Land Acquisition Act which says that an award made by the Collector shall be filed in the Collector's office and be final and conclusive evidence as between the Collector and the persons interested, whether they have respectively appeared before the Collector or not, and the true area and value of the land and the apportionment of the compensation amongst the persons interested. Thus, looking at it from any angle, it must be construed that the Award is made under section 11-A when the same is duly signed and sealed by the Collector and the 2 years period has to be computed accordingly. 15. It is these circumstances, I find that the contentions raised by the applicant is not tenable. 16. This was the only point urged on behalf of the applicants. In so far as the possession is concerned, there is prima facie material to show that possession was handed over on 2-10-1986 to the University, but certain agricultural implements and articles were left behind by the applicants who were given time to remove the same. 17. 16. This was the only point urged on behalf of the applicants. In so far as the possession is concerned, there is prima facie material to show that possession was handed over on 2-10-1986 to the University, but certain agricultural implements and articles were left behind by the applicants who were given time to remove the same. 17. The learned Counsel for the respondent has brought to my notice latest ruling of the Supreme Court in Special Leave Petition No. 9096 of 1988 decided on 28-10-1988 (Kallayappan v. State of Kerala others), 1988 IV S.V.L.R. (C) 92. The view I have taken is fully supported by the said ruling in respect of the interpretation of section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act. 18. In the result. therefore, the revision without substance and the same is dismissed. No order as to costs. Status quo to continue upto 15-12-1988. Revision dismissed. -----