R. C. PATNAIK, J. ( 1 ) THESE two appeals which arise out of judgments passed in appeals heard analogously were also heard analogously and are being disposed of by a common judgment. ( 2 ) THERE stood a house over half a decimal of land recorded in Sikimi Khata. The owner of the land was Sri Radha Raman Jew and its marfatdar was Radha Prasanna Das. Ananta Mohan Das and others were Sikimi tenants. In the year 1961, one Srinibas Nande, predecessor-in-interest of respondents 2 to 9, purchased the house from the sons of one Krushna Chandra Das, one of the Sikimi tenants, under Ext. 7 dated 6-10-61. Rent was accepted from Srinibas and he was recognised as a tenant by the landlord. Kanneilal, respondent 1, in the appeals was inducted as a lessee by Srinibas. He ran a shop there under the trade name Messrs Durga Store. It is alleged that Kanneilal inducted Sankarlal as a partner and both of them ran the business in the premises in question. In the year 1970, Srinibas Nanda filed SCC 16 of 1971 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Balasore against Kanneilal and Sankarlal for realisation of Rs. 420/- towards arrears of house rent. The suit was decreed against Kanheilal. O. S. No. 14 of 1974 was filed by Srinibas Nanda against Kanheilal for realisation of house rent for a subsequent period. Kanheilal took the plea that since 1973 the partnership had been dissolved and Sankarlal (appellant) alone was in possession of the house. Kanheilal filed O. S. No. 5 of 1972 (renumbered as O. S. No. 80 of 1976) for a declaration that the partnership between him and Sankarlal had come to an end and the appellant was the sole proprietor of the business run in the premises. Therefore, he was liable for rent and the amount of Rs. 420/- which he paid pursuant to the decree passed against him in S. C. C. 16 of 1971 was to be reimbursed by the appellant. He also made a prayer for realisation of Rs. 2030/- as rent from the appellant. ( 3 ) THE plea of the appellant in both the cases was that he entered into an agreement with Sri Radha Prasanna Das on 1-12-67 and later on he purchased the house and acquired valid title. He also made a prayer for realisation of Rs. 2030/- as rent from the appellant. ( 3 ) THE plea of the appellant in both the cases was that he entered into an agreement with Sri Radha Prasanna Das on 1-12-67 and later on he purchased the house and acquired valid title. He further pleaded that in view of the decision in S. C. C. 16 of 1971 holding Kanheilal alone liable, the claim of Kanheilal for realisation of Rs. 420/- was hit by the principle of res judicata. O. S. No. 5 of 1973 filed by Kanheilal was dismissed and he preferred Sub-Judge Appeal No. 13 of 1974. O. S. No. 14 of 1974 filed by the Nandas was also dismissed and Sub-Judge Appeal No. 4 of 1975 was filed. By judgment dt. 23-12-75, the learned District Judge remanded the appeals granting opportunity to the parties to amend the pleadings. It was held that the liability of Sankarlal to reimburse Kanheilal in the sum of Rs. 420/- could not be reagitated after the remand. It is worthwhile to notice that in O. S. No. 14 of 1974 filed by the Nandas, the appellant Sankarlal had not been impleaded, Pursuant to the direction in the order of remand, the Nandas impleaded the appellant as defendant 2. That was by order dt. 10-5-76. Kanheilal amended the relief in O. S. No. 6 of 1973 (renumbered as O. S. No. 80/76) and sought a declaration that the Nandas were not entitled to recover any money. The appellant took the plea that by virtue of his purchase by registered sale deed on 21-10-70, he was not liable to pay rent either to Kanheilal or to the Nandas. His plea on the basis of title was negatived. The Nandas were held to be Sikimi tenants. The appellant was held liable to reimburse Kanheilal in the sum of Rs. 420/- and decree for Rs. 4900/- towards damages for use and occupation of the house was passed against him, The appellant carried appeals. The appeals having been dismissed, the appellant preferred these two second appeals. ( 4 ) TWO questions were mainly urged by the learned counsel for the appellants. Firstly, Kanheilal was not entitled to a decree for reimbursement in the sum of Rs. 420/-, S. 70 of the Contract Act on the facts and in the circumstances not being applicable. The appeals having been dismissed, the appellant preferred these two second appeals. ( 4 ) TWO questions were mainly urged by the learned counsel for the appellants. Firstly, Kanheilal was not entitled to a decree for reimbursement in the sum of Rs. 420/-, S. 70 of the Contract Act on the facts and in the circumstances not being applicable. Secondly, the appellant having been impleaded as defendant 2 by order dt. 7-10-76, the suit should have been deemed to have been instituted against him on that date. Hence the decree for a part of the period, claim relating to which was barred by limitation was unsustainable. ( 5 ) HAVING heard the counsel for the parties, I am satisfied that both the contentions have substance and are to be sustained. ( 6 ) IT was claimed by Kanheilal that he was entitled to reimbursement in the sum of Rs. 420/- which he paid to the Nandas by way of satisfaction of the decree obtained by them in S. C. C. 16 of 1971 from Sankarlal inasmuch as Sankarlal was in exclusive occupation and enjoyment of the premises wherein he was running his business upon dissolution of the partnership and was, therefore, liable for the rent. S. 70 of the Contract Act reads as under : "where a person lawfully does anything for another person, or delivers anything to him, not intending to do so gratuitously, and such other person enjoys the benefit thereof, the latter is bound to make compensation to the former in respect of, or to restore, the thing so done or delivered. " the section fell for consideration in State of West Bengal v. B. K. Mondal and Sons, AIR 1962 SC 779 and their Lordships observed :"between the person claiming compensation and person against whom it is claimed some lawful relationship must subsist, for that is the implication of the use of the word 'lawfully' in S. 70; but the said lawful relationship arises not because the party claiming compensation has done something for the party against whom the compensation is claimed but because what has been done by the former has been accepted and enjoyed by the latter. It is only when the latter accepts and enjoys what is done by the former that a lawful relationship arises between the two and it is the existence of the said lawful relationship which gives rise to the claim for compensation. . . . . It is thus clear that when a thing is delivered or done by one person it must be open to the other person to reject it. Therefore, the acceptance and enjoyment of the thing delivered or done which is the basis for the claim for compensation under S. 70 must be voluntary. . . . . "can it be said in the facts and circumstances that the thing that was done by Kanheilal was done for the enjoyment of Sankarlal ? Was it open to Sankarlal to reject the thing that was done ? ( 7 ) THE Nandas filed the suit against Kanheilal and Sankarlal. The suit was decreed against Kanheilal in the sum of Rs. 420/- and was dismissed, against Sankarlal. Since the decree, had been passed against Kanheilal, he satisfied the same. Since the suit had been dismissed against Sankarkal, he was under no obligation to satisfy the same assuming he was in occupation and enjoyment of the premises. There was no occasion for him to reject the thing done because he did not come in the picture at all. There was no scope for his refusal. Therefore, in my opinion, S. 70 of the Contract Act was not attracted at all. The lower appellate Court did not advert to this aspect of the case because at an earlier stage before remand the appellate Court had concluded this aspect holding that liability of Sankarlal would not be reagistated after the remand. That of course did bind the appellate authority when later on appeals were filed against the judgments of the trial Court. The said holding of the lower appellate Court was prior to the remand. It was not open to assail the holding. I, therefore, hold that the Courts below erred in holding that Sankarlal was liable to pay compensation to Kanheilal or to reimburse him in the sum of Rs. 420/- which he paid towards satisfaction of the decree passed in S. C. C. 16 of 1971. It was not open to assail the holding. I, therefore, hold that the Courts below erred in holding that Sankarlal was liable to pay compensation to Kanheilal or to reimburse him in the sum of Rs. 420/- which he paid towards satisfaction of the decree passed in S. C. C. 16 of 1971. There is another aspect of this question Sankarlal had pleaded res judicata, the suit having been dismissed as against him but decreed against Kanheilal, he could not more be held to be liable and his liability towards rent for the period could not be reagistated. Since he had no liability and Kanheilal by making the payment could pot render him liable indirectly and seek compensation by way of reimbursement, I therefore, dismiss O. S. No. 5 of 1973 (renumbered as O. S. No. 80/76) filed by Kanheilal and allow S. A. No. 335 of 1981. ( 8 ) THE second contention urged by the counsel for the appellant was that defendant 2 having been impleaded as a party by order dt. 10-5-76, the suit should be deemed to have been instituted against him on that date and by reason of S. 21 of the Limitation Act, claim for rent for the period which was barred by limitation with reference to date of his impletion could not have been granted. Reference be made to S. 21 of the Limitation Act. It reads as under :"21. Effect of substituting or adding new plaintiff or defendant.- (1) Where after the institution of a suit, a new plaintiff or defendant is substituted or added, the suit shall as regards him, be deemed to have been instituted when he was so made a party : provided that where the Court is satisfied that the omission to include a new plaintiff or defendant was due to a mistake made in good faith, it may direct that the suit as regards such plaintiff or defendant shall be deemed to have been instituted on any earlier date. " ( 9 ) NO doubt, rules of procedure are not framed to punish parties or defeat justice, But distinction has to be drawn between correction of a misdescription and addition of parties. " ( 9 ) NO doubt, rules of procedure are not framed to punish parties or defeat justice, But distinction has to be drawn between correction of a misdescription and addition of parties. Where a party is truly and really on record but there is some error in the description and the Court is able to discover the person or persons intended to sue or to be sued, it is always open to the Court to allow correction of misdescription to allow to designate the party correctly. In Municipal Commr. , Dacca v. Gangamani Chaudhurani, AIR 1940 Cal 153, the suit was instituted for a declaration that the assessment made by the Municipal Commissioner was ultra vires. The suit was instituted against the Chairman of the Municipal Commissioners instead of the Commissioners themselves as required by S. 15 of the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932. The relief sought was against the corporation. Therefore, it was held that an amendment impleading the Commissioners themselves could not be held to be impleading a new party within the meaning of S. 21 of the Limitation Act. It was held to be a case of mere misdescription which could be corrected under O. 1, R. 10 of the Civil P. C. The amendment, therefore, related back to the date of the suit as originally filed and the time could not be reckoned as from the date of the amendment. In Mura Mohideen v. V. O. A. Mohomed, AIR 1955 Mad 294 , it was observed by Rajagopal Ayyanagar, J. : " If however imperfectly and incorrectly a party is designated in plaint the correction of the error is not the addition or substitution of a party but merely clarifies and makes apparent what was previously shrouded in obscurity by reason of the error or mistake. " in Rurapati Venkata Mallayya v. Thondepu Ramaswami and Co. , AIR 1964 SC 818 , the receiver filed a suit without mentioning the name of the firm for which he was appointed. When the error was sought to be corrected, the question that arose was if it was a case of mere misdescription or addition or substitution of party. " in Rurapati Venkata Mallayya v. Thondepu Ramaswami and Co. , AIR 1964 SC 818 , the receiver filed a suit without mentioning the name of the firm for which he was appointed. When the error was sought to be corrected, the question that arose was if it was a case of mere misdescription or addition or substitution of party. The Supreme Court observed that though the receiver ought to have shown in the cause title that it was the firm which was the real plaintiff and it was suing through him, it was merely a case of misdescription and the plaint could be amended at any time for the purpose of showing the correct description of the plaintiff. Where it is a case of misdescription, the amendment would not raise any question of limitation. Therefore, the principle that could be gleaned from the aforesaid is that substance has got to be looked into but not the form in which the pleadings are couched or the parties are shown in the cause title. Where the intention is clear but there is a misdescription, it is always open to the Court to permit correction of misdescription. Mere correction of errors as regards description does not involve any addition or substitution of parties so as to attract the inhibition of Art. 21 of the Limitation Act, 1963. In Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board v. The Firm of M/s. Patel and Patel, AIR 1977 Andh Pra 172, a suit had been filed against the Chairman, Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board. The defendants raised a plea that the suit was not maintainable as the same was not filed against the Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board which was a corporate body under the Electricity Supplies Act, 1948. An application for amendment was filed to bring on record the Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board. It was held that on a reading of the pleadings, it was clear that it was the Board which was intended to be sued and the amendment was for a correction of misdescription, and did not amount to substitution or addition of new party. ( 10 ) CAN it be said that the impletion of defendant 2 pursuant to the order of remand was correction of mere misdescription? Kanheilal alone had been sued as defendant. Kanheilal was not a misdescription of Sankarlal. ( 10 ) CAN it be said that the impletion of defendant 2 pursuant to the order of remand was correction of mere misdescription? Kanheilal alone had been sued as defendant. Kanheilal was not a misdescription of Sankarlal. From a reading of the pleadings it could not be gathered that the Nandas intended to sue Sankarlal. Addition of Sankarlal was considered necessary having regard to the facts. Therefore, impletion of Sankarlal was not correction of a mis-description. It cannot be said that Sankarlal was on record in some form or the other and there was a bona fide error in designating him. Therefore, to the facts and circumstances, proviso to sub-sec. (1) of S. 21 would have no application and impletion of defendant 2 on 10-5-76 would not relate back to the date of institution of the suit as originally filed. It, therefore, follows that the Nandas were entitled to a decree for the period realisation in respect of which was not barred by limitation. Inasmuch as defendant 2 was impleaded on 10-5-76, rent for the period prior to 10-5-73 would be barred by limitation. Calculated at the rate of Rs. 75/- per month, arrears till 31-1-77 comes to Rs. 3129/ -. They are entitled to a decree for the said amount. ( 11 ) IN the result, I allow Second Appeal No. 334 of 1981 in part and modify the decree granted by the Court below to the extent that in place of a decree against defendant Sankarlal for Rs. 4900/-, the plaintiffs shall have a decree for Rs. 3129/ -. The direction regarding interest is sustained. The parties shall have proportionate cost. Accordingly, Second Appeal No. 335 of 1981 is allowed and Second Appeal No. 334 of 1981 is allowed in part. Order accordingly. .