Judgment :- 1. The respondent was a Clerk attached to a tea factory. On 23-5-1984, a Food Inspector visited the factory and took sample from "tea dust" stored in the factory. Respondent received the price from the Food Inspector and issued a cash receipt. When one part of the sample was analysed by the Public Analyst, it was found to be adulterated as it did not conform to the standards prescribed, and the tea dust contained cashew nut endocarp besides structures of tea leaves. Respondent as well as the owner of the tea factory were prosecuted for the offence under S.16 (1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (for short 'the Act'). During trial, the owner of the tea factory died and hence prosecution continued against the respondent alone. One of the other parts of the sample was sent to the Director of Central Food Laboratory on the request of the respondent. The certificate issued by the said Director also shows that the sample contained structures of tea leaves and cashewnut endocarp, besides non-conformity with' the standards prescribed for tea. However, the trial Magistrate acquitted the respondent mainly on the ground that the tea dust was in unfinished stage in the factory when the food inspector took the sample therefrom. Food Inspector preferred this appeal against the said order of acquittal. 2. Learned Public Prosecutor contended that the respondent cannot escape from punishment as the tea dust was sold by him to the Food Inspector. According to the learned Public Prosecutor, it is immaterial that the tea dust was not in finished stage and it was the duty of the respondent to appraise the Food Inspector of the non-saleable condition of the food article. In the trial court, it was contended by the respondent that he had represented to the Food Inspector at the initial stage itself that finished product was not available for sale in the factory, but ignoring the aforesaid representation the Food Inspector took tea dust from one of the gunny bags kept in the working hall of the factory and that he received the price offered since the Food Inspector ordered him to do so. The owner of the factory was not present when the Food Inspector visited the factory. He also contended that the tea dust, after completing the process of manufacture, would be stored in "bonded room" of the factory. 3. The owner of the factory was not present when the Food Inspector visited the factory. He also contended that the tea dust, after completing the process of manufacture, would be stored in "bonded room" of the factory. 3. The respondent got himself examined as a defence witness (D. W. 4) and has deposed to the aforesaid facts. The respondent also examined the Inspector of Central Excise (having jurisdiction over this tea factory) as D.W.1 to prove that storage in the working hall was only in the course of the usual process of manufacture. He said that it was in unfinished stage that tea dust was stored in working hall and later removed to the grading room find finally removed to the bonded room. D.W.1 has further stated that tea dust in finished stage was kept in the bonded room of the factory. He agreed with the defence case that the factory concerned was constructed in accordance with Ext. D1 plan which shows the existence of a working hall, grading room and bonded room. Learned Magistrate accepted the defence evidence and found that the tea dust was taken by the Food Inspector from one of the gunny bags kept in the working hall and that the tea dust was then in unfinished stage. The said finding of fact is not challenged by the Public Prosecutor. The said finding is based on evidence in this case and there is no reason to disturb the said finding. 4. Learned counsel for the respondent advanced two contentions to meet the arguments of the Public Prosecutor. The first is that delivery of article and receipt of its price by a servant or salesman or agent of the owner would only amount to sale made by the owner himself and not a sale by the servant or agent etc. When the servant or salesman or agent receives price and issues cash voucher, he acts on behalf of the owner and hence the sale is one made by the owner himself, contended the counsel. The second contention is that the unfinished commodity is not a food article, at any rate its storage is not for sale and hence taking sample from such stock will not bring it within the penal provision, even if it is found to be adulterated on analysis. 5. The second contention is that the unfinished commodity is not a food article, at any rate its storage is not for sale and hence taking sample from such stock will not bring it within the penal provision, even if it is found to be adulterated on analysis. 5. In support of the first contention, learned counsel invited my attention to the following words used in S.16(1) (a) of the Act: " if any person whether by himself or by any other person on his behalf, imports into India or manufactures for sale, or stores, sells or distributes any article of food". Identical expression is found in S.7 of the Act which imposes prohibition against sale of adulterated food article. According to Sri. Rama Shenoy, S.16(1) of the Act casts criminal liability only on the person who "sells or manufactures for sale etc., either by himself or by any other person", since the seller is the one who has the right to pass the property in the goods (food article) to the buyer. Learned counsel has adopted the reasoning that if the legislature intended, the agent or servant also to be clawed in, the provision would have contained additional words such as "...or on behalf of another person". The absence of such words is clear indication that the law makers never wanted the servant or agent to suffer punishment for merely acting on behalf of the owner of the food article, argued by the learned counsel. 6. The aforesaid argument had once impressed a Division Bench of this Court in State v. Kunchu (1959 K.L.T. 574). It was held by the Division Bench in the said case that "obviously the phrase by any person on his behalf occurring in both S.7 and 16(1) cannot apply to the servant". Their Lordships, in coming to the said conclusion has relied on the ratio laid down by a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in In re S. Moses (AIR 1959 Madras 185). It has been brought to my notice that Falshaw, C.J., of the Punjab High Court has followed the reasoning of the Division Bench in Kunchu's case. (Vide Bhagwandass v. State, AIR 1962 Punjab 419). 7. Much effort is not now necessary to repel the contention of Sri. Rama Shenoy because the Supreme Court has since specifically overruled the dictum in In re S. Moses' case (AIR 1959 Madras 185). (Vide Bhagwandass v. State, AIR 1962 Punjab 419). 7. Much effort is not now necessary to repel the contention of Sri. Rama Shenoy because the Supreme Court has since specifically overruled the dictum in In re S. Moses' case (AIR 1959 Madras 185). Shah, J. (as he then was) who delivered the judgment in Sarjoo Prasad v. State of U.P. (AIR 1961 S.C. 631) has observed as follows: "Every person, be he an employer or an agent is prohibited from selling adulterated food and infringement of the prohibition is by S.16 penalised Prohibition of sale of adulterated food is evidently imposed in the larger interest of maintenance of public health. If the owner of a shop in which adulterated food is sold is without proof of mens rea liable to be punished for sale of adulterated food, there is no reason why an agent or a servant of the owner is not liable to be punished for contravention of the same provision unless he is shown to have guilty knowledge". There is no change in the law so declared by the Supreme Court till this day and the Supreme Court has reiterated the principle in a later case also. (Vide Ibrahim Haji Moideen v. Food inspector, 1969 K.L.T. 628). So, the decision in Kunchus' case (1959 K. L. T. 574) is not good law in view of the Supreme Court decision cited supra. Thus, the first point canvassed by the -learned counsel for the respondent has to be repelled and I do so. 8. For considering the next point, the Tactual position as found by the trial court cannot be overlooked. The Food Inspector has taken the sample from unfinished tea dust stored in the working hall. If that be the position, tea dust has not been manufactured at the stage when it was kept in the working hall. Manufacture of a product may involve various steps and the original commodity may have to pass through multiple stages. Such steps may include devices to remove impurities to the fullest extent possible. It is true that the definition of the word "manufacture" as contained in S.2(viiib) of the Act includes "any process incidental or ancillary to the manufacture of an article of food." The processes contemplated in the definition are only the post manufacture steps and not those which come in the intermediary stages before reaching completion of manufacture. It is true that the definition of the word "manufacture" as contained in S.2(viiib) of the Act includes "any process incidental or ancillary to the manufacture of an article of food." The processes contemplated in the definition are only the post manufacture steps and not those which come in the intermediary stages before reaching completion of manufacture. In this case, as the tea dust was found stored in the working hall it has yet to pass through certain other stages also and hence the manufacturing process would have reached only halfway through. So, the tea dust taken sample from cannot be regarded as. tea dust manufactured in the factory. Nor could it be held that the tea dust was stored by the accused for sale. Tea dust would be ready for sale or distribution only when it reaches the bonded room. It is now well neigh settled that if storage of any food article is not for sale, mere storage is not punishable under the Act. (Vide Delhi Municipality v. L.N. Tandon, AIR. 1976 S.C. 621 and Food Inspector, Calicut v. Padamshi,1968 KLT. 458). It is immaterial that the accused accepted price from the Food Inspector. If the price offered by a Food Inspector is refused, he could entertain the fear (rightly or wrongly) that he would be exposed to prosecution for that conduct. So acceptance of price of the article from a Food Inspector is not the only criterion to determine whether a completed sale has taken place. A single judge of Delhi High Court (Ansari, J.) has considered the effect of taking sample from unfinished stage of manufacturing process for which the person concerned receives price of the article. In Din Dayal v. The State (1972 P.F.A. Cases 636), the learned judge has observed that "it would be unjust and unfair to convict a person for selling an adulterated article of food merely because the Food Inspectors in the exercise of their authority insist upon taking samples from an article of food which admittedly was not meant for sale for human consumption and the position is in no way different when the price offered by the Food Inspector is accepted by the person who is the owner of the article." The same learned judge had considered a similar position in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Nand Kishore (1972 P.F.A. Cases 561). The following observations can be usefully quoted. The following observations can be usefully quoted. "It is only when the process of manufacture is complete that it can be said that an article of food has been manufactured for sale. It may so happen that at the initial stage of the process of manufacturing, an article of food may contain impurities and may not conform to the prescribed standards for that food article. Can it be said that at that stage, a person has manufactured for sale an article of food which is adulterated and is, therefore, guilty of an offence under S.16 of the Act. In my view, the answer must be in the negative. Daring the further stages of manufacture the impurities may be removed. It is only when the process of manufacture is complete and the article of food is ready for sale and if at that stage, it is found to be adulterated, that a person can be said to have manufactured an adulterated article of food and has committed an offence under S.16 of the Act." I am in respectful agreement with the aforesaid observations of the learned single judge. I find no reason to interfere with the order of acquittal and hence the appeal is dismissed.